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MEMOIRS

Lauderdale OF THE History

MARQUIS of TORCY,

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

LEWIS XIV.

CONTAINING

The HISTORY of the NEGOTIATIONS

FROM THE

Treaty of RYSWIC to the Peace of UTRECHT.

TRANSLATED from the FRENCH.

VOL. I.

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LONDON:

'nted for P. VAILLANT, over-against *Southampton-Street* in the *Strand*.

M.DCC.LVII.

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THE ſecond part is taken up with the hiſtory of the conferences of Moerdyke, of Bodegrave, of the Hague, and of Gertrudenberg, to the year 1710. This is the moſt authentic account of thoſe negotiations that has yet appeared. Here he repreſents the ſeveral meaſures which M. Rouillé, the king's plenipotentiary, took to ſucceed in thoſe conferences. The advances that miniſter made only tended to create new pretenſions; and tho' it be natural for mankind to be puffed up with proſperous events, yet it muſt needs give ſurprize, eſpecially to thoſe who recollect the times which preceded or followed, to ſee with what haughtineſs two Dutch burgomaſters behaved towards a potent monarch, who ſome years before had been the terror of Europe, and particularly of the United Provinces. He finds great fault with the inſincerity of the Dutch, whoſe pretenſions increaſed in proportion to the conceſſions of the French, with which they had ſeemed to be ſatisfied.

BE that as it may, it is impoſſible to read this part of the negotiations, without admiring, and with humility adoring the unſearchable ways of the Divine Providence. Here we are furniſhed with excellent leſſons for guarding againſt elation in ſucceſs, or dejection in adverſity. Nothing can more naturally lead to theſe reflexions, than the ſtrong picture our author draws of the diſtreſſed ſituation of the French monarch; a ſituation which would draw pity even from his enemies, had

he not treated mankind with too much inhumanity himſelf in his proſperous days.

THE account our author gives of the debates in council, upon hearing of the inutility of the conferences, is really moving, and heightened in the ſtrongeſt colours. France being reduced to the loweſt ebb, the king is reſolved to make further ſacrifices, and Rouillé has orders to renew the conferences. His inſtructions are accordingly drawn up; but the marquiſs of Torcy is to execute them. Better acquainted than Rouillé with the king's intentions, he offers of his own accord to go to Holland, and to try to conclude a peace, or to penetrate into the ſecret deſigns of his enemies. In the courſe of theſe negotiations, the reader will meet with a great number of curious anecdotes. Here he will find the plan which the marquiſs formed, the manner in which he purſued it, an account of the conferences in a ſeries of letters to his maſter, the difficulties with which the Dutch obſtructed the peace, and the high demands of the allies; but particularly he will be ſtruck with the remarkable converſation between the marquiſs and the duke of Marlborough. It is impoſſible to help admiring the zeal, the ſincerity, the moderation, and at the ſame time the ſkill which M. de Torcy diſplayed in this negotiation, and the modeſty with which he talks of himſelf. He is not one of thoſe negotiators, who take a pleaſure in blackening thoſe with whom they treat. Even

when he complains of the Dutch deputies, for proudly rejecting the king's propoſals; he does juſtice to their perſonal diſintereſtedneſs. But nothing can be more beautiful than the character he draws of the grand penſionary Heinſius.

Most of theſe tranſactions are related in our author's letters to the king, in that prince's diſpatches to M. Rouillé and to his miniſter; and in his letter to the governors of the Provinces. Theſe are precious fragments, which will be always valued by poſterity, as original records of the abject condition of the once mighty Lewis, mourning over the misfortunes of his people, endeavouring even to ſacrifice his intereſts to their ſafety and eaſe; yet always ſteady and unſhaken.

The third part of this work contains the negotiations ſet on foot and carried on with England, during the year 1711, after the change of miniſtry, which brought a new ſet of men into play, who had an intereſt in concluding a peace. Here our author gives the beginning and the conſequences of the turn of fortune in favour of the French; the riſe and progreſs of the negotiation with England; the efforts of the two crowns towards a reconciliation; the obſtructions that retarded it; the means that were uſed to remove thoſe obſtructions, till England and France having agreed, their plenipotentiaries met at Utrecht, to treat of a general peace. On this occaſion he corrects the vulgar error of marſhal Tallard's having been the firſt to make overtures of

of peace; and he gives the honour to the abbé Gaultier, whoſe prudence, diligence and fidelity he highly commends. And indeed he frequently rectifies the miſtakes of modern hiſtorians, by which the public have been ſo groſsly miſled.

HE concludes with the hiſtory of the political operations which filled up the year 1712, and terminated at length in the treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Among other intereſting particulars, he gives a detail of the diſgrace of the duke of Marlborough; of whom indeed he does not draw an advantageous character, but charges him with projects of revenge which all the world will not believe. He draws a lively picture of the conſternation occaſioned by the loſs of ſo many princes of the royal family of France, which produced further obſtacles to the peace, that were at length removed by the project of mutual renunciations. In regard to the treaty of Utrecht itſelf, the reader will find that the chief matters relating to the congreſs were treated between Torcy and lord Bolingbroke at Paris. The whole account of this tranſaction is extremely intereſting, ſeveral of the facts being no where elſe to be found, and none of them to be had any where from ſo great authority.

THIS work may be ſaid to form a continuation to the memoirs of the counts of Eſtrades and Avaux, and a very valuable continuation, whether we conſider the importance of the ſubject, the manner of treating it, the perſpicuity,

cuity, the good ſenſe, and ſpirit of modeſty and moderation that prevails through the whole. It is not the labours of an obſcure compiler, loſt in a labyrinth of original pieces, which he patches together without judgment or choice, ſolicitous only to ſwell the ſize of his volume. Neither is it the performance of an hiſtorian unequal to the taſk he has undertaken, who derives his facts from ſettled prejudices, or endeavours to ſubject them to his capricious conjectures. It is the work of a witneſs, of undoubted credit; one of the principal actors in the field of political operations deſcribed by his elegant pen. He never attempts to attract the attention of his readers to himſelf; he does not reſemble thoſe unimportant authors of memoirs, who impoſe on the public by their titles and high employments, and further endeavour to dazzle them by the embelliſhment of facts, or ſuch partial repreſentations as can be no way reconciled to truth. He never mentions his name, unleſs it be eſſentially connected with facts; and then with ſuch indifference, that the reader is uneaſy, and would not fail to complain, if any other hiſtorian had not paid greater marks of regard to his merit.

It has been the chief endeavour of the tranſlator of theſe papers, to give a faithful copy of the original. Hence he has adhered to the very expreſſions of the author, perſuaded that no intelligent reader will make this an objection, when he reflects that theſe expreſſions come from the miniſter of a prince engaged in a bloody war

with Great-Britain. In this view, allowance will be made for his marks of diſlike to the act of ſettlement, and to king William, whom he ſeems to have mortally hated. Upon the whole, the tranſlator was unwilling to falſify the author, whoſe enmity to our happy eſtabliſhment is viſible throughout all his memoirs. But this is natural to a French miniſter of ſtate; *there being* (to make uſe of the words of another great man, whom he hated alſo) *in that court a root of enmity irreconcileable to this government and the religion of theſe kingdoms* (*).

(*) The duke of Marlborough's letter to queen Anne upon his diſmiſſion.

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THE public will undoubtedly receive pleaſure from theſe memoirs, drawn up by a perſon who was perfect maſter of his ſubject.

IT was no part of the author's deſign, to relate the operations of the reſpective armies. This we have ſupplied with a few ſhort notes, wherein we have only ſpecified the ſieges that were undertaken, the towns that ſurrendered, and the battles that were fought, in the different campaigns, from 1701 to 1712, without entering into any detail. The events of that unfortunate war are too deeply engraved in the memory of the French nation; but the ſecret ſprings of the repeated negotiations for a general peace, have been no where laid open, with ſuch a number of particulars, and with ſuch regard to truth, as in the following papers.

HERE the reader with pity and indignation will behold, on one ſide, the repeated offers, the ſacrifices, the humble ſubmiſſions, which one of our greateſt kings was induced to make, for the repoſe of his people; on the other, the unjuſt, the barbarous pretenſions of the enemies of France, jealous of the felicity and power of a monarch, who, not long before, had given laws to all Europe, which he had ſubdued by his liberality and perſonal greatneſs, as much as by the reputation and terror of his arms. But fate ordained, that this reign, for ever memorable for its ſucceſſes, ſhould be chequered by unproſperous ſtrokes of fortune. It ſeemed as if ſomething

thing would have been wanting to compleat the glory of Lewis XIV. if nations accuſtomed to admire the political abilities of that great prince, his ſublimity, his inexhauſted genius, his generoſity, his exalted views, his moderation in victory, and ſuch a cluſter of united virtues in his perſon, had not been alſo witneſſes to his firmneſs, to his conſtancy and reſignation under adverſe fortune.

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MEMOIRS

CONTAINING THE

HISTORY of the NEGOTIATIONS

FROM THE

Treaty of Ryſwic to the peace of Utrecht.

PART THE FIRST.

NEGOTIATIONS

For the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, from the treaty of Ryſwic to the firſt conferences for the peace.

IF the public acknowledgment be due to thoſe, who of late years have been employed in the drudgery of collecting the treaties, acts, and memorials, which towards the end of the laſt, and the beginning of the preſent century, have changed the face of Europe; our obligation to thoſe laborious compilers would be ſtill greater, had we found them more diligent in the ſearch, and more ſucceſsful in the diſcovery of the truth; or had they ſhewn themſelves free

from thoſe lies, which they have ſo often recourſe to, in order to form a thread of hiſtory between acts allowed to be genuine, and thoſe ſpurious pieces which they have foiſted into their works.

More eager to pleaſe the enemies of France, they have ſcattered the ſeeds of error not only among foreigners, but even among the natives of the kingdom; inſomuch that the greateſt part of thoſe who value themſelves upon politics and a ſuperior knowledge of the intereſt of princes, are perſwaded that the will of Charles II. king of Spain, that ſource of ſo long and bloody a war, was firſt contrived at Verſailles, accepted and executed at Madrid by means of the intrigues ſecretly entered into with cardinal Portocarrero, as well as with ſome other miniſters, who are ſuppoſed to have been bribed by the gold which the marquiſs d' Harcourt, created afterwards a peer and mareſchal of France, had ſcattered with ſo profuſe a hand during the courſe of his embaſſy.

Thoſe who love the truth, would be ſorry it lay buried in obſcurity; and tho' the proper juncture for bringing it to light may not yet be arrived, yet it is full time that thoſe who have been let into the ſecret, ſhould prepare and leave to their children ſuch memoirs or papers, as ſhall one day inform poſterity how ſuch a variety of ſtates happened to change their maſters; in what manner the confederacy of the principal

powers

powers of Europe againſt France came to be diſſolved; and by what a ſurpriſing intervention of providence protecting this crown, the deſigns of its enemies were defeated, at the very time when the proſperous ſucceſs of their arms had intoxicated them to ſuch a degree, as to refuſe the peace which Lewis XIV. begged hard for, even under the moſt onerous conditions.

THE treaties ſigned at Utrecht put an end to his misfortunes, and God was pleaſed to crown the chriſtian conſtancy of that prince, by continuing his great grandſon Philip V. on the throne of Spain, in ſpite of the efforts of a formidable alliance, and the amazing ſucceſs, with which the confederacy of ſo many powers had been conſtantly attended.

THE bare narration of the truth will ſhew the wonders of providence, and ſufficiently prove that God alone directed and ſupported the prince, whom from all eternity he had deſtined to the throne of Spain, without the aſſiſtance of human intrigues and negotiations, formed and conducted with the view of prevailing upon the catholic king to appoint his ſucceſſor.

CHARLES II. king of Spain, was of a weak habit of body, inclined to melancholy; his temper haſty and paſſionate, though with a mixture of timidity. The many ailments to which he had been ſubject from his cradle, had frequently alarmed his ſubjects. He could bear no application to buſineſs; ſo that the queen his mo-

ther, ſiſter to the emperor Leopold, and regent of the kingdom, made uſe of the pretence of taking ſpecial care of ſo valuable a life, to protract her authority. Hence the king her ſon was kept in profound ignorance, not only of public affairs, but even of the territories ſubject to his crown. For he ſcarce knew what towns belonged to him out of the kingdom of Spain.

By the policy of don John of Auſtria the queen was ſtripped of that power, of which ſhe had been ſo jealous; yet he purſued the ſame principle as that princeſs, by keeping the king his maſter in a ſtate of entire dependance.

The prime miniſters that ſucceeded don John followed his example: they took care to conceal from Charles the real ſtate of his kingdom. But he could not be ignorant of the loſſes he ſuſtained every year by the rapidity of the king's conqueſts, while Spain in alliance with the emperor, the empire, and Holland, waged war againſt France.

The king of Spain, tired with the continual repetition of bad news, was glad to embrace the peace of Nimeguen, how glorious ſoever to France; and, conſidering it as a pledge of the public tranquillity, he determined never to break it.

His marriage with the princeſs Mary Louiſa, daughter of the duke of Orleans, ſeemed to complete the treaties lately entered into. The new queen was not at all ambitious of governing.

She

She was ſtill living when Lewis XIV. was informed in 1685, a truce of twenty years having been ſigned the preceding year at Ratiſbon, that the Emperor demanded of the king of Spain the ſovereignty of the Low Countries, for the archdutcheſs his daughter, lately married to the elector of Bavaria. The king of France being convinced that if ſuch a ſettlement took place, it would be a violation of the truce, gave orders to the marquis of Feuquieres, his ambaſſador at Madrid, to make this declaration to the catholic king. 1685.

THE prince and his council were alarmed with the fear of a rupture. In the anſwer given to the French ambaſſador, the ſuppoſed ſettlement of the Low Countries was treated as a chimera, and aſſurances were renewed on the part of his catholic majeſty, of his ſincere deſire to continue the peace, and of his averſion to any thing capable of giving offence to the king.

THE court of Vienna, whoſe intentions were not ſo pacific, tried two years afterwards whether they could not prevail on the king of Spain, to let the archduke, the emperor's ſecond ſon, be educated at his court, as heir preſumptive to the crown. 1687.

THE king of France, having been informed of this new attempt, ſent orders to the marquiſs of Feuquieres, to deſire a private audience of the king of Spain, and to preſent into that prince's own hands, a memorial drawn up

by his majeſty's orders, and forwarded to his ambaſſador.

The ſubſtance of this memorial was, "That "if this prince, influenced by bad counſel, ſhould "ſubvert the order of ſucceſſion, the king in "that caſe could not avoid executing whatever "he thought moſt effectual for maintaining the "dauphin's rights, and muſt conſider every "thing done in favour of the emperor's ſon, "as an infringement of the peace."

The anſwer was in general tems; but the king of Spain gave the queen leave to tell the ambaſſador, that he would never nominate a ſucceſſor till he received the holy viaticum; and to caution him at the ſame time not to believe the reports that might be ſpread in regard to the ſucceſſion, but to inform himſelf thoroughly, before he gave credit to public accounts founded on no authority.

1689. Two years after, juſt at the time when the count of Rebenac ſucceeded his father the marquiſs of Feuquieres in the embaſſy to Spain; the queen, according to the general opinion, died a victim to the excellent deſign ſhe had entertained, of preſerving peace betwixt France and Spain. Her death happened at a time when England and Holland, in alliance with the emperor, were dragging this crown into the war againſt France. The ſudden deceaſe of this princeſs occaſioned violent ſuſpicions; count Mansfeldt, the Imperial ambaſſador, and the count

of

of Oropeza, who were both ſuſpected of having been the authors and inſtruments of this wicked piece of policy, took little or no pains to juſtify themſelves.

THE twenty years truce concluded in the year 1684 had been broke in 1688, by the prince of Orange's invading England, and uſurping the throne of his father-in-law king James II; as alſo by the affair of the coadjutorſhip of Cologne, in conteſt betwixt cardinal Furſtenberg and prince Clement of Bavaria, the elector's brother: and the war ſtill continued, when the king of Spain took to his ſecond wife, the empreſs's ſiſter, daughter of the duke of Neuburg, who was afterwards elector Palatine. This princeſs, being perfectly acquainted with her huſband's temper, knew how to govern him, and of courſe had the management of every thing in Spain. Senſible to flattery, and fond of revenge, ſhe diſtributed rewards and puniſhments according to the impulſe of each paſſion. She had a contempt for the Spaniſh nation, which ſhe could not diſguiſe; ſo that ſhe was feared by ſome, but beloved by no body. The count of Melgar, hereditary admiral of Caſtile, happened to gain her confidence; by which means he had the authority of prime miniſter without the title. The queen had moreover a privy-council of her own, conſiſting of a woman named Berleps, and a capuchin friar, both of whom came with her from Germany.

1697. THE concluding of the peace in 1697 put an end to the diſagreeable tidings, which the king frequently received of the loſs of ſome of his ſtrong towns. The taking of Barcelona by the French, had affected him more ſenſibly than that of any other place; becauſe this being the capital of Catalonia, and ſituated in the kingdom of Spain, was better known to him than the towns in Flanders: he was ſo very ignorant of the importance of the latter, as to believe that Mons belonged to the king of England, and to pity this prince, when Lewis XIV. made a conqueſt of that province.

SPAIN ſtood ſo much the more in need of peace at that time, as the kingdom was deſtitute of troops, of ſhips, of money, and council. The grandees at variance among themſelves, without credit or authority, but not without ambition, quietly expected a revolution, which they conſidered as not very remote. The Spaniſh monarchy no longer ſupported itſelf by its own weight; and the numerous dominions of which it was compoſed, were already deſigned a prey to the ambition of the principal powers in Europe.

1697. THE king of France's only ſon the dauphin, was by law, the only right heir to thoſe extenſive territories. His mother, the late queen Maria Tereſa, eldeſt daughter of Philip IV. king of Spain, had the undoubted right of ſucceeding to the crown in default of male iſſue; and the ſole reaſon for conteſting this right, was the jea-

jealouſy and fear which the other princes of Europe had conceived of the power of France. The common intereſt of hindering the aggrandizement of this crown, had long united thoſe princes; and with this view they maintained that the late queen of France was legitimately excluded from the ſucceſſion of the king her father, as well by the renunciation which this princeſs had made of her rights at her marriage, as by the teſtamentary diſpoſition of that prince.

By this act the excluſion was given to the queen Maria Tereſa; and the deſcendants of Margaret, her younger ſiſter, born of a ſecond venter, and married to the emperor Leopold, were called to the crown. From this marriage ſprang an only daughter, who was married to the elector of Bavaria; ſo that this princeſs, and after her the electoral prince her ſon, would have been entitled to the whole ſucceſſion of the Spaniſh monarchy, in default of male iſſue by Charles II. had the teſtament of Philip IV. been valid. But the emperor did not allow of this pretended right of the electreſs his daughter. He wanted to preſerve the Spaniſh monarchy in his own family, and to get the crown ſettled on the archduke his ſecond ſon; for this purpoſe he renewed the attempt of prevailing on the catholic king to ſend for him to Madrid, that he might be educated near his perſon, as his ſucceſſor and ſole heir to the Spaniſh monarchy.

1697. THE new queen of Spain, the empreſs's ſiſter, entering heartily into the emperor's views, employed her whole credit to forward her nephew's intereſts: but the queen mother of Spain was ſtill living, and having the intereſts of her great grandſon the electoral prince, more at heart, than thoſe of the archduke her nephew, ſhe ſtrongly oppoſed the urgent ſolicitations of the queen her daughter-in-law.

THE obſtacle ſeemed removed, when the queen-dowager of Spain died the month of May 1696; but the repreſentations of this princeſs had made ſuch an impreſſion on the mind of the king her ſon, that the emperor apprehended it would be very difficult to efface them, and that this could not be effected without the aſſiſtance of an able miniſter. Confiding therefore in the prudence of old count Harrach, one of the principal members of his council, and maſter of the horſe, he nominated him his ambaſſador to Spain; and at the ſame time appointed the young count his ſon, to ſucceed him in that embaſſy.

THE firſt article of his commiſſion was the revocation of a will, which the king of Spain had made in favour of the prince of Bavaria, in the life-time and at the ſolicitation of the queen-mother. Harrach ſucceeded in this firſt article, the queen having aſſiſted him with all the influence ſhe had over the king her huſband. This prince tore the will, and withſtood the ſolicitations of cardinal Portocarrero, who preſſed him

to ſummon the ſtates of the kingdom, in order to come to a ſure and valid deciſion, upon a point of ſuch importance to the monarchy.

THE imperial miniſter was not ſo ſucceſsful in the ſecond article of his commiſſion. The king of Spain could not reſolve to nominate his ſucceſſor, and much leſs to ſend for him to Madrid: however he was ſo tired at length by the queen's importunities, that he promiſed to invite the archduke into Spain, if the emperor at the ſame time would ſend ten or twelve thouſand of his troops to defend Catalonia.

This conſent of the catholic king was obtained in 1696, the year before the peace. The war, which ſtill continued, was rather a favourable conjuncture to the emperor's ſolicitations; but his council, who were quick in forming, and ſlow in the executing of projects, ſtarted continual difficulties, which obſtructed the deſires of this prince. The funds were wanting, either for the march, or for the ſubſiſtance of the troops. The Imperial miniſters pretended, that the king of Spain ought to ſupply them. But his finances would not admit of it; and he thought he did enough in favour of the emperor, in ſecuring the poſſeſſion of his dominions to the archduke, without putting himſelf alſo to the expence of an expedition, the whole fruit of which was to be reaped by the emperor and his ſon.

THE peace of Ryſwic proved a new obſtacle to the tranſporting of imperial troops into Spain.

This

This could not be effected without ſhips, which were wanting. England indeed and Holland would have furniſhed them during the war: but the peace had changed the whole ſtate of affairs; ſo that it would have been a direct infringement of the treaties, to ſupport the emperor's pretenſions to the Spaniſh ſucceſſion. For which reaſon, the queen as well as count Harrach adviſed him to ſit down contented for the preſent, with obtaining the perpetual government of the Milaneſe for the archduke, and with ſending at different intervals a ſmall number of forces, under the notion of recruits for the Imperial troops, which remained in Catalonia after the ſigning of the treaties. Thoſe troops, tho' inconſiderable in number, might be ſufficient to maintain the Auſtrian party in Spain, whenever the king ſhould happen to die, an event which could not be very remote.

The elector of Bavaria flattered himſelf with having a ſtrong party in Spain; and being perſuaded that he might look upon the admiral, tho' devoted to the queen, as the chief of that party, he had intruſted him with full powers, as he had alſo intruſted cardinal Portocarrero, to act in the name of the prince his ſon; that both of them might take ſuch ſteps, as they ſhould judge neceſſary, whenever the ſucceſſion was open.

The elector had alſo applied to the king of France for his protection, and entreated his majeſty

jeſty to acquaint him with his intentions, concerning what part of the dominions ſubject to the Spaniſh monarchy he ſhould judge proper to reſerve to himſelf.

THE king, without rejecting theſe advances, made anſwer, that as all connection betwixt France and Spain had been interrupted theſe nine years by the war, it was neceſſary, before any project could be formed, that his majeſty ſhould have particular inſtructions concerning the preſent ſtate of the forces of that kingdom; moreover that the elector ſhould acquaint him with the nature and ſtrength of the party which he thought he had in Spain; and that his majeſty would forthwith ſend an ambaſſador to Madrid, by whoſe relations he ſhould form a judgment of what was proper to be done, in caſe the king of Spain happened to die; an event which might now be conſidered as at ſome diſtance, ſince this prince's health ſeemed to be perfectly re-eſtabliſhed.

THE marquiſs of Harcourt having been appointed ambaſſador to Spain, ſet out for Madrid, the month of December 1697, after taking inſtructions from his majeſty, concerning every thing that he had heard by the moſt faithful accounts of that court. The king particularly recommended to him to make all the inquiry he poſſibly could, into the diſpoſition of the grandees and of the people, in regard to the ſucceſſion. 1697.

To

To diſcover, and to traverſe, the ſecret meaſures and ſteps of the Imperial miniſters.

He was directed to uſe the ſame vigilance in getting what information he could, concerning the party which the elector of Bavaria fancied he had in Spain. The emperor and this prince were at that time the only two, who had declared themſelves pretenders to the ſucceſſion. The king of France had not taken one ſtep ſince the peace, to maintain the Dauphin's right; but juſtice pleaded his cauſe, and the party which favoured the princes of the line of France, tho' unknown to and unſolicited by his majeſty, was by far the ſtrongeſt and the moſt numerous.

The public were firmly of opinion, that the renunciation of the late queen Maria Tereſa, even ſuppoſing it valid, could not be binding to children, who did not ſo much as exiſt at the time of performing an act required by paternal authority; that ſince a minor may, when he comes of age, proteſt againſt all diſpoſitions made to his prejudice during his tutelage, there was ſurely a much ſtronger reaſon, why this power ſhould be preſerved to infants deprived, by any act whatſoever, of their legitimate inheritance.

The queen's partiality in favour of the Germans, whom ſhe careſſed and preferred to the natives of the kingdom, was the cauſe that the national averſion to them increaſed every day. The people, oppreſſed with taxes, and grown weary of a foreign government, were in hopes that

that a prince of the line of France, eſtabliſhing a juſt authority over his ſubjects, would bring peace and plenty into the kingdom; but every body judged that this peace could not laſt, if the 1697.
king of Spain, in compliance with the importunities of the queen his wife, invited the archduke to Madrid, with a body of German troops to ſupport his cauſe, and declared him heir to the whole Spaniſh monarchy.

THE point which Lewis XIV. had chiefly in view, was to maintain the peace lately concluded, and to oppoſe every alteration that could tend to diſturb it. It was therefore incumbent upon him to know the real intentions of the king of Spain, before he could preſcribe any meaſures to the new ambaſſador; for which reaſon, his majeſty choſe to wait for the eclairciſements this miniſter ſhould give him, before he determined which of the two parties ſuited beſt with his own intereſts, as well as with the tranquillity of Europe, either to treat with the emperor, or with the elector of Bavaria, concerning the partition of the Spaniſh monarchy.

THE emperor, who was not ſo zealous for the public welfare, repeated his ſolicitations in favour of the archduke. Harrach ſtrongly repreſented, that it was a long time ſince the reſolution had been taken in the Spaniſh council, to cauſe a body of Imperial troops to march into Catalonia at the expence of his Catholic majeſty, for the ſecurity of that province. He now ſoli-

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cited the fulfilling of that purpoſe; with the like eagerneſs he demanded that the archduke ſhould be invited to Madrid, and acknowledged preſumptive heir to the Spaniſh monarchy; and, that as a pledge of this acknowledgment, this prince ſhould be forthwith inveſted with the full and proper ſovereignty of the duchy of Milan.

The queen of Spain, with all her credit not being able to obtain what the emperor deſired, ordered the admiral of Caſtile to anſwer the ambaſſador, that as a peace had been concluded with France, the reſolution taken during the war, of marching a body of Imperial troops into Catalonia, and of maintaining them there, at the expence of Spain, was of no ſort of uſe in time of tranquillity; further, that the execution of ſuch a ſcheme was impracticable, the finances being ſo low as not to admit of the expences neceſſary, either for maintaining the emperor's troops in Catalonia, or for tranſporting them thither; that the prince particularly intereſted in preſerving the crown of Spain in his family, ought to be at the expence of both; that this expence would amount perhaps to a million a year, an object no way comparable to the advantage which the emperor expected to derive from it. Beſides, it was proper to conſider, that France would look upon the tranſporting of a body of German troops into Catalonia, in time of full peace and without any viſible neceſſity, as a violation

lation of the late treaty, the real motive of the deſtination of thoſe troops being very eaſy to gueſs. In vain did count Harrach repreſent to them, that the war, which his maſter was obliged to maintain in Hungary againſt the Turks, had occaſioned ſuch immenſe expences, and thrown the finances into ſo bad a condition, as to render it impoſſible for him to pay the troops he ſhould ſend to Spain. But they wanted money at Madrid as much as at Vienna; and neither England nor Holland would lend them any tranſports.

THE king was informed of count Harrach's demands, before the marquiſs of Harcourt arrived at Madrid; as theſe demands were likely to be repeated, he ordered his ambaſſador to declare to the court of Madrid, that every ſtep, which the king of Spain ſhould take to the prejudice of his legitimate heirs, would be conſidered by his majeſty, as a rupture betwixt the two crowns.

THE king of Portugal was not afraid to enter the liſts, as heir to the Spaniſh monarchy. He is ſaid to have been excited to theſe pretenſions by the count of Oropeza, who was a deſcendant of the houſe of Braganza, before this houſe had made good its right to the crown of Portugal; he was in hopes that, if the king of Portugal ſhould aſcend the throne of Spain, he himſelf might fill the throne which this prince would leave vacant.

THE marquiſs of Harcourt had not been long at Madrid, before he was acquainted with the internal ſtate of the kingdom of Spain. He ſoon perceived that debauch and luxury equally prevailed among the members of the adminiſtration, and the principal nobility. He gave notice thereof to the king of France, and judging that money properly beſtowed would be a ſure means of ſtrengthening the French party, he propoſed to his majeſty to remit ſuch ſums to him as he ſhould think proper for that ſervice, to be diſtributed as he found occaſion. To this he added, that if his majeſty would order his troops to make ſome movements on the frontiers of Spain, and ſufficient preparations to induce the Spaniards to apprehend the ſiege of Barcelona, ſuch diſpoſitions would ſtrengthen the impreſſion already made by a proper diſtribution of his majeſty's preſents.

HAD our modern politicians been but acquainted with this letter, they would yet more boldly have concluded from thence, that the principal grandees of the court of Spain had been bribed by French gold: as an unanſwerable proof of this, they would have mentioned the propoſal made to his majeſty by his ambaſſador; but they would not have known, nor probably would they have told, that the king did not think proper to enter into expences, which the unbounded influence of the queen muſt have rendered uſeleſs; this princeſs being not only authorized by

the aſcendant ſhe had over the king her huſband, but ſupported moreover by the German troops, that were left in Catalonia under the command of the prince of Darmſtadt, viceroy of that province.

THE French ambaſſador met with a very cool reception at Madrid, where he was a long time without being admitted to an audience of the king of Spain, who was then beſet by the queen. This princeſs exerted her utmoſt endeavours to promote the emperor's intereſts, tho' ſhe was often diſſatisfied, and had reaſon to complain of the behaviour of that prince.

THE members of the privy council, and the chief of the nobility at the court of Madrid, followed the example of the indifference, which their maſter ſhewed in giving audience to the ambaſſador. For a long time they would not ſee him; but the voice of the court varied from that of the people. The people had been long convinced, that Spain would never be happy, till they had a prince of the line of France upon their throne, who ſhould extinguiſh all cauſes of diſſenſion betwixt the two kingdoms. But this general deſire of the nation was neither ſupported by forees, nor by any other meaſure that was likely to render it effectual. The Germans were maſters of Catalonia, and the prince of Darmſtadt maintained himſelf in his vice-royalty by the queen's authority. The king of Spain was taken ill in the month of March 1698; 1698.

when they began to deſpair of his life. The news being brought to Catalonia, the viceroy changed all the governors of the principal towns, removing the Spaniſh officers, and putting Germans in their ſtead; at the ſame time he paid the troops of his own nation, without making any payment at all to the Spaniards. The province ſent a deputation to the king of Spain; but their complaints were ineffectual. Thus the Germans continued maſters of Catalonia. Mean while, the apprehenſion of a German yoke, and the experience the Spaniards had had for ſome years of that nation, increaſed the French party every day; but it was a party without either a head or ſtrength; and no body as yet had ventured to open his mind to the French ambaſſador.

TOWARD the latter end of the month of March, he made his firſt viſit to cardinal Portocarrero, a miniſter highly reſpected not only on account of his dignity of archbiſhop of Toledo, of primate of Spain, and counſellor of ſtate, but alſo for his perſonal merit, of which the king his maſter and the public were perfectly convinced. The cardinal aſſured the marquiſs of Harcourt of his profound reſpect for the king; he added alſo, his attachment; but the whole was in general terms. Some days afterwards when he returned the ambaſſador's viſit, he explained himſelf with greater preciſion. "We may talk of af-
"fairs, ſaid he to the marquiſs, ſome day or other:

" my duty obliges me to pay my firſt attention to " the ſervice of God; that of my maſter comes " next; and next to theſe I have the intereſt " of the king your maſter moſt at heart."

THE marquiſs of Orbalbaſez of the family of Spinoſa, counſellor of ſtate, heretofore ambaſſador at the treaty of Nimeguen, and afterwards at the court of France on occaſion of the firſt marriage of the king his maſter, was the firſt that ſpoke to the marquiſs of Harcourt, and continued afterwards to ſpeak to him with greater confidence than any other miniſter. He informed the ambaſſador of the miſtaken conduct of the queen, and aſſured him that the credit of this princeſs was daily diminiſhing; that ſhe had incurred the public odium, which was increaſing every day; and in ſhort that the miniſtry were divided among themſelves. He further informed him of ſeveral particulars relating to the miniſtry, and to the internal ſtate of the council of Spain.

BY degrees the reſt of the chief nobility and 1698.
great officers of the crown came to viſit the marquiſs, and opened themſelves to him, each with ſome confidence not unlike to that of Balbaſez. They were all deſirous of having a prince of the houſe of Bourbon to ſucceed the king their maſter, in expectation that he would maintain the Spaniſh monarchy undivided, without ſuffering the leaſt diſmemberment of any of the branches, of which that great body was compoſed.

That this was the condition on which the ancient antipathy betwixt the two nations would ceaſe. That the king, in giving one of the princes his grandſons to Spain, would reſcue their country from the German yoke, and become its protector, without changing the government, or without any deſign of reducing it to a province, as the enemies of France and of his majeſty wanted to make the public believe.

THE marquiſs ſoon removed the apprehenſions they might have in Spain, of ſuch a change of government, in caſe their monarchy was ever to devolve upon a prince of the Bourbon family. More difficult it was to prove that the king alone could preſerve the ſeveral dominions belonging to that monarchy, from being diſmembered. Exhauſted at that time of money, and deſtitute of troops or ſhips of war, Spain could not of herſelf maintain and defend thoſe dominions; ſhe was a lifeleſs body, which France muſt be obliged to animate and maintain at her own expence in both hemiſpheres, ſo as to render it capable of acting, if not too late, when France herſelf came to be exhauſted by infuſing life into the inert carcaſe. For there was no ſort of doubt but the reſt of Europe, jealous and alarmed at the increaſe of the king's power, would join all their forces to prevent the union of the two crowns. The confederacy which the treaty of Ryſwic had extinguiſhed, would be revived; and the

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ſame powers would once more unite their forces, and fight the battles of the houſe of Auſtria. Then the preſent inclination of the people in favour of France would vaniſh; or, if it continued, it muſt not only become uſeleſs, but the king would moreover find it almoſt impoſſible to convert it to any advantage.

HIS majeſty therefore had determined the precedent year to prefer the repoſe of his people, and the glory of conſolidating the peace of Europe, to that of ſettling a prince of his family upon a throne, which had been at enmity with France ever ſince it was poſſeſſed by the houſe of Auſtria. The king choſe rather to content himſelf with a part of the Spaniſh monarchy, as an equivalent for the dauphin's lawful rights, than to engage to hinder the diſmemberment of the ſeveral dominions belonging to that crown.

THE dauphin, who during his whole life had been always ſubmiſſive to the will of the king his father, made no ſort of difficulty in agreeing to the reſolution, which his majeſty had judged moſt conducive to the good of the kingdom, and the general intereſt of Europe.

THE partition of the Spaniſh monarchy, in caſe king Charles II. ſhould happen to die without iſſue, was not a new ſcheme. The weak conſtitution of that prince, and his frequent illneſſes and complaints, had occaſioned the forming a project of that kind ſo early as the year

1668. The king had agreed upon a partition with the emperor Leopold by a treaty, ſigned at Vienna, and, for the ſake of ſecrecy, depoſited into the hands of the grand duke of Tuſcany till the Spaniſh ſucceſſion ſhould be open.

THIS treaty, which had been ineffectual ever ſince the year 1668, ſerved as a pattern to the precautions neceſſary for preſerving the tranquillity of Europe. True it is that circumſtances were altered; the ſtate of the emperor's family being quite different. This prince thirty years before had had no ſons; but he had two at the time of concluding the peace of Ryſwic; and there was no poſſibility of ſatisfying the ambition of the houſe of Auſtria, unleſs the Spaniſh monarchy deſcended entire to the youngeſt of theſe princes.

FINDING it therefore to no purpoſe to treat at that time about a partition with the court of Vienna, the king judged it would be more conducive to this end, to enter into a negotiation with the king of England William III. whoſe influence in Holland was ſo great, as to be able to determine the States-General to follow his example.

1697. TOWARDS the latter end of the year 1697, when the treaties of general peace were ready to be ſigned at Ryſwic, and the armies ſtill in the field, marſhal Boufflers had four conferences, within ſight of both armies, with the earl of Portland, a Dutchman by birth, and an intimate confident of the king of England, to whom he

he had been page. It was falſely reported, that at theſe meetings they had regulated the partition of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion; there was no mention made of it, the conferences having turned on the three following articles:

BY the firſt, king William inſiſted that his enemies ſhould receive no aſſiſtance from France. In particular he mentioned his father-in-law king James II; for the further ſecurity of his maſter, lord Portland demanded that this unfortunate prince ſhould be obliged to remove from France, and to follow his unpropitious ſtar to Rome, or whatever other part of the world he chuſed.

IN behalf of the king of France, marſhal Boufflers inſiſted upon a clauſe being inſerted in the treaty of peace, that a general act of grace ſhould be granted to the Engliſh who had followed the fortunes of king James, and that they ſhould be reſtored to the poſſeſſion of their eſtates; a clauſe which the earl of Portland ſtrenuouſly rejected, under the pretence that if it was granted, the king his maſter would never be ſafe in England.

THE third article debated in thoſe conferences was in relation to the city of Orange. Marſhal Boufflers inſiſted that leave ſhould not be given to the king's ſubjects either to enter or to ſettle in that city; as his majeſty foreſaw that the new converts, ſtill attached to their former errors, would flock from the provinces bordering

ing upon Orange, and if leave was given them, would ſettle in that city.

Lord Portland maintained that ſuch a prohibition would be contrary to the pretended ſovereignty of Orange; yet he agreed that the king his maſter ſhould privately give his word, not to ſuffer any of the ſubjects of France to ſettle at Orange, without permiſſion obtained from his majeſty.

After the peace was concluded, the earl of Portland was ſent ambaſſador-extraordinary to France. Upon his arrival, he ſaid that he did not expect to find king James ſtill at St. Germains. He complained of it to the king himſelf at a private audience, as a breach of the promiſe from marſhal Boufflers. But the king of England did not approve of the precipitancy of his ambaſſador. This miniſter, not ſatisfied with demanding the expulſion of king James, inſiſted further, that the king ſhould baniſh out of France, the duke of Berwick and ſeveral other Engliſhmen, who were ſuſpected in England of being accomplices in the plot lately diſcovered, of taking away king William's life.

The demands of the earl of Portland being diſowned by the king his maſter, this miniſter immediately made an apology for his behaviour. He proteſted further, that, agreeably to the intentions of this prince, he had a ſtrong deſire of forwarding that harmony and good underſtanding, which the king of England would be glad

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to eſtabliſh with his majeſty, from a conviction that this union was neceſſary for the welfare and tranquillity of Europe.

THE event moſt likely to diſturb this tranquillity, was the death of the king of Spain: and there was reaſon to apprehend this event to be imminent, from the frequent ailments of this prince; and from his languid ſtate, ſo languid that every relapſe of his diſorder ſeemed to be mortal. A prince of king William's penetration and abilities could not but foreſee the great change, which ſo important an event muſt produce in Europe. He could not therefore be inſenſible of the neceſſity of taking proper meaſures, for preventing another general war. His ambaſſador gave poſitive aſſurances, that this prince was deſirous of meriting the king's friendſhip; and as this miniſter had the thorough confidence of his maſter, there was not the leaſt room to doubt, but that he was pitched upon for ſo important a commiſſion, preferably to an Engliſhman, whoſe fidelity would have been leſs tried, and more ſuſpected.

THESE circumſtances, joined to the ſincere de- 1697.
ſire of maintaining the peace, determined Lewis XIV. to propoſe a partition of the Spaniſh monarchy to king William, nearly on the ſame plan, as that which his majeſty had concluded with the emperor Leopold in the year 1668.

THE

THE prince of Orange, now king of England by the name of William III. had been the oracle of the confederacy formed againſt France in the laſt war. He had the ſupreme diſpoſal of the reſolutions of the Dutch republic: and tho' he uſed to meet with oppoſition from the Engliſh parliament, after he had been invited and received as the deliverer of their country; yet he could be ſure they would not oppoſe the meaſures he ſhould take for continuing the peace, the right of which, as well as of war, is part of the prerogative of the crown, notwithſtanding the limits which the laws of that country preſcribe to the regal authority.

THE two miniſters (1) whom the king appointed to confer with the earl of Portland, had orders to propoſe a treaty between his majeſty and the king of Great-Britain, in order to regulate the partition of the Spaniſh monarchy on the plan of the eventual treaty, which his majeſty had concluded with the emperor in the year 1668. Ignorant of the intentions of the king his maſter, concerning ſo new and ſo important a project, the earl deſired time to diſpatch a courier to England for further inſtructions; fully convinced however that this prince would receive his majeſty's propoſal, as an indubitable proof of his real deſire of preſerving the general tranquillity.

THIS was in the month of March 1698. Count Tallard, afterwards marſhal and peer of France,

(1) Meſſieurs de Pomponne and de Torcy.

France, whom the king had nominated his ambaſſador-extraordinary to the king of England, ſet out for London, with inſtructions regarding the propoſal made to the earl of Portland, and with directions to acquaint his majeſty with the king of Great-Britain's anſwer. He was ſcarce arrived, when my lord Portland received the following anſwer. "That the king his maſter little expected the propoſal made to his ambaſſador. That this prince enjoined him to aſſure the king of France, of his being reſolved to contribute to the utmoſt of his power to preſerve the peace. That he plainly ſaw his majeſty had a ſincere deſire of maintaining the tranquillity of Europe; that he himſelf was very deſirous of contributing to ſo laudable a deſign, and hoped his majeſty would be ſatisfied with his conduct. That he ſhould be as well pleaſed as his majeſty, if means could be contrived, to prevent the war, which the death of the king of Spain was likely to revive. But he did not propoſe any, not knowing the king's thoughts about the matter, nor what was ſuitable to his majeſty. He muſt therefore wait for the eclairciſſements his majeſty would pleaſe to ſend him, promiſing to give his opinion of them freely, as well as of the meaſures neceſſary to be taken in concert for the preſervation of the public repoſe."

THE

1698. THE earl of Portland had a private audience of the king, wherein he gave him an account of the orders he had received. He aſſured his majeſty, that the king of England would obſerve the profoundeſt ſecrecy, in regard to the project, with which he had been pleaſed to intruſt him: adding that he flattered himſelf with ſucceſs, beyond any other miniſter, in this important negotiation, becauſe of his being perfectly well acquainted with his maſter's ſentiments.

AFTER a very obliging anſwer both to the king of England, and to the ambaſſador, his majeſty referred him for a further elucidation of the matter to his miniſters.

WITHIN a few days they let him know, that his majeſty, having maturely examined the ſtate of Europe, agreed that the uniting of Spain and of the territories dependent on that crown, either to France, or to the emperor's dominions, would give a general alarm to all the other powers; however it was not his intention to unite them in ſuch a manner, as France and Spain ſhould henceforward form but one monarchy; but that it was juſt the rights of the lawful heir ſhould be maintained. This was certainly the dauphin, according to law; yet this prince would be ſatisfied, if his right was but once acknowledged; and as ſoon as that was done, he would make no difficulty to renounce it in favour of his youngeſt ſon, whom he would reſign into the hands of the Spaniards, to the end that they might educate

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and form him according to the maxims of their own nation; ſo that France and Spain would ſtill continue to be diſtinct and ſeparate monarchies.

AND as it would be likewiſe neceſſary to remove the inquietude, which the vicinity of the Spaniſh Netherlands, when under the dominion of a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, might give to the Engliſh and the Dutch; the king propoſed therefore to confer the full ſovereignty of them on the elector of Bavaria, whoſe forces and power could give no umbrage to either of thoſe nations.

LORD Portland deſired a copy of theſe propoſals in writing, to ſend to London; and yet he was fully convinced, tho' he had no orders to ſay it, and therefore could not ſay it of himſelf, that neither the king his maſter, nor the other princes and ſtates of Europe, would conſent to let a prince of the Bourbon family ſucceed to the crown of Spain; that the poſſible union of the two monarchies would be an object evermore terrible in their eyes; and that no precaution could remove ſo juſt an apprehenſion, whatever conditions the king might be willing to offer, for quieting thoſe alarms, which the intimate connections between France and Spain would undoubtedly occaſion.

THE earl of Portland would not ſo much as hear of the ſcheme of diſpoſing of the Netherlands in favour of the elector of Bavaria; for the point

point was not to make the Dutch eaſy, in regard to any encroachments from the ſovereign of thoſe provinces; on the contrary, it was their deſire, that whoever poſſeſſed them ſhould have a ſufficient ſtrength, ſo as they might depend upon him as a rampart and barrier to the United Netherlands; and the elector was too feeble to give them any ſuch ſecurity. He added, that with a view of favouring this prince, and of preventing any increaſe of power in the Imperial family, they might agree to acknowledge the electoral prince of Bavaria, and to place him on the throne of Spain, to the excluſion of the archduke. He proteſted again, that he had made this propoſal of his own head, and without being acquainted with, or having had any inſtructions concerning, his maſter's intentions. Perhaps this prince, before he engaged, wanted to know for certain the diſpoſition of the Spaniſh court and nation.

On the contrary, his majeſty's intereſt was to be informed, as ſoon as poſſible, of what he had to expect from England and Holland. Loſs of time in a dubious negotiation might change the preſent diſpoſition of the Spaniards, which if the French ambaſſador at Madrid neglected to improve, he was doing more for the emperor, than the miniſters and partizans of the houſe of Auſtria, ſupported by the whole credit of the queen, had hitherto been able to compaſs. Should the archduke prevail on the Catholic king, to acknow-

knowledge him as preſumptive heir to his dominions, war was inevitable. Even if all the princes of Europe, accuſtomed to behold without alarm the two branches of the houſe of Auſtria ſeated on the Spaniſh and Imperial thrones, ſhould, with the ſame unconcern, ſee the whole power of Charles V. divided betwixt the emperor's two ſons; ſtill it would be inconſiſtent both with the honour and with the intereſt of France, to ſuffer the whole Spaniſh ſucceſſion to be torn from her ſovereign's children to whom it lawfully belonged. Recourſe muſt therefore be again had to arms; and the king muſt forego the pleaſure of making his ſubjects enjoy the ſweets of peace, which during the greateſt part of his reign they had but ſeldom taſted. Thus his majeſty would loſe the fruits of the treaty of Ryſwic, which may be ſaid to have been haſtened, merely with a view of eaſing the kingdom, and of rewarding the zeal and inviolable fidelity of his people; a view which the king preferred to the advantageous proſpect with which the preſent ſituation of affairs ſeemed to flatter him, were he inclined to maintain thoſe pretenſions by the ſword, which his enemies were no longer able to diſpute.

LORD Portland pretended to be ignorant of his maſter's intentions; and therefore count Tallard had directions to preſs this prince to explain himſelf.

THE king of England's anſwer to the French ambaſſador was, "that according to the gene-"ral opinion, the renunciation of the late queen "Maria Tereſa was valid; but it is not, ſaid he, "a queſtion to be determined by the civilians; "there is reaſon to fear that the ſword muſt de-"cide it. He proteſted, that he was deſirous of "preſerving peace, and would contribute to-"wards it with all his might, his age being "now a very ſtrong motive to wiſh for repoſe; "but that he ought at the ſame time to prefer "the intereſt of England, and of Holland, to "every other conſideration. He did not deny "but that at the beginning of the laſt war, he "had entered into ſome propoſals of a treaty "with the emperor, concerning the Spaniſh "ſucceſſion; but, without explaining the parti-"culars, he ſaid that he thought it would be "very proper to make the duke of Bavaria ſove-"reign of the Low-Countries, with the ad-"dition of ſome fortified towns, which his moſt "chriſtian majeſty ſhould reſign to him, in or-"der to ſtrengthen the barrier, and to make "the States-General eaſy."

HIS notion was, that Spain and the Indies might be given to a ſon of the dauphin; the Italian dominions to the archduke; in fine that a treaty of commerce might be agreed upon with England and Holland, and that ſome cautionary towns ſhould be given to both nations, for

for the ſecurity of their trade in the Mediterranean and in the Weſt-Indies.

TALLARD acquainted his majeſty the 11th of April 1698, with the king of England's anſwer. He was deſired to go on with the negotiation, which had been begun in France; and try if he could bring it to a concluſion in England. But as its ſucceſs was dubious, it would have been contrary to prudence, to have neglected the favourable diſpoſition, which the marquiſs of Harcourt obſerved among the Spaniards in general, towards the princes of the royal family of France. It was not the king's intent to abuſe this good diſpoſition, while he was treating upon a different footing with the king of England; it was his buſineſs to improve it, to the end that if the Engliſh negotiation miſcarried, he might have it ſtill in his power to enter upon ſuch meaſures, as he ſhould judge moſt conducive to the welfare of his kingdom. With this view he took care to give the marquiſs of Harcourt the moſt regular intelligence of the circumſtances and progreſs of count Tallard's negotiation.

THE queen of Spain, and her chief favourites among the miniſtry, did not entertain the ſame ſentiments in regard to the princes of the houſe of France, as the generality of the nation; and ſuch was the influence of this princeſs over her huſband, that ſhe kept all thoſe at a diſtance

from his majeſty, who were likely to incline him to favour his ligitimate heirs. This the marquiſs of Harcourt perceived at the very beginning of his embaſſy, by the affected delays in admitting him to a private audience of the king. It was refuſed him upwards of three months, under the pretence of this prince's ill ſtate of health; tho' this never had been a reaſon, to preclude the emperor's ambaſſadors from having acceſs in private either to the king or queen. However, after having waited above three months at Madrid, the marquiſs obtained, towards the end of the month of April, the private audience which he had ſo long ſolicited. Care was taken ſo to order matters in the apartment, where the king of Spain was to receive him, that the ambaſſador could form no ſort of judgment in regard to this prince's ſtate of health. The chamber was lighted with only two wax candles, and the king was placed ſo as his face could hardly be diſtinguiſhed. His anſwer to the ambaſſador's compliment was very ſhort, and the audience finiſhed almoſt as ſoon as it began.

It is hardly probable that ſo intelligent a miniſter as the marquiſs of Harcourt, ſhould have pitched upon ſuch a time and place, as that of this gloomy audience, for engaging the king of Spain to ſign a ſuggeſted act, which was not to come to light till after the death of that prince. Yet it muſt be allowed that Charles II. had

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at that time no diſliking to France; and the marquiſs of Harcourt was of opinion, that if that prince had been at full liberty to follow his own inclination, he would have repoſed an entire confidence in the king's friendſhip; but he durſt not ſhew it, for fear of the ſour and boiſterous temper of the queen his wife.

THE impreſſion which this fear made upon his mind, appeared ſome time after, on an occaſion of importance to Spain. The Moors of Africa had laid ſiege to Ceuta; when the king of Spain wanted not only troops, but even ſhips to tranſport the few ſuccours he could ſend thither: on this occaſion Lewis XIV. offered him as many troops and ſhips as he might ſtand in need of. The buſineſs was to preſerve not only Ceuta, but Oran, and of courſe to prevent the taking of thoſe two places, the conqueſt of which might facilitate the return of the Moors into Spain.

KING Charles, pleaſed with the generoſity of his Majeſty, was willing to accept of an offer applauded by the whole kingdom. It was a long time before the marquiſs of Harcourt could obtain an anſwer to this propoſal, merely from the oppoſition of the queen; till at length this princeſs determining to back the ſolicitations of the two Imperial miniſters with her whole authority, obliged her huſband, under frivolous pretences, to refuſe the ſuccours which France had ſo generouſly offered him. This refuſal was

abſolutely contrary to the opinion of the greateſt and wiſeſt part of the council of ſtate; but none of them durſt oppoſe the arbitrary deciſions of the queen, who was feared, but not at all beloved. The averſion of the Spaniards to a German yoke was generally the ſame; and the ſame their contempt for ſuch members of the adminiſtration, as ſeemed to have the greateſt ſhare in the queen's confidence.

THE marquiſs of Harcourt informed the king exactly, of the ſtate of the Spaniſh court, and of the almoſt general bent of the nation; but at the ſame time he did not conceal from his majeſty, the difficulties he muſt expect in availing himſelf of the diſpoſition of the people in favour of one of the princes his grandſons. That he ſhould lay no ſort of ſtreſs upon it, unleſs he thought himſelf able with his own forces only, to preſerve the Spaniſh monarchy intire and undivided. The Spaniards, too feeble to contribute to their own defence, would change their ſentiments, and return to their old enmity againſt France, whenever his majeſty conſented to a partition of the territories dependent on the crown of Spain.

THIS prudent advice, ſo agreeable to the reflexions the king had made, before ever he entered into a negotiation with England, confirmed his majeſty in the reſolution he had taken to treat about the partition of the Spaniſh monarchy, as the ſureſt way of maintaining the peace

of

of Europe. The king of Great-Britain, confident of the influence he had over the United Provinces, undertook to make them join in the treaty; and count Tallard followed this prince, when he went over to Holland.

WHILE the ſucceſs of this negotiation continued thus in ſuſpenſe, the marquiſs of Harcourt received exact informations of every thing that was tranſacted in London, and regulated his conduct at Madrid, purſuant to the advices and inſtructions which he received from his majeſty. He behaved with great civility to thoſe whoſe good intentions he knew; but he entered into no ſort of engagement with them, his only aim being to prevent their having recourſe to the emperor, if ever they ſhould loſe all hopes that France would aſſiſt them according to their wiſhes, that is, would preſerve the Spaniſh monarchy whole and entire.

IN the mean time the Bourbon party was increaſing daily; and the conduct of the two counts of Harrach contributed to ſtrengthen their numbers. The frequent importunities of theſe noblemen rendered them odious to the king of Spain: while their ſecret ſpeeches, and nocturnal meetings and intrigues, were no leſs diſpleaſing to the queen their protectreſs. Count Harrach the father, juſt before he ſet out upon his return to Vienna in the month of July, made three propoſals to the king of Spain,

all three equally preſſing, and equally diſagreeable.

THE firſt, was to ſettle the ſucceſſion as ſoon as poſſible, for the good of the monarchy.

THE ſecond, to grant to the archduke the government of the dukedom of Milan, which had been entruſted to the prince of Vaudemont.

THE third, to renew thoſe treaties with his ancient allies, which the emperor judged neceſſary for guarantying the peace of Ryſwic.

THE king of Spain did not ſo much as vouchſafe to anſwer the firſt propoſal, having had always an utter abhorrence to every thing that could be ſaid to him in regard to the ſucceſſion.

HE rejected the demand of the government of Milan in favour of the archduke.

WITH reſpect to the treaties of union and guarantying the peace of Ryſwic, he made anſwer, that in the preſent ſituation of affairs, theſe precautions were needleſs.

THIS laſt demand of old count Harrach was as unacceptable to the council of ſtate, as it had been diſpleaſing to the king.

HARRACH had deſired that the council ſhould not be at all informed of the preſſing inſtances he had made to that prince; and eſpecially that they ſhould not be communicated to cardinal Portocarrero their commiſſary; for he ſuſpected the whole council of ſtate, except only the count of Oropeza.

THE.

THE two counts of Harrach, the father and ſon, did not manage better with the queen protectreſs, who had been hitherto devoted to the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria. The emperor, at the inſtigation of his two ambaſſadors, wrote ſeveral letters to her, ſo ſevere and ſo reproachful, that ſhe complained moſt heavily, both of the ingratitude of that prince, and of her cruel deſtiny that rendered her the deteſtation of the whole kingdom of Spain, upon no other account, that ſhe could tell, than for having expreſſed too great a zeal for the intereſts of the Imperial family.

THE greateſt part of the council judged it proper to aſſemble the ſtates of the kingdom; and ſeveral of the principal nobility thought themſelves obliged in honour and conſcience to repreſent to the king their maſter, the neceſſity of ſummoning the ſtates to meet, and to regulate in the general aſſembly the order of ſucceſſion, for the good of his people.

CARDINAL Portocarrero, who had behaved hitherto upon the reſerve, unboſomed himſelf to the marquiſs of Harcourt. He told him, that after having ſcrupulouſly examined into what was moſt agreeable to the ſervice of God, to the good of his country, as well as to common equity, he had determined to eſpouſe the party of the royal family of France; that he would ſtick to this reſolution till the laſt gaſp; a reſolution conformable to the opinion of the prin-

cipal nobility of Spain, and which might be ſaid to be the general voice of the whole nation, except five or ſix ſhuffling fellows ſupported by a queen whom God had ſent to be a ſcourge to Spain*; but that their credit would fall the very inſtant that king Charles was no more.

THIS princeſs, ſenſible of her error in regard to the party ſhe had hitherto eſpouſed, ſeemed deſirous of obliterating the memory of her paſt conduct, by her change of behaviour to France. She began with affecting to receive and to treat the marquiſs of Harcourt with particular marks of diſtinction. She made him ſome preſents, to which ſhe added ſuch ſpeeches and ſigns of affection, as excited the jealouſy of the counteſs of Harrach, wife to the emperor's new ambaſſador.

THESE ſlight tokens were ſoon followed by demonſtrations of much greater regard. The admiral of Caſtile, a miniſter in whom the queen repoſed the greateſt confidence, had orders from her majeſty to eſtabliſh a private correſpondence with the marquiſs of Harcourt: and father Cienfuegos, a jeſuit, who was afterwards Cardinal, made the firſt overtures of this new correſpondence. The admiral afterwards paid ſeveral viſits to the French ambaſſador; in which he gave him to underſtand that his excellency had ſlighted the queen too much; that he ought to have profited of ſeveral offers made on the

part

part of that princeſs; and tho' her name was not mentioned, yet he might eaſily have comprehended that what had been ſaid was by her orders.

THE admiral cloſed this ſpeech with many proteſtations of his zeal for the king's intereſts, and thoſe of the princes his children. He affirmed that he had neglected nothing, that might induce the queen to perſuade the king her huſband to chuſe one of thoſe princes for his ſucceſſor. To this he added ſome advice concerning the conduct the ambaſſador was to obſerve, in order abſolutely to determine the queen to conſider the intereſt of France henceforward as her own. If he followed his advice, the admiral ſaid, there was no danger of ſucceſs.

THE marquiſs of Harcourt was ſo well acquainted with the character of this miniſter, that he did not in the leaſt doubt but his chief view, in ſo many proffers of ſervice, was to amuſe and to deceive him. And even if he had not juſtly ſuſpected thoſe civilities and proffers of ſervice, which he had neither ſought nor expected, ſtill the king's orders obliged him to elude all propoſals of this kind.

THE negotiation with England and Holland was drawing towards a period, when the marquiſs of Harcourt foreſeeing how diſagreeable his perſon would be at Madrid, whenever the treaty of partition came to be made public, had petitioned the king by repeated inſtances, to grant him his diſmiſſion. Surely he would never

never have inſiſted on his recall, if the king of Spain had really adopted that will, which is ſuppoſed to have been ſuggeſted by France; or even if he had given credit to the admiral's ſpeeches, who conſtantly aſſured him of his certain knowledge, tho' the queen had not intruſted him with the ſecret, that her majeſty would be extremely glad the king would invite one of the princes of France to Madrid, to declare him heir to his whole monarchy, and take ſuch further meaſures as ſhould be neceſſary for putting him into the ſure poſſeſſion, after his majeſty's deceaſe, of all the dominions belonging to his crown, without the leaſt partition.

THE admiral frequently returned the marquiſs of Harcourt's viſits, and often aſked him what uſe he had made of their conferences. The ambaſſador ſimply anſwered, that he had acquainted his maſter with them, and only expected his Majeſty's orders. He begged however that the admiral would let him know the queen's intentions, and whether ſhe was deſirous of any thing for her own advantage. This article was not cleared up; and Harcourt had no curioſity to ſift it to the bottom, knowing that the treaty with England and Holland, was upon the point of being concluded.

ACCORDINGLY it was ſigned at the Hague
1698. the 11th of October 1698. Count Tallard and count Briord, ambaſſadors from his moſt chriſtian

chriſtian majeſty, the former to the king of England, the latter to the States-General, both ſigned it, together with the miniſters of this prince and of the republic of Holland, furniſhed with full powers from their maſters.

THIS treaty regulated the partition that was to be made, upon the king of Spain's demiſe, of the dominions ſubject to that crown, a precaution which thoſe powers judged neceſſary for preſerving the peace of Europe.

ACCORDING to this partition, the dauphin was to have the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the port-towns on the Tuſcan coaſt, the marquiſate of Final, and the province of Guipuſcoa.

FOR the electoral prince of Bavaria, they intended Spain and the Indies; with the ſovereignty of the Netherlands.

THE dukedom of Milan formed the ſhare deſigned for the archduke, the emperor's ſecond ſon.

THE electoral prince, who was then very young, might die before his father; this event they guarded againſt, and the treaty made mention, that if ſuch misfortune happened, the elector ſhould be ſubſtituted to his ſon.

THE king of France and his allies mutually engaged to keep the treaty ſecret, during the life of the king of Spain; a condition not leſs neceſſary than difficult to execute.

FOR, in order to preſerve the tranquillity of Europe, the principal deſign of the alliance, they

they were under a neceſſity of doing ſomething to ſatisfy the emperor, at the ſame time that they limited his views, which he was for extending to the entire ſucceſſion of the Spaniſh monarchy.

THE way to moderate them was to let him ſee a formidable alliance, deſigned to oppoſe his ambition, unleſs he would be ſatisfied with the advantages ſtipulated in favour of his family. They muſt therefore acquaint him with the conditions of the treaty, in order to perſuade him to ſign them; on the other hand, the uſe he might make of that knowledge, was dangerous and uncertain, ſince, if he would not conſent to accept of the treaty, he might make a merit of his refuſal with the king of Spain. This monarch and his ſubjects, equally provoked by the treaty of partition, would expect no aſſiſtance, but from the emperor; conſequently the hatred of the Spaniards againſt the Germans would turn againſt France, while the elector of Bavaria would be too weak to afford them any aſſiſtance. Perhaps the pope, and the princes of Italy, from an apprehenſion of the great power of France, would not ſcruple to declare in favour of the emperor. Thus there was equal danger, either in communicating the treaty of partition to the court of Vienna, or in keeping it ſecret.

THE king of England, from a perſuaſion of the influence he had over his Imperial majeſty, undertook to gain his conſent to the treaty.

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THE marquiſs of Harcourt, commending the prudent reſolution his moſt chriſtian majeſty had taken, in concluding an alliance ſo agreeably to his intereſts, added ſome reflections of his own; and as he foreſaw the violent clamour, which the publication of the treaty would naturally raiſe at Madrid, he renewed his ſolicitations to be recalled, at a conjuncture when his preſence at the court of Spain muſt become needleſs, ſince a ſecond-rate miniſter, nay a common ſecretary would be ſufficient for what little affairs there ſhould hereafter be occaſion to tranſact.

THE ambaſſador was a perſon of too much good ſenſe, to perſiſt ſo earneſtly in aſking leave to return to France, if the king of Spain had privately ſigned a will, by the inſtigation, and contrivance of that very ambaſſador.

THE king gave him leave to ſpread the report of his having ſued for his recall, and to make the public believe that his requeſt would be very ſoon granted; that his majeſty would then entruſt the care of his affairs, either to Blécourt or Digulville, old ſervants whom the marquiſs of Harcourt had taken along with him to Madrid.

FROM that time, the more he declined the extraordinary civilities which the grandees and people of all ranks endeavoured to ſhew him, the more eager he found them in courting his acquaintance; but he regulated his conduct entirely by the king's orders, ever ſince the ratification

cation of the treaty of partition, which was in the beginning of the month of November; and the only utility he could derive from this extraordinary kindneſs of the Spaniſh nation was, in purſuance of his majeſty's deſign, to prevent Spain, after ſhe had loſt all hopes on the part of France, from throwing herſelf into the arms of the emperor.

In the mean time, the king of Spain was declining apace: his frequent illneſſes and more dangerous relapſes increaſed the inquietude of his ſubjects, and their uncertainty concerning the choice of his ſucceſſor. At length a report was ſpread, that this choice had been made two years ago; that Charles had certainly ſigned a will, the particulars of which were yet a ſecret; that the queen herſelf, notwithſtanding all her endeavours to dive into the ſecret, did not know it: and at the ſame time, the will was ſaid to be depoſited in the hands of cardinal Portocarrero.

The marquiſs of Harcourt had no ſurer way of coming at the truth, than by applying to the cardinal, to know whether any ſuch will exiſted. Portocarrero made anſwer, that it had been in his poſſeſſion, and that he had engaged by oath to keep it a ſecret, ſo long as the king his maſter lived; but that it was not now in being, for the queen had prevailed on his Catholic majeſty to burn it, and to nominate one of the emperor's ſons to the entire ſucceſſion of his dominions;

that

that the act declaratory of this ſettlement was in the hands of this princeſs, appointing her regent of the whole monarchy, upon the deceaſe of the king her huſband.

PORTOCARRERO foreſaw that there would be great confuſion at Madrid, but that the Bourbon party, which he looked upon as that of reaſon and juſtice, would certainly be the ſtrongeſt, as well on the ſide of the clergy and nobility, as of the bulk of the people.

THIS laſt diſpoſition of the king of Spain was changed ſome time after. It was impoſſible for the treaty of partition to be kept ſo long a ſecret, as had been ſtipulated at the ſigning of it. So many nations were intereſted in a convention of that kind, and ſuch a number of negotiations had been employed in the forming of it, that it could not be long concealed. The firſt account of its being concluded, reached Madrid by the way of Holland. At the receipt of this news, the king of Spain ſummoning the whole miniſtry, held a council extraordinary which laſted three hours; the reſult was his making a will, by which he inſtituted the electoral prince of Bavaria his univerſal heir. When the elector received the news, Count Tallard was then at Bruſſels in his way to Paris, to make a report to the king of the negotiation lately brought to a concluſion with the king of England. He had an interview with the elector, who in confidence acquainted him with the ſettlement, which the

king of Spain had lately made in favour of the electoral prince: yet his highneſs begg'd of him to aſſure the king, that he would ſign whatever act his majeſty thought neceſſary, for his engaging to execute the treaty of partition, notwithſtanding the late teſtamentary diſpoſition made by his catholic majeſty.

THE elector's promiſe and good-will were but a very weak ſecurity; his ſon was a minor, and when he came of age, he might diſavow any engagement whatever that had been taken to his prejudice. It appeared therefore neceſſary to Lewis XIV. as well as to king William, who was returned to London, that the French ambaſſador at Madrid ſhould complain of the ſettlement made in favour of the electoral prince. To be ſilent would have looked like approving of it, and have made the Spaniards believe, that the late teſtamentary diſpoſition of their ſovereign would preſerve his kingdom in peace, and his dominions from being diſmembered; that France was ſatisfied with it, ſince ſhe did not complain; and that they had no reaſon to fear the emperor's impotent revenge.

IN order to facilitate the execution of the treaty of partition, it was proper to remove theſe prejudices; for which reaſon the king of France cauſed a memorial to be drawn up, which the marquiſs of Harcourt was to preſent, at a private audience, to his catholic majeſty. This memorial, without containing any menaces, ſufficiently

ficiently explained the king's reſolution, that his majeſty could not with indifference ſee any injuſtice done to the dauphin.

THE marquiſs of Harcourt had orders to deliver a copy of this memorial to cardinal Cordova, his commiſſary, and afterwards to communicate it to the other counſellors of ſtate: and when he had taken this ſtep, he was to obſerve a profound ſilence. This was too delicate a criſis, to ſuffer the marquiſs to make uſe of the permiſſion, which the king had given him to return to France. This permiſſion was therefore ſuſpended, ſo that he was obliged to prolong his ſtay at Madrid, and to be ſilent in regard to the treaty of partition; for it appeared neceſſary to defer acknowledging that treaty, till it was known what reſolution the emperor would take, when he came to be informed of the king of Spain's laſt diſpoſition.

COUNT Harrach was not ſo moderate: for as ſoon as he had received intelligence of the will, he complained moſt heavily of it, as an injury done to the emperor, and to the whole houſe of Auſtria. He even made ſome diſreſpectful reproaches to the queen about it, at an audience which he had obtained with a great deal of difficulty. This princeſs acknowledged indeed, that an extraordinary council had been held in the preſence of the king her huſband; that ſhe knew moreover that the important point concerning the ſucceſſion had been canvaſſed in that aſſem-

bly; but ſhe pretended and poſitively inſiſted, that ſhe was ignorant how it was decided, the king having ſaid only, that the public reports were falſe.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe proteſtations, it was very well known, that the queen had not neglected her own intereſt, while ſhe was promoting that of the electoral prince of Bavaria, with the aſſiſtance of the admiral. They had both prevailed upon the king of Spain to declare the queen regent of the kingdom, if the prince of Bavaria ſhould be ſtill a minor when the ſucceſſion came to be open. The *junta*, or council of regency, was to be compoſed of cardinal Portocarrero, the two preſidents of Caſtile and Arragon, the inquiſitor-general, a counſellor of ſtate, and a grandee of Spain. At the expiration of the regency, the queen might chuſe what city ſhe pleaſed in Spain for her reſidence, and her dowry was to be eight hundred thouſand crowns a year.

IT was generally believed at Madrid, that to obtain this will, the elector of Bavaria had diſtributed five and twenty thouſand piſtoles; the beſt part of which had been pocketed by Berleps. Others, fancying themſelves better informed, were of opinion, that the admiral, giving up all expectations either from his moſt chriſtian majeſty, or from the emperor, had induced the queen, contrary to her inclination, to favour the intereſts of the houſe of Bavaria.

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THE king of Spain, who was all this while in a very bad ſtate of health, obſerved a profound ſilence; but ſenſible of the ſituation in which he ſhould leave his kingdom, and foreſeeing the diſputes which would ariſe on account of the ſucceſſion, he had privately conſulted the divines and civilians, in order to know whether by divine and human laws he had a right to diſpoſe of his crown. They all unanimouſly agreed, that he had no right to injure his heirs, or to alter the conſtitution of the kingdom, without the conſent of the ſtates-general.

AT the beginning of the year 1699, the principal powers of Europe ſeemed to vye with each other, in aggrandizing the houſe of Bavaria. France, England and Holland, with joint conſent deſigned Spain and the Indies for the electoral prince, who was as yet an infant; at the ſame time that they ſettled the ſovereignty of the Low-Countries on his father. The elector, in behalf of his ſon, then under age, ſigned the partition of the reſt of the Spaniſh monarchy, ſpecified in the treaty of the Hague. About the ſame time, the king of Spain appointed this young prince to be his ſucceſſor. Who would not have imagined, that all cauſe of war was removed, of ſuch a war at leaſt as could give any long interruption to the tranquillity, which Europe at that time enjoyed? But in vain does human prudence form deſigns, if they are not agreeable to the decrees of the ſupreme arbiter 1699.

of peace and war, the great diſpoſer of ſublunary events. The councils of thoſe princes, with all their wiſdom, could not prevent the general combuſtion that was to lay all Europe waſte, nor the fury of the deſtroying ſword, which for a ſeries of years was to ſhed ſuch a torrent of blood.

The prince of Bavaria died at Bruſſels the 8th of February 1699. A great many things were ſaid concerning the real cauſe of his death. The elector moſt ſenſibly afflicted with the loſs of his ſon, did not impute it merely to the diſtemper of which he died. He ſtrove to aſſwage his grief by publiſhing his ſuſpicions; and the treaty of partition came to nothing.

The king at that time releaſed from all engagement, might have abided by the pretended will, if any ſuch had exiſted; but this diſpoſition being abſolutely falſe, his majeſty ſent orders to count Tallard to aſk the king of England's opinion concerning the fatal event, which made void the principal condition of the treaty of partition; and to propoſe a new convention to that prince on the ſame plan as the foregoing, which could be no longer in force.

King William had ſome thoughts of renewing his former engagements, the moment he heard of the death of the electoral prince. He had given orders to his ambaſſador at Paris, to inform himſelf of the king's ſentiments, concerning the change which the unexpected deceaſe of that prince had made, in the meaſures taken

taken for preſerving the tranquillity of Europe; he approved of the ſcheme propoſed to him by count Tallard, of leaving Spain and the Indies to the archduke; of adding the dutchy of Milan to the ſhare intended for the dauphin; and as for the Netherlands, to diſpoſe of theſe provinces in ſuch a manner, as might create no jealouſy or umbrage either to England or Holland.

WHILE the new negotiation was commencing in France and England, the king heard, that, purſuant to his orders, the marquiſs of Harcourt had delivered to the king of Spain his majeſty's memorial, concerning the laſt will made in favour of the electoral prince of Bavaria. All the anſwer given was, "that he ought not to be-"lieve every common report."

THE French ambaſſador not at all ſatisfied with ſo vague an anſwer, had, in purſuance of the king's orders, diſtributed copies of that ſame memorial, which was applauded by the public, and particularly by cardinal Portocarrero. This miniſter not only found it ſuitable to the preſent conjuncture, but alſo with pleaſure foreſaw the dilemma, into which this ſtep of the ambaſſador's muſt throw the enemies of the Bourbon line, and eſpecially the count of Oropeza and Aguilar, as well as the admiral. "On this oc-"caſion the cardinal renewed his aſſurances of "reſpect and fidelity to the king; ſentiments, "he ſaid, founded on honour, conſcience, juſ-"tice, and the intereſt of his country; and for

" theſe ſame motives he ſhould be glad that the " king his maſter would be pleaſed to ſummon " the ſtates of the kingdom."

THE verbal anſwer given by the king of Spain to the marquiſs of Harcourt, was followed a few days after his audience, by a new anſwer in writing, couched in general terms like the former. The purport of it was, " that this " prince had not done any thing in the leaſt to " violate the peace between the two crowns, but " that he was as eager and as deſirous of pre- " ſerving it inviolably as his moſt chriſtian ma- " jeſty; beſides, as the divine goodneſs had been " pleaſed to reſtore him to his health, he did " not think himſelf any way obliged to take " any haſty meaſures; and therefore he hoped " he ſhould ſtill have it in his power for many " years, to make a return to the marks of friend- " ſhip which his moſt chriſtian majeſty had " ſhewn him."

THE ſettlement in favour of the electoral prince of Bavaria was a known fact; the elector, his father, had given notice of it to the king. But now that this young prince was no more, it would have been needleſs to clear up an undoubted truth. The king only ordered his ambaſſador to declare, that without entering into the diſcuſſion of a fact known to all Europe, it was ſufficient that the king of Spain took care to preſerve the peace, and that ſince he was neither in ſuch a decline of years nor of health, as

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to think it neceſſary to nominate a ſucceſſor, he would be pleaſed to reject every propoſal that might be contrary to the laws and eſtabliſhed cuſtoms of his kingdom.

THIS ſpeech, which the marquiſs of Harcourt had orders to make to the catholic king, was accompanied with aſſurances of friendſhip on the part of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, and ſincere wiſhes that God would be pleaſed to hear the prayers of the Spaniſh nation, in granting to the king their maſter the poſterity they deſired. The ambaſſador had orders to ſpeak to the council of ſtate in the ſame ſtile, and to let drop ſome hints capable of making them ſuſpect and apprehend the reſentment of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, in caſe he ſhould be further provoked by any unjuſt ſettlement, ſimilar to that which had been made in favour of the prince of Bavaria; all which orders and precautions would have been quite needleſs, and even prejudicial to his moſt chriſtian majeſty's intereſts, if the king of Spain had really ſigned a ſuggeſted will in favour of a prince of the houſe of Bourbon.

THE court of Spain was in a high ferment at that time, from the diviſions which reigned in council. The people were exaſperated againſt the adminiſtration by reaſon of the ſcarcity of corn; and Madrid, as generally is the caſe of great capitals, was more tumultuous than any other place in the kingdom. This ſcarcity they

attributed to the neglect of the count of Oropeza, preſident of Caſtile. The count was obliged to take ſhelter in his houſe, from whence he durſt not ſtir, for fear of the populace. The king of Spain was obliged to baniſh him, in order not only to prevent him from being torn to pieces by the mob, but alſo to puniſh him for his neglect. This nobleman alone formed the party, that was ſaid to favour the chimerical pretenſions of the king of Portugal to the Spaniſh Succeſſion.

The admiral of Caſtile had the ſame fate as the count of Oropeza, notwithſtanding the queen's protection. He was baniſhed from court, with ſtrict orders not to come within thirty leagues of Madrid: a diſgrace which was owing to the intrigues of count Harrach. The queen reproached this ambaſſador with his underhand dealings, and his nocturnal conferences with the enemies of her authority. He boldly anſwered her reproofs, without making any alteration in his conduct.

These diſturbances greatly increaſed the affection of the people to a prince of the line of France, firmly perſuaded that they ſhould never be happy, till the ſucceſſion of the Spaniſh monarchy was ſecured to him. They were confirmed in their opinion, when they had no longer any room to doubt of the treaties ſigned the preceding year at the Hague, and when a report prevailed towards the end of July 1699, that this treaty,

treaty, which the deceaſe of the electoral prince of Bavaria had made void, either was actually, or would ſhortly be renewed.

THE king of Spain received this intelligence by a courier, from his ambaſſador in Holland: all his doubt was whether the emperor had joined in the ſcheme. This ſecond treaty was not yet ſigned, but the conditions of the partition were ſettled. Their having advice of it at Madrid, occaſioned different reaſonings, and produced two effects. The moſt general opinion was, that this treaty ought to be looked upon as a French artifice, deſigned to intimidate the Spaniards, and to make them look upon the diſmemberment of their monarchy as a thing certain and inevitable, if ever the archduke was called to the crown: it was ſaid that the only way to prevent the partition of ſuch extenſive dominions, and to preſerve them entire under one ſovereign, was to ſecure them to one of the princes of the royal family of France; that this was the only meaſure conducive to the advantage of Spain; that they ought to determine upon it, had they no other motive than to be revenged of, and to puniſh the treachery of king William and the Dutch. It was almoſt the general voice, that without loſs of time they ſhould diſpatch a member of the council of ſtate into France, with a commiſſion to prevail on his moſt chriſtian majeſty, to ſend the Duke of Anjou forthwith to Madrid, and in the mean time to 1699.

enter into an offenſive and defenſive league with France, in order to preſerve the Spaniſh monarchy entire and undivided. The marquiſs of Loſbalbaſez ſaid, that notwithſtanding his advanced age he ſhould offer his ſervice on this occaſion, if his legs would permit him to venture upon the journey. However he named the count of Monterey as a perſon qualified for ſuch a commiſſion, and very capable of executing it to their ſatisfaction in four days.

THE king of Spain by frequent and dangerous relapſes, was gradually drawing towards his latter end, a circumſtance which rendered him more anxious in regard to what meaſures he ſhould take for the good of his ſubjects; when he was appriſed that France, in conjunction with the other powers of Europe, had already entered, and again was entering into meaſures for dividing his dominions after his deceaſe.

THE marquiſs of Caſtel los Riós, a Catalan, whom king Charles had appointed his ambaſſador to France, and who was ſtill in Spain, had orders given him to ſet out as ſoon as poſſible for Paris. At his arrival he was to demand an audience of the king, and to repreſent to him, that his catholic majeſty being informed of the different negotiations carried on in England and Holland, could not without ſurpriſe obſerve, that in his life time they ſhould attempt to determine the fate of the monarchy after his deceaſe, and by an unparalleled convention divide the

the ſeveral ſtates belonging to his crown; that he not only flattered himſelf the king would not enter into, but even that he would oppoſe, any ſuch treaty; eſpecially as his catholic majeſty aſſured him, that he had come into no engagement in regard to the ſucceſſion, with any prince whatever, and as he gave him his royal word not to agree to any propoſal contrary to the intereſts of France. The ambaſſador was to add, that the leaſt his maſter could, and actually did, demand, was that they would leave him in the peaceable enjoyment of his dominions during the remainder of his days. He complained eſpecially of the treachery of the Engliſh and the Dutch.

THE Spaniſh ambaſſador was not yet arrived in France, when his majeſty in concert with king William, thought proper to acquaint the king of Spain with the meaſures taken by the allies for maintaining the general tranquillity, if unfortunately this prince ſhould leave no iſſue behind him. The marquiſs of Harcourt was commiſſioned to wait upon the king of Spain with a confirmation of the news, which he had already heard by public report, and to invite him to ſign the treaty.

IN like manner his majeſty ſolicited the emperor to come into the ſame meaſures. The marquiſs of Villars, whoſe military ſervices raiſed him afterwards to the command of the armies of France, as well as to the higheſt dignities of the king-

kingdom, was at that time envoy-extraordinary at the court of Vienna. There was room to judge by ſome hints, which count Kinſki, the emperor's prime-miniſter, let fall, that this prince would have no averſion againſt treating with the king, about a partition of the Spaniſh dominions, and regulating the conditions of it, before the death of Charles II. The marquiſs of Villars informed his maſter of thoſe hints; but they were very general, and could be conſidered only as the wiſhes of a miniſter thoroughly acquainted with the real intereſts of his maſter, and yet not at all authorized to negotiate and ſettle the articles of a treaty. At that time, France, together with England and Holland, was enquiring, by what means they could preſerve the peace, and prevent a general war, which threatened Europe, whenever the Spaniſh ſucceſſion ſhould be open, an event viſibly at hand. The firſt treaty of partition, reverſed afterwards by the deceaſe of the electoral prince of Bavaria, was upon the point of being concluded. The king, thinking it unadviſeable to change the prudent meaſures he had taken, and to be drawn aſide by the ſpecious diſcourſes of a miniſter who did not ſpeak a word in the emperor's name, only wrote to the marquiſs of Villars, whom he had not yet appriſed of the negotiation with England and Holland, then almoſt finiſhed, deſiring him to liſten to the propoſals, which either count Kinſki, or any of the other miniſters ſhould make him, to give

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an account of them to his majeſty, and coolly to wait for further orders. His majeſty well knew, that at this very time the emperor, ſupported by the credit of the queen of Spain, was uſing his ſtrongeſt endeavours, by means of his ambaſſadors at Madrid, to engage king Charles to declare the archduke his heir, to invite him into Spain in that quality, and to receive a ſufficient body of Imperial troops, in order to ſupport the pretenſions of that young prince.

IN the mean time count Kinſki died, and the other miniſters held quite a different language. The marquiſs of Villars could not entertain the leaſt doubt of the diſpoſitions of the court of Vienna, when, the year following, the king commanded him, by his diſpatches of the 6th of May 1700, to acquaint the emperor with the ſe- 1700.
cond treaty of partition, ſigned that ſame month of May, betwixt his moſt chriſtian majeſty, the king of England, and the ſtates-general of the United-Provinces. His majeſty ordered his miniſter at Vienna, to invite the emperor to accede to the treaty between him and his allies, which they had judged the only expedient for maintaining the public repoſe, and for preſerving Europe from the calamities of a general war. Villars was to deſire a ſpeedy and deciſive anſwer, and to forward it to his majeſty the moment he received it. The directions ſent to Vienna, were communicated likewiſe, by the king's orders, to count Zinzendorff, the emperor's ambaſſador to the court of France.

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THESE circumſtances, which did not happen till the following year 1700, have been related before their time, becauſe it is neceſſary to demonſtrate, that the king was not at liberty to enter into a convention with the emperor about a partition of the Spaniſh monarchy, rather than to treat with king William and the Dutch. This is not the only falſity, that has been ignorantly ſpread in regard to the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, nor the only lie that has been eſtabliſhed in prejudice to the truth. In vain did the marquiſs of Villars ſolicit the emperor and his miniſters, to give a deciſive anſwer to his majeſty's invitation. This anſwer was deferred from day to day, under the moſt frivolous pretences. Sometimes the Imperial miniſters inſiſted on a change of the principal conditions of the treaty. The emperor, they ſaid, could not bear the thoughts of ſeeing himſelf excluded from the poſſeſſion of Milan, and conſequently ſhut out of Italy: he wanted therefore to preſerve, at leaſt, that duchy; and in giving his conſent to the partition, he inſiſted on its being kept a ſecret, and eſpecially that it ſhould not be diſcloſed by any means to the court of Madrid. In exchange for the duchy of Milan, he offered his majeſty the Spaniſh Netherlands: a captious offer, deſigned only to excite the jealouſy of the king's allies, who would never have conſented to this exchange, and, of courſe, with a view of interrupting the harmony and good underſtanding neceſſary for the execution of the treaty.

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THUS theſe miniſters flattered themſelves with the hopes of gaining time, in order to excite jealouſies and diſquietudes at Madrid, and, while theſe were fermenting, to increaſe the number of friends which the houſe of Auſtria might have in Spain. The king of Spain was waſting very faſt, and very little hopes remained of his holding out much longer, when the emperor, being ſtrongly preſſed to explain himſelf, ordered his anſwer to be delivered to the marquiſs of Villars, the beginning of the month of May. It contained a poſitive refuſal to accede to the treaty of partition. But at that time this determination of the court of Vienna was uſeleſs, for the king of Spain's will, which had been received at Verſailles, with the news of his death, changed the whole face of affairs, as we ſhall find by reſuming the thread of theſe memoirs, and of the negotiation which had been continued the remainder of the year 1699, and during the whole courſe of the year 1700.

THE uncertainty of the emperor's reſolution 1699.
had ſerved as a pretext to retard the concluſion of the new treaty. King William and the States-General deferred ſigning it, in hopes, as they ſaid, of perſuading the emperor to enter into the ſame engagements.

DURING theſe delays, the king wanted to know the marquiſs of Harcourt's ſentiments, in regard to acquainting the king of Spain with the meaſures concerted, for ſecuring the general

quiet of Europe by a partition treaty; and his majeſty ordered the marquiſs in the month of July to ſend him his thoughts concerning this matter.

THE ambaſſador in his letters had given a faithful picture of the weak condition of Spain. He had always repreſented in the cleareſt terms to his majeſty, that he ought to lay no ſort of ſtreſs on the almoſt general deſire, which the nation expreſſed, of ſeeing a prince of the blood-royal of France called to the ſucceſſion of king Charles. That this favourable diſpoſition could be of no effect, the Spaniards being under an incapacity to ſupport it. For this very reaſon he had commended his majeſty's prudent reſolution in entering into a negotiation with the king of England and the republic of Holland; and he had looked upon the partition treaty, as the only proper and neceſſary meaſure, for preſerving the peace of Europe. And yet without altering his ſentiments he now made anſwer, "that he "was of opinion nothing could be a greater ob- "ſtruction to the ſucceſs of the treaty, than the "communicating it to the king of Spain and to "his council; that the propoſing to ſign it "would be equally odious to the prince and to "his ſubjects from the firſt to the laſt; that the "Spaniards looked upon the diſmemberment of "their monarchy, as the greateſt misfortune "that could happen them, either in regard to "the eſtates they poſſeſſed in its ſeveral parts, "or to the vice-royalties and preferments which

"they

" they expected, or to the honour and glory of
" the nation. All this, ſaid the marquiſs, will
" induce them upon ſuch an extremity to op-
" poſe it, at leaſt as far as their ſtrength will
" permit; and this declaration may at leaſt give
" them time to guard againſt entering into poſ-
" ſeſſion, and to render the execution of the
" treaty more difficult; beſides, as the dominions
" fallen to your majeſty's ſhare are moſt diffi-
" cult to ſeize, not only on account of their ma-
" ritime ſituation, but of their diſtance; and as
" the bulk of the people have time enough be-
" fore them to determine what party they ſhall
" take; affairs by this means become more per-
" plexed, without my ſeeing any advantage your
" majeſty can derive from this declaration. Be-
" ſides, king Charles will have reaſon to com-
" plain, that without mentioning a word to him
" about his ſucceſſion, a treaty had been entered
" into with other powers to divide it: and that,
" after pretending to make the public believe
" that the reaſon why they had forbeared men-
" tioning any thing about that ſubject was to
" avoid giving him the leaſt uneaſineſs, and not
" to haſten the end of his days; all of a ſud-
" den the contrary will appear, by acquainting
" him with the treaty of partition. And indeed
" if he ſhould happen to die at a ſeaſon when
" ſhips cannot keep the ſea, and the affair muſt
" be put off till the ſpring, your majeſty may
" judge that they will have time enough to take

" their meaſures; and if he lives till ſpring, " this declaration will give them as much time " as they ſhall want to put themſelves upon their " guard."

THE marquiſs of Harcourt, foreſeeing the diſturbances that would happen upon the death of the king of Spain, explained himſelf thus at the end of his letter: " No ſooner ſhall this prince " have cloſed his eyes, but there will be a ge- " neral confuſion, occaſioned by the diviſions of " the nobility, the diſſatisfaction of the people, " and the miſery to which they are reduced by " the dearneſs of all ſorts of proviſions; and if " there is no ſort of order or adminiſtration of " juſtice at preſent, much leſs are we to expect " it whenever that event ſhall happen.

" THE bent of the common people is ſo " greatly in favour of France, that there is all " the probability in the world of their coming " to me, as well as thoſe in higher ſtation, who " have not yet ventured to open their mouths, " eſpecially if they know nothing of the treaty. " Orders will be iſſued out to ſummon the " courts; and I hope that above all things your " majeſty will be ſo good as to lay your poſitive " injunctions on me, either to ſtay here till you " command me to depart, or to get away under " the pretence of going to receive your majeſty's " orders for my aſſiſting at the courts, as I do " not ſee that on this occaſion your majeſty's " ambaſſador can do any thing to ſerve you."

THE

THE laſt article of the letter contained, "that "the king of Spain was taken worſe than ever "laſt Thurſday evening; Friday and Saturday "he was very ill; Sunday he began to be better; "yeſterday and the day before he was up a few "hours; but every body is convinced he will re-"lapſe very ſoon, and that there is not the leaſt "proſpect or hopes of his recovery."

THESE conſiderations, ſo prudent and ſo ſolid, would have been ill placed, and could never have come from ſo intelligent a miniſter as the marquiſs of Harcourt, if by his artful negotiations at Madrid, he had induced the king of Spain to ſign a will ſuggeſted by France; for in that caſe it would have been ſufficient to have put the king in mind of what he had obtained in conſequence of his majeſty's orders, had it been poſſible for him to have forgot a point of ſuch importance, and probably wiſhed for.

IT has been a maxim of falſe politics, that it is incumbent upon a prince, ſometimes to deceive his ambaſſador. But on this occaſion the king would have acted altogether contrary to his intereſts, if he had had leſs confidence in the marquiſs of Harcourt's zeal and abilities, than thoſe Spaniards who were capable of facilitating the ſucceſs of his negotiation.

BUT were we even to ſuppoſe, that his majeſty had employed ſome obſcure negotiator, at the court of Spain, and concealed the knowledge of ſo important a point from his ambaſſador;

yet it was inconſiſtent with his intereſt, and we might ſay with his honour, as well as with the gratitude due in that caſe to the king of Spain, to afflict a dying prince without cauſe, of whoſe good intentions there could be no longer the leaſt doubt; and unſeaſonable, as well as againſt all reaſon, to acquaint him with a treaty directly contrary to the will, which his majeſty had obtained by ſecret and dark practices.

After examining the obſervations made by the marquiſs of Harcourt, his majeſty by his letter of the 16th of Auguſt, ſuſpended the orders he had given him to communicate the project of partition to the king of Spain, and to invite him to ſign it; but his view was only to wait a little longer for the emperor's definitive anſwer, this prince having given hopes that he would at length accept of the diſpoſitions made in his favour: then according to the terms of this letter "there will be no longer any inconveniency in communicating a project already become public. The Spaniards without ſtrength or government are unable of themſelves to hinder the execution of a treaty, which I ſhall have concluded with the emperor, England, and Holland, when all theſe powers will be equally intereſted in the ſucceſs of the meaſures taken for the tranquillity of Europe.

"But even if the Spaniards were able to traverſe this deſign, they could have recourſe to none

" none but to the emperor, who is engaged to " be ſatisfied with the ſhare allotted to the arch- " duke; conſequently, if the news of this treaty " ſhould alarm them, as there is not the leaſt " room to doubt but it will, the effect it is likely " to produce cannot be prejudicial to my inte- " reſts, ſince the emperor reaps no benefit from " it; on the contrary, the people of this mo- " narchy will conclude, as you perceive they do " at preſent, that the choice of the archduke " for their king would certainly involve them in " a war; that this prince would be too weak " to ſupport it; that it would be impoſſible for " him to maintain the monarchy entire againſt " me, and againſt the Engliſh and the Dutch; " and even, if he was able to withſtand all theſe " forces, Spain muſt not expect to have him, " ſince the emperor conſents to the treaty of par- " tition.

" IN theſe circumſtances it is certain, that " the complaints of the people ought to be ra- " ther againſt the emperor than againſt me. I " have given the king of Spain no room to be " diſſatisfied; I have avoided mentioning the " ſucceſſion, not caring to give him any uneaſi- " neſs in his life time; but I do nothing to his " prejudice, when I enter into meaſures for ſe- " curing the tranquillity of Europe after his de- " miſe. With this view I even relinquiſh the " greateſt part of my ſon's rights. The king " of Spain might have reaſon to complain, had

" he ſhewn himſelf diſpoſed to do juſtice to his " lawful heirs, and to make a will in favour of " my ſon, or of my grandſons; but inſtead of " ſuch a diſpoſition, ever ſince the peace the " whole talk has been about the electoral prince " of Bavaria; and, as ſoon as he died, my ears " have been dinned with the intrigues of the " Imperial miniſters at Madrid, ſoliciting that " court to ſend for the archduke, in order for " his being recognized as ſucceſſor to the whole " Spaniſh monarchy.

" TRUE it is that the people have ſeemed " deſirous, that if their king ſhould die, juſtice " may be done to the lawful heirs; but theſe are " no more than empty wiſhes; for I have not " ſeen the leaſt ſtep taken in favour of my ſon, or " of my grandſons, while the emperor's ambaſſa- " dor has had intereſt enough to change the " king of Spain's council, to remove thoſe mi- " niſters who had the greateſt ſhare in the con- " fidence of that prince, and to give a new form " to the adminiſtration, when he did not think " it ſufficiently favourable to his maſter's in- " tentions.

" No one ſhould be ſurpriſed that in this " conjuncture I have purſued other ways, for " ſecuring the peace of Europe, which would " ſurely have been diſturbed, whether the king " of Spain had lived and declared the archduke " his heir, or whether he had died without " making a will

" ALL theſe reaſons of which you may avail " yourſelf as occaſion offers, ſerve to convince " me that the complaints of the people can be " only againſt the emperor. You have not " amuſed the king of Spain with idle pro- " poſals: he would enter into no ſcheme with " me: my meaſures were concerted with other " powers; and, without making any diſa- " greeable ſolicitations to him about the ſuc- " ceſſion, I have ſettled matters in ſuch a man- " ner, that it is impoſſible for this event to di- " ſturb the public repoſe. Thus I do not ſee " what that prince and his ſubjects can have to " ſay againſt you, if he ſhould live yet long " enough to have the treaty communicated to " him; and if it ſhould not be publiſhed till af- " ter his deceaſe, their reproaches would fall " upon the emperor's ambaſſador, and not up- " on you. But as I am perſuaded that a people, " who expected the archduke for their ſove- " reign, would reſpect the emperor's ambaſſa- " dor; ſo there is much more reaſon to think " that the dread of my power, the conduct you " yourſelf have obſerved, and in ſhort the en- " gagements into which my honour muſt na- " turally lead me, will be ſufficient to enforce " that reſpect which is due to your character."

" THE meaſures that the Spaniards might " take, to hinder the execution of the treaty, " muſt be entirely uſeleſs, ſhould the emperor " enter into the engagements propoſed to him;

" for

" for in vain would they deſire to preſerve thoſe " dominions, which he who is to be their maſter " engaged to reſign to my ſon. You may very " well judge that if the emperor refuſes to ac- " cede to the treaty of partition, he will acquaint " the king of Spain with every particular, and " then it would be needleſs to give him any " other information.

" The uncertainty I am under in regard to " what ſtep the emperor will take, is the reaſon " why I cannot give any poſitive order concern- " ing the manner you are to conduct yourſelf, " in caſe of the king of Spain's demiſe. Should " the treaty be ſigned, all you would have then " to do, would be to join with the emperor's " ambaſſador, and with the Engliſh and Dutch " envoys; and to declare the terms of the " partition to the ſtates, or to the council if the " ſtates were not aſſembled; to let them ſee " that it was neceſſary for preſerving the gene- " ral peace; that it ſecures a laſting tranquillity " to Spain; and that as I ſhould take poſſeſſion " of the dominions deſigned for my ſon, at the " ſame time that the archduke ſet out for Spain, " there would be no other negotiation to con- " clude, ſo that you might return to France.

" But if it ſhould pleaſe God to take the " king of Spain to himſelf before the em- " peror has accepted the treaty, or ſhould " the time in which it ought to be ſigned, " and which was fixed to the 25th of September,

" be expired; in that caſe, all you have to do " is, to give a favourable reception to thoſe who " ſhould come to make propoſals to you, and " tell them that you will acquaint me there- " with; that I ſhall liſten to them with plea- " ſure; that at the ſame time they ſhould let " me know what means they have of expreſſing " their good-will by external effects; that you " will inform me thereof of courſe, and I ſhall " certainly have time to ſend you my orders be- " fore the ſtates can aſſemble. I have examined " whether it was proper to recall you directly " from your embaſſy, or to let you continue " ſome months longer; on the one hand I have " conſidered the inconveniency of leaving you " expoſed to the reſentment of the populace, " and perhaps not in a condition to maintain " the dignity of your character; and on the " other the prejudice my ſervice muſt ſuffer, " were I to recall you immediately.

" So long as the king of Spain lives, I ſee no " danger. If this prince dies, and the empe- " ror has ſigned the treaty, count Harrach will " be more expoſed than you. However I am " perſuaded, that you might eaſily ſupport each " other.

" If the emperor ſhould not have ſigned, the " people will ſtill have a greater reſpect for you. " They will perceive that the calling of the " archduke to the crown of Spain, cannot pre " vent a partition of their monarchy; that they

" ſhall

" ſhall be obliged to maintain a very diſadvan-
" tageous war, with forces much inferior to
" mine; and that inſtead of expecting any ſuc-
" cours from England and Holland, theſe two
" powers will join with me; ſo that far from
" apprehending any want of reſpect in the peo-
" ple, you will find them more deſirous of my
" aſſiſtance, as the only thing that can ſave the
" Spaniſh monarchy.

" FROM theſe reaſons I have concluded, that
" by continuing to reſide at Madrid, there is not
" the leaſt room for you to apprehend any in-
" ſult from the populace; and that very great
" inconveniencies would follow from my recall-
" ing you.

" THE ſtrongeſt reaſon for determining the
" emperor to give his conſent to the treaty, will
" be the notion of a very conſiderable party,
" which I may have in Spain; and that thoſe
" who compoſe it can traverſe every meaſure he
" may take, for having the archduke declared
" ſucceſſor to his catholic majeſty. I cannot re-
" call you, without giving juſt foundation to
" believe, that I myſelf am ſenſible how little
" this party is to be depended upon; that I
" abandon them; that the emperor has no need
" to be afraid of their hurting him; that of
" courſe by treating with me he muſt loſe all
" thoſe territories, which form my ſon's par-
" tition; and in ſhort that the archduke muſt
" be maſter of the whole monarchy, if he does

" but

" but wait to ſee what the people will do in his " favour.

" CERTAIN it is, that hitherto the king of " England, and the States General, have enter- " tained the ſame opinion of my party in Spain; " and it is not proper they ſhould alter it."

" YOU are too ſenſible of the importance of " theſe conſiderations, to be uneaſy that my " ſervice requires you to continue a few months " longer at Madrid."

HAD there been any reality in the ſecret will, which the king of Spain is ſuppoſed to have made unknown to the marquiſs of Harcourt, the orders contained in the letter of the 16th of Auguſt, would have been directly contrary to the king's intereſts; for this muſt have been the caſe, had the king given orders to an ambaſſador, from whom he had concealed the chief point of his negotiation, to prolong his ſtay at Madrid. In vain would he have acquired the eſteem of the Spaniſh nation during the courſe of his embaſſy; the ſtrong diſtruſt of his majeſty would have been ſufficient to bring him into diſcredit, at the very time when there was moſt need of ſhewing that entire confidence, which he really merited, and with which his majeſty had always honoured him. I leave it to any body, that has common ſenſe, to judge by the letter of the 16th of Auguſt, whether the opinion the king had of the zeal and capacity of his ambaſſador, ſuffered the leaſt diminution.

THE

THE publiſhing of the treaty of partition excited the vigilance of the council of Spain; and after the orders given to the marquiſs of Caſtel dos Rios to repair forthwith to Paris, the king of Spain thought proper to remove the uneaſineſs which the French ambaſſador might have, in conſequence of the reports that had been ſpread at Madrid, of his majeſty's having made ſome ſecret diſpoſitions in favour of the archduke.

THE cardinal of Cordova, appointed commiſſary to treat with the marquiſs of Harcourt, inſerted theſe words at the end of a memorial, which he had occaſion to ſend him, "That it "was not at all to be ſuppoſed, that his catholic "majeſty thought ſo little of the welfare of his "ſubjects, as, if he ſhould happen to die with-"out iſſue, not to leave matters duly ſettled for "maintaining the general peace, according to "juſtice. The cardinal added, that the ambaſ-"ſador might aſſure himſelf, and aſſure the king "his maſter, that there was no reſolution on the "carpet, concerning the important article of the "ſucceſſion."

ASSURANCES of the like kind had been given to the marquiſs of Harcourt, at the very time that king Charles was calling the electoral prince of Bavaria by his will to ſucceed to the crown of Spain. The memory of ſo recent a fact took away all credit from ſuch proteſtations.

HARCOURT had the ſame diſtruſt of king William's ſincerity. He had acquainted the king

king with his ſuſpicions; but his majeſty, whoſe intentions were upright, judged by his own heart of the ſincerity of his allies. King William ſeemed hitherto to have conſidered the negotiation commenced at Vienna, as his own affair, which he was engaged to bring to an happy iſſue. Heinſius, the penſionary of Holland, who was abſolutely dependant on this prince, expreſſed an equal eagerneſs and ſolicitude to finiſh the work; and the Dutch envoy had received expreſs orders, to uſe all his endeavours, in order to prevail upon the emperor to ſign the treaty of partition.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe appearances of ſincerity, things went on but ſlowly, and every day ſome new difficulty was ſtarted, to prevent the ſigning of the treaty, either on the part of the Engliſh, under pretence of oppoſitions in parliament, or on the part of the emperor. This treaty was to have been ſigned the 24th of September; and now the month of October was advanced, and nothing done. The pretence for theſe delays was the hopes which the allies of France ſtill entertained, of prevailing upon the emperor at length to ſign the ſame engagement. From that time, one would think that their principal aim was to weaken the French party in Spain, by letting thoſe, who compoſed it, ſee, that France undervalued and rejected their good-will, and wanted only to divide their monarchy. The king perſiſted ſtill in his opinion, that the allies were ſincerely deſirous of fulfilling their engagements.

AT

At length the emperor made anſwer, and the king was informed of it towards the end of October, that he rejected every treaty of partition whatſoever. About the ſame time, the Spaniſh ambaſſador arrived at Paris, and demanded a private audience of the king, which was granted him. He had orders from his maſter, to complain of the meaſures taken during his life-time, to parcel out his dominions after his deceaſe.
1699. The king anſwered, that he ſhould be ſorry to have given any juſt cauſe of complaint to the king his brother, his majeſty having nothing ſo much at heart as the welfare and preſervation of that prince, and to ſee him father of a numerous progeny; ſentiments founded as well on perſonal eſteem as on the ties of blood; and that it was theſe very reaſons that induced him to forward and preſs the concluſion of the laſt treaties of peace, his principal view hence-forward being to maintain a perfect and reciprocal harmony with his catholic majeſty, ſuch as nothing ſhould ever interrupt.

The Spaniſh miniſters at the principal courts of Europe, had orders to make very near the ſame complaints. They were louder in England and Holland, but equally inſignificant every where; for Spain was in ſuch a weak condition, that their king had it not in his power to reſent the treatment, of which he thought fit to complain. The kingdom was bereft of every reſource; neither did the adminiſtration repair the

want

want of money and forces. Diviſion equally reigned both in the council and at court. The queen, who had been hitherto abſolute miſtreſs of every diſpoſition that had been made, ſeemed to doubt, amidſt this general confuſion, what part ſhe ſhould take. Count Harrach being linked with her enemies, often traverſed her views. By his private intrigues he obliged her to diſcharge her favourite Berleps; tho' this woman, ever ſince ſhe had been in Spain, had laboured hard to promote the intereſt of his Imperial majeſty.

THE diſcarded favourite, upon her being ſent back to Germany, deſired a private conference of the marquiſs of Harcourt, before ſhe ſet out from Madrid. Her whole converſation turned on the motives, which the queen had to be diſſatisfied with count Harrach. Berleps had as great reaſon herſelf to hate him; ſo that joining her intereſt to that of her miſtreſs, ſhe ſaid that they both looked upon the Harrachs, father and ſon, as their mortal enemies. The father, ſaid ſhe, while he was at Madrid, and the ſon following his footſteps, have been at the head of every party, that has appeared againſt the queen; they have been continually finding fault with her conduct and mine. The ſon is now the ringleader of theſe nocturnal meetings, of a ſet of people that have conſpired to part the king and queen; while at the ſame time they ſend me back to Germany. Harrach, in cloſe connec-

tion with Monterey and Leganez, excites the people to revolt; and this worthy ambaſſador, who has been the queen's greateſt enemy, as well as his father, not content with the miſchief which he has done at Madrid, has moreover painted my miſtreſs in the blackeſt colours to the court of Vienna. He perfectly imitates his father, who ſaid one day to the prince of Darmſtadt, that there were only two roads left for queen dowagers that had no iſſue, one to the convent of *Deſcalças Reales* (1) and the other to the Eſcurial.

THE ſecond treaty of partition was not yet ſigned at the beginning of December. Harcourt, who had always ſuſpected the ſincerity of king William and of the Dutch, was of opinion that the king ought to avail himſelf of the preſent diſinclination of the queen to the court of Vienna, and to make ſome advantageous offers to her, in order to wean that princeſs entirely from the emperor's party. He obſerved notwithſtanding, that even if ſhe were to perſuade her huſband to make a will in favour of a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, ſimilar to that which he had before made in favour of the late prince of Bavaria, ſuch a diſpoſition could have no force, unleſs it was approved of by the ſtates of the kingdoms of Caſtile and Arragon; but that the meeting of thoſe ſtates was a thing, which the king of Spain could not bear the thoughts of,

(1) A convent of Carmelite nuns.

of, having long ſince taken a reſolution never to ſummon them while he lived; and that the queen, and thoſe who had moſt credit and influence at court, would conſider themſelves to be equally intereſted in oppoſing that aſſembly.

THO' his majeſty was loth to ſuſpect the ſincerity of king William, or even of the dubious Dutch, yet the artifices they uſed to retard the ſigning of the treaty were ſo obvious, that he thought it prudent to give inſtructions to the marquiſs of Harcourt, to try the method hinted at by Berleps, to the end that he might have an opportunity of treating with the queen of Spain, if by any unforeſeen accident the new treaty of partition ſhould break off.

IN the midſt of this uncertainty, the king of Spain grew a great deal worſe, ſo that they doubted of his life, the beginning of January 1700. The conference between the marquiſs of Harcourt and Berleps had been productive of no effect; conſequently no meaſure had been taken with the queen, and of courſe there was not the leaſt probability that the king of Spain ſhould make any ſettlement in favour of France, neither could the king depend upon the ſincerity of his allies.

THE ſigning of the ſecond treaty or partition at London the 13th of May 1700, removed all theſe ſuſpicions. The ſame treaty was ſigned at the Hague by the deputies of the States-General,

the 29th of the ſame month and year; but the emperor perſiſted in refuſing to accede to it.

The Dauphin's ſhare was to conſiſt of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the port-towns on the Tuſcan coaſt, the iſlands ſituated in that ſea, and of the province of Guipuſcoa, according to the firſt treaty. To this the ſecond added the duchies of Lorrain and Bar; which the duke of Lorrain agreed to reſign, in exchange for the duchy of Milan.

If the emperor acceded to the treaty, it was ſpecified that the archduke ſhould have Spain, the Indies, and the Low-Countries to his ſhare. By a ſeparate article it was agreed, that the emperor ſhould be allowed three months to conſider of it; and that if he did not accept of the partition at the expiration of that term, the allies would ſettle among themſelves, what prince they ſhould ſubſtitute in the room of the archduke: an article ſo much the more important, as the court of Vienna, naturally ſlow in determining, would defer coming to a reſolution, if there was the leaſt room to hope for advantage from its dilatorineſs, or from any unforeſeen event, that might give a turn to the meaſures ſet on foot, for maintaining the tranquillity of Europe.

The ſigning of the new treaty put an end to all kind of negotiation at Madrid; when the king in compliance with the repeated ſolicitations of the marquiſs of Harcourt, conſented to his

his returning to France, Blecourt an old officer of foot, who underſtood fighting much better than negotiating, was entruſted with what trifling buſineſs there might be hereafter occaſion to tranſact at the court of Spain.

A LITTLE before the ſigning the treaty of partition it was whiſpered about, that ſome ſecret diſpoſitions had been made in favour of the archduke. The common opinion was that the king of Spain had appointed him his heir. The marquiſs of Harcourt, who was ſtill at Madrid, inſiſted upon an explanation from Ubilla, ſecretary to the *deſpacho univerſal*. The ſecretary ſeemed to be embarraſſed; this increaſed the ambaſſador's ſuſpicions, which would have never happened, if in the courſe of his embaſſy he had obtained that famous will, which the Dutch writers pretend he had negotiated, or rather purchaſed, in favour of the duke of Anjou.

THE reports concerning the archduke gained ground, inſomuch that even the principal nobility at the court of Spain, ſeemed not to know what to believe. The count of Oropeza, who was ſtill in exile, deſired the marquiſs of Harcourt to inform him of what he knew in regard to ſuch a ſettlement; at the ſame time he aſſured him that it would be contrary to his opinion, being perſuaded that the chuſing a prince of the line of France, to ſucceed the preſent king, would be the only means of ſecuring the happineſs of Spain.

THESE doubts were not yet cleared up, when the marquiſs of Harcourt, finding it of no ſervice to his maſter to prolong his ſtay at Madrid, took his leave of the king and queen of Spain. He ſet out upon his journey the 20th of May; at a time when the council of Spain were employed about ways and means for raiſing and maintaining new troops. No body doubted but theſe preparations were made with a deſign to ſupport the ſettlement in favour of the archduke. The public formed this judgment from the long conferences, which dom Franciſco Molez, appointed ambaſſador to the court of Vienna, had frequently and in private with the king and queen of Spain; and from the orders he received to ſet out directly upon his embaſſy. He had obtained this poſt, by the intereſt of his protector the admiral, in preference to Caſtel dos Rios. The buſineſs which was to be tranſacted at the court of Vienna, ſeemed to be moſt important; and the conduct thereof was entruſted to Molez, a perſon devoted to the admiral; while Caſtel dos Rios was nominated ambaſſador to the court of France, as to a place where he ſhould have no occaſion to negotiate, no affair of conſequence to manage: and yet Caſtel dos Rios was obliged to his commiſſion the year following for the vice-royalty of the Indies; while Molez, firmly attached to the emperor's intereſts, was poorly rewarded for his zeal, and forced at length to renounce his country. Thus providence laughs

at the projects formed by ambition, and oftentimes defeats those designs, which human policy seems to have planned with the highest wisdom, and conducted with the greatest prudence.

THE marquis was setting out upon his journey, when the king acquainted the emperor with the treaty of partition, inviting him to accede to it. His majesty ordered it to be communicated to the Spanish ambassador, with the same invitation to the king his master. All the answer he desired Blecourt to make, if they should speak to him about it at Madrid, was, that the Spaniards ought not to be surprized, at his having taken the necessary precautions, for preventing the injustice, which threatened the lawful heirs of the king of Spain; and for maintaining the tranquillity of Europe: especially as his catholic majesty had not shewn, since the peace, the least disposition, either in favour of the dauphin, or of his children; but that all his views on the contrary, were directed either towards the late electoral prince of Bavaria, or the archduke.

BLECOURT acquainted the king with the different effects, which the news of a second treaty of partition produced at Madrid. He wrote word that the queen, transported with passion, had expressed the extreme agitation of her mind, at the expence of the furniture of her apartment. That the council was assembled the next day; that expresses had been dispatched to the admiral, and to the counts of Oropeza and Monterey,

all three at that time in exile, to aſk their opinions on ſo important a conjuncture. That the people were grieved, and ſorely afraid of falling under the German yoke: that the Arragonians ſaid, in caſe his preſent majeſty ſhould happen to die, they would chuſe ſuch a ſucceſſor, as ſuited the kingdom of Arragon.

The people in general confeſſed that the king of France had juſtly concerted his meaſures, and acted prudently in ſetting a treaty of partition on foot; but the general odium fell upon the Engliſh and the Dutch.

Count Harrach, unſeaſonably aſſuming the imperious ſwaggering ſtyle of the court of Vienna, gave out that his maſter would ſooner loſe the Imperial crown, than ſubmit to the injuſtice done him; and that whatever might be the conſequence, he would be revenged.

Cardinal Portocarrero, who had retired ſome months before to Toledo, received orders from the king his maſter to repair forthwith to Madrid. He obeyed; but ſo great was his concern upon ſeeing what he had ſo often predicted, that he declared he would not appear in council. He appeared there nevertheleſs, and they had warm debates; but being divided in their opinions, they broke up without coming to any concluſion.

The kingdom was in a general confuſion; and no hopes of relief. It was propoſed to recall the exiled members, and to form a petty council conſiſting only of four or five perſons.

The

The people of Madrid, far from murmuring againſt France, redoubled their vows for a prince of that family. The members of the council of ſtate, excepting the old count of Aguilard, expreſſed themſelves in the ſame ſtyle as the people. The queen, ſtill biaſſed in favour of the emperor, notwithſtanding the great reaſon ſhe had to complain of that prince, begged the king her huſband to ſuſpend all ſort of reſolution, till he could have an anſwer from Vienna.

THIS prince was ſilent; yet he conſulted, both at home and abroad, thoſe, whoſe opinions were moſt likely to be agreeable to juſtice, to the good of his ſubjects, and of courſe to the tranquillity of his conſcience. He had already applied to different theologians and civilians in Spain and Naples, as well as to different biſhops. He reſolved alſo to take advice of the biſhop of Covença, a natural ſon of Philip IV. and archbiſhop of Sarragoça. They were all unanimous; not one of them making the leaſt doubt but the princes of the line of France were entitled to ſucceed him. But this was not ſufficient to quiet the ſcruples of a monarch, who was juſt going to give an account of his conduct in the other world.

BLECOURT was informed that this prince had diſpatched a courier to Rome the beginning of the preceding June; and that he waited for his return with great impatience. At Madrid they knew nothing of the motive for diſpatching this courier;

courier; but Lewis XIV. learnt it of cardinal Janſon, who had the care of his majeſty's affairs at the court of Rome.

CHARLES II. not ſatisfied with the opinions which he had taken in Spain, would likewiſe conſult the head of the church. Cardinal Pignatelli, a Neapolitan, who was elected Pope by the name of Innocent XII. in the year 1692, ſtill filled the holy ſee. The king of Spain wrote to him with his own hand, and ſet before him the danger to which the treaty of partition expoſed the catholic religion, not in the leaſt doubting but that the Engliſh and the Dutch were to have ſome ſhare in the diſmemberment of his monarchy.

HE complained moſt bitterly of a ſcheme being formed and agreed upon, while he was yet living, to parcel out his dominions. He repreſented to his holineſs the calamities and miſeries in which ſuch an enterprize muſt involve Europe; the wars which it would inevitably give riſe to, and in particular the miſchiefs which it portended to the holy ſee. He concluded his letter with appriſing his holineſs, of the repeated inſtances, with which he was ſolicited by the council of Spain, to appoint one of the dauphin's younger ſons his heir, as the only means of preſerving his ſubjects from the calamities they had reaſon to apprehend, whenever it ſhould pleaſe God to call him out of this world. He aſked the Pope's advice upon ſo important a point, as alſo his prayers, being fully reſolved to ſacrifice his own

own private will to the good, and to the tranquillity of his kingdoms.

THE letter was written the 8th of June 1700, and directed to the duke of Duceda, the Spaniſh ambaſſador at Rome. King Charles wrote alſo to this miniſter with his own hand, and gave him orders privately to deliver the letter directed for the Pope, and of which he ſent him a copy, to his holineſs in perſon, ſtrictly charging him to keep it very ſecret. Uride diſcloſed it to cardinal Janſon, and the king was ſoon appriſed of it.

UPON an affair of ſuch importance, the pope choſe to have the opinion of ſome of the cardinals; three of whom, diſtinguiſhed by their virtue, capacity, and merit, were the perſons he conſulted. The firſt was Spada, who had been heretofore appointed nuncio in France, and was afterwards ſecretary of ſtate; the ſecond was cardinal Albano, who ſucceeded a few months after to Innocent XII. and took the name of Clement XI. the third was cardinal Spinola San-Cæſareo. When the conſultation was over, "his "holineſs anſwered the king of Spain, com-"mending his piety, and his zeal for religion, "as well as for the good of his ſubjects, and "concluding that he ought not to depart from "the opinion of his majeſty's council, founded "on the neceſſary principle of ſecuring the union "and entire preſervation of his monarchy."

THE

THE king of France having had certain advice of this whole tranſaction from cardinal Janſon, could no longer entertain any doubt of king Charles's intentions in favour of one of the princes of France. Yet his majeſty perſiſted in the reſolution of adhering to the engagements he had entered into and renewed by the ſecond treaty, notwithſtanding any reaſon he might have to doubt of the ſincerity of his allies, who by their delays, by their continual difficulties, and by their great repugnance to agree upon the neceſſary meaſures for executing the treaty, rendered themſelves every day more ſuſpected. The king likewiſe knew that the affection of the Spaniards, for a prince of his family, gained ground, and was no longer a ſecret. Cardinal Portocarrero gloried in his ſentiments; he had agreed with Blecourt to acquaint him with every thing that might contribute to the ſucceſs of an event big with ſuch immenſe advantages to Spain. At that time very few had any notion of ſerving the emperor; among thoſe few were reckoned the marquiſs of Leganez, and the ſecretary Ubilla.

NOTWITHSTANDING the alliance betwixt the United-Provinces and France, the Dutch reſident at Madrid, who had been excluded from all public function, on account of a perſonal quarrel, had frequent conferences by night with Leganez in the ſtreets of Madrid. There was no Engliſh miniſter then at the court of

Spain;

Spain; ſo that Blecourt was left alone, to make head againſt the emperor's ambaſſador.

IN the month of July, count Harrach offered 1700.
the king of Spain twenty thouſand Imperialiſts, to guard the duchy of Milan, the ſame number for Naples, and the ſame for Sicily. Empty promiſes, which it was impoſſible for his court to perform. Indeed, they were ſcarce liſtened to; and the count perceived that they were grown the ſubject of deriſion. He therefore changed ſtyle; and to weaken the French party, he propagated a report, as if Lewis XIV. had declared in expreſs terms, that if the Spaniſh monarchy was offered to one of the princes his grandſons, his majeſty would refuſe it. He further affirmed, that Blecourt had mentioned it, in poſitive terms, in conſequence of the orders he had received from his court.

A SPEECH of ſuch a nature, though falſe, made, nevertheleſs, an impreſſion on the mind of the king of Spain. He had promiſed Portocarrero, to appoint a prince of the line of France to ſucceed him; and as the cardinal preſſed him to perform his word, he made anſwer, that his honour would ſuffer, ſhould the king of France refuſe to approve of his choice. At the ſame time he renewed his inſtances to the emperor, not to liſten to any propoſal of a partition. Further, he gave orders to the viceroys of Naples and Sicily, as well as to the governor of Milan, to receive a body of troops, which the

emperor propoſed to ſend them. And yet the Spaniſh ambaſſador to the court of France poſitively declared, that the king his maſter had not nominated his ſucceſſor.

THIS contradiction in his catholic majeſty's conduct, was owing to the inceſſant ſolicitations of the queen of Spain. The king was now reduced ſo low by a train of inveterate diſorders, as to be ſenſible of the approaches of death; yet during the whole month of Auguſt his health ſeemed to be better than uſual. Count Harrach taking an advantage of his imbecility, made him promiſe that he would conſult his council no more; and yet a few days afterwards, this ſame prince told the duke of Medina Sidonia, that he would follow the advice of his council, and nominate a prince of France his ſucceſſor to the crown; but that he could not reſolve to invite him into Spain.

AFTER ſo open a declaration, the duke of Medina Sidonia preſſed Blecourt more than ever, to let him know whether the king would accept of the entire ſucceſſion of the Spaniſh monarchy for one of the princes his grandſons, as there was no manner of reaſon to doubt of his catholic majeſty's being ready to make ſuch a diſpoſition, as ſoon as he was ſure it would not be rejected.

CASTEL dos Rios, the Spaniſh ambaſſador in France, had orders to inform himſelf particularly in regard to the king's intentions.

THE

THE Spaniards were all unanimous; the clergy, the council of ſtate, and the gentlemen of the long robe, all acknowledged the dauphin's rights, and wiſhed to ſee the crown of Spain ſettled on one of that prince's ſons. At Madrid they were in hopes that the king of England would not perform his engagements. It was a bleſſing the whole nation longed for, and what the conduct of the Dutch reſident gave room to expect; for his correſpondence with the marquiſs of Leganez continued, and he had frequent conferences with the Imperial ambaſſador, though he aſſured Blecourt of the contrary.

COUNT Harrach was not at all diſcouraged; he ſtill expected a change, and notwithſtanding the reaſons which the queen had of being diſatisfied with his conduct, with his ſpeeches, and with the accounts which he ſent to the emperor, ſtill he grounded his hopes not only on the credit, but likewiſe on the ſincerity of that princeſs. Accordingly ſhe obtained an order for the council of ſtate to aſſemble; and they were acquainted by a meſſage from the king, that the partiality they ſhewed in favour of a prince of France, was diſpleaſing to his majeſty. Notwithſtanding this declaration, ſeven members of the council were not deterred from giving a ſtronger confirmation of their former opinion in favour of a ſon of the dauphin.

THE

THE king of Spain was taken dangerouſly ill again, towards the end of September; and finding himſelf at the point of death, he received the laſt ſacrament of the church. It was privately whiſpered, that he had confirmed the teſtamentary diſpoſition in favour of the archduke, appointed the queen regent, and eſtabliſhed a council.

THE beginning of October people altered their ſentiments. Blecourt wrote word to the king, that it was rumoured at Madrid, as if one of the dauphin's ſons had been called to the crown of Spain; that cardinal Portocarrero had ſteadily and effectually exerted his utmoſt endeavours for a prince of the line of France; and that he had hindered the king from executing a contrary will, extorted from him by the queen.

AT length the event, foreſeen by all Europe, happened. Charles II. ſovereign of ſo many different dominions, died the firſt of November in the year 1700; and his death in a very little time occaſioned a general combuſtion in Europe.

BY his will, ſigned the 2d of the October preceding, he acknowledged the right of his ſiſter, the infanta Maria Tereſa, queen of France, and mother of the dauphin; as alſo the right of his aunt queen Anne, and conſequently that of the dauphin, the only heir according to the laws of the kingdom; but to prevent all Europe from being alarmed at the uniting of ſuch extenſive dominions

dominions to the crown of France, of which the dauphin was the only presumptive heir, Charles called the duke of Anjou, the dauphin's second son, to the succession, appointing him sole heir to all his kingdoms and lordships, without any exception or partition whatsoever. He ordered all his subjects and vassals to acknowledge him for their lawful sovereign. But till this young prince came to Madrid, and even till he was of age, his majesty ordained a council of regency or *junto*, for the administration of the state; and nominated the members of which it was to be composed, placing the queen at the head.

IMMEDIATELY upon the king of Spain's decease, the *junto* wrote to his most christian majesty, giving him notice of this event; and the Spanish ambassador had orders to deliver the will to his majesty, together with the letter signed by the queen and the members of the *junto*.

AS they were in doubt at Madrid, whether the king of France would accept of the last proposals of his catholic majesty; in case of such a refusal, the *junto* ordered Castel dos Rios, to make the same courier who had been sent from Madrid, proceed forthwith to Vienna; the intention of the late king having been to bequeath the entire succession to the archduke, in case the first settlement should not be accepted in France.

THE king was then at Fontainebleau. Upon the arrival of the courier, the Spanish ambassa- 1700.

dor communicated the orders he had juſt received, to the ſecretary of ſtate for foreign affairs, and demanded a private audience of his majeſty. The king, before he would fix the hour, was deſirous of having the opinion of his council, upon an event ſo unexpected, and yet ſo important to the royal family, to the welfare of the kingdom, and to the general tranquillity of Europe.

The council conſiſted of the dauphin, who was principally intereſted in the ſettlement made by the king of Spain; of the count of Pontchartrain, chancellor of France; of the duke of Beauvilliers, preſident of the council of finances, and governor to the young princes of France; and of the marquiſs of Torcy, ſecretary of ſtate for the foreign department.

It was eaſier to foreſee than to prevent the conſequences of the deciſion in queſtion. His majeſty had engaged himſelf to reject every diſpoſition whatſoever, made by the king of Spain in favour of a prince of the line of France; an engagement that excluded either a will, a donation, or any other form of deed or ſettlement. By breaking his engagements, he would incur the cenſure of violating the ſacred word of a king; and moreover the conſequence of ſuch a violation was inevitable war. His chief view in haſtening the concluſion of the peace ſigned at Ryſwic, was, to let his people have time to breathe after a long ſeries of wars; and now when they had ſcarce begun to enjoy a

little repoſe, they muſt be obliged to ſupport a new war, which would ſoon become general: for there was not the leaſt room to expect, that the neighbouring princes, who were ſo greatly alarmed at the power of France, would tamely ſuffer the king to extend his authority, ſo as to have the ſupreme direction, in the name of his grandſon, of the dominions ſubject to the crown of Spain in the old and new world.

ON the other hand, it was to be conſidered, that if the king refuſed to accept of the will, this ſame deed transferred the entire ſucceſſion to the archduke. The ſame courier that had been diſpatched into France, would proceed to Vienna: and the Spaniſh nation without any heſitation would acknowledge the emperor's ſecond ſon for their king. The houſe of Auſtria of courſe would reunite, betwixt the father and ſon, the power of Charles V. a power heretofore ſo fatal to France. And beſides all ſecurity for preſerving the peace of Ryſwic would ceaſe, the treaty of partition being no longer ſufficient to maintain it.

THE emperor had obſtinately refuſed to ſign this treaty, at a time when he had reaſon to apprehend the effect of the connexions of France with England and Holland. His alarms were diſſipated by the ſecret advices, which the miniſters of theſe two powers had communicated to thoſe of the court of Vienna. As no preparations were making on their ſide, this prince had

not the leaſt room to ſuſpect, that king William and the Dutch entertained any deſign of ſupporting the diſpoſition of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion by force of arms. It was therefore to be preſumed, that now when the emperor was perfectly eaſy, he would never accept of what he had refuſed when he had all the reaſon in the world to be alarmed.

THE king, by rejecting the will, had no other courſe left than either entirely to reſign the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, or to wage war, in order to conquer that part which the treaty of partition had aſſigned to France.

A GENERAL renunciation would deprive the princes, his children, of their lawful rights, acknowledged by king Charles, and by the Spaniſh nation; and enrich, at their expence, that houſe of Auſtria, whoſe hatred to France was ſo violent, that the emperor choſe rather to run the riſque of loſing all, than conſent to ſhare the immenſe ſucceſſion with this crown.

IF the king determined upon going to war, in order to ſupport the engagements he had contracted with England and Holland, there was no doubt but he would be obliged to bear the whole burden of it by himſelf; but more than this, there was room to expect that ſoon after the war was commenced, theſe faithleſs allies would join with his majeſty's enemies, to oppoſe the execution of that very treaty, which he had been ſo greatly afraid of infringing.

TO maintain that treaty, he muſt go to war; but this war would be onerous to France, and moreover unjuſt. What reaſon could the king have for declaring it againſt Spain? By what title could he ſeize on part of her dominions? What injury had Charles II. done to France, in acknowledging one of her princes for his univerſal heir? And where was the wrong done to the French nation, if the Spaniards ſubmitted and conformed to the juſt will of their ſovereign? The whole kingdom made a voluntary and unlimited offer of itſelf; and France, by rejecting that offer, would conſider the Spaniards as enemies, without any other reaſon than believing, that it was more agreeable to her intereſts to ſeize upon part of the Spaniſh dominions; and without any other right than that of a treaty, the eſſential conditions of which had been already violated by her allies.

WAR being inevitable, it was much better it ſhould be for ſupporting the cauſe that had moſt juſtice on its ſide; and this was ſurely that of the will, ſince the king of Spain called his natural heirs to the ſucceſſion, from which they had been unjuſtly excluded by his predeceſſors.

THERE was reaſon to believe that, notwithſtanding the bad ſtate of her finances, Spain would yet be able to aſſiſt the king, in oppoſing the partition of her territories. To enable him to defend her, ſhe was ready to put him in poſſeſſion of ſtrong towns, and of harbours,

whoſe ſituation would facilitate the commerce of France, and might ruin that of her enemies. Beſides, there might be ſome hope that the Indies would be of no ſmall aſſiſtance.

With theſe arguments did the ſecretary of ſtate enforce the opinion, which he opened in council, of accepting the will.

The duke of Beauvilliers, who ſpoke next, concluded with abiding by the treaty of partition, from a perſuaſion that France muſt be ruined by another war, which would be the certain conſequence of accepting the will.

The chancellor enlarged upon the different advantages on each ſide of the queſtion, ſetting each of them, alternately, in the cleareſt light; he then ſummed up the inconveniencies attending them; but not preſuming to determine upon a queſtion of ſuch importance, where the deciſion would be generally praiſed or cenſured according to the event, he concluded that his majeſty alone, whoſe experience ſurpaſſed that of his miniſters, was capable of deciding, from the lights he had received, what he judged moſt agreeable to his glory, to the intereſt of his family, and to the general good of his ſubjects.

The dauphin delivered himſelf in few words, and without any ſort of heſitation concluded on accepting the will; more pleaſed to ſee his ſecond ſon reign over the whole monarchy of Spain, than with being ſovereign himſelf of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily.

The

THE king determined to accept the will; but deſired that this reſolution ſhould be kept ſecret for ſome days.

THE writers of theſe latter times have falſely aſſerted, that madam de Maintenon aſſiſted at this council, and gave her opinion.

THE Spaniſh ambaſſador was afterwards admitted to a private audience, in the king's own cloſet, where he had the honour to preſent unto his majeſty the will of the late king of Spain, with a letter from the *junto*, ſigned by the queen dowager and by the miniſters of which this council was compoſed.

THE king in confidence appriſed him of the reſolution he had taken; but as it was not to be declared till his majeſty's return to Verſailles, he charged him to keep it ſecret a few days longer; but that he might not retard the Spaniſh courier, he took care the next day to let the ambaſſador have his letter in anſwer to the *junto*.

As ſoon as the king's reſolution of accepting the will became public, it raiſed ſuch an outcry and uneaſineſs, in all parts of Europe, as had been foreſeen and expected. The transferring the crown of Spain to the houſe of Bourbon, was one of the moſt important events that had happened for many ages, and the moſt likely to rekindle a general war immediately. Yet the king was deſirous of preſerving peace; for this end he

uſed the precaution to form alliances abroad, while at home he gave orders for oppoſing a ſufficient force to thoſe powers, who might be tempted to declare againſt his majeſty, or againſt the king his grandſon.

He entered therefore into a treaty with the king of Portugal, with the duke of Savoy, and with the duke of Mantua, who took a French garriſon into his capital.

In Germany his allies were the duke of Brunſwick Wolfembuttle, the duke of Saxe Gotha, and the biſhop of Munſter. The elector of Saxony, king of Poland, was juſt upon the point of joining in the ſame alliance, when the ſituation of affairs in Europe came to alter.

The moſt faithful and at the ſame time the moſt powerful of the king's allies in Germany, was the elector of Bavaria, at that time governor of the Spaniſh Netherlands. He prevailed likewiſe with his brother the elector of Cologne, to enter into the ſame engagements. Theſe two princes, uncles of king Philip V. reſolved in all events to maintain their nephew's rights, and notwithſtanding the loſs of their eſtates and dignities, they ſteadily adhered to the cauſe they had eſpouſed, as the moſt juſt.

The king of Great-Britain and the States-General of the United-Provinces ſeemed as much offended with his majeſty's breaking thro' the treaty of partition, as if they had faithfully performed

every

every article of it themſelves: yet they were for ſome time at a loſs which party to take. After very heavy complaints, the Dutch, conſulting the intereſts of their commerce, acknowledged the king of Spain. Dubious of their allies, and of their ability to maintain a new war at a time when they ſtood greatly in need of peace, they amuſed the king all the next year with a ſham negotiation; which was not diſcontinued till the fear and jealouſy of ſo great an acceſſion of power to France, determined king William and the Dutch to unite at length with the houſe of Auſtria; when, in order to maintain their reſpective intereſts, the famous treaty, called *the grand alliance*, was ſigned at the Hague the 7th of September 1701 by the emperor's miniſters, and 1701.
thoſe of Great-Britain and Holland.

THE flames of war had already broke out in Italy. The prince of Vaudemont, governor of Milan, obeyed the laſt will of Charles II. as did alſo the other governors of the ſeveral dominions ſubject to the Spaniſh monarchy. Purſuant to the prince of Vaudemont's deſire, the king ſent a body of troops to defend the duchy of Milan. His majeſty afterwards ordered a ſtrong army to march into that duchy, and declared the duke of Savoy generaliſſimo. The emperor on his ſide cauſed his army to enter Italy. If the ſincerity of the prince who commanded the French forces, had been equal

to his valour; France and Spain would have had reaſon to promiſe themſelves a happy iſſue of that war.

DURING the firſt year, the emperor ſtood his ground alone (1). By the treaty ſigned at the Hague, his allies had engaged to ſend him ſpeedy ſuccours; but to render king William's promiſes effectual, the parliament of England muſt have firſt approved of that prince's engagements.

THE Engliſh are a people rarely unanimous in their ſentiments. At that time the diſputes ran very high betwixt whigs and tories. The king of Great-Britain favoured the former, entruſting them with the chief poſts and employments. He was ſure indeed of their votes in parliament; but he could not be ſure of bringing the nation into a new quarrel, when ſhe was groaning under the weight of the former war, and ſtill felt the prejudice it had done to her commerce. Perhaps it would have ſignified but little, to have repreſented to thoſe who bear the burthen of the taxes, that Europe was in imminent danger of being oppreſſed, unleſs the love of liberty united thoſe princes and ſtates, whoſe intereſt it was to oppoſe the king of France's ambitious deſigns. The old bug-bear of univerſal monarchy had leſs

(1) In 1701 prince Eugene forced the poſt of Crepi, and remained maſter of the whole country between the Adige and the Adda. Marſhal Catinat met with ſeveral checks. The battle of Chiari, fought the firſt of September, proved unlucky to France.

leſs effect upon the minds of the Engliſh, than the dread of new taxes in caſe of another war.

BUT the death of king James II. and eſpe- 1701.
cially his majeſty's reſolution of acknowledging the prince of Wales as king of Great-Britain, altered the diſpoſitions which a great part of the people ſeemed to have towards peace. The different parties united. The whole Engliſh nation looked upon it as the greateſt indignity, that France ſhould pretend to arrogate a right of giving them a king, in oppoſition to a prince of their own inviting, who had reigned over them many years.

KING William profited of this general reſentment of the people, and in the ſpeech which he made to both houſes of parliament, he treated the recognition of the prince of Wales, not only as the higheſt indignity that could be offered to his perſon and to the nation, but likewiſe as an act equally intereſting to the proteſtant religion, to the preſent and future tranquillity of Europe, and to the real happineſs of England.

NEITHER did he forget the danger to which the commerce of England was expoſed, in its principal branches, by an union between Spain and France.

THUS flattering the temper and diſpoſition of the Engliſh, king William received from both houſes, the higheſt aſſurances of indignation againſt France, of zeal for preſerving the repoſe

and

and liberty of England as well as of all Europe, and of an earneſt deſire to ſupport the rights of the houſe of Auſtria, as the only means of eſtabliſhing the public repoſe on a ſolid baſis.

He obtained alſo the neceſſary ſupplies for commencing and carrying on a war, which he had recommended to them, and which the nation looked upon as indiſpenſable; fully determined "to agree to no peace till they had received ſatisfaction for the great indignity "offered them, in acknowledging the pretended "prince of Wales."

In order to carry on the war, the commons reſolved to raiſe and maintain forty thouſand land forces, for the quota which the king of Great-Britain was to contribute to the grand alliance; and forty thouſand ſeamen for the fleet. King William made a further demand of ſeven thouſand men, which was granted.

While ſuch a number of enemies were combining againſt France, ſhe received very little aſſiſtance from Spain, that kingdom having been long in a very feeble condition; yet it was to be ſupported by immenſe expences, which were neceſſary for preſerving the different parts of a monarchy, ſo ill adminiſtered for many years.

The beginnings of the war were fortunate to France, and the campaign of 1703 did honour

to

to her in Germany (1). Briſac ſurrendered to the duke of Burgundy. Marſhal Tallard took Landau, and defeated, in the neighbourhood of Spire, the enemy's army, commanded by the prince of Heſſe, who was afterwards king of Sweden.

THE

(1) WE ſhall give here the chief operations of the war during the years 1702 and 1703. In 1702 the Imperialiſts entered the duchy of Mirandola. Prince Eugene ſurpriſed Cremona, and was driven from thence the ſame day, the firſt of February: on which occaſion marſhal Villeroy was made priſoner. The duke of Vendome obliged prince Eugene the 24th of May to raiſe the ſiege of Mantua; and defeated general Viſconti at Santa Vittoria the 26th of July. Albergotti made himſelf maſter of Reggio and Modena. Both ſides claimed the victory at the battle of Luzara, fought the 15th of Auguſt. The duke of Vendome took Luzara and Guaſtalla. In Flanders the allies took Venlo the 23d of September, Ruremond the 8th of October, and the citadel of Liege the 23d of the ſame month. In Germany, M. de Blainville ſurrendered Keyſerwert the 13th of June. The duke of Bavaria ſurpriſed Ulm the 8th of September. M. de Melac ſurrendered Landau the 11th of September. Marſhal Villars took Neubourg the 11th of October, and defeated the Imperial army at Fredlingen. Prince Frederic of Brandenbourg raiſed the ſiege of Rhimberg the 20th of October. Count Tallard took Triers the 25th of October, the town and caſtle of Traerbach the 6th of November. The French troops entered Nancy the 3d of December. The count of Chateau Renaud was entirely defeated the 22d of October, by the duke of Ormond, at the port of Vigo, whither he had convoyed the galleons from Mexico.

IN 1703 the allies retook Rhimberg the 9th of February. Marſhal Tallard obliged the enemy to raiſe the ſiege of Traerbach the 25th of February. Marſhal Villars made himſelf maſter of Offembourg, of Raſtadt, and of the redoubts which the enemy had raiſed on the Quinche.

1704. THE next year the face of affairs was entirely changed (2). The unhappy iſſue of the battle of Hochſtet, obliged the elector of Bavaria to repaſs the Rhine with the army under his command; and his country became a prey to the enemy.

THIS

Quinche. He took the fort of Kell the 9th of March. The elector took Neuburg on the Danube the 3d of February. He beat the enemy at Paſſau the 11th of March, and at Burglenfeldt the 28th. He ſeized Ratiſbon the 8th of April, and was joined the 11th of May at Dutlingen by Marſhal Villars. The elector took Kufſtein the 18th of June, and Inſpruck the 26th. The duke of Vendome forced the paſſage of the mountains at the entrance of the biſhopric of Trent the 26th of July. M. de Vaubecourt took Barſello the 27th of July. M. de Legal routed a detachment of the prince of Baden's army the 30th of July. Marſhal Villars and the elector gained a complete victory over the count of Stirum at Hochſtet the 20th of September. In the Netherlands marſhal Villeroy ſtormed the town of Tongres the 10th of May. The duke of Marlborough took Bonne the 15th of May, and Hui the 16th of June. The French had the advantage at the battle of Eketem, fought the 30th of June. The allies took Limburg the 27th of September, and the town of Gueldres the 17th of December. The duke of Vendome beat general Viſconti. The duke of Burgundy took old Briſac the 6th of September. The prince of Heſſe was defeated by marſhal Villars, who made himſelf afterwards maſter of Landau. The Imperialiſts took poſſeſſion of Bamberg the 30th of November. The Engliſh and the Dutch fleets were ſeveral times defeated by the French.

(2) THE year 1704 the king of Spain had in the beginning ſome ſucceſs againſt the king of Portugal, who repulſed him afterwards. The Engliſh fleet took Gibraltar the 4th of Auguſt. The duke of Vendome made himſelf maſter of the dominions of the duke of Modena, who had joined the emperor. The Imperialiſts ſeized

on

THIS prince, after his return to the Netherlands, where he acted as vicar-general for the king of Spain, was not more successful two years afterwards at the battle of Ramillies; where, in 1706. consequence of the fatal overthrow of the king's army, which happened in the month of May 1706,

on the territories of the duke of Mirandola, who was in treaty with France. The grand prior of Vendome took Revere the 10th of April. The duke of Feuillade took the castle of Suza the 12th of June. Towards the end of the preceding year he had made himself master of all Savoy, except Montmeliand. In Italy the French became likewise masters of Vercelli the 20th of July, and of the town of Yvrée and Senſano. In Germany, the elector took Paſſau the 9th of January, and the duke of Marlborough did the ſame by Donawert the 2d of July. The battle of Hochſtet was fought the 13th of Auguſt. There it was that prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough obtained a complete victory over the French and Bavarian armies. Marſhal Tallard was taken priſoner. The allies made themſelves maſters of a country of above 80 leagues in extent. The 23d of November they took Landau, the 19th of November Traerbach, and Triers the 29th of October.

THE next year, 1705, in Italy, the French took the town of Villafranca the 7th of February, and the caſtle the 3d of April, Mirandola the 11th of May, and Chivas the 28th of July. At the battle of Caſſano, fought the 16th of Auguſt, the French remained maſters of the field of battle. They took Soncino the 23d of October, and the allies took Montmeliand the 11th of December. In Spain, Marſhal Teſſé was obliged to raiſe the ſiege of Gibraltar; and in May the Portugueſe made themſelves maſters of Salvaterra, Valencia, Alcantara, and Albuquerque. Gironne declared for the archduke the 4th of October. Barcelona ſurrendered to that prince the 9th of October. Marſhal Villars forced the lines of Weiſſemburg the 3d of July. Hombourg ſurrendered to the marquiſs of Conflans. The prince of Baden forced the lines of Haguenau the 28th of September, and entered

the

1706, the Netherlands were ſeized by the enemies of France and Spain (3).

OUR misfortunes did not end here. Bad conduct, in undertaking and carrying on the ſiege of Turin, gave prince Eugene an opportunity of flying to the aſſiſtance of the duke of Savoy. The king's army was beaten out of its intrenchments, and obliged to retire to Dauphiné. We agreed to the terms of a capitulation

the town the 5th of October. In Flanders, the allies forced the lines of Vignemont, and took Tillemont and Lovain. The elector made himſelf maſter of Dieſt the 25th of November.

(3) DURING the campaign of 1706, in Spain king Philip loſt Villareal the 8th of January, and Alcantara the 16th of April. The ſiege of Barcelona was raiſed the 12th of May; and Catalonia was open to the archduke. The Portugueſe took Ciudad-Rodrigo and Albuquerque. The allies made themſelves maſters of Carthagena the 30th of June, and of Salamanca the 8th of July: they marched to Madrid, and there proclaimed the archduke king of Spain. They took Alicant the 4th of September: but Carthagena was taken back again from them the 18th of November. The iſlands of Yvica and Majorca ſurrendered to the archduke. Alcantara was taken back from the Portugueſe the 14th of December. In Flanders, the fatal battle of Ramillies was fought the 23d of May, when the French loſt Louvain, Bruſſels, Mechlin, Lieres, Bruges, Gaunt, Antwerp, &c. In Italy, the French began with taking the caſtle of Nice the 4th of January, and they gained the battle of Calcinato the 19th of April; but they were obliged afterwards to raiſe the ſiege of Turin, the 7th of September; their lines were forced by prince Charles, and they loſt the duchies of Modena, Mantua and Milan, together with Piedmont; and at length the kingdom of Naples. In Germany they had ſome advantages; for they took Drufenheim the 2d of May, Haguenau the 10th of May, and the Iſland of the Marquiſate the 30th of July.

tulation drawn up by prince Eugene, for withdrawing the remainder of the French forces out of Italy. And yet theſe forces were victorious under count Medavi, over the Imperialiſts commanded by the prince of Heſſe, at the very time that the articles of capitulation were drawing up to ſecure their ſafe paſſage out of Italy, which was intirely abandoned to the emperor.

NEITHER was the king of Spain more ſucceſsful. The appearing of the Engliſh fleet before Barcelona obliged him precipitately to raiſe the ſiege of that city, in which the archduke was ſhut up. The communication being cut off betwixt him and his kingdom, he was obliged to return by the way of France.

LEWIS XIV. bore with great conſtancy of mind all theſe viciſſitudes, ſo different from the ſucceſs which had heretofore attended his majeſty's arms. There was ſome pleaſing glimmering of the return of his former good fortune, when, at the beginning of the campaign of 1708, (1) the duke of 1708.

(1) THE years 1707 and 1708 produced the following operations. In 1707 the French troops evacuated all Lombardy. The enemy took Capua the 2d of July, Naples the 8th, in ſhort the reſt of the kingdom; Gaeta the 30th of September, the caſtle of Suza the 13th of October, and Orbitello the 21ſt of December. Marſhal Berwick gained the battle of Almanza the 25th of April, and king Philip took Requena the 3d of May, Valencia, and the other towns of that kingdom; Saragoſſa the 25th of May, Serpa the 26th of May, Alcira the 10th of June, Mequinença the 7th of July, Mouçon the 7th of Auguſt, Puicerda and all Cerdagne; Ciudad-Rodrigo the 4th of October, the city of Lerida the 13th of October, and the

of Burgundy, who had the command of his majeſty's army, ſurprized the town of Gaunt; but our hopes were all blaſted at the fatal battle of Oudenarde, a battle not only unfortunate but ill conducted, owing to the jealouſy betwixt the courtiers of a young prince, and the general who commanded the army under his orders.

By this unlucky blow, Spain was ſtript of the reſt of her poſſeſſions in the Netherlands, except only Luxemburg, Mons, and Newport. The ſame event had like to have obliged France to ſubmit to the hardeſt conditions, for the obtaining of a peace, at that time neceſſary to the nation, if God, after humbling his majeſty, had not blinded his enemies.

Though the courage of this prince appeared proof againſt all danger, yet he felt a real and juſt concern for the protracting of a war, which was

caſtle the 12th of November. The enemy raiſed the ſiege of Toulon the 22d of Auguſt. Marſhal Villars ſurprized the lines of Stolophen the 22d of May, ſeized on the duchy of Wirtemberg, and raiſed contributions beyond the Danube, took Schorendorf, defeated general Jances and took him priſoner; but the elector of Hanover obliged him to repaſs the Rhine. By ſea the French obtained ſeveral advantages.

In the year 1708 the French took Gaunt, Bruſſels, and Plaſſendal. At the battle of Oudenarde, fought the 11th of July, the enemy had the advantage. They laid ſiege to Liſle the 22d of Auguſt, and took it the 23d of October, and the citadel the 8th of December. They retook Gaunt the 30th of December. The Engliſh made themſelves maſters of Sardinia the 15th of Auguſt, and of Portmahon the 29th of September. The duke of Savoy took the forts of Exilles, Feneſtrelles, and Perouſe. In Spain the French had ſome ſucceſs.

was grown ſo oppreſſive to his ſubjects. More ſenſible of their ſufferings than of his own glory, he had endeavoured to eaſe them, by trying various methods of ſetting a negotiation on foot.

ACCORDING to the general opinion at that time, the only way of coming at a peace, was to apply to the Dutch. This route the king had followed ever ſince the year 1706. During which time, ſeveral propoſals of accommodation were made to that Republic. The ſeaſon for overtures of peace is that of ſucceſs; but they are never liſtened to, unleſs they be ſupported by victory.

AFTER ſuch a ſeries of misfortunes, all the anſwer given to the applications of the French court was, that the Dutch, inſeparably attached to their allies, required, as a preliminary condition, and as a baſis of future treaties, that Spain, together with the dominions ſubject to that monarchy in the old and new world, ſhould belong to the houſe of Auſtria; that the republic of Holland, perpetually jealous of the deſigns of France, ſhould have a ſufficient barrier in the Netherlands for her ſecurity, and to calm her juſt fears; that the commerce of her ſubjects with France ſhould be ſettled; and the advantages granted at Ryſwic, in regard to this article, be increaſed.

AS ſoon as theſe preliminary conditions were adjuſted, France might then negotiate concerning the other articles of the peace.

THESE haughty demands were ſupported by the ſpeeches of the enemies of France. Their uſual language was, that the allies ought to diſtruſt the artifices of this nation, and to guard againſt all ſeduction; that a ſolid peace, ſuch as Europe wanted, for the ſecurity of her repoſe and her liberty, could never be agreeable to the inclinations of the French, nor be the real view of their king; that he had no other aim than to divide a potent confederacy, whoſe principal ſtrength conſiſted in the union of its ſeveral members: let us but continue the war a few years longer, ſaid they, and we ſhall have very little to fear from France, though ſo formidable at preſent.

THESE ſpeeches, and the ſeverity of the conditions propoſed by the enemy, appeared to a great many in France, nothing more than a contrivance to impoſe upon the people, and to make them patiently ſubmit to the calamities of war.

BUT at length the truth broke out. The count of Bergheik, intendant of the Netherlands for the king of Spain, had ſet a kind of negotiation on foot, after the battle of Ramillies, with Vanderduſſen penſionary of the city of Tergow. The king approved of it, and the preſident Rouillé, at that time intruſted with the care of his majeſty's affairs at the court of the elector of Bavaria, had been admitted into the ſecret. They diſcloſed it to M. Hannequin, echevin of Rotterdam, whoſe pacific diſpoſition had been con-

conſpicuous on other occaſions, particularly at the treaty of Ryſwic. He had orders to acquaint the penſionary of Holland with the conditions, on which the king would agree to terminate the war.

AT that time, there was reaſon to believe, that the events which happened in the year 1706, would determine the partition that was to be made, for the peace of Europe, betwixt king Philip and the archduke.

THE former, though compell'd to quit the kingdom of Spain, was ſtill poſſeſſed of Naples and Sicily; it was therefore thought, that he might be contented with keeping theſe two kingdoms, together with the other territories in Italy ſubject to the crown of Spain, and leave Spain to the archduke, who was then in poſſeſſion of it. This ſeemed to be a partition authorized by the viciſſitudes of the war.

BUT the next year this partition would by no means do. The emperor's troops had penetrated into the kingdom of Naples, and made themſelves maſters of it without any difficulty; while in Spain the duke of Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, which reſtored all the provinces of that kingdom, except Catalonia, to the obedience of their lawful ſovereign.

ON the ſide of Italy, king Philip was poſſeſſed only of Sicily and the port-towns of the Tuſcan coaſt. Thus the plan of peace, agreeable to the ſtate of affairs in 1706, did not at all ſuit the

year 1707. But ſtill as this prince was maſter of the Weſt-Indies, he had it in his power to grant very high advantages to the Dutch in favour of their commerce, advantages perhaps ſuperior to thoſe which they would have obtained of the houſe of Auſtria. So ſenſible an intereſt ſeemed to be a very proper means of rendering them inclinable to peace.

Monsieur Menager, deputy for the town of Rouen to the council of commerce, a perſon thoroughly verſed in whatever related to the Weſt-India trade, had formed a ſcheme, in purſuance of what knowledge he had acquired during his ſtay in Spain. By this ſcheme he pretended that it was a very eaſy matter, according to his ideas, to inſure the trade of all the European nations to the new world, without any prejudice to Spain, nay in concert with that crown. The project was reliſhed by the king; and as Menager had occaſion to go to the Hague about his own affairs, his majeſty gave him leave to communicate his ſcheme to ſome of the leading men in the republic.

He ſhewed it to the penſionary Heinſius, to the baron of Duywenworden, and to Vanderduſſen; but even if theſe men had reliſhed it, and thought it would be an advantage to their country to get it accepted, ſtill the diſgraces of the campaign of 1708 would have cut off all hopes of peace.

And

AND yet France grew every day more diſtreſſed for want of it: the king, as father of his ſubjects, conſidered himſelf more obliged to procure a peace for them, than to continue thoſe uſeleſs efforts, which he was making at the price of their blood, in order to maintain the king his grandſon on the throne of Spain. The ſtate, exhauſted by expences that were now paſt all bearing, had no other poſſibility of repairing ſuch a multitude of diſaſters but by a peace; and the ſooneſt obtained was the beſt.

THE plan of commerce propoſed by Menager might have ſerved as an introduction to the negotiation; but the Dutch would not liſten to it when they found that the baſis thereof was to leave king Philip V. in poſſeſſion of the crown of Spain and the Indies. It became therefore neceſſary to try ſome other way.

ABOUT two years before, a reſident of the duke of Holſtein Gottorp to the States-General, came to Verſailles of his own accord and without any commiſſion. He waited on the ſecretary of ſtate for foreign affairs, and offered his ſervices in communicating by a ſecret and unſuſpected channel, ſuch propoſitions as his majeſty ſhould judge proper for advancing a peace. His good will was commended, but before the king would make uſe of it, he ordered that upon his ſetting out for the Hague, they ſhould only tell him, to let the penſionary know, that his majeſty conſented to treat on the baſis of thoſe conditions which his enemies called pre-

liminaries; that it was neceſſary they ſhould agree upon a place where they might carry on their conferences in ſecret, and that they ſhould ſend a paſſport for the ſecurity of the miniſter entruſted with his majeſty's orders.

THE miniſtry agreed with this reſident whoſe name was Pettekum, to eſtabliſh a correſpondence with him, ſuch as the public welfare and his zeal for peace ſeemed to require. Accordingly he ſet out for the Hague, and executed the commiſſions with which he had been charged; when the count of Bergheick came from Mons to Verſailles towards the end of the month of Ja-
1709. nuary 1709, and acquainted the king with the ſecret inſtructions which he had received from the king of Spain, with orders to communicate them to his majeſty.

THESE inſtructions, in that prince's own hand writing, contained a full power to offer the Dutch every condition they ſhould deſire for the ſecurity of their commerce. He informed Heinſius and Vanderduſſen of it; and the anſwer they both made, was immediately carried to Mons by one Lamberg, whom they ſent on that errand. The purport of it was, that "the propoſals which "Bergheick had to make would be hearkened to, "if he had inſtructions to offer to reſign Spain "and the Indies to the houſe of Auſtria, as a "fundamental and neceſſary article of peace."

A MINISTER from the king of Spain could not poſſibly continue a negotiation, whereof the firſt article was to conſent to the dethroning of his

his maſter. Bergheick confined himſelf to the advantages, which the Dutch commerce would reap, by treating with the king of Spain; and he told Lamberg, that he had actually received full powers from this prince to enter into a private negotiation with the republic, and that he would ſend the copy of thoſe powers to Vanderduſſen; but in order to act in concert in an affair of ſuch importance, it was neceſſary they ſhould confer with equal and mutual confidence on both ſides; that he would repair to whatever place they ſhould point out for the conferences; and in ſhort that the propoſals he was about to make, in relation to the commerce of the ſubjects of the Republic, would be ſo indubitable and ſo advantageous, that her miniſters could never refuſe to accept of them. For anſwer he received a memorial, in Vanderduſſen's own hand-writing, containing theſe words:

"THE count of Bergheick muſt know, that "unleſs he makes the ſame offers, as thoſe here- "tofore made, of Spain and the Indies, of the "Milaneſe and the Netherlands, together with "what has been added, as alſo a favourable "treaty of commerce, there can be no talking "to him with any confidence upon the other "preliminary articles."

THESE conditions, ſo very hard, were nearly the ſame as Pettekum had brought with him to Holland, to ſerve as a baſis for a general peace. After his arrival at the Hague he had written word,

word, that he ſhould return forthwith to Verſailles, to give an account of his commiſſion: But ſuch was the ſituation of affairs at the beginning of the year 1709 (1), that there appeared to be an abſolute neceſſity for concluding a peace, without loſing a moment's time. For this purpoſe it was judged eſſential to enter into conferences; to agree upon them at any rate whatſoever; and to defeat, before the opening of the campaign, the ſubterfuges and artifices which the enemy put in practice in order to keep all appearance of negotiation at a diſtance.

THE king therefore, without waiting for the return of Pettekum, tho' he was ſhortly expected, gave orders to his miniſter for foreign affairs, to write immediately to Vanderduſſen, that his majeſty, having ſeen the memorial in his handwriting, conſented, for the ſake of peace, to treat on the conditions demanded as a baſis of the negotiation. They were all exactly repeated, and in conſequence of the conſent given to theſe preliminaries, the letter concluded with deſiring a paſſ-

(1) I HAVE already mentioned the loſſes the French ſuſtained in 1708. In 1709, the allies took Tournay the 29th of July, and the citadel the 3d of September. The 11th of September was fought the battle of Malplaquet, the bloodieſt in the whole war. The enemy remained maſters of the field of battle. They took Mons the 26th of October. The count de Bourg ſaved Alſace by beating count Mercy at Ottmerſheim the 26th of Auguſt. In Spain the French took ſome towns, and obtained a few inconſiderable advantages.

a paſſport, as well for the perſon of the king's plenipotentiary as for the count of Bergheick.

THERE was reaſon to believe that the Dutch, obſtinately inſiſting on the abſolute ceſſion of the Spaniſh monarchy as a fundamental condition of peace, would refuſe to admit a miniſter from king Philip to the conferences. His majeſty in his great wiſdom had foreſeen this refuſal, but his intention was to procure at leaſt for Bergheick a private conference with the Dutch deputies, ſo that in treating *tete-a-tete*, he might have an opportunity of making ſuch offers as were capable of ſtriking the States-General, and of engaging them, even for the intereſt of their own ſubjects, to maintain the king of Spain on the throne where God had placed him.

PETTEKUM brought Vanderduſſen's anſwer to the miniſter, who had wrote to him by his majeſty's expreſs order. He ſent the paſſport for the ſecurity of the Plenipotentiary, whom his majeſty ſhould pleaſe to appoint. The penſionary deſired he would repair to Antwerp, that he might afterwards draw nearer the Hague; for he thought it more proper to hold the conferences in a place dependant on the province of Holland, than in Brabant. He conſidered that orders would be more expeditiouſly given, becauſe of the proximity of the Hague, when difficulties were removed; and in ſhort that the government would be better acquainted with the

negotiation, and might find it eaſier to employ one of its members in tranſacting it.

In Vanderduſſen's anſwer to Bergheick brought alſo by Pettekum, the paſſport he had aſked was refuſed; the purport of it was, that in order to keep the conferences private, they could only admit of a plenipotentiary from France.

The ſeaſon of action was now approaching, there being hardly three months left till the opening of the campaign; and when once it began, the negotiation would either break off, or its ſucceſs would become more dubious.

The king deliberated about the choice of a perſon, to be entruſted with his full powers and inſtructions, in a commiſſion of ſuch high importance to the good of his kingdom. Among all his ſubjects, he pitched upon monſieur Voiſin, at that time counſellor of ſtate, and who had been intendant at Maubeuge, while the king laid ſiege to Namur in 1692. Voiſin and his wife had the addreſs and the good fortune to pleaſe madam Maintenon, who ſtaid at Dinan.

As ſoon as Voiſin was appriſed, by the ſecretary of ſtate for foreign affairs, of the diſtinction ſhewn him by his majeſty, far from looking upon this choice as a favour, he thought it a burden too heavy for him; and at the very inſtant he determined not to accept of it. At firſt he excuſed himſelf on the account of his incapacity;

pacity; he ſaid with ſome warmth, that he never had the conduct of political affairs, and then raiſing his tone of voice as if in a paſſion: "I "am ſo tired, ſaid he, with hearing my name "mentioned by the public as often as any "conſiderable place becomes vacant, while at "the ſame time I can obtain none, that I am "determined not to accept of this commiſſion, "from whence I can expect nothing but trouble "and vexation."

IN vain did the ſecretary ſet before him, the marks of confidence and eſteem which the king ſhewed him; the importance of the employment and the nature of the ſervice which he ſhould render to his majeſty and to the whole kingdom, by promoting a peace ſo greatly wanted; the injury on the other hand, he was doing to himſelf, ſhould he refuſe to comply with ſo honourable a choice. All theſe arguments were to no purpoſe. Monſieur Voiſin, as if guided by fortune who did not wait for him in Holland, but was ready at his door, concluded with theſe words: "I know how to get off; do not be in "pain about it; I have not the leaſt apprehenſion "that the king will take it amiſs." When he had finiſhed theſe words, he went immediately to Saint Cyr, and the next day the king appointed monſieur Rouillé, preſident of the great council, to ſet out for Holland, in order to treat with the deputies of the States-General, and to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to procure a general peace.

ROUILLE

ROUILLE had been ambaſſador in Portugal, and afterwards entruſted with the king's affairs at the court of the elector of Bavaria, when this prince returned to the Netherlands after the fatal battle of Hochſtet. While he reſided in Flanders, he had begun a kind of negotiation with this ſame Vanderduſſen, the perſon appointed to confer with the king's plenipotentiary: thus the matter in reſpect to him was neither foreign nor new.

THE inſtructions he received from his majeſty, removed all thoſe difficulties, which generally ariſe at the opening of a treaty. As there was no time to loſe, he had orders to admit of the powers of the Dutch deputies, without entering into a ſcrupulous diſcuſſion of their validity. The king deſired him not to run into long harangues, in demonſtrating his majeſty's great deſire of reſtoring the tranquillity of Europe. The ſtrongeſt proof of the ſincerity of his intentions, was the order he gave him to declare, at the very firſt conference, that he would conſent, for the ſake of peace, to relinquiſh Spain, the Indies, the Milaneſe, and the Netherlands; and to grant the Dutch ſuch conditions as ſhould be favourable to their commerce, and ſecure them a barrier in Flanders.

THE fortune of war, evermore uncertain, is able to overſet all negotiations of peace, even when far advanced. But the negotiation we are

ſpeaking

ſpeaking of ſtood upon very weak foundations; it was not ſo much as commenced.

THE campaign was upon the point of being opened, and its firſt operations might deſtroy all hopes of peace. The ſureſt way to avoid the freſh calamities, into which Europe was going to be involved, was to come to ſome agreement quickly, before the armies took the field. The king had already conſented to the principal conditions of the peace, by granting thoſe which the Dutch called preliminaries. They might therefore make a general regulation of the other terms, appoint a time for drawing up the articles in form, and in the mean time come to a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities.

THE preſident Rouillé had directions to make this propoſal to the Dutch deputies; and to inſiſt on the neceſſity of taking this reſolution, if the Republic was ſincerely deſirous of peace.

THE kingdoms of Naples and Sicily were never comprehended among the ceſſions required as preliminary conditions. So inconſiderable a ſhare of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion ought not to have been denied to king Philip, ſince it was only a ſmall equivalent for the extenſive dominions which they wanted him to reſign. The Engliſh alone affected to take umbrage, that a prince of the houſe of Bourbon ſhould continue in poſſeſſion of thoſe two kingdoms, as he would be thereby enabled to interrupt the trade of Great-Britain

Britain in the Mediterranean and the Levant. But the Dutch had no ſuch apprehenſions, for which reaſon they had not hitherto oppoſed an indemnification ſo greatly diſproportioned to the ſacrifice the king was going to make to the public. There was reaſon therefore to believe that they would back this propoſal; nay, that they would not be againſt Rouillé's demand for increaſing ſo ſmall a partition.

The king therefore wanted Sardinia to be added to the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, together with the port-towns on the coaſt of Tuſcany. His majeſty had not only the particular intereſt of the king his grandſon in view, but likewiſe the general good of Europe: for its tranquillity required that whoever was king of the two Sicilies ſhould have power ſufficient to maintain him in his new dominions; as he would have all the reaſon in the world to apprehend the ambitious deſigns of the houſe of Auſtria, ſupported by a numerous party, who had openly declared in favour of that houſe at the laſt revolution of the kingdom of Naples.

When once the archduke was become king of Spain, he might eaſily keep up a ſecret correſpondence at Naples and in Sicily; beſides, he might without difficulty tranſport a number of troops into thoſe kingdoms with all expedition, if he continued maſter of Sardinia. But the main point was to conclude a peace, which every day grew more neceſſary. This being

the principal object propoſed by his majeſty: however deſirous he might be of moderating the conditions preſcribed to his grandſon, he thought proper to wave all uſeleſs diſputes, that might retard a work, the ſpeedy concluſion of which was of ſuch immenſe conſequence to the nation.

HE therefore gave monſieur Rouillé leave, whenever he judged fit, to deſiſt from the demand he had made of Sardinia and the port towns on the coaſt of Tuſcany; but this deſiſtance was to be according to the degrees preſcribed by his majeſty.

THE firſt, was to give up Sardinia, and to keep the port towns on the coaſt of Tuſcany.

THE ſecond, was to demoliſh the fortifications, and to leave the towns diſmantled to king Philip.

THE third, was to reſign thoſe towns, either fortified, or diſmantled, to the Grand Duke of Tuſcany.

THE king was ſo deſirous of peace, and his intentions were ſo pure, that he gave particular directions to Rouillé, to ſuppreſs every expreſſion at theſe conferences, that might give room to believe he had any deſign of fomenting the jealouſy, which the republic of Holland began to conceive of the ſecret deſigns of the court of Vienna. And indeed this Republic had long purſued a conduct diametrically oppoſite to her

ancient maxims. The moſt ſacred of theſe had been heretofore to preſerve the equilibrium between the principal powers of Europe. But now ſhe departed ſo widely from theſe principles, as to exert and even to exhauſt her treaſures, in order to make the ſcale preponderate greatly in favour of the houſe of Auſtria.

THESE reflexions, tho' ſo very juſt, appeared altogether uſeleſs, at a time when paſſion united the enemies of France. Whatever might be ſaid to ſatisfy the leaſt prejudiced, would be conſidered as an artifice to divide the allies. Sincerity and plain dealing were the guides which the miniſter was to follow in executing the king's orders.

BUT theſe were equally neceſſary on the part of the Dutch, and ſince they were treating for their allies as well as for themſelves, they were bound both by equity and the regard to the public tranquillity, to take proper and ſure precautions, for eſtabliſhing and maintaining king Philip in the peaceable poſſeſſion of that kind of equivalent, with which he muſt be contented.

THERE was not the leaſt room to doubt, but Spain would be in a prodigious agitation, ſuch as ſhould even produce a total revolution, when the ſubjects of his catholic majeſty, who had been hitherto unſhaken in their fidelity, came to hear that this prince conſented, or was compelled to abandon them; that the archduke was

to

to be their king; and that this prince, now at the head of an army in Catalonia, would have it in his power to wreak his vengeance on the greateſt part of the kingdom, whoſe inhabitants, of all degrees, had conſtantly refuſed to acknowledge him for their ſovereign, at the time of his greateſt proſperity.

IT was therefore an eſſential point to make the Dutch explain themſelves in the cleareſt terms, and without any ambiguity, concerning the means by which they would oblige the emperor to withdraw his troops from the kingdom of Naples. Sicily was ſtill ſubject to the king of Spain, they were therefore to be aſked what meaſures they would take to put this prince in poſſeſſion of the kingdom of Naples, at the ſame time as he relinquiſhed ſuch extenſive dominions that ſtill acknowledged him for their ſovereign. This kind of exchange on both ſides was to go hand in hand; it was but juſt; and when the king, for the ſake of peace, agreed to ſo many hard conditions, it was fit that the execution of the articles relating to his grandſon ſhould be ſecured.

FOR this reaſon the preſident Rouillé had orders to preſs the Dutch deputy, to give a clear explication of the intention of his maſters, in regard to ſo eſſential a point, on which the concluſion and preſervation of the peace depended.

IF the deputy ſhould aſk him of what opinion he was himſelf, and what he thought concerning

the meaſures proper to be taken for ſecuring this equivalent to king Philip, and for the execution of the treaty; in that caſe the king gave Rouillé leave to propoſe, that the republic of Holland ſhould uſe all her intereſt with the emperor, to engage him to withdraw his army from the kingdom of Naples. That the Imperial forces ſhould be replaced by Dutch troops, who were to guard that country, till it was peaceably delivered up to king Philip. That the troops ſhould be tranſported by a Dutch fleet. That by this means the Republic would become and continue a truſtee, into whoſe hands this kingdom was to be depoſited, till the concluſion of the peace. That another Dutch ſquadron ſhould convoy the king of Spain in his paſſage either to Naples, or Sicily; but that if the Engliſh ſhould expreſs any jealouſy of the preference granted to the Dutch, then an Engliſh ſquadron might be joined with the Dutch. That when the conditions of the treaty were ſettled, the king would make it his buſineſs to perſuade his grandſon to ſign them; that, in caſe of refuſal, his majeſty would recall the French troops which at that time ſerved in Spain.

Neither did his majeſty forget the intereſts of particular perſons, who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their inviolable attachment to king Philip.

Rouille was alſo to ſtipulate, that the eſtates, honours, and dignities, which this prince had granted,

granted, as well to his ſubjects, as to foreigners, ſhould be continued to them.

THESE conditions were leſs relative to the Dutch, than to their allies. The direct advantage, and what affected them the moſt, was that which they promiſed themſelves in favour of their commerce. Neither were they leſs zealous for the ſecurity of that pretended barrier, which they demanded in the Netherlands. Commerce is the baſis of their power. The grandeur of the Republic was owing to the care which the people took to cultivate their trade, and to their application and induſtry in improving it. During the war this trade was at a low ebb: it declined more than ever, ſince their joining in the confederacy formed againſt France, when they bore the greateſt part of the expence, without deriving the leaſt advantage from it.

THEIR allies were their ſecret enemies. The Engliſh, conſtantly attentive to avail themſelves of every opportunity of extending their commerce upon the ruin of that of other nations, loſt no opportunity of making the Dutch feel the weight of their injuſtice and oppreſſion. The Republic was ſtill prejudiced with the falſe notion, that her commerce would be deſtroyed, if Philip V. a grandſon of France, ſhould continue peaceable poſſeſſor of Spain and the Indies. Being alſo convinced, that a haſty ſeparation from her allies, would be more fatal to her than their inſincerity, ſhe laid it down as an invariable rule,

ſteadily to perſiſt in the engagements ſhe had contracted, till the allies obtained in concert, and by their joint efforts, a peace agreeable to their expectations.

And yet they were not ignorant in Holland, of the king's diſpoſition to favour their commerce in the treaty of peace. Menager, by his majeſty's orders, had given notice thereof to the penſionary Heinſius, to the baron of Duyvenworden, and to Vanderduſſen. They knew that, in conſideration of the peace, the king would grant the renewal of the treaty of commerce, as ſigned at Ryſwic; and conſequently an exemption to Dutch veſſels from paying the duty of fifty ſous per tun; the tariff of 1664; the ſuppreſſion of the later edicts, and that of the tariff of 1669.

When Menager offered theſe conditions, they thought them ſo advantageous, and were ſo fully convinced, that, if they obtained them, the ſituation of the Dutch merchants in regard to commerce, would become ſuperior to that of other nations, not even excepting the French; that rather than forego ſuch advantages, theſe miniſters of the Republic never contradicted the propoſal which Menager made them, of excepting out of the revocation of the edicts ſubſequent to the tariff 1664, twelve ſorts of merchandiſes, the ſale of which, if permitted in the kingdom, would ruin the manufactures, induſtry, and navigation of his majeſty's ſubjects.

The

THE republic of Holland was now fully acquainted with his majeſty's intentions, in regard to the article of commerce; but had not yet explained herſelf upon the ſecond article, which ſhe had equally at heart. This was that barrier of which her miniſters were for ever talking, and which they looked upon as eſſential to the ſecurity of the ſtate, without having as yet mentioned in what manner they would have it formed. According to them the Republic had reaſon to be under the greateſt dread of his majeſty's power; ſo that their alarms would never ceaſe, but they muſt live in perpetual diſquietude, unleſs the conditions of peace ſhould be ſuch as ſcreened them from the reſentment and incurſions of France.

NOTHING therefore but a ſtrong and ſufficient barrier, could give them hopes of enjoying a ſolid and laſting tranquillity. It was impoſſible yet to tell the ſcheme of the Dutch, or what they wanted in order to compoſe that famous barrier. For they were ſtill ſilent in regard to the circumſtances of an article ſo important to them, ſo importunately demanded, and ſo eſſential to a general peace.

IN the memorial of Vanderduſſen's own handwriting, and which gave occaſion to the opening of the conferences, after theſe words, *the Spaniſh Netherlands*, were marked the following words, *and that which has been added*; but the addition was obſcure, and no explication of it had as yet been given by the Dutch.

The preſident Rouillé had orders to demand this explication, and to know of Vanderduſſen what he underſtood by theſe terms, *and that which has been added*; and, in ſhort, to preſs him to declare in expreſs terms what uſe his maſters intended to make of the Spaniſh Netherlands. The king was to be informed of their intention as to this point, before any regulation could be made about the barrier. France was too deeeply intereſted in the fate of the Netherlands, to be kept in the dark in regard to the purpoſes for which her enemies deſigned thoſe provinces. Even the Dutch themſelves were not leſs intereſted in acquainting his majeſty with their deſign; for after all, time muſt be productive of changes; the animoſity inſpired by war ſubſides in time of peace, in conſequence of that connexion which is naturally formed between trading nations. The increaſe of power which the United-Provinces endeavoured to procure for the houſe of Auſtria, might one day or other become dangerous, and perhaps fatal to their Republic. At preſent they demanded neither barrier nor ſecurity againſt the deſigns of the emperor, who was enlarging his power at their expence. But were they ſure, that when with their aſſiſtance he had united the ſeveral dominions which they were endeavouring to recover for his family, gratitude would prevail over the temptation he might perhaps have, of adding likewiſe the other provinces, heretofore

fore dependent on the crown of Spain? Should this caſe happen, in vain would Holland have recourſe to France. In conſequence of ſo many precautions taken to bar the French from having any entrance into the Netherlands, while the United-Provinces were left open to the emperor, the Dutch would be deprived of the aſſiſtance of a crown, whoſe ancient alliance ſo greatly contributed to the liberty and riſe of their Republic.

THE king gave the preſident Rouillé leave to inſinuate theſe ſimple and natural reflexions; they were to riſe from the very nature of the queſtion he was to make, without ſhewing the leaſt affectation on his ſide, or the leaſt deſign of ſpreading the ſeeds of diſcord amongſt his majeſty's enemies.

THERE was reaſon to believe that the Dutch reſerved Spaniſh Guelderland for themſelves, as a very ſmall indemnification for the immenſe expence they had been at in ſupporting the war. A pretenſion of that nature muſt have been diſcuſſed between the emperor and them. The only intereſt the king had therein was that of religion, to prevent any change thereof in Guelderland, in caſe that province was to become ſubject to the Dutch.

THE hints which their miniſters let drop at different times, gave room to believe, that to form their barrier they would demand the towns of

of Ypres, Menin, Tournay, Condé, and Maubeuge, and that this was the price at which they would ſet the reſtitution of Liſle and its Chatellany, which was looked upon as out of all manner of doubt.

THESE pretenſions appeared exorbitant, but as peace was become abſolutely neceſſary, all that could be expected, was to moderate their rigour, and to propoſe ſuch expedients as were capable of ſoftening an enemy, who were perſuaded they could obtain whatever they aſked, and that they ought to make a good uſe of their preſent ſucceſs. For this reaſon the king permitted the preſident Rouillé, to propoſe the exchange of Ypres and Menin, with the town and duchy of Luxemburg, which are at a greater diſtance from the territories of the Republic than Ypres and Menin. This propoſal ought to remove their inquietude, and theſe two towns, which the king conſented to give in exchange, would ſtrengthen their barrier.

HIS majeſty would have been ſatisfied with the ceſſion of Luxemburg after the fortifications were demoliſhed, if by this expedient the propoſal of exchange was accepted. But there was reaſon to think that Rouillé would find great difficulty to make it paſs, the averſion of the enemy to all kind of accommodation being ſuch that they would object againſt acquiring Ypres and Menin with their dependencies, only at the

expence

expence of a fortreſs, the revenue of which could not be at all compared to that of the two towns which his majeſty was willing to cede to them.

BUT if the propoſal of an exchange, how advantageous ſoever to the Dutch, and to the perſon for whom the Low-Countries were deſigned, ſhould not be accepted of, the king gave Rouillé leave to drop it, and in that caſe to agree that the towns of Ypres and Menin ſhould be given up on account of the peace, without any other equivalent, than the reſtitution of Liſle.

THE Dutch, whom France had formerly humbled, were now acting the part of umpires between the great powers of Europe. It ſeemed as if they had a right to diſpoſe as they pleaſed of other princes territories, to reſerve ſuch a part for themſelves as ſuited their own conveniency, and to divide the reſt, according to their will and pleaſure. They were intoxicated by that degree of honour, to which their allies had raiſed them. A zeal for thoſe allies, and an implacable hatred againſt France, ſeemed to be the whole rule of their conduct. They forgot that no peace can be ſolid or durable, unleſs its conditions be juſt; that our attention ought not to be directed only to the preſent moment, when we are treating of a general peace; that theſe treaties become laws; that prudence, as well as the intereſt of ſovereigns, directs them to examine into the conſequences of theſe treaties, to extend their views to futurity, and to repre-

ſent thoſe events to their minds, which may happen in a long ſucceſſion of time.

By means of theſe and the like reflexions, the Dutch might think that the emperor Leopold had then no more than two ſons, and no other heir; that one of theſe princes might die without iſſue; and that the whole power of the houſe of Auſtria would be then united under one head. They could not bear the notion of ſeeing two princes of the houſe of Bourbon, ſeated on the thrones of France and Spain; then how great muſt be their danger, ſhould the ſeparate dominions and rights of the two branches of the houſe of Auſtria at any time fall into the ſame hands?

It was in order to prevent theſe dangerous conſequences, and the miſchief which threatened Europe, that the king would have been glad to have ſecured, at leaſt by the peace, the liberty and repoſe of Italy.

In order to attain this end, it would have been neceſſary to oblige the Germans to repaſs the mountains. It would have been further expedient to diſpoſe of the countries occupied at that time by the Imperial armies in Italy. The Milaneſe, of which that prince was in poſſeſſion, would have been given, together with the dukedom of Mantua, to the republic of Venice, if the preſſing neceſſity of affairs had permitted us to negotiate for any time, and with equal advantage.

His

HIS majeſty would have conſented, tho' with reluctance, to leave to the duke of Savoy that part of the duchy of Milan, which had been intended to reward his perfidy, and would have been ſatisfied with getting Exilles and Feneſtrelles out of his hands.

BUT if the fortune of war had proved ſo favourable to France, as to enable his majeſty to obtain conditions of peace more to his liking, than thoſe which his enemies wanted to impoſe upon him; he would have then diſpoſed of the duchies of Milan and Mantua in favour of the elector of Bavaria his faithful ally.

BUT projects of this kind, in the ſituation his affairs were in at that time, were empty ſhadows, from which there was no manner of room to hope for the leaſt ſucceſs. His majeſty could hardly flatter himſelf with obtaining, in favour of the two electors of Cologne and Bavaria, both of them faithful allies of France and Spain, a full and entire reſtitution of their dominions; as well as the enjoyment of the dignities of which they had been unjuſtly deprived by that deſpotic authority, which the emperor had uſurped in the deliberations of the empire, contrary to the liberty and privileges of the Germanic body. This reſtitution and perfect re-eſtabliſhment of the houſe of Bavaria, was one of the articles of the inſtruction given to monſieur de Rouillé, and recommended to him by his majeſty in a moſt particular manner.

IT

IT was expected that the treaty of Ryſwic would in all probability be the baſis of the peace, which was to be concluded with the emperor and the empire; for ſince that treaty there had been no change of affairs relative to Germany; and of courſe one would have imagined for a certainty, that there would not be the leaſt queſtion about Straſburg, which the king had in ſome meaſure purchaſed by the ceſſion of Briſac, Friburg, and Philipſburg.

IF any other articles of leſs importance, concerning Germany, ſhould be brought upon the carpet, Rouillé had inſtructions to refer the canvaſſing of them to the public conferences, which were to be held, as ſoon as the preliminary articles could be ſettled with the Dutch.

THE conditions of the peace to be concluded with England were compriſed in the preliminaries.

THE firſt conſiſted in acknowledging as queen of Great-Britain the princeſs who then poſſeſſed the throne (1), and whom France had hitherto treated only as princeſs of Denmark.

SECONDLY, it was inſiſted that the king ſhould acknowledge the validity of the regulations made by the Engliſh parliament for ſettling the ſucceſſion to the crown of Great-Britain in the proteſtant line.

HIS majeſty foreſaw that the Engliſh, pretending to be afraid leſt king James, by continuing to

(1) WILLIAM III. king of England, died the 19th of March 1702, and was ſucceeded by his ſiſter-in-law, queen Anne.

to reſide in France, ſhould one day be able to raiſe freſh diſturbances in England, would inſiſt on that prince's removing out of the kingdom.

HE judged likewiſe, that thoſe, who found their private account in continuing the war, would perhaps have credit enough to make the parliament demand the ceſſion of Dunkirk, as a neceſſary condition of peace.

AT any other time the Dutch, in all probability, though intimately connected with England, would, for their own intereſt, have oppoſed any ſuch demand; but then the tide of paſſion ran ſo high againſt France, that every propoſal for reducing its power, was conſidered as a juſt and neceſſary expedient for the ſafety of Europe.

THE duke of Marlborough, and Heinſius, the penſionary of Holland, in ſtrict intimacy with prince Eugene, were in ſome meaſure the triumvirs of the confederacy. The two generals had the good fortune to win battles, and to ſucceed in the moſt important of their undertakings. The penſionary had been cloſely attached to the late king, who ſettled him in the poſt of firſt miniſter to the States-General; he had been alſo the depoſitary of that prince's ſecrets, and ſtill preſerved the authority which he had received from him. They appeared all three to have a perſonal intereſt in oppoſing the peace.

THE duke of Marlborough nevertheleſs let the people believe, that he ſhould not be ſorry to ſee a negotiation ſet on foot and happily concluded, for ſettling the tranquillity of Europe.

He

He had liſtened coolly to ſome propoſals, which flattered his predominant paſſion of acquiring and amaſſing unbounded treaſure. His credit at court, undermined by his enemies, began to decline. Part of the nation were tired with ſeeing the power ſo long divided between the duke and the high-treaſurer the earl of Godolphin, his boſom friend and relation. Their enemies were working upon the mind of the queen, by ſecret artifices, to prejudice her againſt them. This princeſs began to be uneaſy at the uncontrouled power of her general. They who were in the ſecret had reaſon therefore to believe, from the tottering ſituation of the duke, which was not yet publicly known, that he would be glad to receive from France a reward proportioned to his merit, ſhould he contribute, by his care and induſtry, to deliver her from the horrors of an unſucceſsful war.

THE ſituation of the penſionary of Holland was very different; with the authority which he had acquired in the Republic, he had no ſecret deſigns, no cabals to fear, that could remove him from a poſt which he filled to the ſatisfaction of his maſters, and wherein he conducted himſelf with moderation. There was ſome reaſon therefore to judge, that, directing his attention chiefly to the intereſt of his country, he would be glad to ſee the iſſue of a war, the burden of which lay ſo heavy upon the Republic. Hitherto the United-Provinces bore the greateſt part of its weight; and the emperor only reaped the advan-

tage of it. It was therefore probable, that a minister so able, and so zealous for his country's welfare, as Heinsius was reported to be, would sincerely endeavour to rescue it from an onerous war, the whole benefit of which accrued to an ally, whose power they should, some time or other, have reason to fear.

IN short, the French were extremely desirous of the speedy issue of a peace, which was become necessary to the nation. They flattered themselves therefore, that he who was to have the principal share in this great work, would sincerely contribute to its perfection.

UPON this same principle, no body doubted but Vanderdussen, considered as the protector of the conferences proposed, would, in the course of the negotiation, exert the spirit of peace and the sentiments of a good republican, impatient under the insolent authority, which the English had usurped during king William's reign, and which they still preserved since his decease, in the deliberations of the Republic.

THESE reflections, added to the conditions which the king was ready to grant, scarce left any room to doubt of the success of the negotiation. The opinion was, that if it did not produce a peace so soon as could be wished, still his majesty might obtain a suspension of hostilities. In that case, he would have fixed the term of suspension to the 25th of May.

The end of the FIRST PART.

THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND PART.

FIRST conferences of peace held at Moerdyke. Firſt propoſals of the Dutch deputies. The king's anſwer to theſe propoſals. Conferences at Woerden. Conferences held in a yatcht, near the village of Bodegrave. Diſcuſſion of ſeveral of the preliminary articles. Obſtacles to the peace. The king's offers rendered uſeleſs by the inſincerity and pride of the Dutch. The nature of theſe offers; and of the demands of the Dutch. The conferences continued. The king propoſes new conditions, more advantageous to Holland and to the allies. He is anſwered by pretenſions ſtill more extravagant. Diſtreſſed ſituation of France. The king makes new ſacrifices for the ſake of peace. The Dutch become more unjuſt and more untractable. The king ſends the marquis of Torcy, his miniſter for foreign affairs, to the Hague, to make a laſt effort towards obtaining a peace. Letter to M. Rouillé, which ſerves as inſtructions to the marquis of Torcy.

MEMOIRS

CONTAINING THE

HISTORY of the NEGOTIATIONS

FROM THE

Treaty of Ryſwic to the peace of Utrecht.

PART THE SECOND.

From the firſt conferences of Moerdyke, to the negotiations of peace with England. The years 1709, 1710.

The FIRST CONFERENCES

At Moerdyke, and afterwards at Bodegrave, 1709.

THE preſident Rouillé ſet out the 5th of March. By the way he ſaw the count of Bergheik, purſuant to the king's orders. They had a conference the 8th of the ſame month at Hall. Bergheik told him what he thought, in regard to the intereſts of the king of Spain; what he knew concerning the preſent ſtate of Holland;

and in ſhort what he could hear relating to the character of the perſons, whom they ſuppoſed the government would nominate, to treat of the conditions of a general peace.

THIS interview was not long a ſecret. The myſtery was ſoon revealed by Rouillé's journey through the Netherlands. Upon his arrival at Antwerp he was to be informed, what part of the territories of the Republic he ſhould repair to, in order to open the conferences. There he received no directions, as had been promiſed, for the further regulation of his motions. At length the 15th of March, Pettekum acquainted him by a letter dated the 14th, that the 17th of the ſame month, he ſhould meet with two perſons, whoſe names he was a ſtranger to, at a village called Stryenſe Sas, oppoſite to Moerdyke. He recommended the ſecrecy of this firſt ſtep to him, in ſtronger terms than ever.

THE meaſures concerted were punctually obſerved. The preſident Rouillé and two Dutch deputies met exactly at the place, and on the day appointed. The deputies were Buys, penſionary of the city of Amſterdam, and Vanderduſſen, penſionary of Tergow: the former, beſides being attached to the Engliſh, who were moſt ſanguine for continuing the war, was obſcure and tedious in his ſpeeches, and in ſhort ſeemed fitter to raiſe than to remove difficulties. The latter appeared to be of an eaſier temper, and more inclined to peace; but ſo ſervilely was he ſubject to his collegue, that he looked

looked as if he durſt not open his mouth in his preſence, while the collegue behaved towards him with the air of a ſuperior, ever attentive not to leave him alone with the preſident Rouillé.

In this very place he had three conferences. The opening of them ſeemed to promiſe peace; nothing could be more moderate, nothing more pacific than the expreſſions of the deputies. They commended and thanked Rouillé for his readineſs in coming to Holland, and for coming in time of war, with no other ſecurity than a paſſport made out in a different name; for, in fact, it was in the name of Monſieur Voiſin. They added, that his fears in this caſe would have been well-grounded; ſince ſome days before, the earl of Albemarle, who commanded at Bruſſels, had ordered a party to way-lay him; and that the ſcheme would have been put into execution, if, at the advice of a perſon of great prudence, the order had not been revoked.

The preſident Rouillé ſhewed the deputies the full powers with which the king had honoured him; and they found them as ample as they could wiſh. The communication of powers ſhould have been reciprocal; yet they acknowledged they had received none from their maſters. The reaſon they alledged was, that, to expedite theſe powers, it would be abſolutely neceſſary to communicate the ſecret of the conferences to the deputies of all the provinces.

Rouillé admitted the excuſe as ſufficient, according to the order contained in his inſtructions. Mutual civilities were continued, as well as aſſurances of ſincerity on both ſides, and of equal ſolicitude to eſtabliſh a laſting and happy peace. This peace was to be founded on the conditions mentioned in the anſwer made to the memorial in Vanderduſſen's hand-writing. Such a preliminary left very little for the treaty to add.

The preſident Rouillé thought ſo, and he had reaſon to think ſo. The whole kingdom of France would have been in the ſame way of thinking, had they known the conditions which the king at that time conſented to; but they were ignorant, as yet, how far the enemies of France were tranſported by their animoſity. Intoxicated with the ſucceſs of their arms, and but too well acquainted with the melancholy ſtate of this kingdom, they reckoned to be able to penetrate into the heart of it. The common people, flattered with the advantages of each campaign, were accuſtomed to look upon the taxes with which they were loaded, as an eaſy burden. They thought themſelves indemnified for the expences of the war, by the honour and profit of the Imperial and Engliſh Generals. The deputies durſt not diſoblige either them, or the penſionary, who were all three intimately connected.

As ſoon as Vanderduſſen's memorial came to be talked of, the deputies made anſwer, that it contained indeed the moſt eſſential points, and

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the firſt to be examined; but that there were ſtill ſome other articles of equal importance. They aſked, whether his moſt Chriſtian majeſty had a power from the king of Spain; and they ſaid that it would be a great condeſcenſion on the part of their maſters, ſhould they be ſatisfied, and engage their allies to be ſatisfied, with his majeſty's promiſe of obliging his grandſon to ratify whatever he ſhould ſtipulate for him or ſhould promiſe in that prince's name to accompliſh.

If the queſtion was about dethroning him, no ſecurity appeared to them ſufficient: but if they came to talk only about giving him the leaſt indemnification, for the ceſſion of ſuch extenſive dominions, the Dutch deputies only offered that their maſters ſhould uſe their good offices with thoſe very allies, whoſe entire ſatisfaction was ſo dear to them; and promiſed to ſolicit their conſent to leave the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to king Philip. The propoſal of adding Sardinia they would not liſten to. The demand of the port-towns on the coaſt of Tuſcany, even diſmantled, was alſo rejected; and that of leaving them to the great duke of Tuſcany met with the ſame fate. It was loſing time, to pretend to any indemnification. The intention of the courts of Vienna and London, which the deputies declared in expreſs terms, was not to leave even the ſmalleſt part of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion in the hands of king Philip. After this declaration they had the aſſurance to complain, that this

prince had lately acknowledged his ſon, the prince of Aſturias, for his ſucceſſor to the crown, and pretended that this very ſtep proved a freſh obſtacle to the peace.

NEITHER did the preſident Rouillé find them more tractable, when he came to treat about the emperor and the empire. He propoſed the renewal of the treaty of Ryſwic, as the only reaſonable demand, which the Germanic body and its chief could make, or could expect that the king would grant. The deputies replied, that they had but a ſlender knowledge of the affairs of Germany; however they knew enough to aſſure him, that the treaty of Ryſwic was quite out of the queſtion, that they muſt re-eſtabliſh that of Munſter, not in the ſenſe which the French gave to ſeveral of its articles, but as underſtood by the Germans.

THE conditions on the behalf of England were, that the king ſhould acknowledge queen Anne, and the ſucceſſion as ſettled by parliament on the proteſtant line; that he ſhould make a full and entire reſtitution of all the conqueſts, which the French had made in America upon the Engliſh, during the war; and that his majeſty ſhould oblige king James to remove out of the kingdom.

THEY would not let Monſieur Rouillé flatter himſelf, that the Engliſh would be ſatisfied with theſe demands. They told him, that this nation would inſiſt, in the proceſs of the negotiation,

tion, on the town of Dunkirk's being ceded to the crown of Great-Britain, in the condition wherein it was at that time; and they talked greatly of the obligation which France would owe to the Republic, if ſhe could prevail on the Engliſh, to be ſatisfied with Dunkirk, after demoliſhing the fortifications.

THE anſwers given by the preſident Rouillé, as well as his obſervations on the injuſtice of theſe ſeveral articles, were to no manner of purpoſe. The enemies of France thought they had it now in their power to preſcribe laws to this kingdom. The Dutch, animated with the ſame ſpirit of reſentment againſt this nation, acted as the faithful interpreters of their allies.

THE deputies further deſired the execution of the treaties which had been concluded with the king of Portugal, in order to engage that prince to join in what they called the grand alliance. They would fain have had the king promiſe to conform to the conditions of thoſe treaties, without knowing their contents, nor the advantages which the king of Portugal was to obtain in recompence for his ingratitude to France.

AS they had charged themſelves with the intereſts of all their allies, they demanded in behalf of the elector of Brandenburg, that his majeſty ſhould acknowledge the new title of king of Pruſſia, which that prince had aſſumed. This was not one of the preliminaries, and yet they treated it as an eſſential condition; and further,

they inſiſted that this prince ſhould receive no moleſtation on the part of France, in his new poſſeſſion of the counties of Neuchatel and Valengin.

THE perfidy of the duke of Savoy had been of too great ſervice to the allies, for them to neglect the intereſts of this prince. For him therefore the deputies demanded the reſtitution of Savoy and of the county of Nice; and they demanded it in an imperious tone, as an abſolute condition, which the king was not in the leaſt to call in queſtion, if he had any deſire of peace. They added, that his majeſty ſhould promiſe, to leave this prince in the quiet enjoyment of all the advantages which he had obtained in conſequence of the good ſervices done to his allies.

ON this occaſion Rouillé was going to ſpeak of Exilles and Feneſtrelles, which the king wanted back. The deputies immediately interrupted him, declaring that they could not ſo much as hear of ſuch a propoſition. That the allies had engaged to maintain the duke of Savoy in thoſe territories and ſtrong places, which he ſhould have the good fortune to take, either in Provence or Dauphiné; that it would be on their part a contravention of the treaty, ſhould they agree to a peace, which was to ſtrip him of two fortreſſes of ſuch importance to his ſafety.

THERE had been no mention as yet of the conditions, which the Republic inſiſted upon for herſelf. The miniſters ſhe employed at the conference

ference were willing to ſhew, that the intereſts of her allies were as dear to her as her own. After having previouſly treated of thoſe articles, which related to each of the allies in particular, they ſtated the pretenſions of the States-General.

THE firſt, was the re-eſtabliſhment and full and entire execution of the tariff of 1664, without any exception of merchandiſes. In anſwer to Rouillé's objections they ſaid, that the marquis of Alegre had made them a promiſe thereof three years before, by his majeſty's order.

THO' convinced in their minds of the diſtreſſed ſituation of France, and confirmed in this opinion by the amazing offers which this crown made for the purchaſe of peace, ſtill they affected to dread her power; and, under pretence of ſecuring their frontier, they were for ever repeating their favourite topic of the barrier, which they inſiſted upon as a neceſſary condition, extending it from the ſea to the Maeſe. In this barrier they not only included Liſle, which they were reſolved never to part with; but moreover, not ſatisfied with Menin and Ypres which the king conſented to yield to them, they demanded alſo, the additional ceſſion of Furnes, Condé, Tournay, and Maubeuge.

IN exchange for theſe exorbitant demands, they gave ſome glimmering hopes, that their maſters might conſent to the reſtitution of Liſle. Likewiſe that they ſhould not be againſt employing

ploying their good offices in favour of the electors of Cologne and Bavaria; ſtill excepting, in regard to the elector of Bavaria, the reſtoring him to the dignity of firſt elector, which together with the Upper Palatinate and the county of Cham, ſhould be ſettled on the elector Palatine.

The principality of Mindelheim, which the emperor, of his own authority and without any ſort of right, had beſtowed upon the duke of Marlborough, was likewiſe continued to that general.

The Dutch wanted to have the citadel of Bonne, and the towns of Liege and Huy, garriſoned by their troops and mercenaries, if theſe conditions for themſelves and their allies were granted. They demanded alſo that none of the dominions ſubject to the crown of Spain ſhould ever become ſubject to France, upon any pretext, or under any title whatſoever.

In fine, not yet ſatisfied with theſe precautions, they inſiſted that if the ſcheme for leaving Naples and Sicily to king Philip, which they had cruelly rejected, ſhould nevertheleſs be granted by their allies, it ſhould be on condition only that theſe two kingdoms returned to the houſe of Auſtria, in failure of iſſue in a direct line from this prince; and that in conſideration of ſuch equivalent, he ſhould renounce all right or pretenſion to any part whatſoever of the Spaniſh monarchy.

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THE deputies not only rejected the deſign of diſpoſing of the duchies of Milan and Mantua, in prejudice to the emperor and his family; but they gave further to underſtand, that the allies would perhaps demand the towns of Toul and Verdun for the duke of Lorrain.

As a mark of confidence and of the purity of their intentions, they acquainted Rouillé with the ſolicitations which England, together with the other proteſtant princes, were then making at the Hague, to prevail upon the Republic to act in concert with them, in order to obtain leave for the French refugees to return to France, and to inſiſt upon it as an eſſential condition of peace.

AT the ſame time the deputies aſſured him, that their maſters would not make a demand ſo diſagreeable to his majeſty; they only begged he would permit the French that were naturalized in Holland, to enjoy the privileges which he and his predeceſſors had granted to the ſubjects of the Republic.

THE points canvaſſed in this conference were properly no more than the ſketch of a treaty of peace, by opening a regular negotiation with all the parties intereſted in the war. The firſt ſtep was to engage the allies to ſign the preliminaries, which the preſident Rouillé and the Dutch miniſters ſhould agree upon. The preſident wanted to know what meaſures they had taken

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for this effect. They made anſwer, that as ſoon as the king had determined, and made known his intentions, in regard to the ſeveral points conteſted, they ſhould have a conference with the Engliſh miniſters; that when theſe two powers were ſatisfied, they ſhould agree together about the means of obliging their allies; the Republic being determined not to act but in conjunction with England.

The name of peace conveys the idea of ſo happy a ſtate, that whoever oppoſes it downright, is looked upon as an enemy to the public welfare and tranquillity. Even thoſe who moſt delight in the horrid ſcenes of war are obliged to diſguiſe their ſentiments, and would have it thought that their views are pacific. The deputies could not deviate from their inſtructions; but whether true, or falſe, all their expreſſions ſeemed to be full of a ſincere deſire of ſeeing very ſoon a happy iſſue of their conferences.

They begged of Rouillé very earneſtly to acquaint them with the king's anſwers, and whether he would wait for them in Holland, or return to France to receive them from his majeſty in perſon. He had once a notion of ſo doing, which he hinted in the conferences; but when he came to reflect that a journey to court, and his ſudden return to Holland, could not be kept ſecret; that it would be making an uſeleſs and dange-

dangerous diſcovery, and give occaſion to new difficulties, when the conferences came to be renewed:

He therefore promiſed the deputies, that he ſhould do every thing, to anſwer the eager deſire they expreſſed, of knowing the king's intentions. It was agreed, that as ſoon as he received an anſwer, he ſhould give them notice; that without loſs of time they ſhould fix upon a place where they might ſee one another again; and that for his part he ſhould take care to be there exactly at the time appointed.

The deputies told him moreover, that as ſoon as their maſters received certain notice of his majeſty's ultimate reſolution, they would ſend a miniſter to England to acquaint that court with it. They ſaid they wiſhed that the duke of Marlborough was ſtill at London. They conceived that his abſence would create new delays, becauſe no reſolution in an affair of ſuch importance, would be taken, without having had previouſly his advice. Beſides it was not at all befitting that, to make overtures of peace, the Dutch ſhould watch the very time when this general was away from the queen his miſtreſs; but they added, that the deputy appointed to go over to England muſt by all means have a writing ſigned by the preſident Rouillé, containing the preliminary articles which the king had ordered him to agree to, purſuant to the full power given him by his majeſty. This writing was

to obtain credit to what the deputy ſhould ſay; and he ſhould have directions to read it only to the queen of England and to the duke of Marlborough, but not to let it out of his hands.

In fine they demanded as the laſt condition, that the acknowledging of the electoral dignity, which ſome years ſince had been granted to the duke of Hanover, ſhould be inſerted and ranked among the preliminary articles.

During the conference, ſome of the commiſſaries of Zealand happened to paſs through the place where it was held; they knew Buys and Vanderduſſen, but did not look upon themſelves as obliged to conceal this diſcovery. The ſecret now began to be known. Several of the foreign miniſters at the Hague in behalf of the princes engaged in the alliance, raiſed their voices, and made loud complaints againſt theſe clandeſtine tranſactions, the knowledge of which was concealed from their maſters. The duke of Savoy's envoy, not content with complaining to the penſionary, ſet a ſpy to watch the preſident Rouillé, and to give him exact intelligence of all his motions.

The zeal of the miniſter from Savoy was ſeconded by the envoys of Portugal and Brandenburg.

The emperor's reſident was as warm as the other miniſters of the allies, and had better intelligence; even before the opening of the conferences, he had notice of the offers, which the pre-

preſident Rouillé intended to make to the deputies of the Republic. Thus all the powers allied againſt France unanimouſly oppoſed a negotiation, which the Dutch carried on but faintly, and durſt not even acknowledge.

And yet in France they flattered themſelves with the hopes of peace: it was neceſſary; it was wiſhed for; and this was all the foundation they had to think it would be concluded. For it appeared plainly by the account which the preſident Rouillé gave to the king, of what had paſſed in the firſt conference, that there was nothing to be expected on the part of the Dutch, but ill will; and that, even if their intentions were good, they abſolutely wanted power and credit with their allies, to engage them to come into a peace.

The king ſo ſincerely deſired it, that the relation ſent him by the preſident Rouillé was incapable to diſcourage him. He had reaſon to be provoked at the inſincerity of the Dutch, when one of their deputies diſowned, what the other had agreed to have written himſelf, with the authority of his ſuperiors; and what his majeſty had been willing to conſider and to approve of, as the baſis of the negotiation they were going upon.

Nor was his majeſty leſs offended with that heap of exorbitant pretenſions, which the Republic ſtarted in favour of her allies, and with thoſe exceſſive advantages which ſhe demanded,

either for her commerce, or for that pretended barrier which ſhe wanted to form under the pretence of her own ſecurity.

And yet peace was ſo deſirable a thing at that time, that the king, notwithſtanding the ſoundneſs of his judgment, flattered himſelf, that in the midſt of ſo irregular a proceeding he could in ſome meaſure ſee, and with ſatisfaction obſerve, the eagerneſs which the deputies had ſhewn to reſume the conferences.

His majeſty reflected on the deſire they had expreſſed, to prevent the opening of the campaign by a quick concluſion: He gave a favourable interpretation to the ſpeeches they had held, in regard to the different articles of the greateſt moment. His inſtructions to Rouillé, were to come to another conference as ſoon as he could; to try to reduce the preliminaries to thoſe articles only which were comprized and ſpecified in Vanderduſſen's memorial; to wave, if poſſible, all other demands for the preſent, and to defer the diſcuſſion of them to the aſſembly, that ſhould be appointed for treating of a general peace. He renewed the permiſſion he had given him, of engaging to produce the king of Spain's conſent to renounce, in favour of the archduke, the crown of Spain, and the dominions ſubject to that monarchy in the old and new world. He likewiſe deſiſted from the propoſal of adding Sardinia, and the ports on the Tuſcan coaſt, to the two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, which

he was willing to accept of, as an equivalent for his grandſon.

In regard to the barrier, his majeſty conſented to add Ypres and Menin, with their dependencies, to the ſtrong places already promiſed to the Dutch for the pretended ſecurity of their frontier.

The advantages that had been promiſed in favour of their trade were confirmed; and with reſpect to the exception of the twelve ſorts of merchandizes, Rouillé had orders to tell them, that when this affair came to be examined by itſelf, the king would readily conſent to every reaſonable demand of the Dutch nation, provided it was not attended with any eſſential prejudice to the commerce of his own ſubjects.

His majeſty agreed to recogniże princeſs Anne, as queen of Great-Britain, and to renew the treaty concluded at Ryſwic with that crown.

He engaged likewiſe not to oppoſe or diſturb the order of ſucceſſion, as eſtabliſhed by Engliſh acts of parliament.

As to the conqueſts made during the courſe of the war, either by France over the Engliſh, or by the latter over any part of the king's dominions, his majeſty judged it would be better to make a mutual reſtitution. He was alſo of opinion, that the treaties concluded at Ryſwic with the emperor and the empire ought to be revived.

It was doing a great deal to ſettle the principal conditions of the treaties, that were to be concluded with ſuch a number of princes and ſtates, during that ſhort ſpace, which ſtill remained, from the end of the month of March, to the opening of the campaign. For as to particular enquiries, and to the deciſion of every difficulty, that would naturally ariſe from the connexion and explication of ſuch a multitude of pretenſions, there was no other way than of referring them to the conferences for ſettling a general peace.

And yet it was a matter of infinite conſequence towards the forwarding of a peace, till the place of meeting was appointed for that purpoſe, to keep the negotiation alive, even during the operations of the two armies, if they could not agree to a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities.

For this reaſon the king commended Rouillé, as having formed a right judgment of his majeſty's intentions, and ſhewn himſelf ſenſible of the danger of interrupting the conferences; which would have been difficult to renew, had he, in compliance with the ſolicitation of the two deputies, taken the reſolution of going back to receive freſh orders from his majeſty, rather than wait for them, as he did, at Antwerp.

The king renewed the orders he had given him before, to ſtay upon the territories of the Republic, ſo long as they would permit him; and that if he was obliged to depart from thence, his

his majeſty would have him wait in one of his frontier towns, for any further orders he ſhould pleaſe to ſend him.

It was the common opinion at that time, that there was no poſſibility of obtaining a peace, but by the good offices and interpoſition of the Dutch. One would have ſaid, that they were guardians of that fair deity's temple, that they had the key of it in their own hands, and that the entrance was forbidden to all thoſe whom they ſhould refuſe to introduce. It was therefore judged a matter of prudence, to take particular care not to ſet them againſt us, tho' their inſincerity was evident, and the king was now fully convinced of it. The memorial drawn up by Vanderduſſen had been the firſt baſis of the negotiation; for it was upon the demands contained therein, that the conferences were begun. Now there was not a word in this memorial, whereby it was given to underſtand, that the Dutch inſiſted on the king's producing a power from the king of Spain, to agree, in his name, to the conditions demanded by the allies. On the contrary it was known, that this prince held theſe conditions in the utmoſt abhorrence. All that the king could do, was to ſee them executed; and this his majeſty engaged to perform; whilſt the Dutch confined themſelves to mere good offices of very little weight, to diſpoſe their allies to peace. And yet it was in the power of this Republic, to explain herſelf in re-

gard to her allies, in ſuch a manner as ſhould determine them to put an end to a war, which they could not continue without her aſſiſtance.

The deputies, in juſtification of their maſters, pretended that the Republic had no power to diſpoſe of the property of others; that ſhe would ſcruple, and her ſcruple would be well grounded, to do any ſuch thing. But this falſe delicacy vaniſhed, when the queſtion was to procure unjuſtly, for thoſe very allies, the poſſeſſion of territories which did not belong to them, to ſtrip the lawful poſſeſſors, and to involve all Europe in flames in order to ſupport their iniquitous pretenſions.

The king was content with little, when he propoſed that the king his grandſon, ſhould have the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, as a very trifling equivalent for the loſs of ſuch extenſive dominions, which this prince would be obliged to ſacrifice to the public tranquillity: but the leaſt he could expect was, that they would ſecure this unequal portion to him.

As the deputies had avoided entering into a diſcuſſion of this ſubject, the king gave orders to the preſident Rouillé, that he ſhould bring it upon the carpet at the very next conference.

His majeſty wrote to him to propoſe joining a ſquadron of his ſhips to the Dutch fleet, which ſhould convoy the king of Spain either to Naples or Sicily. He likewiſe judged it neceſſary, that

that the arrival of this prince in thoſe kingdoms ſhould be preceded by a body of troops in the ſervice of the States-General, in ſuch a number as ſhould be agreed upon.

THE king judged ſo favourably of the prudence of the Republic, as to think ſhe had not engaged to obtain for the emperor a pure and ſimple re-eſtabliſhment of the treaty of Munſter, in ſuch a manner as the Germans pretended to interpret it.

HIS majeſty gave directions to Monſieur Rouillé, to evade, as much as poſſible, the condition demanded by England, of obliging king James to quit the kingdom.

THE conferences having been firſt opened, with an intent to negotiate upon the foot of the demands contained in Vanderduſſen's memorial, there was reaſon to believe that their deliberations would be confined to the articles ſpecified in that paper; and yet the Dutch deputies, exceeding the limits of their firſt plan, had extended themſelves to the intereſts of the ſeveral princes engaged in the alliance. Of theſe they had made new articles of pretenſions and demands, which were to be referred to the general treaty of peace. The king was not obliged to explain himſelf in regard to theſe ſeveral queſtions, and yet his majeſty thought proper to anſwer them.

ROUILLE had therefore orders to declare, that in regard to the inſtances made in favour of the

king of Portugal, his majeſty would not oppoſe any act of generoſity which the houſe of Auſtria ſhould ſhew him.

Who could have foreſeen ſome years ago, that this houſe was to become a benefactreſs to that of Braganza; and the Dutch to employ their beſt offices for the intereſt of Portugal? but maxims of policy are ever ſubject to change. Heretofore the princes of the houſe of Auſtria looked upon the grandfather and father of the young king of Portugal, as rebellious ſubjects. His great uncle was impriſoned in Spain, where he died after a long confinement. This young prince had forgot the ſuccours of France, and the injuries of the houſe of Auſtria, or perhaps he was unacquainted with what had paſſed before his birth.

The deputies of the Republic had alſo demanded, that the intereſts of the elector of Brandenburg ſhould be comprized in the preliminaries. The king ordered Rouillé to anſwer, that his majeſty did not rank this prince among his enemies; that indeed his troops ſerved in their armies, but only as mercenaries; therefore if there was any pretenſion to regulate on his ſide, it would be proper to defer it to the conferences for a general peace; that they could not require of his majeſty, to guaranty the peaceable poſſeſſion of the counties of Neufchatel and Valengin to the elector; that this would be covenanting about the rights of other claimants, who had

had reaſon to complain of the elector's taking forcible poſſeſſion of an eſtate before he had proved his right. The king however promiſed in relation to this article, that he would uſe no violence to diſturb the elector in the poſſeſſion of thoſe counties.

THE erection of a ninth electorate in favour of the duke of Hanover, the right of garriſoning Rhinsfelds, as well as the inſtances in favour of the elector of Brandenburg, were affairs abſolutely foreign to the preliminaries, and conſequently to be referred to the general conferences of peace.

HIS majeſty even conſented, that the re-eſtabliſhing the two electors of the houſe of Bavaria to their eſtates and dignities, ſhould be referred to thoſe conferences. Not that he had any indifference in regard to theſe princes; on the contrary he had their intereſts greatly at heart, and judged his honour concerned in protecting them: but he thought the minds of the contending parties would be leſs exaſperated, when they agreed on all ſides to meet and ſincerely to treat about a general peace; that the two electors would find friends, who would ſerve them; and that as a reconciliation was drawing near, it would be much eaſier to propoſe and to agree upon expedients capable of removing thoſe difficulties, which were fomented and increaſed, during the continuance of the war, by the inveterate animoſity of parties.

HIS

His majeſty confirmed the order he had given, of inſiſting on the reſtitution of Exilles and Feneſtrelles, then in poſſeſſion of the duke of Savoy.

He refuſed to agree to the demand which the Dutch made of Tournay, Condé, and Maubeuge, for the ſecurity of their barrier. And, in order to prevent any further mention of ſuch a diſagreeable ſubject, he gave leave to the preſident Rouillé, to offer them Furnes with its dependances, after demoliſhing the fortifications of that town. He might even have reſigned it to them, fortified as it was, could this condeſcenſion have been ſufficient to prevent every other demand on the part of the Dutch, and to ſatisfy them upon the article of the barrier. Yet the fortifications were of great uſe for the ſecurity of Dunkirk; and beſides, the territory belonging to it was as fruitful as that of the lordſhips of Ypres and Menin, and conſequently produced a conſiderable revenue.

There was no occaſion to take any notice of what Vanderduſſen mentioned, in regard to the deputation which his maſters propoſed to ſend to England, in order to inform princeſs Anne of the king's intentions towards accelerating a peace. The duke of Marlborough knew every word of it, before he ſet out for London. Yet it ſignified nothing to oppoſe what the States-General ſhould think proper; and the ſend-

ſending a deputy on their part to England, was a matter abſolutely indifferent to his majeſty.

But it was not a thing indifferent to his majeſty, to give, in caſe of ſuch a deputation, the written acknowledgment, which Vanderduſſen had previouſly demanded of the preſident Rouillé. The multiplying of this kind of writings, creates perplexity; and beſides it ill became the Dutch, to require ſuch a number of eclairciſſments, and ſuch repeated ſecurities, when they did not ſo much as give a full power to their deputies, whom they had choſen to negotiate a peace.

The king concluded his inſtructions, with a plain repetition to Rouillé of the orders he had before given him, that he ſhould uſe his utmoſt endeavours to fix his reſidence in ſome town of Holland, in order to keep up the negotiation; his majeſty judging it neceſſary to continue the conferences, till they ſhould be productive of a peace. By fixing his reſidence in Holland, he might find means of acquainting the honeſt Republicans, who had the good of their country at heart, with the ſeveral ſteps which the king was taking towards a peace, and which in all probability the partizans of war kept from their knowledge, at the ſame time that they concealed from them the advantageous and unexpected conditions which his majeſty offered the Republic, both for the advancement of her commerce, and to remove on his ſide every cauſe of apprehenſion.

The

THE friends and enemies of France were equally alarmed at the firſt report of the conferences. The former were afraid of being abandoned and ſacrificed to the preſſing neceſſities of the kingdom; the latter apprehended a diviſion betwixt the principal powers who formed the grand alliance.

SOME of the towns belonging to France were frightened at the flying reports, that they were ſhortly to be ceded to the enemy. Among others the town of Thionville, alarmed at the notion of being transferred to the duke of Lorrain, wrote to his majeſty in the moſt ſuppliant terms, beſeeching him on their bended knees, not to oblige his faithful ſubjects to acknowledge another maſter.

ON the other hand, the miniſters reſiding at the Hague, on the behalf of the princes of the empire, made loud complaints, as ſoon as they heard that conferences had been held for negotiating a peace. They declared that their maſters would never conſent to enter into any treaty, unleſs France offered the full re-eſtabliſhment of the peace of Munſter, as a preliminary. Prince Eugene, at that time at Bruſſels, ſpoke in the ſame ſtyle; adding menaces that he would carry ruin and deſolation into the heart of France, at the opening of the campaign.

MY lord Cadogan, the duke of Marlborough's great favourite, and conſidered as that general's right-hand, improved upon the grumblings and menaces

menaces of the Germans. He complained, on the part of England, to the penſionary, pretending that Rouillé had boaſted of having already agreed with the States-General. Thus he blew the coals, and ſtirred up all the foreign miniſters at the Hague, carefully to watch and to oppoſe the opening of any conferences. In ſhort, the partizans of war omitted nothing in their power to increaſe its devouring flame, thinking themſelves unhappy, if the negotiations of peace were to be in the hands of the Dutch, who, by conducting a tranſaction of that importance, would ceaſe to depend on two generals, that found their private account in the war.

NEVERTHELESS the conferences recommenced, as ſoon as the preſident Rouillé informed Buys and Vanderduſſen, purſuant to their agreement at parting, that he had received the king's anſwers. The two deputies deſired he would meet them at Woërden.

HE did not fail to be at Woërden the 12th of April.. There he received a note from Vanderduſſen, mentioning that his collegue and he did not think it proper to go into the town, for fear of being diſcovered; that they deſired he would be ſo good as to come three miles further, for the greater ſecrecy of the remainder of the conferences, and they ſhould wait for him in a yacht upon the canal. Thither he went; they ſeemed equally pleaſed at the ſight of each other; and in this very place they had four conferences.

THE

The preſident Rouillé huſbanded his powers, and prudently expatiated on the king's complaiſance in deſiſting, for the love of peace, from the propoſal his majeſty had made of adding Sardinia to the equivalent for the king his grandſon. But this deſiſtance made no impreſſion on the deputies; tho' Rouillé told them further, that his majeſty would relinquiſh the port-towns on the Tuſcan coaſt, in favour of the houſe of Auſtria.

The deputies did not ſeem to take any notice of this addition. Their principal and conſtant aim was to ſtrengthen the barrier, which they imagined could never be too ſecure, nor too extenſive. They looked upon it as a rampart, that was abſolutely neceſſary for ſtopping the incurſions of France. For this purpoſe they wanted to keep the important town of Liſle, that had been conquered the preceding campaign by the allied army.

The preſident Rouillé had orders to inſiſt on the reſtitution of this capital of French-Flanders, which had been conſiderably improved in its fortifications and trade, ſince it became ſubject to his majeſty. He was not allowed to make the leaſt abatement upon ſo eſſential an article; ſo that no peace could be concluded, unleſs Liſle with its dependencies was reſtored to France.

In order to obtain this reſtitution, he offered an equivalent, purſuant to the power he had lately received. He propoſed therefore to reſign

Furnes

Furnes with its dependencies, after demoliſhing the fortifications.

HAVING made theſe offers, he inſiſted that the preliminaries ſhould be reduced to thoſe articles only, which were contained in Vanderduſſen's memorial, the baſis of the negotiations. This laſt conference was entirely taken up in conteſting theſe ſeveral points.

BUYS piqued himſelf upon his eloquence, which he endeavoured to diſplay in the ſecond conference: and while it laſted, he was indulged the pleaſure of combating and rejecting the preſident's propoſals.

ROUILLE retired to the village of Bodegrave; where the memory of the French is preſerved very much to their diſadvantage. The deputies lodged in a houſe in the neighbourhood, and came the next day to bring him to their yacht.

HERE the third conference was held. It was agreed to declare the ceſſion of Spain in the preliminaries, in ſuch a manner as it ſhould include all the parts of that monarchy, except the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, without ſpecifying the other territories in particular.

ROUILLE propoſed the admitting of Menager to the conferences, in order to examine along with him the exceptions to the tariff of 1664, which he pretended to be advantageous to the mutual commerce of France and Holland. The deputies refuſed to hear him. He will come, ſaid they, full of his own ſcheme; and, without entering

ing into the general plan, he will think only of defending his own opinion, even to the endangering of the main affair. They poſitively declared, that the republic would accept of no propoſal to her prejudice; that if the ſcheme in queſtion was really conducive to her advantage, and to the mutual intereſt and commerce of both nations, Menager might draw up a memorial, and ſend it; that the States-General did not want any body to inſtruct them in regard to their own intereſt; that a memorial would convey the author's conceptions, as clearly as if he came to explain them himſelf in perſon.

The converſation grew warm upon the article of the barrier, which affected the Dutch more ſenſibly than all the reſt. Buys was the ſpokeſman; but he ſtarted a great many more difficulties than he cared to ſolve. He ſaid indiſcreet things very often; while his collegue was ſilent. He aſſerted that the leaſt advantage the Republic could derive from the paſt and future ſucceſs of her arms, was to ſettle ſo ſtrong a barrier, that her territories ſhould no longer be expoſed to the inſults of France. To which he added, that the king of France ought to be leſs concerned at the loſs of the towns he was about to relinquiſh, than thankful for a peace by which the remainder of his conqueſts was ſecured to him. His majeſty, he ſaid, would owe this obligation entirely to the United-Provinces; and if the opinion of ſeveral members of the govern-

ment was to be taken, inſtead of endeavouring to favour France, they ſhould ſupport the ſcheme unanimouſly projected by the allies, of reducing her to the Pyrenean treaty. He pretended likewiſe to make a merit of the moderation of his maſters, at a time when their ſpirits were ſo greatly raiſed by the extraordinary ſucceſſes of the confederacy; at a time when they fancied they ſaw their armies almoſt at the gates of Paris; at a time, in ſhort, when the partizans of war were continually ſounding the alarm, and endeavouring to perſuade the people, already intoxicated with ſucceſs, that the moment now was come, when they could impoſe even the hardeſt terms upon the French king.

THROUGH a cloud of warm expreſſions that dropped from Buys, Rouillé thought he deſcried that the ceſſion of Furnes, with its fortifications, might be conſidered as ſome equivalent. He judged however that it was not yet time to explain himſelf.

THEY proceeded therefore to the indemnification, that was to be given to the king of Spain. The deputies acknowledged, that, without the conſent of England, they could not promiſe that the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily ſhould be relinquiſhed to this prince. That it would be a great point, if the Engliſh conſented to let him have the kingdom of Naples only. Thus the Dutch, ſervilely ſubject to England, depended on that crown, and on the emperor, for the de-

ciſion of an eſſential article of the peace, which they conſequently left uncertain; when the king did them the honour to addreſs himſelf to them, for facilitating the means of reſtoring the general tranquillity.

THE deputies ſaid, that they would make a report to their ſuperiors, of his majeſty's propoſal for an equivalent to the king of Spain.

THEY renewed their demand, that the treaty of Munſter ſhould be entirely reſtored, in favour of the emperor and the empire. However this was only a good office; for the deputies agreed that their maſters were not at all engaged to propoſe, much leſs to defend, an article ſo likely to break off all negotiation.

THEY deſired that the king would be pleaſed to expreſs himſelf in ſtronger terms than thoſe he had hitherto made uſe of, in conſenting to acknowledge the order of ſucceſſion, as ſettled by act of parliament, in favour of the proteſtant line; they inſiſted at the ſame time on the neceſſity of obliging king James to remove from France. All their demands were eſſential conditions, according to them, without which no peace could be concluded; and they pretended that a peace would be impoſſible, ſo long as this prince continued to reſide in the kingdom; that the ſecurity of England as well as of Holland depended on his removal; that both governments would go hand in hand, and never act contrary to their joint

joint intereſts; that the only mitigation they could admit in this article, would be not to make it an expreſs condition of the treaty, but to leave the manner of accompliſhing it to his majeſty.

THEY were ſatisfied with his majeſty's anſwer, in regard to the king of Portugal.

BUT as he conſented to acknowledge the elector of Brandenburg's new title of king of Pruſſia, they deſired that his majeſty would be pleaſed to add in expreſs terms, that he would let him peaceably enjoy the counties of Neufchatel and Valengin, without prejudicing the rights of the other claimants.

THEY ſaid they had no power in regard to the article of Exilles and Feneſtrelles.

THEIR laſt demand was in favour of the duke of Hanover; and, according to cuſtom, they pretended as a preliminary and eſſential condition of peace, that the king ſhould promiſe to acknowledge the ninth electorate, created ſome years before in favour of that prince. To gain this point, they offered that the intereſts of the two electors of Cologne and Bavaria ſhould be likewiſe comprehended in the preliminaries; and they went ſo far as to ſay, that ſince the king's enemies included their allies, his majeſty had an equal right to include his. This offer was accompanied with proteſtations on their ſide, of the ſincere deſire of the Republic to aſſiſt the two electors with her beſt offices. They added

moreover, that they hoped his majeſty would remember the good diſpoſition of their maſters, and the ſteps they had taken in favour of thoſe princes.

Rouille had had time to conſider the inſignificancy of theſe ſpeeches. However he took care to let the deputies know, that a ſimple promiſe of good offices in favour of the houſe of Bavaria, was not an adequate ſatisfaction to engage the king to acknowledge himſelf indebted to their maſters for their good intentions.

The fourth conference of the fourth of April, was employed only in recapitulating what had been before ſaid in the three preceding.

The terms which the king was willing to grant to the Dutch, either in favour of their trade, or for the ſecurity of their barrier, were ſo advantageous to that nation, and ſo ſuperior to what they had any reaſon to expect from their conjunction with ſo many princes allied againſt France, that there was room to believe a prudent people would not let ſlip ſuch a favourable opportunity of obtaining the utmoſt of their wiſhes. However, Rouillé judged they would not be as yet ſatisfied with ſuch a multitude of conceſſions; and that they would not deſiſt from demanding Tournay and Condé, eſpecially if the king perſiſted in his pretenſions, that Liſle ſhould be ceded to him, with its Chatellany and dependancies.

THE Dutch deputies employed in theſe conferences, did not appear to be of a tractable diſpoſition, nor to have a genius fruitful of expedients. On the contrary Buys's abilities ſeemed to conſiſt in raiſing difficulties. As to Vanderduſſen he was generally ſilent, and when he thought himſelf obliged to ſay ſomething, he ſpoke only to ſupport the haughtineſs of his collegue, to defend his unjuſt demands, and to confirm his refuſals. Both of them, when good reaſons or even pretexts were wanting, got off by declaring, that their powers were inſufficient, or that they were not fully acquainted with the intentions of their allies.

EVERY negotiator naturally wiſhes and hopes to ſucceed. Rouillé had reaſon to deſire it, but he flattered himſelf without any appearance of probability. His hopes were founded only on the ſatisfaction which the deputies expreſſed at ſeeing a miniſter from the king, and on the impatience they had of being carefully informed of his majeſty's anſwers.

AT the beginning, they deſired that the conferences ſhould be kept ſecret. They were afterwards not diſpleaſed to ſee that their negotiations had got wind, and that the public was no longer a ſtranger to them. However, the particulars were not yet known; for the deputies gave an immediate account to the penſionary only, who communicated as much as he thought proper to ſuch members of the government as

he choſe to confide in; but he concealed not one individual circumſtance from the duke of Marlborough.

After the conference of the fourth of April, Rouillé determined to fix his reſidence at Bodegrave, a village only ten leagues diſtant from the Hague. He pitched upon this place with the agreement of the deputies. They left him at liberty to go either to Woerden, or to Gouda, and expreſſed an eager deſire of ſeeing him again. When they parted, Vanderduſſen gave him his hand, unknown to his collegue, who was at ſome little diſtance. He told Rouillé that he might write to him from Gouda. This was the only time that Vanderduſſen ſpoke to him, when Buys was not preſent. The ſequel of the negotiation plainly ſhewed, that under this mark of civility no myſtery was hidden.

The impatience which the two deputies expreſſed, to be quickly informed of the king's anſwers and reſolutions, induced Rouillé to deſire a paſſport from the States, for the courier whom he was to ſend to his majeſty. They begged to be excuſed from mentioning it, becauſe they ſhould be obliged to apply to the States in full aſſembly, and conſequently the ſecret would be divulged. For this reaſon they adviſed him to truſt his diſpatches to the ordinary poſt. They only aſſured him that he might make himſelf perfectly eaſy, as well in regard to what he wrote, as to the anſwers he might receive.

After

AFTER the departure of the deputies, Pettekum the duke of Holſtein's reſident, came to Bodegrave. It had been now ſome time, as we have already mentioned, ſince this man had buſied himſelf, of his own head, with making propoſals for a general peace. Tho' the negotiation was conducted thro' another channel, yet he would not miſs his aim; flattering himſelf with the honour, and probably with the profit which he had reaſon to expect, could he have any ſhare in this important work. The preſident Rouillé heard nothing of any conſequence from him. Pettekum wrote to the miniſter in France, whom he was known to, that the trip he had taken to Bodegrave, was not without the privity, but with the conſent of the penſionary; that this miniſter was concerned at the report which the deputies had made of the conferences, and of the limits which his majeſty had ſet to his laſt conceſſions, reducing them to the ceſſion of Furnes diſmantled; and that he began to doubt whether his majeſty was ſincerely deſirous of peace.

HEINSIUS was a perſon to be regarded, not only on account of his weight in the Republic, and the confidence he had acquired with the allies; but likewiſe for the purity of his intentions, for his ſincerity, and for the deſire he had of ſeeing the general tranquillity re-ſettled, if credit could be given to the perſon, whom he had employed to repreſent his ſentiments. Pettekum

gave his advice to go on briſkly with the negotiation, and not to trifle, for ſo he expreſſed himſelf, but to be ingenuous, and to make ſuch offers as the penſionary ſhould have reaſon to recommend to the allies, who were bitter enemies to all overtures of peace, and unanimouſly endeavoured to perſuade the government to ſend Rouillé immediately back.

Prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough were expected at the Hague. In their abſence the miniſters of inferior rank were exciting the people to continue the war another campaign, and France in their opinion would not be able to ſtand it. She was at her laſt gaſp, they ſaid; now was the time to avail themſelves of her deſperate condition, and without giving her a moment's breathing, to hinder her from ever recovering her ſtrength ſo as to be any more the terror of her neighbours. The envoy from Lorrain ſeconded the outcry of the multitude, who were for continuing the war.

The impatience of thoſe who longed to ſee the duke of Marlborough at the Hague, was quickly ſatisfied. This general had been thoroughly informed of every thing that paſſed at the conferences. He had conſented, before he embarked for England, to let the preſident Rouillé continue in Holland, confident that nothing would be done without his approbation, and that he ſhould have it in his power to retard or to prevent the progreſs of the negotiation,

juſt

juſt as he pleaſed. It would therefore have been an idle thing of him, to act ſo odious a part, as that of openly oppoſing the general quiet of Europe, when he could at any time ſecretly hinder it.

He judged then that it was high time to break off the conferences. He never expected ſuch conceſſions from the king towards facilitating a peace. He began to be afraid leſt they ſhould make an impreſſion upon the people, who were now grown tired of a long and bloody war, the whole profit of which was reaped by the Auſtrian family and by the two generals, whilſt the United provinces were oppreſſed with its weight.

These reflexions induced him to declare immediately after his arrival at the Hague, that the conferences were infinitely diſagreeable to the court of England; that he had orders to deſire the States-General to break them off, if France determined to make no further offers, and would not extend them in favour of the emperor and of Great-Britain.

At the ſame time prince Eugene made a declaration of the like nature, and moreover demanded as an indiſpenſable preliminary, that the Spaniſh monarchy ſhould be ceded whole and entire to the houſe of Auſtria, without the leaſt amputation of any member belonging to that crown; and further that there ſhould be a pure and ſimple re-eſtabliſhment of the treaty of Munſter.

Upon

Upon the firſt report of the conferences, the marquiſs Delborgo, envoy from the duke of Savoy, diſpatched his ſecretary to acquaint that prince with the affair. He likewiſe preſented a memorial to the States-General, couched in very ſtrong terms, deſiring them not to liſten to any overture of peace, without the conſent of the duke his maſter.

Such a number of attacks and batteries againſt a peace might have been ſufficient to make the duke of Marlborough eaſy, whoſe influence of itſelf was very great in the deliberations of the States-General.

And yet he was not without his inquietudes. The more liberal the king proved in his conceſſions, the more the duke was afraid of the impreſſion they might make, and of the reflexions of the honeſt patriots among the Dutch, on the dangerous vicinity of a power, whoſe aggrandizement might ſome day or other prove fatal to the Republic. He endeavoured therefore to render theſe very offers ſuſpected, imagining he ſhould perſuade them that the French king was inſincere; and in ſhort that Rouillé had been ſent to Holland only to amuſe and to deceive the allies.

The better to eſtabliſh this diſtruſt, he undertook to have it propagated by that very Petterkum, who valued himſelf for being looked upon as a ſecret agent of the court of France.

The duke of Marlborough in his converſation with Petterkum, gave this malicious turn

to Rouillé's commiſſion, as an indubitable truth; and perhaps he perſuaded him, that the ſtate of the conferences was an evident proof of the king's ſecret intentions; and that the offers made by his majeſty might paſs as ſo many marks of his contempt for the emperor and Great-Britain. But, ſaid he, France is miſtaken, if ſhe thinks ſhe can obtain a peace in ſpite of theſe two powers, or entertains a notion that Holland can force them to give their conſent. Before a peace can be ſettled, full ſatisfaction muſt be given to all the allies, Rouillé muſt be ſent back, and the private negotiations be broke off.

THE penſionary then judged that it was high time to communicate the ſecret of the conferences to the ſtates of the province of Holland, whom he had not as yet acquainted with it. He alſo charged the deputies of the other provinces to give the ſame notice to their ſuperiors. He had a perſonal intereſt in making the public believe, that he was deſirous of peace; for which reaſon he threw the whole odium of the difficulties attending it, upon the Engliſh, and particularly on the duke of Marlborough.

AT that very time a French refugée who lived in Holland, and whoſe name was Amirault, came from Amſterdam, his place of reſidence, to wait upon the preſident Rouillé; and aſſured him that the whole province of Holland, particularly the city of Amſterdam, were extremely deſirous

deſirous of a peace; that Buys, one of the deputies at the conferences, and firſt penſionary of that town, was deſpiſed by his fellow-citizens; and that the perſon they confided in, was Baſſecourt, the ſecond penſionary, a prudent and pacific man.

In the mean time, the allies were ſo ſtrongly and unanimouſly bent againſt peace, that the king, grown daily more ſenſible of the neceſſity of putting an end to the war, was ſtill willing to flatter the Dutch, by granting them new privileges for their commerce. His majeſty therefore permitted the preſident Rouillé to promiſe, in his name, that the tariff of 1664 ſhould be reſtored in their favour, without reſtriction or exception of any kind of merchandize whatſoever.

In regard to the barrier, Rouillé was to defer no longer, but immediately to declare that Furnes ſhould be given up with its fortifications.

He was alſo permitted to yield Condé, if this hard article ſhould be abſolutely inſiſted on. The king knew full well, that the ſecurity of his kingdom on the ſide of the Netherlands depended on his keeping poſſeſſion of Condé and Tournay; and that he ought not to be leſs vigilant in preſerving, than the Dutch were earneſt in aſking for, a barrier, under the pretence of ſecuring their territories: but the great need of a peace was a more cogent reaſon, and, in the preſent circumſtances, it was very well, if he could ſave Tournay by ſacrificing Condé.

Sin-

SINCERITY, the foundation of all ſucceſsful negotiations, was very little obſerved on the part of the Dutch. The conferences had been firſt ſet on foot, on condition that the preliminaries which they had demanded, ſhould be the baſis of the treaty: and the king had agreed to it.

HIS majeſty had alſo granted the demands made in favour of the commerce of the Dutch nation.

AND yet at every conference the deputies trumped up ſome new difficulties, under pretence of the barrier. At each anſwer from the king, they obtained ſome new conceſſion; on the contrary, they themſelves rejected every offer ſuitable and conducive to forward the peace. In vain did Rouillé exhort them to perſuade their allies to finiſh a long war, which had been ruinous to all parties; and to let them know, in caſe of denial, that the Republic would leave them to themſelves, and think of her own intereſts; the deputies gave no aſſurances on their ſide, but of general and faint recommendations.

THE king promiſed, that the crown of Spain, with the dominions ſubject thereto, ſhould be ceded to the houſe of Auſtria, excepting only Naples and Sicily, which were reſerved for a ſmall indemnification to the king of Spain; and yet the Dutch would hardly promiſe their general good offices for obtaining ſo moderate a demand.

HIS

His majeſty had permitted the preſident Rouillé to truſt his ſecret intentions to the two deputies, though they had produced no power from their maſters to treat at all. Neither had they any thoughts of remedying this eſſential defect, after the conferences were no longer a myſtery, and when there was no reaſon for keeping them ſecret. It was only by public report, that the penſionary was known to have at length acquainted the government with the offers made by his majeſty; offers ſo advantageous to the Dutch, that the common opinion was, it would have been better to have ſent them directly to the preſident of the week, who is obliged by the laws of the country, to give an account of what memorials he receives during his miniſtry. In all probability, the Engliſh party would not have had ſufficient credit in that caſe in Holland, to prevail over the intereſts of the Republic.

NOTWITHSTANDING the many reaſons which his majeſty had to complain of the irregular conduct of the Dutch, ſtill he did not chuſe that the conferences ſhould be broke off; though he was perſuaded that it would have been better, if the friends of peace and of their country's welfare had been rightly informed of the conditions he was ready to grant for the promoting of both. It is probable they would have reflected ſeriouſly on the changes that may ariſe from the fortune of war; a fortune ſo uncertain that the Republic might loſe in one day all the advantages, which the

the king had offered for obtaining a peace, and conſequently the fruit of thoſe great expences which ſhe had hitherto been at, only for the intereſt and aggrandizement of her allies.

COULD theſe reflections have prevailed on the Dutch, to prevent the opening of the approaching campaign, and to propoſe a ſuſpenſion of arms, in caſe a peace ſhould not be immediately agreed to: the preſident Rouillé had not only a power to conſent to it, but even to make the propoſal himſelf, in order to give time and leiſure for negotiating, without any apprehenſion of the alterations which the viciſſitude of war might make in the conditions already granted.

TO ſum them up once more, the king promiſed the Dutch, that he would re-ſettle the treaty of commerce concluded at Ryſwic.

THAT he would grant them the tariff of 1669, with ſuch exceptions however as ſhould be agreed upon by both parties, for the mutual advantage of the commerce betwixt France and the United Provinces.

IN regard to the barrier, his majeſty reſigned Ypres and its Chatellany, Menin with its dependencies, and Furnes with its fortifications and dependencies.

AFTER a ſacrifice of ſo many towns for the ſake of peace, he gave the preſident Rouillé permiſſion to make a further addition of Condé, and even of Maubeuge; if theſe new conceſſions, joined to ſo many others, ſhould be productive of

of a happy iſſue, and could preſerve Tournay to the crown of France.

THE conditions in favour of the houſe of Auſtria, were to let her have the Spaniſh monarchy, and the territories ſubject to that crown, reſerving only the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, to indemnify king Philip.

THE demand of interpreting and limiting the treaty of Munſter was unmaintainable; even the propoſal of reſtoring it was needleſs; ſince this treaty, being a baſis to thoſe of Nimeguen and Ryſwic, was ſuppoſed to be reſtored, when not derogatory to the two laſt, which were to be confirmed by the enſuing peace.

THE propoſal of leaving the elector of Brandenburg in quiet poſſeſſion of the counties of Neufchatel and Valengin, without prejudicing the rights of the other claimants, was accepted.

THE article of relinquiſhing Exilles and Feneſtrelles to the duke of Savoy, gave a great deal of juſt uneaſineſs to his majeſty; his enemies wanting to oblige him to reward the infidelity of this prince, at the time when they would not ſo much as liſten to the equitable demands of his faithful allies, the electors of Cologne and Bavaria; and when the Dutch durſt offer no more than their good offices, for reſtoring theſe two princes to their dignities.

THE king renewed the poſitive orders he had already given to Rouillé, of inſiſting ſtrongly on the intire reſtoration of theſe electors, as alſo on the

the complete reſtitution of their moveables, jewels, and generally of the ſeveral effects, of which they had been ſtripped during the courſe of the war.

In relation to England, his majeſty offered to renew the treaty concluded with that crown at Ryſwic. He promiſed alſo not to diſturb the tranquillity of Great-Britain either directly or indirectly, nor to attempt to alter the ſettlement made by act of parliament, for eſtabliſhing the order of ſucceſſion.

In regard to this article, he deſired Rouillé to enquire of the deputies, what kind of terms their maſters intended to uſe, in engaging to maintain that order of ſucceſſion, which, contrary to all juſtice, had been ſettled by the Engliſh acts of parliament. For after all, nothing appeared to him ſo precarious as ſuch a ſettlement. It is well known that the Engliſh are an inconſtant people, and very apt to change their opinions. One parliament, in a different conjuncture, repeals, what another has judged neceſſary to the welfare of the kingdom. It was therefore proper to know what the Dutch would do, if the Engliſh ſhould ſome time or other alter their political principles, and refuſe to acknowledge a German prince for their king, who by acts of parliament had been declared preſumptive heir to the crown; and whether the Dutch, in ſupport of his right, would give themſelves the trouble of tranſporting their troops to England.

His majeſty had an horrid repugnance againſt compelling king James to quit the kingdom. The preſident Rouillé had therefore orders to avail himſelf of the ſtrongeſt arguments, with which he was furniſhed by the king, to evade complying with this odious demand. He promiſed not to ſend him any ſuccours after the concluſion of the peace; and deſired Rouillé, as ſpeaking of his own head to the deputies, to ſound whether their maſters would grant an aſylum to this unfortunate prince at the Hague, and in what manner a proviſion could be made for his ſubſiſtance.

In fine, he judged it conducive to his ſervice, that Rouillé ſhould obtain paſſports of the Republic, for the ſecurity of the couriers he was to ſend to France. That he ſhould let his majeſty have ſome of them for occaſional uſe, ſhould the ſituation of affairs ever require his diſpatching an expreſs to him with a verbal order.

The civility ſhown by Vanderduſſen, upon his taking leave at the laſt conference, was never conſidered by his majeſty as a mere matter of indifference. Every minute circumſtance ought to be minded in a country, where they think it no diſhonour to accept of a gratification for an important ſervice. It was proper to know, whether the ſecond Dutch deputy had really any ſuch thought. In this caſe, the king empowered Rouillé not only to flatter his expectations, but moreover to give him poſitive aſſurances of a ſuit-

a ſuitable reward, ſhould he be able to perſuade the Republic to ſeparate from her allies, by concluding a particular peace, and till it became general to agree to a ſuſpenſion of arms.

THE Dutch had many powerful reaſons that obliged them to deſire it. The burden of the war was growing every day more heavy upon them, money more ſcarce, the public credit exhauſted, and the ways and means for raiſing the ſupplies extremely difficult. This embarraſſing ſituation could not be diſguiſed. On the one hand, the difficulty of continuing the war was prodigious; on the other, the king made extraordinary and unexpected advances towards facilitating a peace. One would have thought that, in this caſe, the choice was eaſy. Even thoſe who were for protracting the war durſt not own it, but appeared as lovers of peace. They joined with the honeſt Republicans in ſaying, that the Engliſh had gained too great an aſcendant over the Dutch government, that all their deciſions were laws, and they had no other aim than to puſh things to the laſt extremity.

VANDERDUSSEN propoſed a private interview with the preſident Rouillé at his country-houſe. Here he gave him a lively picture of the ſituation of the Republic. As a ſtronger proof of his ſincerity, he told him he would diſcloſe an important ſecret to him; and with the ſame breath, he added, that the penſionary had his ſpies at the court of France, men that could be depended

upon, and who were well informed of every thing that paſſed; from theſe he received a regular account of the moſt ſecret debates in council, of the diſpatches ſigned in the public offices, as well as in the count of Bergheik's cabinet. The penſionary, ſaid he, knows the contents of every letter you have written ſince you have been in Holland, and the character you have drawn of the two deputies appointed to treat with you. At Turin they know every thing that has been propoſed on both ſides, in relation to the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. And how do you imagine it poſſible for the negotiation to ſucceed, when ſuch a number of powers, who have an intereſt in oppoſing it, are informed even to the minuteſt circumſtances of the account you give, and of the orders you receive.

VANDERDUSSEN perhaps was ſincere in what he ſaid; or perhaps his unboſoming himſelf thus was only an artifice to induce Rouillé to diſcloſe the full extent of his powers, and to ſhew himſelf more open and communicative than he had hitherto been.

EVEN the *Gazettes à la main*, continued Vanderduſſen, diſcover the low ſtate of France, and the frightful miſery of her provinces: it is no longer time to trifle; the ſafety of the kingdom depends upon a peace; upon a ſpeedy peace; before the opening of the campaign. If the armies take the field, the pretenſions of the allies will then know no bounds. In vain ſhall the good

good Republicans mourn over the calamities of France; it will no longer be in their power to relieve the kingdom, as the intereſt of Holland might perhaps require. They are ſenſibly afflicted at the ſuperiority, which they ſee the Engliſh are aſſuming over the Republic; France alone would be able to aſſiſt her in caſe of a rupture, which ſeems almoſt unavoidable betwixt the two nations; hence the honeſt patriots would be glad to preſerve her from deſtruction.

HAVING made this diſcovery, Vanderduſſen concluded his ſpeech with obſerving, that as the pacific party, who favoured France, were much the weakeſt in Holland, the king ought to do ſomething to enable this party to gain the ſuperiority. Now, according to him, there were two principal ways of attaining this end; the one was to grant the advantages which the Republic demanded in favour of her commerce, and the other a proper barrier for her ſecurity.

WITH reſpect to the commerce, not the leaſt abatement was to be made in the terms already demanded by the deputies. But as to the barrier, he agreed that it was the intereſt of the States-General to reduce their pretenſions. For the honeſt Republicans were ſufficiently convinced, that the maintaining a great number of garriſons was already but too burdenſome to the ſtate; but the negotiation was to be agreeable to all the members, and the only way to

make them unanimouſly approve of it, was to continue it on the footing already propoſed.

Let us, ſaid he, enter upon public conferences. Perhaps in the courſe of a general negotiation we ſhall hit upon ſuch expedients, as may be proper for moderating the demands in regard to the barrier. It is indeed to facilitate the opening of theſe conferences, that the friends of peace are deſirous to ſee the ſatisfaction of the allies comprized in the preliminaries. You muſt not think they deal hard with you, in pointing out this way to obtain a peace. Were they to obſerve a different conduct, they would be not only ſuſpected, but even accuſed of favouring France, and of clapping up a peace juſt at the eve of a campaign, from which the Republic and her allies have room to expect the moſt ſignal advantages.

Thus did Vanderduſſen endeavour to win the confidence of the preſident Rouillé, and to engage him not only to diſcover the full extent of his powers, but likewiſe to acknowledge himſelf indebted to him for the conduct which he had hitherto obſerved in the conferences, and even for the inſincerity which his collegue and he had ſhewn in their denial, and in their demands.

He wanted to perſuade monſieur Rouillé, that the penſionary, as *firſt mover* of the peace, employed every one whoſe intentions he knew to

be honeſt, and whom he thought capable of co-operating with his own views, in conducting this great work. That the king muſt therefore furniſh him with arms for ſilencing the partizans of war; and then he ſhould not want reſolution. Vanderduſſen aſſured him, that as to himſelf he might depend on his ſteadineſs, and on the wholeſome counſels which he gave that miniſter, with whom he pretended to be upon a footing of intimacy.

When this interview was over, Pettekum came to Bodegrave, to preſs the preſident Rouillé not to loſe a minute, but to finiſh his work. He told him that he muſt abſolutely and without the leaſt delay agree to the ſeveral demands which the Republic had made by her deputies; that this was the only way to facilitate the penſionary's ſchemes, which were all tending to peace. That the longer Rouillé delayed, the more weight he gave to the intrigues of prince Eugene and of the duke of Marlborough; that the former was gone to Amſterdam in order to ſeduce the magiſtracy of that city, who were inclinable to peace. That Marlborough, on the behalf of England, inſiſted on all the articles that had been demanded, without admitting the leaſt abatement.

Pettekum was perhaps an honeſt man, and ſaid what he thought; perhaps on the other hand he wanted to make a merit of what he was about,

both with the Dutch and with the allies of the republic.

BE that as it may, the preſident Rouillé happening to receive the king's orders while Pettekum was at Bodegrave, charged him to acquaint the penſionary therewith, and to propoſe reſuming the conferences the 21ſt of April.

THE two deputies repaired the ſame day to Bodegrave, and told Rouillé that they were come to know, what he had further to communicate. He begged they would previouſly inform him of the uſe they had made of his laſt propoſals, of the effect they had produced, and what he was to expect from the preſent diſpoſition of their maſters. This was a neceſſary explication, ſince he had hitherto received only a faint promiſe of vague good offices on the part of the Republic, in exchange for the poſitive and real aſſurances which he had given in the name of his majeſty.

THE deputies made anſwer by a ſimple repetition of what they had ſaid in the preceding conferences, to juſtify the ſincerity of their maſters, and to prove that they could offer no more than their good offices: beſides it was requiſite that the king ſhould put the Republic in a way of commanding reſpect, not only from her allies, but even from her own members, the partizans of war being very numerous, whereas there were but few who wiſhed well to their country, and

who were ſincerely deſirous of peace: but that the good intention of theſe pacific members would be of no uſe, ſo long as the king did not furniſh them with the means of enforcing their opinion, as the moſt agreeable to the welfare of the Republic.

THEY likewiſe expreſſed their great concern at his majeſty's being ſo reſerved at a critical juncture, when it was of the utmoſt conſequence to France to make the moſt of thoſe moments which ſhe was waſting, whilſt prince Eugene and Marlborough, with the miniſters of the allies in Holland, were effectually employing their whole time in traverſing the negotiations of peace.

THEY likewiſe complained to Rouillé, of the diffidence which he himſelf ſeemed to have of the conduct of the States-General; a diffidence very unjuſtly founded, as nothing could be a clearer proof of their ſincerity, than the ſteps they had taken to terminate a war, which they had hitherto carried on with great ſucceſs, and which from the preſent ſituation of their affairs they were ſtill able to continue for many years.

THE preſident Rouillé reminded them of the ſeveral ſteps which the king had taken to forward the peace, as inconteſtable proofs, both of his majeſty's deſire to re-eſtabliſh it, and of the confidence he had in the ſincerity of their maſters. To theſe conditions he added ſuch as he had a further authority from his majeſty to grant,

grant, namely the tariff of 1664, the ceſſion of Furnes with its fortifications; and as he ſaw that theſe advantages produced no effect, he promiſed further that they ſhould have Condé.

He reſerved his power of reſigning Maubeuge, being convinced that it would be of no ſignification. This he concluded from what the deputies had ſaid in anſwer to the propoſal of Condé, which was, that in all probability either he had not given a faithful and exact account of the laſt conferences, or elſe his majeſty was not ſincerely deſirous of peace, ſince he offered ſo little to obtain it, after they had explained themſelves on their ſide not only as the moſt moderate of the allies, but even of the members of the Republic; that it was time to put an end to the ſlow proceedings of a fruitleſs negotiation; that if it was protracted any longer, the hot-headed partizans of war would gain the ſuperiority over the friends of peace, and to the conditions already demanded would add the reſtitution of the Pyrenean treaty.

This declaration cloſed the conference which was held in the morning. They dined together, and while they were at table the deputies made frequent proteſtations of their ſincere deſire of concluding a happy peace, an event equally longed for by thoſe who of the ſame way of thinking had been partners of their trouble, and had aſſiſted them in reducing the preliminaries to their preſent degree of moderation. They pretended

tended that France ought to acknowledge her obligations to them, for lending her a hand to ſave her from the dreadful abyſs into which ſhe was likely to plunge ſhould ſhe loſe the preſent opportunity, which ſhe never would recover again, unleſs, contrary to all appearance, the fate of arms made a change in her favour.

As ſoon as dinner was over, they all three renewed the conference. The Dutch deputies opened it with a recapitulation of all the articles which they called preliminaries, and which they inſiſted on as abſolutely neceſſary for concluding a peace. They declared that their barrier was not ſufficiently ſecured by the king's conſenting to add Ypres, Menin, and Condé, to his former offers, but that he muſt alſo part with Tournay and Maubeuge.

In regard to the allies, the emperor and the empire inſiſted on the re-eſtabliſhment of the treaty of Munſter; and therefore it was abſolutely neceſſary to agree to this article.

Nor was the condition of leaving the duke of Savoy in the entire poſſeſſion of whatever he had ſeized upon in Dauphiné leſs eſſential to the peace. The Dutch made it a point, upon which they piqued themſelves, to obtain every advantage in favour of their allies, that could be procured by a negotiation entruſted to the care of the Republic. At the ſame time they ſeemed to take a ſecret ſatisfaction in making the allies of

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France repent their connexions with this crown and with Spain: for at length the deputies explained themſelves peremptorily, in regard to the intereſts of the electors of Cologne and Bavaria. They refuſed to comprehend theſe princes in thoſe very preliminaries, in which not one of the Republic's allies had been omitted. They ſaid further, that if the elector of Bavaria was ever reinſtated, it muſt be upon condition of letting the elector Palatine have the Upper Palatinate, the inveſtiture of which he had already received of the emperor, with the firſt rank in the electoral College. That in reſpect to the elector of Cologne, he ſhould admit of a Dutch garriſon in the citadel of Liege, in Huy, and in Bonne.

They proteſted that the allies would never conſent to leave king Philip in poſſeſſion of the leaſt part of the Spaniſh monarchy, either as an indemnification, or under any other title whatſoever. Then quitting the ſtyle and character of negotiators, and inveſted, as it were, with the authority of Roman conſuls, they declared that the fate of arms ſhould determine the articles of peace; therefore the king of Spain muſt not flatter himſelf with obtaining the leaſt indemnification out of that monarchy; that the two electors ſhould not be heard but in a general aſſembly, whenever it was appointed for concluding a peace; that if theſe princes ever obtained the reſtitution of their dominions, it would

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be a favour for which they muſt be indebted to the protection of England and Holland; and that the beſt advice which could be given to them both would be, to merit this protection, by courting theſe two powers.

THE deputies then told Rouillé, that this was the laſt word they had to ſay. We are very ſorry, continued they, that you did not underſtand ſo much at the firſt conferences, or at leaſt that you did not give proper notice of it to the king your maſter.

ROUILLE, ſurprized at the haughtineſs and inſincerity of the negotiators, as well as at the unexpected ſeverity of the conditions, ſaid, that at leaſt he looked upon the reſtitution of Liſle and its Chatellany as a point that had been already ſettled. It is true, anſwered they, that you always ſuppoſed it, but we never had any ſuch thought; you miſtook our intentions. We were willing to let you believe what you pleaſed. At the beginning of April, Liſle was in a weak condition of defence; this the French knew, and we were afraid they had ſome deſign to attack it; therefore it was prudent to let you believe it would be reſtored at the peace, and you flattered yourſelves with that notion; but Liſle is now very ſafe, ſo that we would not have you think any more about it.

THEY were not a little proud of this artifice and when Rouillé put them in mind of their having promiſed, that the States-General would employ

ploy their good offices to obtain the Two Sicilies for the king of Spain, they made a great noiſe about the term *promiſed*, as ſuppoſing an engagement which they denied, pretending they had only ſaid, that the intention of the Republic was to contribute, as far as poſſible, to maintain king Philip in poſſeſſion of the regal title with which he was inveſted. Thus the deputies ſhewed their ſincerity only in acknowledging the trick they had recourſe to, in treating of the reſtitution of Liſle. Beſides, they gave themſelves no ſort of trouble, to juſtify the enormous difference betwixt the preliminaries originally propoſed by Vanderduſſen himſelf, as a baſis of the negotiation, and the previous conditions now demanded by the enemies of France.

At every new conference, the proſpect of peace ſeemed to remove to a greater diſtance; and the only reſource to prevent the freſh difficulties, which might naturally ariſe from the fortune of war, would have been to agree, before the opening of the campaign, upon a ſuſpenſion of arms. Monſieur Rouillé wanted to make the propoſal, but the deputies did not give him the leaſt opportunity to mention it, and indeed they had leſs liberty at this than at the preceding conferences.

Prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough, with the miniſters of the allies, all aſſembled at the Hague, had had time to beſtir themſelves. The authority of the two generals, the confidence

confidence with which their ſucceſſes inſpired them, together with the ſpeeches of the ſubaltern miniſters, increaſed the almoſt general deſire of continuing the war, and the expectation of making eaſy conqueſts upon a kingdom, which was ſaid then to be quite exhauſted by its loſſes.

BEFORE Buys and Vanderduſſen came to the laſt conference, they had been obliged to wait upon prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough. No doubt but they received from the two generals ſuch orders as were unfavourable to peace; and they faithfully executed theſe orders.

THE preſident Rouillé had but too much reaſon to complain not only of their inconſtancy and of their new demands, but likewiſe of their diſowning points, which they ſeemed to have agreed to at the preceding conferences. He charged Pettekum to repreſent his juſt complaints to the penſionary. All the anſwer this miniſter made him was, that he did not know what expreſſions the deputies had uſed. That, in the main, he was ſure they had not exceeded their orders; that they had even ſoftened them, when they ſaw that Rouillé took fire at their explanation, and that he was following a very wrong method to obtain a peace. Go to him, ſaid he to Pettekum, and tell him from me, that I adviſe him as a friend, not to chicane about the barrier. Bid him write to the king his maſter in ſtronger terms; and if he has not ſufficient inſtructions,

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let him aſk for fuller powers, ſo as the States-General may be ſatisfied.

THE penſionary in general confirmed the deciſion of the deputies upon all the other articles; ſaying that they had determined according to their inſtructions.

PETTEKUM waited on the duke of Marlborough, and eaſily perceived by the manner of converſation, that the penſionary's ſtile and language had been dictated by that general. Yet the duke, agreeable to his character, falſly proteſted that he ſhould be glad of a peace, and would contribute all in his power to bring it to a happy iſſue; that France had been in the wrong to retard this great work, as it was her intereſt to concur in the meaſures conducive to it; and to grant, as ſoon as poſſible, the conditions demanded. Pettekum made anſwer, they were ſo very hard, that, in all probability, the king would ſooner break off the negotiation, than agree to them. So much the worſe for France, replied Marlborough; for when the campaign is once begun, things will be carried a great deal farther than the king imagines.

PETTEKUM ſet out for Bodegrave; where he acquainted Rouillé with what he had done, and with what he had heard. Upon his return to the Hague, he ſaw the duke of Marlborough again, and told him that he believed the king would recall Rouillé, if the allies perſiſted in refuſing the reſtitution of Liſle to his majeſty, and the

the Two Sicilies as an indemnification to the king of Spain. Never, ſaid Marlborough, will the allies recede from their preliminary demands.

THE day before, this general had conferred with the deputies of ſtate, and demanded that all conditions of peace ſhould be rejected, unleſs the Spaniſh monarchy was reſtored intire, and Dunkirk demoliſhed.

THIS is what Pettekum learnt of the penſionary. At the ſame time this miniſter told him, that he was ſorely grieved to ſee all proſpect of peace removed to ſuch a diſtance, by the pretenſions of the allies; that he was no leſs concerned at the inſincerity of France, and at her obſtinacy in oppoſing her own happineſs, by refuſing to explain herſelf, as ſhe ought, in regard to the barrier, which might induce the States-General to be deſirous of peace, and to favour her deſigns.

TOWARDS the end of the month of April, the duke of Marlborough embarked for England. He gave out that he had private reaſons for this ſudden motion; and he did not even ſo much as ſtay till the wind was fair.

THE public imagined, that the principal motive of this expedition could be nothing elſe but a ſettled deſign of defeating all negotiations of peace: for the ſchemes then a hatching at the court of London were not yet known. And it was alſo ſaid, that if he did not ſucceed in breaking off the conferences, he would only bring

back ſome of his truſty dependants, and leave them at the Hague, in order to traverſe all ſorts of negotiation during the campaign.

THERE was no longer any room to hope for ſucceſs from the conferences held in Holland. Rouillé expected every day the king's orders for his return; and the only ſervice he thought himſelf capable of rendering his majeſty, was to penetrate, if poſſible, into the real cauſe of the amazing conduct of the Republic and her deputies. Vanderduſſen had affected a ſtrong deſire of peace. He had agreed with the count de Bergheik, to a plan for obtaining it, and to the opening of the conferences. He ſtill ſhewed himſelf ready to hear any thing from Rouillé; and they both agreed to have a private interview. They met accordingly: and Vanderduſſen attributed the demand of the Spaniſh monarchy intire, without any reſerve in favour of king Philip, chiefly to the miniſters of Savoy, directed by Marlborough.

THE moderate party had no longer the upper hand in the debates of the ſtate. The penſionary and other pacific patriots were obliged to give way to the torrent. Marlborough and prince Eugene, ſupported by a great number of the partizans of war, carried every thing before them: a misfortune, ſaid Vanderduſſen, which would not have happened, had the conditions demanded at the firſt conferences, during the abſence of theſe generals, been granted. Their return

return to Holland had ſtrengthened the party, and occaſioned the orders which the deputies received, of inſiſting upon the renunciation of the whole Spaniſh monarchy, without the leaſt partition. Their having been ſilent upon ſo rigorous a condition, was owing to the regard they had for Monſieur Rouillé. You ſeemed, ſaid Vanderduſſen to him, ſo haſty and warm at the anſwers we gave to other articles, when we had expreſſed ourſelves in leſs poſitive terms, that we thought we might avoid giving you a freſh ſubject of provocation. We owned it to our ſuperiors, and have been blamed for it.

ROUILLE made anſwer that this was ſo extraordinary a variation, as he could not believe it, till it was declared to him in form, by the way of conference hitherto obſerved; that if he acted otherwiſe, he ſhould give room to think, that the States-General had never any intention to treat ſincerely and bona fide; but that their private view was to amuſe their people, and afterwards to invent ſome frivolous pretext for breaking off the negotiation.

VANDERDUSSEN acknowledged that Rouillé might have reaſon ſo to believe, tho' there was nothing more contrary to the intention of the well-meaning patriots; that they were greatly to be pitied, but to attempt to juſtify them would lay him under a neceſſity of diſcloſing the preſent ſituation of the government, a myſtery

which no member of the Republic was permitted to reveal. He could only ſay in general, that they to whoſe prudence the opening of the conferences had been owing, were now cenſured, ſuſpected and even abuſed.

From ſo open a declaration, whether true or falſe, Rouillé concluded, that all he had to do now was to make the beſt of his way back to France, as ſoon as he received the king's orders for his departure, which he hourly expected.

The Deputy begged of him not to deſpond, but to wait for ſome favourable turn, which time, patience, and the good conduct of the well-meaning party might effectuate. There is, ſaid he, a great deal of warmth, and but very little ſtability in their counſels. They have already refuſed the duke of Marlborough, to let the demolition of the fortifications and outworks of Dunkirk be comprized in the preliminaries. And yet we muſt expect that this demand of the Engliſh will be ſtrenuouſly ſupported, at the treaty of general peace.

In vain did the preſident Rouillé endeavour to inſinuate, that it would be proper to agree to a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities. Vanderduſſen made anſwer that it would be impoſſible to oppoſe the will of prince Eugene and of the duke of Marlborough, who had both too great an intereſt in opening the campaign; that the States could only take a proper precaution to check the vivacity of thoſe commanders, and for that purpoſe ſend ſuch

deputies to the army, as ſhould be more diſpoſed to conſider the public welfare, and the conſequences attending it, than to humour the generals.

VANDERDUSSEN deſired Rouillé to let him have paſſports for two Dutch ſhips. The aſking for ſuch a trifle juſt at the very moment of their ſeparation, gave Rouillé an opportunity to make him ſenſible, that he might expect much greater favours, if he ſhould ſucceed in his endeavours to conclude a good peace.

BUT after theſe declairciſſements, there were very little hopes of obtaining any ſuch. They left no room to doubt but that the Republic had ſubjected herſelf in ſuch a manner to the authority of her allies, as voluntarily to loſe all power of embracing the ſide moſt agreeable to her intereſts. By a blind ſubmiſſion to her pretended friends, ſhe was made to believe, that now was the time for cruſhing France, for profiting of its loſſes, and for reducing her ſo low, that ſhe ſhould never more be what ſhe had often been in the preſent king's reign, a terror to her neighbours.

IT is true this kingdom was then afflicted with heavy ſcourges; baleful famine threatened to join the devouring ſword; an exceſſive hard froſt ſucceeding ſuddenly to a thaw at the beginning of the month of January, had deſtroyed all the grain. The ſpring was advancing, and not the leaſt promiſe of maturity from the

fruits of the earth. Nothing on every ſide, but miſery was expected. The general converſation was as melancholy as the ſubject that occaſioned it. Nay, they made the caſe worſe than it really was; and what every man ſaid, true or falſe, was carried into foreign countries. This however is certain, that a war of eight years againſt the greateſt part of the powers of Europe had extremely weakened the different provinces of the kingdom. The news tranſmitted from thence to foreign nations made them eaſily believe that France was exhauſted of men and money. The ways and means for raiſing new funds, were every day declining; and the king's armies, heretofore crowned with lawrels, had been obliged, after hard-fought battles, to abandon countries into which they had made a triumphant entry.

GERMANY, the Netherlands, and Piedmont, were witneſſes of our diſaſters. The king's enemies, who had been uſed to ſurrender towns almoſt as ſoon as our armies ſat down before them, had made themſelves maſters in their turn of the ſtrong places belonging to his majeſty. They threatened now to penetrate into the heart of France. The kingdom was not in ſuch a poſture of defence, as to look upon theſe as empty threats, how new and improbable ſoever they might have been thought at the commencement of the war. Then the king gave his orders on the banks of the Danube, the Tagus, and the

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Po. Who could have imagined that in a few years, he ſhould have been reduced to defend the internal parts of his kingdom, and even obliged to examine whether he could continue ſafe in his ordinary reſidence?

THO' the courage of his troops had been tried upon all, even the moſt diſaſtrous, occaſions, yet it was doubted whether they would be able to withſtand the want of pay and ſubſiſtance.

THE only reſource was that of peace, a bleſſing much deſired, and even demanded, for the ſafety of the kingdom. But ſo eager a deſire, being founded on evident neceſſity, only ſerved to increaſe the haughtineſs of our enemies, and furniſhed their malice with new motives for cruſhing us, by the continuance of a war, which we were no longer able to maintain. This was the cauſe of ſuch a number of pretenſions, which they called neceſſary preliminaries, of the ſubterfuges and chicanery of the Dutch negotiators, who were under the direction of their allies, of the freſh demands they made at each conference, and of their diſowning at their laſt meetings, the very ſame points to which they had before agreed.

HIS majeſty's reign had been a ſeries of uninterrupted proſperity. He was therefore more ſenſibly affected with theſe heavy calamities, as he had been a ſtranger to diſappointments ever ſince he took the reins of a moſt

flouriſhing kingdom into his own hands. It was a terrible ſubject of humiliation to a monarch accuſtomed to conquer, celebrated for his victories, for his triumphs, and even for his moderation whenever he gave peace, and preſcribed its terms, to ſee himſelf obliged to aſk it of his enemies; and for the obtaining it, to offer them, but in vain, the reſtitution of part of his conqueſts, and of the whole Spaniſh monarchy, together with the deſertion of his allies; in ſhort to ſee himſelf under the neceſſity of applying, in order to have thoſe offers accepted, to that very Republic, whoſe principal provinces he had overrun in the year 1672, and whoſe ſubmiſſions he had rejected, when ſhe ſued to him for peace on ſuch conditions as he pleaſed himſelf to dictate.

UNDER ſo ſenſible a change the king behaved with the reſolution of a hero, and with the perfect ſubmiſſion of a chriſtian to the orders of Providence; leſs affected with his own internal pangs, than with the ſufferings of his people; and ever ſolicitous to eaſe their burden and to terminate the war. It was hardly perceived that he uſed any violence to conceal his ſentiments from the public: indeed they were but little known; for it was then a common opinion, that more ſenſible to his own glory than to the miſeries of his kingdom, he preferred the keeping of a few towns which he had conquered himſelf in perſon, to the quiet and happineſs of his peo-

people; and that if he could reſolve to part with thoſe towns, he might have a peace, which depended on ſo ſmall a ſacrifice.

SOME of thoſe who had the freeſt acceſs to his majeſty's perſon, were not exempt from theſe unjuſt ſuſpicions. They even crept into the council, which at that time was compoſed of the dauphin, the duke of Burgundy, and five miniſters, namely monſieur de Pontchartrain, chancellor of France; the duke of Beauvilliers, preſident of the council of Finances, and heretofore governor to the young princes of France; the marquiſs of Torcy, ſecretary of ſtate for foreign affairs; monſieur Chamillart, ſecretary of ſtate, and intruſted with the department of war; and monſieur des Marets, comptroller-general of the finances.

AS ſoon as the relation of the laſt conferences was read in council, all hopes of accommodation vaniſhed. And yet they were ſtill more ſenſible than ever of the neceſſity of coming to ſome agreement, let the price be what it would.

THE duke of Beauvilliers made a ſpeech, wherein he uſed the ſtrongeſt arguments to demonſtrate the neceſſity of a meaſure, which they found ſo difficult to accompliſh; and to what a dilemma the king and the kingdom muſt be reduced, if unfortunately they let ſlip the opportunity of concluding a peace. In pathetic and moving terms he expatiated on the fatal conſequences of a war, which it was impoſſible any longer to ſup-

ſupport. He repreſented to them, in the ſtrongeſt colours, the ſhocking figure which the king would perhaps be obliged to make, in order to appeaſe his enemies, and to receive ſuch conditions from their hands as they ſhould pleaſe to impoſe.

The chancellor heightened this melancholy picture; and both addreſſing themſelves to the reſpective miniſters, one of war, and the other of the finances, preſſed them to tell his majeſty, as faithful ſervants, whether from the particular knowledge they had of the condition of the troops and of the revenue, they thought it was poſſible for him to ſupport the expences; and whether it was prudent in him to run the hazard of another campaign?

So melancholy a ſcene would be difficult to deſcribe, were we even permitted to diſcloſe the moſt moving part of it.

Then indeed the king was ſenſible that the ſituation of a monarch, abſolute maſter of a great kingdom, is not always the happieſt, nor the moſt deſirable. He found by experience, that tho' he was above the level of other men, yet he was expoſed to greater viciſſitudes; that the higher we are raiſed, the more we are ſenſible to misfortunes; and that it muſt be a deep and juſt concern to a prince, to ſee himſelf attacked on every ſide, without having the means either of continuing the war, or of concluding a peace.

God

GOD was pleaſed to humble him, before he checked and chaſtiſed the pride of his enemies. The king, ſubmiſſive to the orders of Providence, conſented to make new ſacrifices; and without knowing as yet whether they would be accepted, he wrote to Rouillé to reſume the conferences.

HIS majeſty ordered him to acquaint the two deputies, that he could not give the name of a regular negotiation to looſe converſations, wherein the time was waſted to no purpoſe, in equivocal ſpeeches on the part of the Dutch; in making freſh demands, without being ever ſatisfied with thoſe already granted; and in artfully concealing the inexhauſtible fund of their own pretenſions as well as thoſe of their allies.

ROUILLE had orders therefore to demand a clear and preciſe explication; but in what manner ſoever the deputies ſhould anſwer, he was directed to keep his temper and not to break with them, but on the contrary to declare in plain terms, as he had full power to declare, that his majeſty conſented to part with Maubeuge. He likewiſe empowered him to add Tournay, after ſome difficulty; and charged him above all things to remember, that the main point was to conclude a peace before the opening of the campaign.

HE had orders to uſe his utmoſt efforts towards obtaining the reſtitution of Liſle, and to endeavour to gain this point by offering an equivalent. In that caſe his majeſty permitted him to conſent to the demolition of the fortifications

of

of Dunkirk, and even to fill up the harbour, provided he might keep Tournay, and Liſle was reſtored. In ſhort, he conſented to ſurrender Tournay, and even to let Liſle continue in the poſſeſſion of his enemies, if this new conceſſion on his ſide could be productive of a peace.

With the ſame view of a peace ſo neceſſary to the nation, the king agreed to re-eſtabliſh the treaty of Munſter, according to the demands of the emperor and the empire, with the clauſe only of demoliſhing the fortifications made at Straſburg by his orders, and to reſtore that city in the condition it had been in, before it became ſubject to his majeſty. He was ſatisfied with the kingdom of Naples only without Sicily, for the indemnification of the king his grandſon. He conſented to refer the intereſts of the electors of Cologne and Bavaria to the public conferences of peace. In ſhort, he promiſed that king James ſhould remove out of France, on condition that a proviſion was made for his ſecurity and maintenance by the general treaty.

The letter containing theſe orders was read and heard with equal ſorrow in the council held the 28th of April. The king did not waver an inſtant: he had taken his ultimate reſolution. Senſibly affected with the diſtreſſes of his people, he thought he could not purchaſe a peace for them too dear.

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HITHERTO no body could tell, at what price the enemies of France would ſet ſo valuable a bleſſing. Their deſigns ſeemed to be nothing leſs than to perpetuate the war, and to ruin the kingdom. The more conceſſions his majeſty made, the more untractable he found them, and the more they roſe in their demands. It was of the utmoſt importance to know the bottom of their deſigns, and particularly thoſe of the States-General. To ſpin the negotiation out to any length would only further expoſe the calamitous condition of France, and entirely diſhearten the people. In order to raiſe their ſpirits, it was incumbent upon the king to publiſh the offers he had made for purchaſing their repoſe; to make them fully ſenſible of the rancour of his enemies, and the inſincerity of their manner of treating; in ſhort, to expoſe to his loyal ſubjects, zealous for the glory of their maſter and of their country, all that had paſſed at the late negotiation, and whatever further intelligence he might acquire with any certainty, concerning the plan of the powers allied againſt France.

THE knowledge of their projects was likewiſe neceſſary for preventing their effects, and for concerting juſt meaſures to render them abortive.

THOUGH the conferences, which had held now theſe two months, proved ineffectual, ſtill the king judged he muſt not abſolutely break off all negotiation, at a time when the nation ſtood in ſo great need of peace; but there was no room

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for any hopes from the conferences of Bodegrave. There had been four of theſe conferences in the above ſpace of time; and all that we learned from them was that the Dutch, either deſignedly, or out of condeſcenſion to the ſuperiority of their allies, would neither ſincerely nor effectually co-operate towards a peace. The month of April was now almoſt expired, and the opening of the campaign had been retarded only by the badneſs of the ſeaſon. There was ſo little time left to negotiate, that Rouillé could hardly confer with the deputies, and make uſe of the new credentials from his majeſty; and if he ſhould be obliged to aſk for freſh inſtructions, the courier ſent on ſuch an occaſion would not have time to bring them back, before the armies took the field. Such therefore was the criſis, that it could have been wiſhed, for the ſucceſs of the negotiation, that the perſon entruſted with the management thereof had ſo compleat a knowledge of the real ſtate of affairs, as to take upon him to exceed his powers, if he found a lucky, though unexpected, moment, of bringing matters to a concluſion.

THESE obvious reflections induced the miniſter concerned in the department of foreign affairs, to make an offer to his majeſty, of going himſelf in perſon into Holland, in order to try, whether there was ſtill a poſſibility of negotiating with any proſpect of ſucceſs. If he found there were no hopes, then his buſineſs was to penetrate, as far as he was capable, into the ſecret deſigns

of

of his enemies, and perhaps to engage them to make the diſcovery themſelves. Not that there was the leaſt fault to be found with the preſident Rouillé. He had with great ſagacity conducted an unſucceſsful negotiation; with ſingular prudence huſbanded the orders he had been entruſted with by his majeſty; and, without exhauſting his powers, given the deputies ſufficiently to know, that the king would grant their maſters great part of the advantages they demanded, either for their commerce, or for the pretended ſecurity of their barrier. But now the buſineſs was to hurry the negotiation, ſince the king did not chuſe to break it off; and to know before the campaign was opened, what he might poſſibly expect from continuing the conferences. The ſecretary of ſtate, perfectly acquainted with his maſter's intentions, with the ſituation of the kingdom, and with what had paſſed during the courſe of the negotiation, might, without waiting for freſh orders, ſeize the lucky minute, if any ſuch ſhould offer, for concluding a peace immediately.

His majeſty reliſhed the propoſal of his ſecretary, who ſtaid behind after the other miniſters were gone out of the cabinet, where the council was generally held. Yet he would not determine immediately, but deferred giving his reſolution till the day following, when the council was to be aſſembled.

A commission of this nature was not exempt from preſent danger to the perſon who

propoſed it, nor from future vexations and uneaſineſs.

In regard to the danger, he muſt traverſe the enemy's country, at a time when the allied troops were to be in motion; he muſt go and reſide at the Hague, the ſeat of hatred and reſentment againſt France; and for the ſafety of his perſon, as well upon the road as during his reſidence in Holland, he muſt truſt intirely to one of thoſe paſſports without a name, which Rouillé had obtained in that form, becauſe they were intended only for couriers.

Rouille himſelf, tho' he had been provided with a proper paſſport in form, and was expected to open the conferences, narrowly eſcaped being taken by lord Albemarle's orders; therefore Torcy with no other ſecurity than that of a paſſport, extremely liable to be conteſted, had much greater reaſon to fear they would refuſe to acknowledge its validity, or at leaſt that they would keep him confined during a tedious diſpute.

As to the vexations and uneaſineſs which this commiſſion was likely to occaſion, he foreſaw that, if he ſucceeded, the peace ſo greatly wiſhed for, could not be concluded but upon conditions not very honourable to France. That a treaty of this kind would be a ſubject of reproach and diſhonour to him and to his memory. That it would be ranked among the number of thoſe ignominious conventions, which France had been obliged to ſubmit to after the heavieſt diſaſters. The remembrance

membrance of paſt evils is eaſily effaced. The circumſtances of former tranſactions are often loſt in the obſcurity of time; but poſterity think they have a right to condemn thoſe treaties which reflect diſgrace on a nation, if they know not the fatal cauſe that gave riſe to them. The miniſter who ſigns an inglorious, tho' neceſſary, convention, is ranked among the number of unfortunate negotiators, and conſidered as an inſtrument of ſhame to his country.

ANOTHER diſagreeable circumſtance, which attended this undertaking, was the ſhame of not ſucceeding. The king's offers were ſuch, that the negotiator was likely to bear the whole blame, if he happened to miſcarry in a treaty ſo ardently wiſhed for by the whole kingdom.

YET theſe conſiderations gave way to the flattering hopes he had of doing an important ſervice to the king his maſter, to whoſe liberality both he and his family were ſo greatly indebted; and of contributing either to ſome lucky turn of affairs, or to the diſcovery of the enemy's deſigns.

THE propoſed journey being laid before the king in council, the next day the 29th of April was unanimouſly approved of. The letter deſigned for the preſident Rouillé ſerved for the marquiſs of Torcy's inſtructions. It was worded thus:

" *Verſailles, the* 29th *of April*, 1709.

" MR. preſident Rouillé. With impatience " I waited to ſee what effect the orders I gave " you, by my letter of the 15th inſtant, would " produce; and I had reaſon to believe, they " would be ſufficient to oblige the Dutch depu- " ties to come to an agreement with you at laſt, " about the principal conditions of the peace; " when I was convinced of the contrary, by yours " of the 24th, with which you charged your ſecre- " tary. I find, by the relation you give me of " your laſt conference, that the Dutch are at a " greater diſtance than ever from concluding any " treaty: I might even add that they are more " inſincere, did I not think it is owing to the ap- " prehenſion they have of their allies, and eſpe- " cially of the Engliſh, that the deputies now " diſown thoſe very conditions, to which you and " they had agreed at the two firſt conferences. " I had room to think, from the account you " gave me of the ſecond, that the only difficulty " was about Tournay and Condé; ſo that upon " giving up the latter, and Maubeuge inſtead of " Tournay, the Dutch would have reaſon to be " ſatisfied with the barrier I promiſed them.

" I RECKONED they would form no more dif- " ficulties about the kingdoms of Naples and Si- " cily, ſince the deputies themſelves propoſed " the terms that were to be uſed, in preſerving " theſe two kingdoms for the king my grand- " ſon.

" IN

" In ſhort, they inſiſted ſo faintly on the pre-
" tenſion of re-eſtabliſhing the treaty of Munſter,
" that it looked as if their maſters ſupported
" this unjuſt demand, after two ſolemn treaties,
" only out of complaiſance to their allies.

" But as I find at preſent, that, notwithſtand-
" ing the progreſs which you had made in your
" negotiation with the deputies, they now begin
" to conteſt every point on which they ſeemed to
" have agreed with you before; that they will
" hardly let the king my grandſon have the
" kingdom of Naples; that they inſiſt on the re-
" eſtabliſhment of the treaty of Munſter; and
" that they even deny they had ever conſented to
" the reſtitution of Liſle and its Chatellany; I
" can have no good opinion of the ſucceſs of a
" negotiation, wherein each deputy diſowns at
" one conference, what he had before agreed to
" at another: and till there is more ſound reaſon
" and conſiſtency in their manner of treating, not
" only five weeks, but ſeveral months would be
" ſpent to no purpoſe.

" From M. Vanderduſſen's memorial, of
" which mention is made in the inſtructions I
" gave you, and whereof I ſend you again a copy,
" I expected to meet with more expedition and
" ſincerity in the Dutch negotiators. It ſpecifies,
" as you ſhall ſee again, the reſignation of Spain,
" of the Indies, of the Milaneſe, and of the Spa-
" niſh Netherlands; and taking no notice of the
" kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, it gives ſuffi-

" ciently to underſtand, that the intention of the " Dutch was to preſerve thoſe territories for the " king my grandſon.

" THE terms of *what has been added to the* " *Spaniſh Netherlands*, are relative to the propo- " ſals made on my part in 1706. They inclu- " ded only Ypres and Menin; but now I have " added Furnes with its fortifications, Condé, " and Maubeuge. I therefore give a great deal " more than M. Vanderduſſen aſked in that " memorial, which was the baſis of the preſent " negotiation. If the pretenſions of the Dutch " have riſen in proportion to my conceſſions, and " to the eager deſire I have expreſſed of conclu- " ding a peace, it will be prudent now to pur- " ſue a different method, and to let them ſee, " that if they have ſo great a confidence in their " forces, and in thoſe of their allies, I have much " greater reaſon to confide in the Divine Aſſiſt- " ance; but as the way to obtain this aſſiſtance, " is by contributing all in my power, to the re- " eſtabliſhment of peace in the chriſtian world, " I am willing to extend the ſacrifice already be- " gun, far beyond the limits which I propoſed " at firſt.

" BEFORE you explain yourſelf concerning " this matter, it will be neceſſary for you to re- " capitulate what has already paſſed in the con- " ferences, and to make the deputies ſenſible of " the inconveniencies of a negotiation, in which " one of the two parties never comes to a poſi-

" tive

" tive declaration of his pretenſions, but raiſes " them higher at every ſtep you take to ſatisfy " them.

" You muſt remind them of M. Vanderduſ- " ſen's memorial, and let them ſee, that I have " given you the orders neceſſary for ſatisfying the " Dutch upon every article contained therein.

" You are then to ſay, that ſince the ſeveral " ſteps you have taken have been hitherto ineff- " fectual, and the propoſals you might ſtill make " may probably turn out to my prejudice; you " deſire they will let you have a reaſonable plan " of the pretenſions of the Dutch and their allies: " for it is impoſſible to look upon that as ſuch, " which the deputies mentioned at the laſt con- " ference, and of which you have given me an " account.

" You are to wait for their anſwer; but " whether it be to your ſatisfaction, or you re- " ceive the ſame denials from them as you have " hitherto done, ſtill continue to command your " temper; and when they have done ſpeaking, " it is my intention that you ſhall add Maubeuge " to the conceſſions already made, though I had " given you directions to reſerve this town for " the laſt extremity, and only in caſe it ſhould " be ultimately conducive to the obtaining of a " peace.

" If this town be not ſufficient to obtain it, " and the Dutch deputies ſhould ſtill inſiſt upon " the ceſſion of Tournay, you are to uſe every

" art and effort in your power, for the preſer-
" ving of ſo important a town, which I have al-
" ways looked upon as part of the ancient do-
" main of my crown; but in ſhort I deſire you
" will rather give up this article, than loſe the
" opportunity of putting an end to the war be-
" fore the opening of the campaign.

" After ſo much condeſcenſion on my ſide,
" I had reaſon to believe that the Dutch would
" have no longer perſiſted in keeping Liſle and
" its Chatellany; but ſince the deputies acknow-
" ledged the artifice they made uſe of upon that
" occaſion, I doubt very much of the ſincerity of
" their maſters, till they have fully explained their
" intentions. I expect therefore that you enter the
" liſts with them once more, in order to obtain the
" reſtitution of Liſle and its Chatellany; and you
" muſt uſe all your ſkill to carry your point: for I
" look upon it as a matter of ſuch immenſe con-
" ſequence, to recover them out of the hands of
" my enemies, that if you cannot obtain your
" end, without giving an equivalent, I conſent,
" for this purpoſe, and you may judge with what
" reluctance, to demoliſh the fortifications of
" Dunkirk, which I ſhall keep diſmantled, and
" to fill up its harbour.

" You are not to have recourſe to this extraordi-
" nary expedient, till the laſt extremity. But if you
" ſhould be obliged to propoſe it for the recove-
" ry of Liſle, manage it ſo as to ſave Tournay
" alſo. In ſhort, you muſt confine yourſelf to

" the

" the preſerving of Liſle, if the propoſal you " make of diſmantling Dunkirk ſhould not be " ſufficient to ſave Tournay, and to oblige my " enemies to let me have Liſle back again; and " at the very laſt extremity, rather relinquiſh " Liſle, than not to come to an agreement.

" You will be ſurprized upon reading this let- " ter, at the orders it contains, ſo different from " thoſe which I have hitherto given you, which " I thought to be too extenſive; but I have been " ever ready to ſubmit to the divine will; and " the calamities with which it has pleaſed God " to afflict my kingdom do not leave the leaſt " room for me any longer to doubt, but that he " is willing I ſhould make a ſacrifice to him of " every thing, that is moſt dear and valuable to " me in life.

" I SHALL therefore ſet aſide all conſideration " likewiſe of my glory and my intereſts, upon " the article relating to the re-eſtabliſhment of " the treaties of Weſtphalia. You are to inſiſt " as much as poſſible on the execution of that " of Ryſwic. Let them ſee, purſuant to your " former inſtructions, the difficulty there is " at preſent in reſtoring the treaties of Weſt- " phalia. Tell them, that their interpretation " will be a new ſource of wranglings and diſputes, " nay perhaps of war. But after you have ex- " hauſted every ſolid argument in your power, " if they ſhould be unavailing, you are to agree " to this article. Only obſerve at the ſame

" time, that Straſburg, reverting to its priſtine " ſtate of an Imperial city, as it borders upon " the territories of the houſe of Auſtria, will " ſoon fall under the emperor's yoke; and there- " fore this prince will thereby become maſter " of a fortreſs, that may prove formidable to " Alſace.

" You know with what pain I conſented to " the ceſſion of Spain; you may therefore judge " with what reluctance I agree to reduce the " partition of the king my grandſon to the king- " dom of Naples only. Sicily is the only State " in Italy that has faithfully adhered to him. If " he loſes that, I cannot think him ſafe among " the Neapolitans, who revolted againſt him, " while he was yet in poſſeſſion of Spain. The " revenues of the kingdom of Naples, are far " from being ſufficient to maintain the regal " dignity. You muſt therefore uſe your ut- " moſt perſuaſion to oblige the deputies to per- " form their promiſe. Firſt of all you de- " manded Sardinia, and the port-towns on the " Tuſcan coaſt, in order to annex them to the " Two Sicilies; and they only found fault with " this addition. When I gave up that point, " they furniſhed you with the terms which were " to expreſs the reſerving of Naples and Sicily; " let them reflect upon what they would ſay " themſelves, were you to ſhuffle and fly from " your agreement, as they have done. I grant " ſuch conſiderable advantages to my enemies,

" as

" as ſhould engage them to let the king my " grandſon enjoy at leaſt theſe two kingdoms; " but after having explained my motive of per- " mitting you to make ſuch a number of ceſſions, " for the ſake of peace, I ſhall alſo add that of " Sicily, ſhould it be abſolutely neceſſary for " terminating the war.

" I can hardly believe that the Dutch are de- " termined to affront me perſonally, by inſiſting " on my leaving the duke of Savoy in poſſeſſion " of what he has ſeized in Dauphiné. Indeed " I ſhould look upon an obſtinacy of this ſort " as an intended inſult, and the conſequence of " a ſettled reſolution of continuing the war. " For which reaſon I ſhould think it needleſs to " go on with a negotiation, which the ill af- " fected might have credit to defeat for ſo " weak a conſideration. I ſhall therefore make " no alteration in the orders I have already " given you, concerning the article of the duke " of Savoy, namely the reſtitution of Exilles and " Feneſtrelles, and all that belongs to Dauphiné. " In regard to the inſtructions contained in the " preſent letter, it is my intention that you exert " all your art and abilities in not opening your- " ſelf but by degrees; that you take ſpecial care " not to exhauſt them; from a perſuaſion that " you will do me a conſiderable ſervice, and that " I ſhall be particularly obliged to you for re- " ſerving as many of the powers I have given " you, as poſſible.

"THE conditions which the Dutch want to "prescribe to the electors of Cologne and Ba- "varia are so harsh, that perhaps it would be- "better to refer them to the public conferences, "than to regulate them as preliminary articles. "My reason is, because when the ministers are "met in order to treat of peace, these princes "will be able to support their rights; or at least "when they see the difficulties that are brought "against their restoration, they will not com- "plain that I have forgot them.

"SHOULD it be impossible to obtain the re- "stitution of the Upper Palatinate in favour of "the elector of Bavaria; at least it must be sti- "pulated for him, that this province, with the "dignity of first elector, shall return to his "branch, when that of Neuburg comes to be "extinct; but you may judge that having a- "greed to conditions of greater importance, "and more essential in regard to myself, I shall "not retard the peace, for the demands which "the Dutch make in regard to the two elec- "tors of Cologne and Bavaria.

"I HAVE only one thing left to observe to "you, that the king of England is resolved to "ask leave to remove out of my kingdom after "the peace, provided care be taken of his main- "tenance, and some place be appointed where "he may live in safety. I do not find that the "Dutch deputies have answered what I men- "tioned to you upon this article.

"YOU

" You have here my inſtructions; what I ex-
" pect from your prudence is, that you huſband
" them properly, and make ſuch good uſe of
" the means I have put into your hands, as to
" conclude a peace, which is become abſolutely
" neceſſary to my kingdom. (Affairs were not
" in a condition to demand a ſuſpenſion of arms.)
" Upon this, &c."

THIS letter, ſigned LEWIS, and counterſigned COLBERT, having been read in council, the king added the following lines in his own hand-writing, and ſigned by his majeſty; " I approve of
" what is contained in this letter, and my will
" is that it ſhall be executed by Torcy."

TIME was precious; the king aſked Torcy when he could ſet out; he replied, that one day would be ſufficient to make himſelf ready. Accordingly he ſet out from Paris the evening of the firſt of May, the ſame day as the king uſed to go to lie at Marly.

NOTWITHSTANDING that this journey had been undertaken out of pure zeal, and was likely to furniſh none but diſagreeable and perhaps dangerous adventures; ſtill it excited the envy of many as ſoon as it became public; and gave occaſion to ſuſpicions extremely wide from the real motives upon which it was undertaken. Some above the level of the common run of courtiers charged the miniſter with views which never once entered into his head: they expreſſed no deſire to hurt him, but they interpreted

preted his intentions, and without rendering them ſuſpected, they endeavoured to make people believe, that ſuch a ſtep was equally contrary to the king's ſervice and to his glory; that it ill became one of his miniſters to apply in a ſuppliant form for peace to his enemies.

It pleaſed God to proſper the marquiſs's journey; providence ſcreened him from all unlucky accidents; no embarraſſing adventure of any kind retarded him upon the road; he met with none of the enemy's out-parties, with no queſtions or interrogatories from the governors of the frontier towns, whether friends or foes. Every thing ſeemed to favour the ſecrecy of his expedition. He was afraid of being diſcovered at Bruſſels; and, to avoid paſſing thro' that city, he was obliged to take a round-about road. The poſtilions told him they were forbid under very ſevere penalties to carry couriers any other way than thro' the town. But that very day the gates were ſhut by the order of prince Eugene, who was making a review within the walls. Hence the poſtilions were under the neceſſity of making a circuit, which they would never have done by perſuaſion. At Antwerp they wanted to ſee his paſſport. Monſieur Doſembray ſhewed one, which he had obtained in his own name for making a tour to Holland, in order to regulate ſome affairs relative to the poſt-office.

TORCY ſtopped ſome days at Rotterdam, in order to ſhew to Tourton's correſpondent, whoſe name was Sincerf, his letters of credit, and to get intelligence at the ſame time, in what manner, upon arriving at the Hague, he might have a private interview with the penſionary. Sincerf was an honeſt man: beſides, this affair could not be long a ſecret, and conſequently Torcy ran no riſk in diſcovering himſelf to a perſon, whoſe aſſiſtance he wanted in order to get incog. to the Hague, and to light at the penſionary's houſe. The banker offered to conduct him; and that very moment the coach was got ready. Torcy and he arrived together at the Hague the 6th of May, towards ſeven o'clock in the evening, and alighted at the penſionary's door. Sincerf was immediately admitted to ſpeak to him; while the marquiſs waited in a kind of hall for the anſwer which the banker was to bring him.

THE

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M E-

MEMOIRS

CONTAINING THE

HISTORY of the NEGOTIATIONS

FROM THE

Treaty of Ryſwic to the peace of Utrecht.

The SECOND PART continued.

Conferences of the Hague and of Gertrudenberg.

Conferences of the Hague, 1709.

HEINSIUS came out directly; upon which Sincerf withdrew, and the king's miniſter delivered his full powers into the penſionary's hands. The latter ſeemed to be ſurprized as he read them, finding that his majeſty had deputed one of his miniſters into Holland, to confer with him concerning the means of concluding a firm and durable peace.

HEINSIUS, penſionary of the province of Holland, had been raiſed to this poſt by the protection of the prince of Orange, afterwards king of England. This prince, perſuaded of his zeal and attachment to his perſon and family, placed an intire confidence in him. He had ſent him to France after the peace of Nimeguen, about the affairs of the principality of Orange; and in the diſcharge of this commiſſion Heinſius had experienced the bad temper of a miniſter, who was more accuſtomed to talk roughly to military officers, than to treat with ſtrangers. He had not forgot, that the miniſter threatened to ſend him to the baſtile.

HE was thoroughly acquainted with public affairs, to which he had been trained from his youth, and was intimately connected with prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough; theſe three formed their projects in concert, regulated the time for putting them into execution, directed the ways and means, and were in ſome meaſure the ſoul of the confederacy. But the penſionary was neither charged with deſiring to protract the war becauſe of the weight it gave him in the republic; nor with any view of perſonal intereſt. His external appearance was ſimple; there was no ſhew of pomp in his houſe; his family conſiſting only of a ſecretary, a coachman, one footman, and one maid-ſervant; ſo that he was far from making the figure of a firſt miniſter. His ap-

appointments from the Republic were four and twenty thouſand florins, the greateſt part as keeper of the ſeals.

His addreſs was cold, but had nothing forbidding: his converſation was polite; and he ſeldom grew warm in diſpute.

The treaties of partition and of the grand alliance had paſſed thro' his hands: he was therefore acquainted with the principal affairs which had preceded the war, as well as with what had paſſed ſince it broke out, and of courſe was extremely capable of knowing, and of facilitating, if he pleaſed, the means conducive to peace. We ſhall ſee the uſe he made of his knowledge, by relating the conferences held at the Hague: before we give this relation, it will be proper to exhibit the plan which Torcy had formed.

He ſuppoſed that the conditions, which he had a power of granting, would be either accepted, or refuſed. If they were accepted; the conſequence would be peace, of which the king was extremely deſirous; and thus his intentions would be accompliſhed.

Should the enemy reject the conditions gradually offered, his majeſty would give undeniable proofs of a ſincere deſire on his ſide of ſacrificing his glory and intereſts to the general pacification of Europe; and yet he would be under no engagement, becauſe his miniſter would declare, and would not ceaſe to repeat, that all offers were void, if thoſe he made on the be-

half of the king ſhould not be productive of peace.

THE neceſſity of making the king's real ſentiments known, as well in France as in foreign countries, was neither the only nor the principal advantage which his majeſty's miniſter propoſed to derive from his journey. He hoped, as already hath been ſaid, and looked upon it as an eſſential ſervice, that he ſhould be able to penetrate into the real intentions of the enemy, which were abſolutely unknown both to the French, and to ſo many other nations blindly engaged in bearing the weight of an unprofitable war, which tended only to the aggrandizement of the houſe of Auſtria.

THIS plan he purſued during the courſe of the negotiation related in the following diſpatches to the king. His majeſty had approved they ſhould be addreſſed to the duke of Beauvilliers, that he might read them to him in council.

Firſt Letter to the King.

Sir, *Hague, May 7, 1709*

"SINCE yeſterday that I arrived here, I have "twice ſeen the penſionary. Upon coming "to this place, I alighted at his houſe, and was "introduced to him by a merchant a corre- "ſpondent of Tourton's, who brought me hi- "ther from Rotterdam in his coach. I thought "this way ſtill more ſecret than that of M. Pet- "tekum's, and this firſt conference laſted from "ſeven o'clock till half an hour after nine.

"AFTER

"AFTER the firſt compliments were over, "we ſoon entered upon buſineſs, tho' the pen- "ſionary told me ſeveral times, that as he had "no authority to treat, and the government "had nominated two commiſſaries to negotiate "with M. Rouillé, it was their buſineſs, and "not his, who was only miniſter of the pro- "vince of Holland, to diſcourſe of matters of "peace; however if I was ſtill willing to make "any propoſal to him, he would report it, and "he believed that he ſhould be empowered to "hear me. This reſerve, which I found no diffi- "culty to combat with very ſtrong arguments, "did not hinder us, Sir, from entering into "a general diſcuſſion of the ſeveral matters com- "prized under the name of preliminary arti- "cles; when taking an opportunity from what "offered in converſation, I complained, in ſuch "a manner as not to give him any reaſon of "being offended, of the ſeveral variations which "your majeſty had obſerved in the demands "that Meſſ. Buys and Vanderduſſen had made "to the preſident Rouillé.

"THIS was the principal ſubject of our firſt "conference: it gave the penſionary an oppor- "tunity of recalling paſt tranſactions to mind, of "mentioning the ſchemes which the Republic had "formed many years ſince, and the advice which "the late king William had heretofore given her "for her ſecurity, in order to ſhew me that "their pretending to keep Liſle was not a new

" idea; that this town was more neceſſary than
" any other for ſtrengthening the barrier; and
" tho' the United Provinces had not been hi-
" therto able to obtain it, yet prudence direct-
" ed them to avail themſelves of a ſingular
" and unexpected conjuncture, which deliver-
" ed into their hands a town they had aſked
" before the peace of Ryſwic, but to no pur-
" poſe at that time, becauſe of the ſuperiority
" of your majeſty's arms. We ſpoke of the
" ſeveral towns which the Dutch inſiſted upon
" at preſent, for the ſecurity of this pretended
" barrier; and we examined them together upon
" the map. In ſhort, Sir, I omitted nothing to re-
" fute his pretenſions, and to convince him that
" Furnes, Ypres, Menin, and Condé, were ſuf-
" ficient for the ſecurity of the barrier. I did
" not enlarge any farther, becauſe the penſionary
" continued to tell me, that he had no autho-
" rity to treat, but that he would acquaint the
" States of Holland with my propoſals. It was
" not proper for me to be laviſh of them, with-
" out expecting any advantage; and beſides I
" was deſirous to know what he thought con-
" cerning the other articles called preliminaries,
" before I made any farther conceſſions. We
" paſſed on to that of Spain. I found him re-
" ſolute in maintaining that his maſters, having
" engaged themſelves by treaties with their al-
" lies, could not depart from the conditions to
" which they had mutually agreed. That the
" Spa-

"Spaniſh monarchy ought to be preſerved in-
"tire, and the crown transferred to the houſe
"of Auſtria, without any diſmemberment: that
"they muſt perform their engagement, and
"the Dutch could not with a good grace pro-
"poſe to their allies to abate their demands,
"when the flouriſhing condition of their affairs
"had ſo far ſurpaſſed their expectations. He
"expatiated on their forces, on the ſucceſs they
"had reaſon to expect the next campaign; and
"when I ſhewed him by former examples,
"the uncertain iſſue of war, and how prudent
"it was for a ſtate like Holland, not to lay
"her whole dependance upon dubious events;
"he replied, that the late ſucceſſes had in
"ſuch a manner raiſed the courage of the peo-
"ple, that a great many complained of the
"conceſſions which the deputies had made to
"M. Rouillé, almoſt every body being per-
"ſuaded that they ought to make a better uſe
"of the Republic's ſucceſs.

"I FOUND the ſame obſtinacy in regard to
"the other articles; he abſolutely refuſed to
"leave the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to
"the king of Spain; nor would he make any
"conceſſion in regard to Naples, or even to
"Sicily alone. Treaties with the allies were
"the excuſe he conſtantly alledged, for not diſ-
"membering the crown of Spain.

"With the ſame reſolution he demanded
"ſatisfaction for the emperor and the empire;

" and this ſatisfaction was not reduced to the " treaty of Munſter, ſuch as it now ſtands, but " ſuch as they would have it for the ſecurity of " the princes and ſtates of the empire: thus he " inſiſts that Straſburg ſhall become an Impe- " rial city; and yet neither Philipſburg nor " Landau are to be reſtored to your majeſty.

" I WILL not trouble your majeſty with all " that I thought it my duty to ſay, in order to " detect the injuſtice of theſe pretenſions. I " dare aſſure you that I forgot nothing, and " I really think the juſtice of the cauſe fur- " niſhed me with a multitude of inconteſtable " reaſons, had I been engaged with people leſs " prejudiced with the idea of the proſperous " ſituation of their affairs, and of the ſucceſs " they had reaſon to promiſe themſelves from a " campaign the preparations of which are al- " ready finiſhed; for it was to no purpoſe for " me to repreſent to them, that Holland herſelf " ought to be jealous of the ſucceſs of her allies, " when carried too far.

" THEY look upon it as an act of moderation, " not to inſiſt upon the Pyrenean treaty, which " they think they may eaſily obtain, as ſoon as " the campaign commences. I was not there- " fore in a hurry, ſeeing the inutility of my ar- " guments, to make any offers to the penſionary, " becauſe he had no authority to accept of them. " On the contrary I told him it would be to no " purpoſe to give himſelf the trouble of ac-

" quaint-

" acquainting the States of Holland with my ar-
" rival, and of receiving any orders from them
" on my account, at their aſſembly next Friday.
" That I foreſaw the inſtructions they would give
" him muſt be productive only of a tedious ne-
" gotiation; and the affairs which your ma-
" jeſty has been pleaſed to commit to my care
" will not admit of my being ſo long abſent
" from your perſon, to perform the office of a
" negotiator; that your majeſty had command-
" ed me to apply directly to him, either in order
" to conclude a treaty of peace, or to be inform-
" ed of the intentions of the States-General; if
" the firſt point could not be accompliſhed, I
" had at leaſt the information I deſired concern-
" ing the ſecond; and then I had nothing fur-
" ther to do, but immediately to return to your
" majeſty.

" The penſionary ſeemed more deſirous of
" retaining me, than he had been of entering
" upon the ſubject. He told me, that though
" he had no authority himſelf he might ſupply
" that defect, by ſending for Meſſ. Buys and Van-
" derduſſen, who were empowered to negotiate.
" This I refuſed; for I told him, that your ma-
" jeſty had expreſly commanded me to addreſs
" myſelf to him only, and that I did not chuſe
" to commence a negotiation, when my buſineſs
" was to put the finiſhing ſtroke to one already
" commenced. He inſiſted upon my ſtaying,

" and told me that, at leaſt, theſe gentlemen " would inform me of what had paſſed between " them and M. Rouillé. I ſtill made ſome dif- " ficulty, though I was reſolved to accept of the " conference, becauſe this was the only way I " had to act in purſuance of my orders; and as " the penſionary was to be of the party, I thought " I ſhould fulfil your majeſty's intentions. Be- " ſides, it was impoſſible for me to oblige him " to ſhut his door to people, whom he was plea- " ſed himſelf to admit.

" We agreed therefore to meet this morning " at nine o'clock at the penſionary's. The ſame " ſubjects as yeſterday have been canvaſſed 'till " two in the afternoon. M. Buys has rendered " the converſation more warm; yet there was " nothing offenſive in our diſputes, and I could " be glad that the eſſentials anſwered to the " forms: but to let your majeſty in a few words " into the ſtate of the affair, I have the honour " of telling you, that, to compoſe their bar- " rier, they demand the ſame towns, concerning " which they have already explained themſelves, " namely Liſle, Tournay, and Maubeuge, to be " joined to thoſe which M. Rouillé had agreed " to cede to them.

" In regard to the article of Spain, they de- " mand the monarchy entire.

" For the ſatisfaction of the emperor and the " empire, they pretend that Straſburg ſhall be

" re-

" re-eſtabliſhed as an Imperial city, without giving " any equivalent for all the ceſſions which they " require of your majeſty.

" I DEFERRED explaining myſelf in regard to " the offers your majeſty had commanded me to " make, ſeeing them ſo difficult about articles " which do not relate to the barrier; for I began " with this, and by different obſervations I have " perceived, that, notwithſtanding the ſtrength " of thoſe engagements which theſe gentlemen " are conſtantly mentioning in favour of their " allies, this important article of the barrier " will, in all probability, determine the Dutch " to conclude a peace. I therefore made ſome " overture in regard to Maubeuge. The offer " was accepted as a ſmall part of what the Dutch " pretend to, but not as a ſufficient ſecurity. I " went no further, but ſaid that it was need- " leſs to agree about the article of the bar- " rier, if they formed inſuperable difficulties " about the reſt. I declared that a peace could " not be concluded, unleſs the kingdoms of Na- " ples and Sicily were preſerved for the king of " Spain.

" COULD I even particularly recollect every " thing that has been ſaid upon this ſubject, ſo " as to be able to make a faithful report of it to " your majeſty, I ſhould only tire you with an " uſeleſs narrative. The ſummary is this, the " penſionary pretends that the Dutch are engaged " by their treaties to procure the intire monarchy

" of

" of Spain for the archduke; that they cannot
" therefore, without going from their word, ſti-
" pulate the leaſt diſmemberment thereof; be-
" ſides they know that the Engliſh are againſt it,
" becauſe of their trade to the Levant. This laſt
" argument I combated, by reminding him that
" when the ſame reaſon was mentioned to king
" William, at the time of the treaty of partition,
" he anſwered, that England would ſtill have
" the ports of Genoa and Leghorn, if that of
" Meſſina was ſhut to her commerce. The pen-
" ſionary replied, that king William had chan-
" ged his opinion, ſince this very ſame motive of
" the Engliſh trade to the Levant obliged him
" afterwards to ſtipulate with your majeſty, the
" exchange of the kingdoms of Naples and Si-
" cily for the duke of Savoy's territories; and in
" ſhort that we had ſeen the heavy charge which
" the Engliſh nation brought afterwards in par-
" liament, againſt the miniſters who ſigned the
" treaty of partition. The penſionary and Meſſ.
" Buys and Vanderduſſen, impatient to return to
" the article of the barrier, quitted that of Na-
" ples and Sicily, to aſk me what your majeſty
" then intended to do for the Dutch. After
" having long avoided any explanation, as a
" thing quite needleſs, ſince they would make
" no conceſſion upon the article of Naples and
" Sicily, I thought, Sir, it was proper to let
" them ſee what they would loſe, ſhould the ex-
" ceſſive regard to the intereſts of their allies hin-
" der

" der them from making a good uſe of the fa-
" vourable diſpoſitions of your majeſty. I told
" them therefore, that if they would give me
" back either Maubeuge which I had juſt ceded
" to them, or Condé, they ſhould have Tournay.
" I fancy that the mentioning to cede Tournay
" began to produce a good effect; for they cer-
" tainly expect that I ſhall deſiſt from my pre-
" tenſion of getting back Condé or Maubeuge as
" an equivalent. They ſeemed afterwards to
" be more eager in ſoliciting me not to be im-
" patient; but to wait for the duke of Marl-
" borough, who is expected back from England
" in two days. They would be glad that the ar-
" ticle of Naples and Sicily was diſcuſſed with
" him, becauſe the Engliſh are principally con-
" cerned in it. I think I ſee alſo that they are
" not ſorry that the article of Dunkirk, about
" which they ſeem to be very indifferent, ſhould
" be ſettled with my lord Marlborough. In
" ſhort, Sir, I believe that they have nothing
" really at heart, but the article of their barrier:
" yet they inſiſt as vigorouſly as ever upon the
" other articles; leſs out of affection to their al-
" lies, whoſe behaviour they reſent, than thro'
" fear leſt they ſhould find thoſe allies no more
" ready to lend their aſſiſtance upon an emer-
" gency, if the Republic was to abandon them
" when they think her in a capacity of fulfil-
" ling her engagements. I had no difficulty, Sir,
" to expreſs an extreme impatience of returning

" to

" to your majeſty, and a very great concern at
" loſing my time here to no purpoſe, ſeeing they
" made inſuperable difficulties upon ſuch an arti-
" cle as that of Naples and Sicily, which I could
" not give up, after they had agreed to it. They
" denied this agreement; we diſputed a long
" time about the fact, and they pretended to have
" ſaid only, that the article of Naples and Sicily
" might be reſerved for the public conferences
" of peace. I ſhall wave repeating all I ſaid to
" ſhew the injuſtice of ſuch a propoſal, and the
" abſurdity of leaving the king of Spain in ſo
" dubious a ſituation, while your majeſty is wil-
" ling to grant ſuch extraordinary conditions.
" I did not demand any further conferences;
" but they propoſed one to me for to-morrow
" morning; and as I am here, Sir, only to ſo-
" licit and to ſpeak, I ſhall with pleaſure em-
" brace every opportunity they give me of meet-
" ing them, till I find all conferences ineffectual,
" and then I ſhall return to your majeſty. Yet
" I am reſolved to wait for my lord Marlbo-
" rough, if his departure is not delayed; for it
" ſeems to me, that in the preſent ſituation of
" affairs he is to determine our fate, and that
" there are ways of making him reſolve upon a
" peace. Could my tarrying here contribute to
" this end, I ſhould not regret the time I pro-
" poſe to ſtay; which, if poſſible, I ſhall pro-
" tract to the end of next week. Then I ſhall
" for certain know, what I have to expect, from
" the

" the offers I ſhall have made, in conſequence " of your majeſty's orders. I have all along in- " ſiſted on the reſtitution of Liſle. There are " ſo many ways of facilitating this point, that, " notwithſtanding your majeſty's permiſſion, I " ſhall not make uſe of them, till they deter- " mine the matter. I have even explained my- " ſelf to-day, and theſe gentlemen themſelves " have conſented, that whatever I ſay to them, " as well as M. Rouillé's offers, ſhall be void, " if the negotiation breaks off.

" I ASKED leave for M. Rouillé to come hi- " ther. At this they expreſſed ſome difficulty, " apprehending leſt his arrival and mine toge- " ther ſhould give too much umbrage to their " allies. I did not inſiſt upon it; nay, I was " pleaſed with the care they take to conceal this " negotiation, and I promiſed them I would keep " myſelf as private as they deſired. But I queſtion, " whether I ſhall be able to do ſo long. I am even " ſurprized myſelf, to be in ſuch a place as the " Hague, where there are ſuch a number of foreign " miniſters attentive to the leaſt ſhadow of nego- " tiation, and to have had two conferences with the " penſionary and with two deputies of ſtate, without " any body's knowing any thing of the matter, " theſe four and twenty hours, except Pettekum, " to whom I told it, and Tourton's correſpon- " dent, the merchant who introduced me yeſter- " day to the penſionary. This ſeems to be a " more private way, than that of coming hither

" by

" by the public carriages, and of being intro-
" duced by Pettekum, whom with difficulty I
" ſhould have found out. I think, Sir, the pen-
" ſionary was pleaſed with the ſecrecy of my jour-
" ney. Yet he had had ſome advices of it from
" Bruſſels, to which he gave no credit; and theſe
" he had received from Jaupin, poſt-maſter of
" that city, who had diſcovered the ſecret, tho'
" I had avoided paſſing through Bruſſels.

" AFTER to-morrow's conference, I ſhall have
" the honour of informing your majeſty of the
" debates on both ſides, and of the terms we
" ſhall conclude upon; and I intend to diſpatch
" a courier for this purpoſe, notwithſtanding that
" I do not expect any freſh orders from you, as I
" have ſeveral times declared to the penſionary.

" THOUGH I do not inform your majeſty in
" particular of every thing that I have ſaid upon
" the article of Naples and Sicily, yet I beg you
" will believe I have omitted nothing to convince
" them, that you could not, even if you were
" willing, oblige the king of Spain to reſign all
" his dominions; and that as he had nothing
" further to loſe but his life, he would rather
" riſk it to continue in Spain, than preſerve it
" by deſcending from the throne without the
" leaſt partition of that monarchy.

" AMONG ſeveral bad reaſons, which have more
" weight than good ones, when employ'd by peo-
" ple who have a ſuperiority of force on their ſide,
" Buys quoted the example of king Auguſtus,

" who

" who ceded Poland to preſerve Saxony. I told " him that I had the example of that prince con- " ſtantly before my eyes; and that the fate of his " two miniſters, confined by his orders after the " ſigning of ſo diſadvantageous a treaty, ought to " be a check to thoſe who are entruſted with ſuch " dangerous commiſſions.

" We ſpoke of the article of commerce, of the " ninth electorate, of the affair of Neufchatel, " and of the convention between the princes of " Heſſe for the poſſeſſion of Rhinsfelds. Your " majeſty had already given your orders in re- " gard to all theſe points, without making any " difficulty.

" Neither Orange nor the people of the pre- " tended reformed religion have been ſo much " as mentioned. I ſee no change that I can ex- " pect, in reſpect to the electors of Bavaria and " Cologne.

" The article of Savoy I have always treated " as a perſonal offence which they ſeemed to intend " to offer your majeſty; the duke of Savoy being " ſufficiently indemnified already for thoſe towns, " the demolition of which he gives as a reaſon for " inſiſting on an equivalent. I explained to thoſe " gentlemen the advantages he received at pre- " ſent from that part of the Milaneſe which they " had procured for him; and this enlargement " of territory ſerved me as an argument, to let " them ſee that the engagements which they were " continually ſounding in my ears, as a law

" in-

" inviolable, had not hindered them from diſ-
" membering the Spaniſh monarchy, ſince they
" gave ſome provinces of that crown to the
" duke of Savoy, as they had given others to
" the king of Portugal.

" To-morrow I ſhall have a freſh account
" to ſend to your majeſty, to-day's diſpatches
" containing the moſt eſſential matters that
" have paſſed in the two conferences."

The king's miniſter had no orders from his majeſty, to propoſe their permitting the preſident Rouillé to come to the Hague: but in an affair of ſuch importance he ſtood in need of aſſiſtance. Whoever thinks his own knowledge ſufficient for diſcerning and with certainty determining the part he ought to act on many occaſions in life, muſt have had very little experience; he will often ſee his preſumption puniſhed by miſtakes, which he would have avoided, had he taken prudent counſel. A good plan is often improved in conſequence of the inquiry and diſcuſſion of two perſons actuated by the ſame deſire of ſucceſs: if one does not perceive the deficiency of the project which he has formed, the other does; and they both act jointly in correcting it. The mind is enlightened by contradictions, when theſe ariſe from a mutual deſire of ſeeking and diſcovering the truth.

The king's miniſter experienced not only the utility of the preſident's councils, but likewiſe his aſſiſtance in thoſe long conferences, where a ſingle

a ſingle perſon would not have been adequate to the taſk of anſwering the ſpeeches of the managers of theſe conferences, of refuting their objections, and of ſhewing the injuſtice of their pretenſions.

Letter to the duke of Beauvilliers.

"YOU will ſee, Sir, by the letter I have "the honour of incloſing for the king, the "ſituation of the affairs committed to my ma- "nagement. I am therefore frequently obliged, "I aſſure you, to recollect the ideas with which "I ſet out, in order to be prepared againſt every "thing I hear, and to be able patiently to bear "the many humiliations to which I am expoſed. "When I received his majeſty's orders for this "journey, the ſacrifice ſeemed to me to be "great. Far am I from finding my troubles "diminiſhed; and what I experience upon the "ſpot greatly ſurpaſſes what I had only ima- "gined to myſelf at a diſtance.

"I HAVE detained the courier till to-morrow, "that I may be able to inſert in my letter an "account of this evening's conference. If in "the others I have been too quick or too ſlow, "his majeſty muſt judge, as I have laid before "him the reaſons of my conduct. I thought it "was neither right to go hand over head, nor "to leave the Dutch too long in ſuſpenſe with "regard to the advantages which they ſo ob-

" ſtinately demand, and which his majeſty is " willing to grant them, to the end that being " excited by ſuch generous conditions, they may " in their turn ſolicit my Lord Marlborough.

" To-MORROW there is to be an extraordi- " nary meeting of the States of Holland. The " penſionary will give them an account of my " journey and propoſals, and probably it will " be next Wedneſday before they have an an- " ſwer from the towns. I depend very little " upon Molo. However I will ſee him. Tour- " ton, who is come hither, ſeems to be more " eſteemed; and to-morrow he returns to Am- " ſterdam.

" YESTERDAY the penſionary told me that " he looked upon himſelf, as the innocent cauſe " of a report which had been ſpread of my jour- " ney, before it was reſolved upon. That M. " Rouillé having acquainted him by means of " Pettekum, of my aſking for a blank paſſport " in order to make uſe of it if there ſhould " be occaſion; from this ſingle propoſition, " which he underſtood in the ſame ſenſe as " Rouillé and Pettekum had meant it, one of " the members of the government inferred, that " I was really to come hither, and this news " had been current, though no body believed " it. And indeed a great many ſtill queſtion " whether I am at the Hague or not: I aſſure " you I almoſt doubt of it myſelf, and with im- " patience I wait for the moment to get from " hence;

" hence; but depend upon it, Sir, it will be " when there is nothing further to be done, " and that I find the armies juſt ready to take " the field; ſo that I ſhall chuſe rather to tarry " here the whole month, than to go away, ſo " long as I have the leaſt hopes. I beg you " will ſend me back my courier, not ſo much " on account of any orders, for I expect no " more; as becauſe when he is gone, I have " only a valet de chambre left, and I bid him " ſend me another the moment he arrives at " Verſailles."

May 7.

The letter to his majeſty continued.

May 8, 1709.

" IN the conference of this morning I found " the ſame difficulties, as in the two preceding. " The ſame oppoſition againſt relinquiſhing the " kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to the king " of Spain; the ſame inſtances in regard to the " reſtitution of Straſburg, as well as to the de- " molition of fort Louis, of which no mention " as yet had been made. And yet theſe gen- " tlemen maintain, that every new propoſal " which they advance, has been already made to " M. Rouillé: that they are obliged by their " treaties to attend to the intereſts of their allies, " to procure a barrier for the empire; and that " there will be none, ſo long as your majeſty, " whoſe power on certain occaſions they affect

" to extol, continues to have fortreſſes on the " Rhine and a town of ſuch importance as " Straſburg. Yeſterday I told the penſionary, " that I was amazed to ſee the Republic ſo zea- " lous for the ſtates of the empire, after being " witneſs to the fulminating letters, which ſhe " writes to them every year, complaining of " their indolence. He told me, and to day he " repeated it, that they diſtinguiſhed greatly " between the circles of Swabia and Franconia, " and the other ſtates of the empire; for the " allies were ſo vaſtly indebted to theſe two cir- " cles, that it was incumbent upon them to pro- " vide for their ſecurity, by reſcuing them, pur- " ſuant to treaties, from the juſt fears occaſioned " by the vicinity of Straſburg. That this was " not a new demand, the ſame city having been " included in the preliminaries of the peace of " Ryſwic. He agreed to what I told him; that " your majeſty by reſigning it, would have pre- " ſerved Philipſburg, Briſac, and Friburg; and I " added that on theſe conditions I would pre- " ſume to adviſe you to give up Straſburg.

" They dropped this point, which the Dutch " have not near ſo much at heart, as that of the " barrier in the Netherlands; and M. Buys " brought this barrier, where we left it yeſterday, " again upon the carpet. I ſaw that my laſt " propoſal had made no impreſſion, that the af- " fair went on but heavily, and that by maintain- " ing a point during three whole conferences

" which

" which I could not carry, I did nothing but " waſte my precious time, which I ought rather " to employ in demonſtrating to the Dutch, be- " fore Marlborough's return, the advantages " they may derive from the peace. For this " reaſon, after diſputing a whole hour I yielded " Tournay, without reſerving either of the two " towns, one of which I had demanded as an " equivalent for this ceſſion. In ſhort I judged " that it was time alſo to give way upon the ar- " ticle of Liſle, finding it impoſſible to engage " the Dutch to forward a peace, unleſs they " were ſatisfied about their barrier. The con- " ſent I gave to this diſagreeable article, was " managed by degrees; and I venture to aſſure " your majeſty, that I did not yield, till I ſaw " a certain and imminent rupture, unleſs I ab- " ſolutely ſatisfied thoſe who were to be the " principal movers in the affair. If it comes to " a concluſion, I ſhall not have paſſed your ma- " jeſty's orders; and if there be no poſſibility of " concluding, the offers I have made are void. " I deſigned to keep them longer back; but I " might loſe a lucky minute, and I ſaw no ad- " vantage in running that riſk.

" WHEN the Dutch are once ſatisfied, they " will preſs my Lord Marlborough more warm- " ly at his return; and if they had not been ſa- " tisfied in regard to their barrier, I ſhould find " them ſtill more zealous in ſupporting the in- " tereſts of their allies. I ſpoke very reſolutely

" concerning the other articles in diſpute. In " reſpect to that of Naples and Sicily, I de- " clared that it was needleſs to argue at all; that " your majeſty inſiſted upon this partition for " the king your grandſon; that you had given " me your orders upon the ſubject; and that " the power with which you had intruſted me, " was to execute and not to exceed thoſe or- " ders.

" I SPOKE in the ſame manner about the ar- " ticle of the duke of Savoy; and I ſaid very " near the ſame thing in regard to Straſburg. " I rejected the demolition of Dunkirk. Should " there be any further diſpute about this point, " as I don't doubt but there will, and that I " ſhall be obliged to give it up, my deſign is to " wait for my Lord Marlborough's arrival, in " order to explain my mind to him: for thus " the Engliſh and the Dutch being ſatisfied, " they will eaſily incline the ſcales, and the op- " poſition of the other allies cannot hinder our " concluding.

" THE ſentiments of the public in regard to " peace are differently repreſented. If I am to " believe the penſionary and Meſſ. Buys and " Vanderduſſen, as the preparations of the cam- " paign are finiſhed, there are few who would " not be glad to ſee the iſſue of it. They are " not afraid of the conſequences that may attend " the progreſs of the allies. They ſay that Eng- " land wants to make no conqueſts in France;

" that

" that the houſe of Auſtria is too weak, to ap-
" prehend any enterprizes from her; and there-
" fore that the ſucceſſes of the campaign cannot
" be too proſperous; that they will produce
" the re-eſtabliſhment of the treaty of the Pyre-
" nees; and that till France is reduced to her an-
" cient boundaries, ſhe will be always formidable;
" for they either raiſe or depreſs your majeſty's
" power, juſt as they find it ſuits their different
" purpoſes. If the point be to acquire dominions
" and ſtrong towns, France is the only ſelf-united
" power which the reſt of Europe ought to fear,
" and of courſe her enemies ſhould take all pre-
" cautions againſt her for their future ſecurity.

" If they want to perſuade us to grant exor-
" bitant demands, they pretend that it would
" be a prudent part, if France did but conſider
" her preſent weakneſs, as well as the ſtrength
" of her enemies, and not expoſe herſelf to the
" dreadful conſequences of another overthrow.

" I ENDEAVOUR, Sir, to convince them, that
" they are miſtaken, in regard both to the power
" and the pretended weakneſs of France. That
" the one is certainly diminiſhed by a long ſe-
" ries of wars againſt all Europe; that it muſt
" be a great many years before the people can
" recover themſelves, and that nothing can be a
" ſtronger proof of this, than the offers which
" your majeſty now makes for the obtaining
" peace, ſince in any other conjuncture you
" would never have conſented to the like ſa-

" crifices, nor would your enemies have ever " dared to demand them. But I tell them that " they are equally miſtaken, when they believe " France to be ſo reduced as to be ready to " ſubmit to ignominious conditions, rather than " expoſe herſelf to the hazards of a campaign; " that the ſame Frenchmen who during the win- " ter declare both by their tongues and their " pens, the neceſſity of concluding a peace at " any rate, will perhaps change the whole face " of affairs, if it comes to a battle; that the fate " of empires is in the hands of the Almighty; " that this would not be the firſt time he " threw the rods into the fire, which he had " uſed for the chaſtiſement of nations; and that, " if the Dutch reflect on the laſt campaign, they " muſt allow they trembled ſeveral times during " the ſiege of Liſle. They who are deſirous of " peace, all ſay that it muſt be a ſolid one, and " that to render it ſuch, they muſt firſt of all " have a barrier; but I am afraid they will add " the whole Spaniſh monarchy to it.

" The propoſals from Amſterdam are come " to nothing. Indeed I have not as yet had " any certain account of them. I ſhall give " but little credit to Molo, tho' I wrote him " word to come hither. This morning I told " the penſionary, that I did not queſtion but he " would come, as ſoon as he heard of my arri- " val. His behaviour deſerves but very little " attention. I think he is looked upon as a

" man

" man who loves to make people believe, that " he has acquaintances and intimacies which he " really has not.

" In this morning's conference Buys treated " of the article of the French religioniſts, who " are actually confined on board your majeſty's " gallies. He inſiſted on their being ſet at liber- " ty; and the penſionary deſired the ſame thing " in favour of four miniſters who are confined in " different priſons in France. Without length- " ening my letter to acquaint your majeſty with " my anſwers, I can aſſure you, that there will " be no further mention of this article.

" That of the king of England was upon the " carpet yeſterday, and put off till the arrival of " my lord Marlborough. The propoſal of fix- " ing the reſidence of this prince at the Hague, " frightened the penſionary and the two de- " puties.

" They have propoſed another conference to " me to-morrow night; I have accepted of it, " and we ſhall meet at ſeven o'clock. The next " day the penſionary will acquaint the ſtates of " Holland with all that we have been hitherto " ſaying. This is a right ſtep; upon my lord " Marlborough's arrival, which is ſhortly ex- " pected, I ſhall learn, before a few days are " over, what ſucceſs I am to expect from my " journey. As yet I can form no certain judg- " ment. I continue to meet with civilities from " the perſons with whom I am negotiating, but

" they take no notice of me out of the pen-
" ſionary's houſe. I have not ſtirred abroad
" but to wait upon him, and ſo long as he
" chuſes, I ſhall continue to keep myſelf con-
" cealed; tho' the news of my arrival is now
" become public, and an account of my paſſing
" thro' the neighbourhood of Bruſſels was inſerted
" in the gazettes.

" To-day he told me, that I might ſend for
" M. Rouillé if I had a mind, and he only
" deſires him to keep himſelf as private as
" poſſible. I reckon that he will be here to-
" morrow night, and that I ſhall benefit by the
" aſſiſtance of his good counſels, the better to
" execute your majeſty's orders. I will not take
" up your time any longer with ſuperfluous aſ-
" ſurances of a zeal equal to my duty, to my
" grateful acknowledgment, and to the profound
" veneration with which I am, &c.

" *Sir*, *May* 9.

" I AM juſt come from the fourth conference,
" where the ſubjects treated in the preceding,
" were canvaſſed anew, and the pretenſions of the
" Dutch in favour of their allies were defended
" with the ſame vivacity by M. Buys, who ſtill
" continues to act the orator. Notwithſtanding
" his obſtinacy in regard to the articles of Ex-
" illes, Feneſtrelles, and Straſburg, I am inclined
" to believe that my journey will not be uſeleſs.
" I think they begin to be leſs ſanguine in regard
" to the article of Naples and Sicily. They ex-

" preſs

" preſs an eager deſire to detain me, whenever " I declare, that I muſt go, ſince I have ex- " hauſted my powers, and that, my propoſals " having been rejected, I have diſcovered the " intentions of the Republic.

" THE penſionary paid a greater attention " than uſual to what I ſaid concerning the " change, which a battle, as ſurely a battle would " be fought the beginning of the campaign, was " like to make in my propoſals. In the courſe " of converſation, he aſked me in what manner " we could contrive to hinder the armies from " acting. I anſwered that he was better ac- " quainted than I, with the meaſures neceſſary " for that purpoſe; and we almoſt agreed that " when my lord Marlborough conſented, they " would give themſelves very little trouble about " the complaints of the allies. He is expected " here next Monday, at leaſt they know he is " to embark on Saturday, and his arrival is " looked upon as deciſive of our affair.

" THE penſionary told me that the anſwer " of the ſtates of Holland would be expedi- " tious, and that as ſoon as he received it, he " would give me notice. It will probably be " to-morrow night, or the day following. I aſk- " ed him whether I could bring M. Rouillé to " the conferences. He made no difficulty, but " conſented with a good grace. In ſhort, Sir, I " may ſay, that things now ſeem to afford a " more joyous proſpect, were it poſſible to

" rejoice

" rejoice for concluding at ſuch a price, as it " muſt coſt your majeſty.

" I HEAR that the duke of Lorrain ſtill con- " tinues his intrigues. The penſionary has made " it no ſecret; yet I am not well enough ac- " quainted with the particulars, to give an exact " account to your majeſty. You will know " from other quarters, that the enemy's army " was ordered to aſſemble the 28th of this " month.

Hague, May 12, 1709.

" THE penſionary has made a report of our " conferences to the ſtates of Holland. He " has given an account of them to the States " General, by means of the deputies for ſecret " affairs; in fine he has imparted them to the " miniſters of the allies of the Republic. This " he told the preſident Rouillé and me, at the " conference we had the 11th inſtant with him " and Meſſ. Buys and Vanderduſſen. He gave " us to underſtand, without explaining himſelf " very preciſely, that the ſtates of Holland were " ſatisfied as to themſelves, with the conditions " which your majeſty was pleaſed to grant them; " but he added, that they could not be ſo well " pleaſed with your refuſing to conſent to the de- " mands of their allies. He expatiated on the " obligations of treaties: and repeated what he " had already ſaid, that the Dutch could not " avoid fulfilling them; ſince the proſperous " ſituation

" ſituation of their affairs did not permit them to
" alledge any one plauſible excuſe, to depart in
" the leaſt from their engagements.

" THIS argument, Sir, I oppoſed, by repeating
" ſeveral of the reaſons which I had made uſe of
" in the preceding conferences. I added what-
" ever I thought moſt convincing, to demon-
" ſtrate, that the ſatisfaction obtained by their
" allies was infinitely ſuperior to their expecta-
" tions at the commencement of the war. I
" ſhould have perſuaded people, whoſe aim had
" been nothing but juſtice; but I was oblig-
" ed to ſuſtain a freſh attack from M. Buys.
" He ſpoke next, and defended with greater ve-
" hemence than ever the duke of Savoy's pre-
" tenſion to Exilles and Feneſtrelles. The pen-
" ſionary backed him now and then, ſtill upon
" the foundation of their treaties, and on the ne-
" ceſſity for procuring a barrier for an ally, who,
" in conſequence of having ſacrificed ſo much in
" their cauſe, muſt expect an implacable reſent-
" ment on the part of your majeſty. In ſhort,
" theſe gentlemen continued to avail themſelves
" of the motives of the proſperous ſituation of
" their affairs, and of the apprehenſion they and
" their allies have of your majeſty's power.

" THE reſult of all their ſpeeches was this,
" that they ought to profit of their preſent ſitua-
" tion, in order to live in future ſecurity; that if
" their allies have not ſufficient barriers as well as
" themſelves, they muſt expect to be attacked as

" ſoon

" ſoon as France recovers her ſtrength; and that " it was but prudent to prevent Europe from be- " ing involved in a freſh war.

" THESE general propoſitions ſo eaſy to refute, " were not unanſwered on our ſide; but as ſoon " as we refuted them, M. Buys, according to " cuſtom, quitted the ſubject in hand, to leap to " another article.

" THUS has he behaved, ſince I have been " treating with him. Therefore, without con- " cluding any thing, he paſſed from the article " of the duke of Savoy, to that of the kingdoms " of Naples and Sicily. The preſident Rouillé " was the beſt witneſs I could have, to complain " of the variations, which your majeſty had ob- " ſerved in the conduct of the deputies on this " occaſion. For this reaſon I let him ſpeak; " but when the facts were cleared up, we were " not the further advanced. The ſame declara- " tions on the part of theſe gentlemen, that the " fate of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily " ſhould be decided only at the public conferen- " ces of peace; and the ſame repreſentations on " our ſide, how abſurd it was to pretend, that " the ſituation of his catholic majeſty ſhould be " left unſettled, while that of the archduke was " regulated, while the Dutch were ſatisfied with " their barrier, and while the Engliſh enjoyed " the greateſt part of their demands.

" IN the midſt of this warm debate, Buys " aſked us, whether your majeſty had the king

" of

" of Spain's conſent in writing, to accept of the " kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, inſtead of Spain " and the other dependencies of the Spaniſh mo- " narchy. We made anſwer, that your majeſty " was far from having propoſed to the king of " Spain, to give prematurely any ſuch conſent; " that you had been ſatisfied with apprizing " him of the ſteps which, perhaps, you would " be obliged to take for the good of peace; but " that it was impoſſible to obtain his acquieſ- " cence to an exchange, which the Dutch ſtill ſo " obſtinately diſputed, though it was upon this " foundation the negotiation had been ſet on " foot. Buys replied, that this want of power " was a *defectiveneſs*; that in vain ſhould we " treat of the other conditions, if we were " not authoriſed in regard to the principal, and " that it would be impoſſible to take any right " meaſures to hinder the opening the campaign. " His exaggerations on this occaſion, in regard to " the ſuperiority of their troops, their confidence, " their ardour, and the great advantages they " expected, were infinite, and tedious to relate. " I ſhall only mention, that having on other oc- " caſions obſerved, that he wanted to make a " handle of our great deſire, as he thought, of " avoiding another campaign, I gave him once " more to underſtand, that it would be more " glorious, more advantageous to France, to " conclude a peace on the conditions of the Py- " renean treaty, after the loſs of a battle, than

" to

" to purchaſe it at preſent on the terms which
" the Dutch demanded for their allies.

" In regard to the king of Spain's conſent,
" M. Rouillé and I told them, that we had rea-
" ſon to be ſurprized at this new demand, ſince
" a moment before they aſſured us, that your
" majeſty need only to open your mouth, and
" ſuch was the deference of the king your grand-
" ſon to your will and pleaſure, that without dif-
" ficulty he would reſign his whole monarchy,
" as ſoon as your majeſty deſired him: that ſince
" your majeſty's word alone would be ſufficient,
" according to them, when the point was to
" make the king your grandſon reſign the intire
" monarchy of Spain; this ſame word ought to
" have ſtill a greater effect, when you were pro-
" curing for his catholic majeſty, a kind of in-
" demnification for the dominions he was to re-
" nounce. M. Rouillé put Meſſ. Buys and Van-
" derduſſen in mind, that they had both of them
" made the ſame demand at the firſt conference;
" that at the ſecond he had aſſured them, your
" majeſty would anſwer for the conſent of the
" king your grandſon; that they had been ſa-
" tisfied with this promiſe; and of courſe they
" had no right at preſent to revive a difficulty
" which by their own conſent had been already
" removed.

" Yet we propoſed to agree by an article of
" the treaty, that the king of Spain ſhould have
" three months to conſider of it; that at the ex-
" piration

" piration of this term, he ſhould forfeit all right " to a partition, if he refuſed to accept of that " which was agreed to. They all three ob- " jected, that this interval would take up the " whole campaign, and in the mean while their " armies, from whom they expected moſt ſur- " prizing feats, would continue inactive. In " ſhort, I never ſaw ſuch obſtinacy, nor ſuch " eagerneſs as Buys has ſhewn, to ſtart new dif- " ficulties. Your majeſty will be ſo good as " to conſider, whether it will be proper at pre- " ſent to take any ſtep with the king of Spain, " in order to remove this laſt difficulty, and to " have his conditional conſent, ſo as to be able " to produce it, when occaſion requires. In the " mean time we ſhall maintain that the time of " calling for it is not yet come, and that theſe " gentlemen have no right to make any ſuch de- " mand of us, when on their ſide they have not " produced any conſent, either of the emperor, " or of the archduke, to the articles that regard " the houſe of Auſtria.

" AFTER diſputing a long time, without " coming to any concluſion, the penſionary with " great judgment and temper ſummed up the " whole matter in debate. He ſaid, that diſ- " puting anſwered no purpoſe, that neither ſide " was perſuaded, contrary to the orders and in- " tereſts of their maſters; that M. Rouillé and " I were acquainted with their engagements, and " with the regard they owed to their allies, the

" Republic not being empowered to treat in " their name; that he begged of us to conſider, " how far we might yet extend our conceſſions, " as on the other hand they would ſeriouſly re- " flect on the propoſals we had made them, as " well as on thoſe to which we had refuſed to " acquieſce.

" THEY reckon that we defer giving our " conſent to the diſmantling of Dunkirk, in " order to yield this point to my lord Marlbo- " rough; but they are inflexible on the article " of Straſburg. In regard to Alſace, I think " there are none but the populace, and thoſe " who are fond of war, that make mention of it. " The penſionary's intentions ſeem to me to be " honeſt, and his manner of negotiating very " juſt. He propoſed inviting prince Eugene to " come hither, that ſo the principal parties in- " tereſted in the war might in ſome meaſure " confer together. He concluded afterwards, " that it would be better to wait for my lord " Marlborough's arrival. As they will be both " here this week, I ſhall in all likelihood know " what I have to depend upon, before the expi- " ration of that term, and I hope to be able to " ſet out from hence the beginning of the week " following. God grant it may be in ſuch a " manner, as your majeſty ſhall have reaſon to " be ſatisfied with my journey.

" THE envoys of Sweden, Denmark and Lor- " rain have been to pay me a viſit. To the la- " ter

"ter I mentioned the rumours that had been "ſpread, in regard to an equivalent for the "duchy of Montferrat, which he is poſitively "ſaid to demand, at the expence of your ma-"jeſty. Within theſe few days I had been alſo "told, that with this view he pretended to ob-"tain the three biſhoprics, and the perpetual go-"vernment of Alſace, which by the peace was "to be reſtored to the houſe of Auſtria. He "ſtrongly denied theſe ſuppoſitions, which I "myſelf, in our converſation, treated as chime-"ras." He told me that indeed he ſolicited, as "your majeſty knows, an indemnification for "the duchy of Montferrat in favour of his ma-"ſter; but without ſpecifying any territory, "only propoſing the duchy of Mantua, as that "which the emperor might at preſent moſt ea-"ſily diſpoſe of.

"IN other reſpects I found him perfectly ac-"quainted with the plan of this Republic and of "her allies in regard to peace; and what he men-"tioned to me concerning this matter, agrees "with what the penſionary and the other two "have repeated ſeveral times in the courſe of our "conferences.

"THIS plan is to fulfil their treaty with the "emperor, by procuring, purſuant to their ob-"ligation, all the Italian dominions for the arch-"duke.

"TO ſatisfy the particular intereſts of Hol-"land, as well as thoſe of England, by ob-

" taining Spain and the Indies for this ſame
" prince.

" To perform their treaties with the king of
" Portugal and the duke of Savoy, by oppoſing
" any partition whatſoever of the Spaniſh mo-
" narchy, except ſuch as hath been agreed upon
" with theſe two princes.

" To form a barrier which they pretend to be
" neceſſary for the empire, by inſiſting on the
" ceſſion of Straſburg; and the ſame envoy of
" Lorrain aſſures me, that the elector of Bran-
" denburg and the Proteſtant Cantons inſiſt
" likewiſe on the ceſſion of Alſace and Franche
" Comté, as a barrier for theſe two powers. In
" ſhort, Sir, they talk of nothing but barriers,
" a term ſo little known in ancient negotiations,
" that the penſionary acknowledged yeſterday
" they had been greatly puzzled to expreſs it in
" Latin in their laſt treaties.

" ALL nations ſeemed to have conſpired againſt
" your majeſty, under the affected notion of the
" terror of your power, to enrich themſelves
" with your ſpoils, at a conjuncture which they
" think favourable to their pretenſions.

" PRINCE Eugene is arrived.

May the 14th.

" THE animoſity of your enemies increaſes,
" and by the letters received from France,
" the people here are excited to make another
" campaign, from which they promiſe them-
" ſelves

" ſelves moſt ſignal ſucceſſes. Two days ago a " perſon, whom I ſhall have the honour to men- " tion by name to your majeſty, as ſoon as I " make uſe of a ſafer channel than that of the " poſt, advertiſed M. Rouillé and me, not to loſe " a moment, if we had a mind to conclude; that " the minds of the people were exaſperated; " and that the preſent form of government was " ſuch, that affairs of the greateſt importance " were decided not by the wiſeſt party, but by " numbers. We thought he wanted to frighten " us, and we reſolved to wait for my lord Marl- " borough.

" THE day following, which was yeſterday, " we ſpoke each of us ſeparately to the ſame per- " ſon. His intentions appeared to us ſo upright, " and the detail he gave us of this government, " convinced us in ſuch a manner of the ſolidity " of his reaſons, that I reſolved to ſpeak to the " penſionary before Marlborough's arrival. I " went to him that very evening, and found him " alone; I told him in confidence, the laſt or- " ders I had received from your majeſty, letting " him at the ſame time ſee, that your majeſty " could not poſſibly deſiſt from demanding an " equivalent for the king of Spain, and that there " was none more ſimple and more natural than " that of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily.

" THIS article and that of Feneſtrelles and " Exilles were diſputed as at the other conferen- " ces, and the penſionary concluded with telling

" me, that we muſt by all means wait for the " arrival of my lord Marlborough, which was " retarded only by contrary winds. He told me " that he had found prince Eugene very reaſon- " able upon the ſubject of peace. The report " of a negotiation was the motive of his coming " hither. The penſionary had endeavoured to " diſſuade him from coming : but prince Eugene " told him that he had promiſed lord Marlbo- " rough to meet him here, at his return from " England ; that he had anticipated the term " only a few days, which he had done the " more eaſily, as all the neceſſary orders are " given for opening the campaign, and his ab- " ſence can occaſion no inconveniency. The " penſionary told me that he would pay a viſit " to prince Eugene to-day ; that to-morrow he " and I ſhould talk over matters again ; and " that upon lord Marlborough's arrival, affairs " might be much advanced the remainder of the " week.

" I AM aſhamed Sir, I have got no farther, after " exerting all the means, which your majeſty " had given me, to bring matters to a concluſion. " With ſuch arms I was perſuaded, that I ſhould " ſurmount the difficulty I conſtantly experience " concerning the king of Spain's partition : but " inſtead of entering into the juſtice of my rea- " ſons upon this article, they anſwer that your " majeſty may make another ſettlement for the " king your grandſon ; and upon my aſking

" what

" what ſettlement that is, they propoſe to me " as an expedient to which there muſt be " no reply, to diſmember Franche Comté, and " beſtow the ſovereignty of it on his catholic " majeſty.

" WHAT I ſuffer, Sir, from this ſort of propo- " ſals, little concerns your majeſty's ſervice; but I " can aſſure you that hitherto my patience has " not failed me, and that I ſhall keep my temper " till I depart from hence, judging it neceſſary " for the execution of your orders; as they " will be executed, whether affairs are brought " to a concluſion, or whether I clearly perceive " the impoſſibility of having a peace before the " campaign. I reckon to ſet out from hence " the very lateſt in Whitſun-week; and tho' I " hope to be in four days with your majeſty, " yet I will diſpatch a courier to you after I have " ſpoke to my lord Marlborough, in order to " inform you as quick as poſſible of the ſituation " in which I ſhall leave your affairs. I am with " profound reſpect, &c. &c.

To the duke of Beauvilliers.

Hague, May 14, 1709.

" YOU will ſee, Sir, by the letter which this day I have writ to the king, that the " diſpute is now reduced chiefly to the equiva- " lent for the king of Spain, and the reſtitution " of Exilles and Feneſtrelles. Theſe are two

" points which I made no doubt but I ſhould " carry, having yielded all the reſt; but not " being able to ſucceed in theſe, I think of re- " turning to France, ſorry that my journey and " my ſtay in this place have been of no manner " of ſervice to the king. The notion they have " in Holland of the bad ſituation of our affairs " produces ſtrange effects; and thoſe who feel " the calamities of war, forget their hardſhips, " in hopes of cruſhing France, which for their " own ſecurity they imagine cannot be too much " humbled.

" How deſirous ſoever I may be of receiv- " ing letters from France, not having had any " ſince I left the kingdom, yet I ſhould be glad, " tho' at the expence of my own private ſatisfac- " tion, that no news came from thence theſe eight " days; the accounts they write, are only pro- " ductive of freſh obſtacles to the concluding of " the peace.

" The ideas that have been ſo often given us, " of the Republican and well-meaning party, are " very different upon the ſpot, from what they " are ſuppoſed to be at a diſtance. At preſent " it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh any certain rules, " for treating with a government compoſed of " an infinite number of people, who fancy them- " ſelves, and will be, maſters. They are in a " great meaſure unpractiſed in buſineſs, and di- " rected by ancient impreſſions, which have a " very great influence on the preſent times.

" My

"My lord Marlborough's arrival will deter-
"mine my departure, which I do not think to
"defer any longer than the beginning of next
"week."

A SUSPICION of the infidelity of the poſt had obliged Torcy to defer mentioning in his diſpatches the name of Vanderduſſen, who was the author of the ſecret intelligence in regard to the animoſity of the people, and the almoſt general oppoſition to peace. He had drawn a picture of the government, in which it appeared, that affairs of the greateſt importance were determined by the moſt numerous and not by the wiſeſt party. Yet his proteſtations of ſincerity and upright intentions did not remove the diſtruſt, which one naturally entertains of advices given by an enemy. In all probability Vanderduſſen's view was to diſcover the bottom of the king's intentions, by intimidating thoſe who were negotiating on the part of his majeſty. They jointly made anſwer to Tourton, a French refugee, who was ſent by Vanderduſſen, that they had nothing further to ſay, beyond what they had declared to the penſionary.

VANDERDUSSEN, not at all diſcouraged, was the day following at the baron Duywenworden's, who had invited Torcy and Rouillé to dine with him at a country ſeat in the neighbourhood of the Hague, belonging to his father-in-law the earl of Portland.

UNDER the pretence of a walk, Vanderduſſen entered into a ſeparate converſation with both of them, at different intervals. He repeated the ſame intelligence which Tourton had given them in his name the day before; to which he added ſome particular circumſtances.

ACCORDING to him, the public with one common voice were deſirous of a campaign, for which the neceſſary funds and preparations were ready. By general report France was reduced to the laſt extremity. This news was confirmed every poſt by letters from Paris and from the different provinces of the kingdom. The concluſion drawn from thence was, that if the Dutch would but avail themſelves of this conjuncture, they would have nothing more to fear; but if neglecting it, they failed in their engagements to their allies, the Republic would be inevitably undone.

VANDERDUSSEN therefore inſiſted on the urgent neceſſity of coming to a quick explication; in a few days it would be too late; they would ſoon increaſe their demands; and even now they wanted to include Valenciennes and Cambray in the barrier.

A GREAT many had already propoſed the Pyrenean treaty, and even in this they thought themſelves moderate. This very treaty printed in Dutch was hawked about from houſe to houſe, without knowing by whoſe authority or direction.

IT

IT is a miſtake, ſaid Vanderduſſen, to depend upon the credit of a few well-meaning perſons of the province of Holland, who are deſirous of peace, as a thing uſeful and even neceſſary to the welfare of the ſtate. The reſolution of this province, the principal of all, depends on upwards of five hundred perſons, moſt of them ſwayed by prejudice, who look upon France as reduced to her laſt ſhifts, and ſo animated by the remembrance of former times, that, without reaſoning about the matter, they have concluded on the neceſſity of cruſhing this potent enemy.

I AM, ſaid Vanderduſſen, the only perſon in my town inclined to peace, and I have eight and twenty perſons againſt me, all equal in credit with myſelf. My reſiding at the Hague hinders them from deliberating on the laſt propoſals, and certainly they would never be ſatisfied with the conditions relating to the allies.

IN regard to the article of the barrier, they think themſelves able to obtain ſuch an one, as ſhall infinitely exceed that which you have offered; and the letters from France give ſuch a melancholy deſcription of the ſtate of the kingdom, that if you delay a few days longer, the United Provinces will form new pretenſions.

WHY and for what reaſon, ſaid Vanderduſſen, ſhould you defer explaining yourſelves, till Marlborough arrives? the time of his coming is uncertain, perhaps it will be fifteen days before he can be here; beſides he will raiſe new difficul-

ties againſt the peace, inſtead of removing the old ones.

VANDERDUSSEN therefore extolling himſelf as a man of honour and a lover of his country, adviſed them to ſpeak plainly to the penſionary; to be before-hand with Marlborough; and to believe it to be a matter of the greateſt importance to finiſh quickly; for in ſhort, ſaid he, the well-meaning party will be forced to give way to the torrent, and beſides they are unable to oppoſe their allies. And how ſhould they indeed be able to reſiſt ſeventy, and even very near fourſcore thouſand troops, which are actually in the Netherlands?

THESE repreſentations, founded on truth and agreeable to the advices which Torcy and Rouillé received from different parts, made an equal impreſſion on them both.

IN ſome conjunctures prudence requires us to try to gain time; in others each moment is precious.

THE condition of France was every day growing worſe and worſe. The people were ſtarving; the finances exhauſted; while not one reſource was left.

IT was doubted whether the courage of the troops would not fail, together with the means of ſubſiſting; and yet the opening of the campaign was at hand, the month of May being almoſt expired. And what hopes could there be of bringing ſo important a negotiation to a happy iſſue in ſo ſhort an interval? all that could

could be done was to let all Europe ſee plainly the ſincerity of the king's intentions, and his real deſire of reſtoring peace, while his enemies uſed every endeavour to prevent it.

For this purpoſe, it was neceſſary that his majeſty's conceſſions for terminating the war ſhould be made public.

Vanderdussen had inſiſted on the demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk, as an eſſential condition for ſatisfying the Engliſh. Torcy told him in confidence that this condition, how hard ſoever, ſhould not hinder it from being concluded. Vanderduſſen begged of him to declare it to the penſionary; but you both adviſed me, replied Torcy, to wait for the duke of Marlborough, before I declared it; yet I will follow your laſt advice, and accordingly will ſpeak to the penſionary.

The diſmantling the town of Dunkirk was not the only pretenſion of the Engliſh; they demanded further that the harbour ſhould be filled up. The Dutch, ſaid Torcy, may one day be ſorry for having backed the demands of the Engliſh; and Vanderduſſen was of the ſame opinion. He even allowed that the Republic was afraid of the authority which this crown had acquired in Holland. After debating this article, they proceeded to that of Straſburg.

Independently of the rights, which the king had acquired to Straſburg, by the ceſſion of Alſace, this city had been expreſsly yielded to

his

his majeſty by the laſt treaty of peace; and this increaſe of right was in ſome meaſure purchaſed by an onerous exchange. There was not therefore, even the ſhadow of equity, to inſiſt upon its being ceded to the empire by way of reſtitution; but little attention is paid to equity, when injuſtice ſupplies the place of reaſon.

VANDERDUSSEN propoſed to find out ſome expedient for adjuſting this point; Torcy was againſt it at firſt; but at length he mentioned the diſmantling of Straſburg. Vanderduſſen, without conſenting to it, aſked what he thought of putting a Swiſs garriſon into the town; and the expedient was not rejected.

THE queſtion concerning the indemnification for the king of Spain, was debated to no manner of purpoſe.

VANDERDUSSEN poſitively affirmed that Buys, his co-deputy, was ſincerely deſirous of peace: to this he was led by his intereſt, hoping that upon its being concluded he ſhould be nominated ambaſſador to France. Accordingly he was nominated after the treaty of Utrecht; and during the courſe of his embaſſy he was ſo affected with the great qualities which he perceived in his majeſty, that when death ſnatched away this monarch, the concern which the Dutch ambaſſador expreſſed on the occaſion, was enough to confound the ingratitude of ſeveral of the king's ſubjects, on whom he had ſhowered his favours.

WHEN

WHEN theſe converſations were over, Torcy, upon his return to the Hague, waited on the penſionary; and finding him alone, told him in confidence that the king would conſent to demoliſh the fortifications and to fill the harbour of Dunkirk. Thus the Engliſh had reaſon to be content, and the negotiation might go on, without loſing time in waiting for the duke of Marlborough, whoſe arrival was very uncertain, becauſe of the contrary winds.

THEY might alſo examine into the two expedients concerning Straſburg, which had been diſputed with Vanderduſſen.

THESE articles, replied the penſionary, might form a part of the ſatisfaction of the allies; but it would not be complete. By treaty the Republic is engaged to procure complete ſatisfaction; ſhe ought therefore to diſcharge her obligations, before ſhe lays down her arms. She is not permitted to think otherwiſe, whilſt the affairs of the grand alliance are in ſo flouriſhing a condition. The Engliſh indeed would receive ſatisfaction in regard to the greateſt part of their demands, but not to all; and in proof of this he added, that the parliament had preſented an addreſs laſt year, to conclude no peace without preſerving Naples and Sicily united to the Spaniſh monarchy; that the Engliſh would never conſent to leave theſe two kingdoms in the hands of a prince of the houſe of Bourbon; neither could the Dutch conſent

ſent to ſuch a meaſure, becauſe they had the ſame intereſt in hindering it as the Engliſh, founded on their trade to the Levant, and on the obligations ariſing from their alliances. That they had promiſed the emperor to maintain him in poſſeſſion of all the Italian dominions; and that they could not break thoſe promiſes, nor force him to reſign the kingdom of Naples, of which he was in poſſeſſion.

Torcy made anſwer, that this was not the firſt time he had heard the frivolous objection of the addreſſes of an Engliſh parliament; that every body knew they were not laws; and that if they were the occaſion of the enacting of laws, theſe were no rule in the ſigning of treaties, and had no force at the moſt, except within the limits of the Engliſh monarchy.

In forming of alliances, we are apt to be liberal of our promiſes. We muſt dazzle the powers we want to engage; we muſt allure them with the preſent proſpect of advantages: but wars do not laſt for ever; after a certain time peace is deſired; and, to obtain it, we are generally obliged to relinquiſh ſome, and frequently all the advantages we had promiſed each other, when we took up arms. The Dutch were ſuch conſiderable gainers by the offers which the king had made them, that there was reaſon to be ſurprized at their oppoſing a partition for the king of Spain, and at their obſtinacy in depriving him

of

of all ſovereignty, when they wanted to oblige him to diveſt himſelf, for the ſake of peace, of the Spaniſh monarchy and the Indies.

THIS is what Torcy endeavoured to make the penſionary comprehend; at the ſame time ſhewing him that the emperor was a ſufficient gainer by the war, and by the aſſiſtance of his allies, to relinquiſh the kingdom of Naples, for the good of peace, and to conſent to its being joined to Sicily, of which king Philip was ſtill in poſſeſſion.

THE penſionary perſiſting on the obligation of treaties, and on the neceſſity of waiting for the arrival of the duke of Marlborough, in order to regulate the article of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, as well as that of the king of England, Torcy agreed to that kind of demurrer. There remained now the article of Straſburg; and Heinſius aſked what uſe he might make of the expedients propoſed; his deſign being to mention them to prince Eugene: whether he was ſincere, or not, he aſked the king's miniſter, what he thought of them. They both agreed that the penſionary ſhould communicate thoſe expedients to prince Eugene, as propoſed by a third perſon, whom he neither could nor would mention by name; that if they were approved, perhaps they would remove the difficulties which France oppoſed to the reſtitution of Straſburg.

THE penſionary promiſed to ſpeak in this ſenſe to prince Eugene, and to wait upon him the next day.

He affirmed that though this general had been ſo ſucceſsful, yet he did not appear ſanguine for continuing the war; on the contrary, there was room to preſume he would be very reaſonable.

The penſionary engaged to acquaint Torcy with prince Eugene's anſwer, the day after the viſit which he intended to pay him.

In the mean time Torcy received further advices from Amſterdam and Rotterdam, of the ſentiments of thoſe towns and of the province of Holland, in regard to peace. Theſe advices agreed in ſhewing, that thoſe who might be conſidered as the beſt meaning party, eſpecially in the cities of Amſterdam and Rotterdam, were perſuaded of the impoſſibility of a peace, ſo long as France incumbered it with the condition of leaving the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to the king of Spain. The ſame ſpirit was diffuſed on every ſide, and the enemies of France, perſuaded ſhe was reduced to the laſt extremity, thought themſelves entitled to demand whatever they pleaſed, and ſure of obtaining their demands.

On this foundation, the penſionary had propoſed erecting Franche Comté into a kingdom, in order to form a ſettlement for the king of Spain. Others, beſides this miniſter, were willing to look upon this chimerical idea as feaſible. They did not in the leaſt doubt, but it was juſtice to ſupport every demand whatever of the duke of Savoy's.

The

THE Dutch had promiſed to guaranty to that prince, the poſſeſſions he ſhould ſeize upon in Dauphiné and in Provence. If he had made himſelf maſter of theſe two provinces, the Republic would have thought that ſhe was bound to maintain him in the poſſeſſion of both, and at the ſame time that ſhe had power enough to preſerve this increaſe of territory to her ally.

THE letter to his majeſty the 16th of May, informed him of the conference, which was held the 15th of the ſame month with the penſionary.

Letter to the King.

Hague, the 16th of May, 1709.

Sir,

"THE converſation I had yeſterday with the penſionary does not as yet furniſh me "with matter ſufficient for diſpatching a courier "to your majeſty; we wait for the duke of "Marlborough, and till he is arrived, they will "come to no concluſion in regard to my propoſals. The laſt was to demoliſh the fortifications of Straſburg. The penſionary told me, "that he had mentioned it yeſterday to prince "Eugene, as an expedient for leaving this town "to your majeſty, without giving any umbrage "to the empire; that his anſwer was, he could "determine nothing on this ſort of affairs, without conſulting my lord Marlborough; yet he believed

" believed that the demolition of the fortifica-
" tions of Straſburg would not ſatisfy Germany,
" your majeſty having other fortifications on the
" Rhine. The penſionary backed this reflection,
" and maintained that the Rhine alone ought to
" ſerve as a barrier betwixt France and the Em-
" pire; otherwiſe that your majeſty having al-
" ways a free entrance into Germany, the neigh-
" bouring ſtates would live in continual appre-
" henſion of your power.

" I COMPLAINED of this new pretenſion, and
" of their being ſo ready to maintain every
" demand, which the enemies of your majeſty
" thought fit to trump up, under the idle deno-
" mination of a neceſſary barrier. I let him ſee,
" that it was an unprecedented thing to want to
" deprive your majeſty of the right of having
" fortreſſes for the ſecurity of your kingdom, eſpe-
" cially when the emperor, inſtead of the em-
" pire, had a garriſon in Philipſburg: that all
" they could demand of your majeſty, was to de-
" moliſh the bridges you had over the Rhine,
" and that you would conſent thereto, as you
" had done at the treaty of Ryſwic.

" ON this occaſion, I put him in mind of the
" vaſt difference I had found at my coming hi-
" ther, betwixt the plan now propoſed by the
" Republic, and the ſcheme communicated by
" the deputies to M. Rouillé; that when I left
" your majeſty, you looked upon the partition
" of Naples and Sicily in favour of the king your

" grand-

" grandſon, as a ſettled piont; and that ſince I " had been here, this article was every day more " and more diſputed.

" THE penſionary wanted ſtill to juſtify the " deputies of ſtate; but the excuſe was need- " leſs, as it conſiſted only of the ſame reaſons " ſo often refuted. However he maintained " with his uſual vigour, the pretenſions of the " allies to the whole Spaniſh monarchy; and per- " ſiſted reſolutely in declaring that the Dutch " could not recede from their engagements.

" THE term barrier is extended now to ſuch " a length, that he told me, the kingdoms of " Naples and Sicily were a neceſſary barrier to " Tyrol.

" WHEN men reaſon on principles like theſe, " it is difficult to come to any concluſion. The " penſionary told me, that I ſhould treat per- " haps with more eaſe, and perhaps more inde- " pendently of the Dutch, with prince Eugene " and the duke of Marlborough. I anſwered, " that the motive of my journey being chiefly " relative to his republic, I ſhould have been " better pleaſed to treat with him and with the " deputies of the Republic only. He repeated " the reaſon ſo often alledged, of their engage- " ments to their allies; adding, that he was very " ſorry the negotiation had begun ſo late.

" IT is almoſt needleſs to relate to your ma- " jeſty, what the penſionary repeated to me as a " new propoſal; namely, the erecting Franche

" Comté into a kingdom, and giving it as an " equivalent to the king of Spain. Though one " cannot help being provoked at a project of " that kind, if ſeriouſly propoſed; yet I anſwered " him without any appearance of anger, that if " the provinces re-united to the crown could be " diſmembered, your majeſty had no occaſion " either for the advice or conſent of your ene- " mies, to diſpoſe of them, as you thought pro- " per, in favour of the princes your children. " He inſiſted on the emperor's paſſionate de- " ſire of keeping poſſeſſion of all the Italian " dominions; and how difficult it would be " for the Dutch to deprive him of the king- " dom of Naples, in violation of their engage- " ments. On this occaſion, we ſpoke of the in- " tereſts of the houſe of Auſtria, in regard to the " preſervation of the imperial dignity; of her " ancient views upon Italy; and in ſhort of the " violences practiſed by the German troops laſt " winter, againſt the pope's territories and the " princes of Lombardy. The penſionary rea- " dily acknowledged that the Republic had con- " demned this conduct, leſs indeed out of com- " paſſion for the princes of Italy, than through " fear leſt the emperor, engaging in a new war, " ſhould no longer be at liberty to ſend his " troops into Piedmont for the opening of the " campaign; that he had promiſed nevertheleſs " they ſhould be there in time, and indeed had " kept his word.

"YET it appears, said the pensionary, that "the French are not much afraid of the efforts "of the duke of Savoy. I told him that as the "duke of Berwick had a good army, he might "easily baffle the designs of the enemy; that "in all probability your majesty would have a "superiority in Germany and in Catalonia; and "therefore that all the hopes of your enemies "must be confined to the Netherlands. He told "me that the allied armies were very strong on "this side, and that they had reason to promise "themselves great success.

"MANY idle circumstances of this conversa-"tion I shall not relate to your majesty; but "speaking of the present situation of the affairs "of Europe, and extending our views into futu-"rity, the pensionary agreed with me, that the "house of Austria now reduced to two princes, "might soon be extinct; that the duke of Savoy "would then be king of Spain; and I men-"tioned several circumstances to him, proving "that this prince had always flattered himself "with the notion of one day ascending that "throne. I asked him, whether they would be "pleased in Holland, to have such a neighbour, "sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands. He "told me, that this was a remote prospect; yet "in that case, there would be wars betwixt "France and Spain, which would furnish the "Republic with the means of defending her ter-"ritories, if she did but play her cards well.

"In this conference I had an opportunity of "telling him, that the difficulties which impeded "the peace would quickly vaniſh, if we would "but let Europe continue in its preſent ſitua- "tion; that the king of Spain might eaſily relin- "quiſh Sicily; and the houſe of Auſtria ſhould "be ſatisfied with the acquiſition of all the Ita- "lian dominions. The penſionary wanted to en- "ter into a converſation concerning the ſchemes "that had been propoſed, for ſecuring in that "caſe the commerce of the Weſt-Indies; but "his ideas of the matter being ſomewhat con- "fuſed, he did not rightly diſtinguiſh between "the propoſal made by count de Bergheik, and "the ſcheme formed by M. Menager. He told "me that the execution of ſuch a plan was im- "poſſible, but in other reſpects gave due praiſe "to count de Bergheik.

"All that I learn, Sir, is agreeable to what "the penſionary and the deputies of ſtate have "ſaid to M. Rouillé and me, jointly, and "ſeparately. The notion of peace is well re- "ceived here, and gives a pleaſure to the peo- "ple, who are oppreſſed with taxes; but they "are not oppreſſed to that degree as to termi- "nate the war, by breaking thro' the leaſt of "the engagements they have contracted with "their allies. They think their honour and ſe- "curity depend upon the manner in which they "are to fulfil their treaties.

"They

"THEY are perſuaded that the partition of "the Spaniſh monarchy is a ſcheme impoſſible "to execute; and tho' the Dutch are leſs afraid "than the Engliſh, of ſeeing the kingdoms of "Naples and Sicily poſſeſſed by a prince of the "houſe of France, yet it ſeems that they ſuffer "themſelves to be carried away by the tor-"rent, and that they had rather think as the "Engliſh, than contradict them.

"MOLO is arrived. He has ſpoke to me like "all the reſt, whom I had ſeen before he came. "I have examined him in regard to thoſe Re-"publicans, and thoſe well-meaning perſons, "with which his letters are generally ſtuffed; "they are but empty names; it all comes to no-"thing, when I attempt to ſearch to the bottom. "In ſhort, Sir, I ſhould have been gone from "hence, did not I think it abſolutely neceſſary "to wait for my lord Marlborough. I do not "expect to find him more flexible than thoſe "with whom I have been treating hitherto; "however I ſhall have left nothing untried, and "your majeſty will be informed of the real de-"ſigns of your enemies."

THE king's miniſter had reaſon to be afraid, that his majeſty diſſatisfied with ſo much condeſcenſion to the penſionary, with the deference paid to the inſinuations of the Dutch deputies, with the frightful, and perhaps groundleſs accounts of the diſpoſition of the province of Holland,

land, and particularly of the cities of Amſterdam and Rotterdam; diſſatisfied, I ſay, with all this, would juſtly reproach him for having too precipitately diſcovered the full extent of his powers: but his apprehenſions were removed by the letter he received of the 14th of May. The king not only approved of his conferences at the Hague, and the account he had given to his majeſty of the firſt conferences, but added ſome new conceſſions to facilitate the execution of his orders.

He agreed to fix a term of three months, for inſtance, for the king of Spain, to have leiſure to deliberate during that time, whether he would accept or refuſe the propoſed indemnification; of which he ſhould be abſolutely deprived, if he let that fatal term expire without coming to a reſolution; and that his ſilence ſhould be conſidered as a refuſal.

In that caſe the king would abſolutely withdraw his troops from Spain, and deny any further aſſiſtance to his grandſon. Of all the engagements which the enemy might inſiſt on, with regard to Spain, his majeſty was determined to refuſe none, except employing his forces, or granting a paſſage to the enemy thro' his territories, to dethrone his catholic majeſty.

The king would have been glad, if the urgent neceſſity of his affairs ſhould oblige him to drop all demands of an equivalent in favour of king

king Philip, that he might, in conſequence of this exceſſive condeſcenſion, be permitted to keep poſſeſſion of Dunkirk and Straſburg, or at leaſt of one of theſe two towns.

That no further mention ſhould be made of re-eſtabliſhing the treaty of Munſter, in the ſenſe of the Germans.

In order to remove all cauſe of jealouſy from that nation, his majeſty conſented to demoliſh fort Louis, as alſo to ſurrender Briſac, if upon this condition they would allow him to preſerve Straſburg and Landau with their fortifications.

The diſtreſſed ſituation of affairs was an urgent reaſon for eſſaying all ſorts of ways to come to a ſpeedy peace. Therefore it was no diſhonour to try, whether the duke of Marlborough, who was intereſted in continuing the war, would not be more ſenſibly affected by the ſuperior intereſt, which the king would ſet before him in contributing to a peace.

If this bait could take, to make him employ his attention and credit, and he ſucceeded ſo as to preſerve the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, or even the kingdom of Naples only, as an equivalent to king Philip for the ceſſion of ſuch extenſive dominions, the recompence the king agreed to give him was to be two millions of livres.

In failure of this equivalent, his majeſty intended to grant him the ſame recompence, if he was permitted to keep Dunkirk with its harbour and fortifications.

And

And the ſame ſtill, if upon the refuſal of Dunkirk, they would leave him Straſburg, on condition of reſtoring fort Kehl to the empire.

Of theſe three alternatives, the king preferred that of the equivalent for the king of Spain.

The recompence was to increaſe in proportion to the ſervice; it was to be three millions, if beſides granting the equivalent to his catholic majeſty, they would alſo conſent to the king's keeping Dunkirk, or Straſburg and Landau, upon ſurrendering fort Kehl and Briſac.

In fine, his majeſty went ſo far as to impower his miniſter to offer four millions of livres to Marlborough, if this general could procure the two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily as an equivalent for the king of Spain; and if France was left in poſſeſſion of Dunkirk, Straſburg and Landau.

Every ſovereign prince at that time preſumed, they had a right to form pretenſions againſt France. They would have thought it a diſgrace, not to make ſome demands to the prejudice of this crown.

In the liſt of the ſeveral pretenders appeared the duke of Lorrain. He demanded an equivalent for Longwi, which the king had fortified; and he ſolicited the allies to include his demand in the preliminaries. His majeſty had never refuſed him this equivalent, thinking it but juſt. The only point was to regulate the forming it. This would require a particular convention, abſolutely

ſolutely independent of the articles of a general peace; but this prince flattered himſelf that if it was comprized in the preliminaries, he might have a chance of obtaining the city of Toul with its diſtrict; as alſo the liberty of fortifying Nancy, or ſome other poſt in Lorrain. Now this is what the king would have abſolutely refuſed.

He pretended alſo to an indemnification for his rights to that part of the Montferrat, which the emperor had given to the duke of Savoy; and the poſſeſſion of Charleville, as heir to the late duke of Mantua.

The king was not anſwerable for what the houſe of Auſtria had done; the duke of Lorrain ought therefore to have carried his complaints to the court of Vienna, and demanded an indemnification for any injuſtice the emperor might have done him in diſpoſing of the Montferrat.

With regard to Charleville, there were ſeveral claimants to that part of the duchy of Mantua; the remedy at law was open to them all, and his majeſty left them all at liberty to maintain their rights.

Concerning the article of the barrier, his orders mentioned, that upon ceding Liſle, they ſhould ſeparate the Chatellanies of Doway and Orchies from its dependencies, and propoſe a ſuſpenſion of arms, if the enemy were diſpoſed to peace.

Every

EVERY day this event was more and more deſired. The king's diſpatches of the 22d of May brought orders for giving up Exilles and Feneſtrelles, if it was impoſſible without this condition to agree upon the preliminaries.

BEFORE Torcy received this laſt order, the duke of Marlborough arrived from London at the Hague. The negotiation was then reſumed with greater warmth, the conferences became more frequent, and if the enemy had ſhewn the ſame ſincerity as his majeſty, the miniſters employed in negotiating a peace had not left the Hague without concluding it. The divine goodneſs would not ſuffer a treaty to be ſigned, ſo greatly to the diſadvantage of the royal family and of France. The following letters will explain the circumſtances and iſſue of the conferences.

Letter to the King.

May 22, 1709.

"THE negotiation with which your majeſty "entruſted M. Rouillé and me, ſeemed "to be at a ſtand. Both the penſionary and "prince Eugene expected the duke of Marlbo- "rough, before they would anſwer the offers I "made them. He arrived here the 18th in "the morning, and ever ſince there has been "ſo great a buſtle, that I have been obliged to "defer writing to your majeſty, not being able

"to.

"to inform you with any kind of certainty of "the ſucceſs our propoſals would meet with. "Since yeſterday we find they will be of no ſer- "vice, and that after having ſatisfied the Engliſh "and the Dutch, in regard to every demand "wherein theſe two nations were intereſted, "they chuſe rather to break off, than to mo- "derate the pretenſions formed by the empe- "ror, as well in his own name, as in that of the "empire, or to deſiſt from demanding a ceſſion "of the towns and ſtrong places, of which the "duke of Savoy has poſſeſſed himſelf in Dau- "phiné. As an affair of ſuch importance obliges "me to give your majeſty a detail of the prin- "cipal occurrences that have happened theſe "five days, I have the honour of acquainting "you, that as ſoon as the duke of Marlborough "arrived, I deſired M. Pettekum to aſk him "when I might wait on him. After he had "conſulted the penſionary, and made a number "of excuſes and compliments, for the liberty "he took in appointing me an hour, and not pay- "ing the firſt viſit, I went to him after dinner. "Were I to relate all the proteſtations he made, "of his profound reſpect and attachment to your "majeſty, and of the deſire he has of one day "meriting your protection, I ſhould fill my let- "ter with things leſs eſſential, than thoſe I am "going to mention. His ſpeeches are florid. "I obſerved in what he ſaid to me, a great deal "of art, in naming the duke of Berwick, and

"the

" the marquiſs of Alegre. I availed myſelf, Sir,
" of this circumſtance, to make him ſenſible in
" the courſe of our converſation, that I was not
" ignorant of the particulars of their correſpon-
" dence with him, and that your ſentiments
" were not changed. He bluſhed, and pro-
" ceeded to the propoſals of peace. The pen-
" ſionary had informed him in the morning of
" every thing that had paſſed ſince his depar-
" ture from London. I thought that he had
" nothing to demand for England, after being
" informed of the offers I had made in regard
" to Dunkirk; but he told me that he had ex-
" preſs orders from princeſs Anne, to inſiſt par-
" ticularly on the reſtitution of Newfoundland;
" ſince this matter ſo deeply intereſted the whole
" nation, that it would be doing a particular
" pleaſure to his miſtreſs to ſettle it as a preli-
" minary article.

" I CONFESSED, that your majeſty's inſtruc-
" tions on this head were wanting, but that I
" was verily perſuaded it was a matter that
" would not hinder the peace, and that it might
" be eaſily regulated, either by exchanges, or
" by mutual reſtitutions on the part of England.
" He has brought lord Townſhend with him,
" who is appointed to aſſiſt on the part of Eng-
" land at the negotiations of peace.

" LORD Marlborough told me that we ſhould
" enter into further particulars with Townſhend,
" in regard to the affair of Newfoundland. He
" added,

" added, that this ſame lord had orders concern-
" ing the king of England, whom he ſtiled
" the prince of Wales. He expreſſed a ſtrong
" deſire of being in a capacity to ſerve him, as
" the ſon of a king, for whom, he told me after-
" wards, he would have ſpilt the laſt drop of
" his blood. That he believed it was his intereſt
" to remove out of France; and when I aſked
" him to what country he ſhould retire, and in
" what manner he was to ſubſiſt, he agreed in
" reſpect to the firſt article, that this prince
" ſhould be at liberty to fix his reſidence where-
" ever he choſe; ſhould enjoy perfect ſecurity;
" and be his own maſter to go wherever he
" judged proper.

" The article of his ſubſiſtence met with
" greater obſtacles. I propoſed to him the
" expedient of the queen's dowry. He ſaid
" that the laws of England rendered the pay-
" ment of that ſum extremely difficult; how-
" ever he begged of me to inſiſt ſtrenuouſly on
" this article, when my lord Townſhend and
" he came to ſpeak to me about it in the confer-
" ences. This lord, ſaid he, is a kind of in-
" ſpector over me, tho' he is a very honeſt man,
" who has been choſen thro' my means, and of
" the whig party: Before him I muſt ſpeak like
" an obſtinate Engliſhman; but I wiſh with all
" my heart I was able to ſerve the prince of
" Wales, and that your ſolicitations afforded me
" an opportunity of doing it.

" He told me a great many things of that " kind in confidence, and all to corroborate the " reaſons he had for rejecting my propoſal. With " this ſame air of confidence he expatiated on " the folly of his nation, ſo extravagant a folly " that they ſet no bounds to their ideas, that " they believe it is their intereſt, and in their " power to demoliſh France; tho' prudent peo- " ple, but who are not at the helm of affairs, " are convinced as well as myſelf, that it is time " to conclude a good peace.

" After ſuch ſpeeches, I had no room, Sir, " to expect much complaiſance on his ſide, in " regard to an equivalent for the king of Spain; " ſo that I diſputed in vain to induce him to " conſent to it. I propoſed ſucceſſively Naples, " and afterwards Sicily. I repeated all the ſame " reaſons ſo often mentioned to the penſionary, " and to the deputies of this republic.

" The preceding day I had received your ma- " jeſty's laſt orders, by the courier you ſent back " the 14th inſtant. The time of concluding the " treaty, and of preventing the opening of the " campaign, ſeemed to me very urgent; I there- " fore thought I ought no longer to defer making " uſe of your majeſty's permiſſion, whereby I " was impowered to renounce every part of the " Spaniſh monarchy. Lord Marlborough aſ- " ſured me that this was the only way to con- " clude a peace, for which he continued to ex- " preſs a ſtrong deſire, as he ſhould think, he

" ſaid,

" ſaid, of ſpending the remainder of his days in " quiet, while he looked upon the amazing " advantages of the allies in the preſent war, " as entirely owing to the hand of the Al- " mighty.

" IT is to this Almighty hand he attributed " their ſurprizing union, whereby eight nations, " of which their army is compoſed, think " and act like a ſingle man; and continuing " with the ſame appearance of modeſty, he told " me that if they made another campaign, they " ſhould be in no want of proviſions, for their " fleet would bring them corn, which ſhould be " unloaded at Abbeville.

" I WILL not tire your majeſty, with relating " my anſwers. He propoſed to me to wait on " prince Eugene, who lodged in the ſame houſe " with him, which was lord Albemarle's. The " prince was gone out; I put off the viſit till " next day, and in purſuance of what my lord " Marlborough and I had ſaid, I went to the " penſionary. I diſcloſed to him the new ſacri- " fice, which your majeſty was ready to make, " in relinquiſhing, for the ſake of peace, the " partition you had hitherto reſerved of the " kingdoms of Naples and Sicily for your grand- " ſon. I ſhewed him the importance of coming " to a concluſion: and I had reaſon to be- " lieve that he ſincerely deſired it; for he him- " ſelf mentioned the neceſſity of preventing " the operations of a campaign, by a ſuſpenſion

" of arms, and hitherto he had been very averſe
" to this meaſure.

" YET I did not find him more flexible in
" regard to the article of the duke of Savoy;
" he repeated his uſual ſpeeches on the obliga-
" tion of treaties, and ſo ſtrongly repreſented the
" obſtinacy of all the towns of Holland, in main-
" taining the promiſes made to that prince, that
" I had reaſon to doubt whether it would be poſ-
" ſible to overcome the difficulties we had met
" with in regard to this unjuſt pretenſion. He
" ſpoke of Alſace, but more faintly than uſual,
" enough to let us ſee, that if it depended upon
" him, affairs would be ſoon concluded: but the
" Republic has thrown herſelf into a kind of ſer-
" vitude in reſpect to her allies.

" WE agreed that we might have a conference
" at his houſe on Monday with the duke of
" Marlborough and with prince Eugene, and
" that both ſides ſhould honeſtly and bona fide
" ſeek the proper means of coming to a con-
" cluſion.

" I THOUGHT myſelf obliged to pay a viſit to
" prince Eugene, before the day appointed for
" the conference. My lord Marlborough, who
" had propoſed it to me, conducted me to his
" apartment. As the converſation turned only
" on general matters, I ſhall not give an account
" of them to your majeſty. They both returned
" my viſit, and Lord Townſhend with them.

"THE intended conference was held the 20th "inſtant at the penſionary's. He opened it "with a recapitulation of the ſeveral points, "which M. Rouillé, who was preſent, and my- "ſelf, had agreed to ſince our arrival at the "Hague. On the article of the renunciation "of Spain, he added, that the king of Portugal "demanded the confirmation of a treaty con- "cluded with your majeſty, in regard to the ri- "ver of the Amazons. M. Rouillé was better "qualified than any body to anſwer this new "pretenſion, having made the treaty; but the "queſtion appeared ſo uneſſential, that they rea- "dily agreed to refer it to the general confer- "ences of peace, and the penſionary himſelf "made the propoſal.

"THE two miniſters from England explained "the pretenſions of that crown; the principal "difficulties were ſolved; and the reſt related to "the removal of the king of Great Britain out "of France, to his ſubſiſtence, and to the article "of Newfoundland.

"CONCERNING the firſt, they agreed that "this prince, whom they always called the prince "of Wales, ſhould chuſe whatever place he "liked for his retreat, there to enjoy an entire "liberty, and his perſon to be ſafe.

"LORD Townſhend gave a more particular "explanation, than lord Marlborough had done, "of the difficulties which attended the pay-

" ment of the queen's dowry, according to the " laws of England. At length they conſented " to the propoſal I made them, either to let the " king of England continue in France, as he had " done hitherto; or to provide for his ſubſiſt- " ence by ſuch means as ſhould be judged pro- " per, if the nation inſiſted on his removing to " ſome other country.

" I PROPOSED an act of oblivion for thoſe " Engliſh ſubjects, who had followed the for- " tunes of the late king his father. The oppo- " ſition was but weak; however they agreed to " refer this queſtion to the conferences of peace, " as the canvaſſing thereof would be too intri- " cate, as well as unintereſting to the affairs of " ſtate, to include it in the preliminaries. My " lord Marlborough added, that if they were " ſettling the intereſts of individuals, he had or- " ders to ſpeak in favour of the duke of Rich- " mond, and to maintain the duke of Hamilton's " claim to the duchy of Chatteleraut.

" THEY inſiſted on the reſtitution of New- " foundland. Our anſwers were agreeable to " what I had already mentioned concerning this " article to my lord Marlborough; after having " made them ſenſible however of the importance " of the Newfoundland fiſhery, in training up " and exerciſing a great number of French ma- " riners, we agreed that this article ſhould not " hinder the peace. They ſaid they had orders

" to

" to demand, that at the concluding thereof, com-
" miſſaries ſhould be appointed to finiſh the af-
" fair of Hudſon's Bay; to which we conſented.

" In ſhort, Sir, England and Holland be-
" ing ſatisfied, we had reaſon to believe that
" the pretenſions formed under the name of the
" empire would not be of ſufficient weight in
" this place, to hinder a bleſſing ſo neceſſary to
" all Europe, as that of peace.

" And indeed prince Eugene at the beginning
" of his diſcourſe ſaid, that we had taken our
" advantage in favouring the Engliſh and the
" Dutch, in order to engage them in our in-
" tereſts; but notwithſtanding this reflexion, he
" inſiſted not only on the reſtitution of Straſ-
" burg, but likewiſe of all Alſace. The founda-
" tion of this pretenſion was the common and
" ſo often exploded pretence, of providing for
" the ſecurity of the empire, and ſetting per-
" petual limits to the ambition of France. He
" diſtinguiſhed between the emperor, as head of
" the houſe of Auſtria, and as head of the em-
" pire. He agreed that the houſe of Auſtria
" might be ſatisfied with the offers made by
" your majeſty; but that the emperor at the
" ſame time ought to make farther demands
" as head of the empire, ſince he was obliged in
" this quality to provide for the ſecurity of its
" members. Concerning this principle a warm
" diſpute aroſe, tho' on both ſides we kept with-
" in bounds. Prince Eugene varied greatly in

"the purpoſes for which he intended Alſace;
"ſometimes the emperor was to poſſeſs it as be-
"fore the treaty of Munſter; ſometimes he
"ſeemed willing to enfranchiſe the ten cities,
"and to diſpoſe in ſome other manner of the
"landgraviate of Alſace, which he did not ex-
"plain. The antient diſputes in regard to the au-
"thority of the Landgrave and the prefecture of
"the ten cities, were brought again upon the
"carpet. In a word ſuch a number of queſtions
"were diſcuſſed without determining any, that
"quite tired with talking, both ſides held their
"tongue.

"AFTER a very long pauſe, monſieur Buys,
"who was preſent at the conference, as well as
"Vanderduſſen, reſumed the diſcourſe with his
"wonted oratorical ſtrain, and inſiſted on pro-
"ceeding to the article of the duke of Savoy.
"This I oppoſed, thinking it needleſs to look
"out for a new ſubject of debate, when we were
"ſtopped upon an eſſential point. It ſtruck
"two, and the conference ended. Monſieur
"Rouillé and I ſtaid with the penſionary and
"the deputies of Holland. I begged of him
"to order paſſports to be made out for our
"return. He ſeemed to be very much con-
"cerned that the conference ſhould turn out ſo
"unſucceſsful. He preſſed us ſtronger than
"ever to defer our departure; at length he add-
"ed a very jumbling propoſal to ſplit the differ-
"ence in regard to Alſace, and that your ma-
"jeſty

" jeſty ſhould be ſatisfied with the rights which
" the treaty of Munſter gave you, as landgrave,
" and as prefect of the ten cities, without exer-
" ciſing ſo ample an authority as that which you
" now poſſeſs. We were at ſuch a diſtance from
" concluding, that I thought it would be of no
" ſervice to add the ceſſion of Straſburg to ſo
" many others, which I condemned myſelf for
" having made, and in regard to which I was
" afraid I had explained myſelf too ſoon.

" VANDERDUSSEN went that evening to ſpeak
" to Pettekum; this is the perſon I meant in my
" letter to your majeſty, of the 14th, and whom
" I was afraid to mention by name, becauſe that
" letter was forwarded by the ordinary poſt.
" He told me that we were loſing time, that the
" animoſity of the people was increaſing daily;
" that the ſtates of Holland, who were to meet
" the next day, would be more turbulent than
" uſual, and the majority would be for con-
" tinuing the war. He lamented the weakneſs
" and incapacity of the preſent government: of
" which he mentioned ſeveral inſtances. He
" formed predictions of the future deſigns of the
" Engliſh; in a word, he ſpoke to me with ſuch
" ſincerity, that having already experienced his
" real deſire of peace, I told him that my laſt
" power extended ſo far as to ſurrender Straſburg
" to the empire, to be reſtored to its former
" ſtate of an Imperial city; but that I did not
" chuſe to proſtitute this offer in the morning's

" con-

" conference, being fully convinced by all the
" arguments I had heard, that this new conde-
" ſcenſion on the part of your majeſty would be
" as ineffectual as the preceding. He confeſſed
" I was in the right However monſieur Rouillé
" and I, having well weighed the reſolution we
" were to take for your majeſty's ſervice, and
" perceiving clearly that it was impoſſible to
" conclude, notwithſtanding the extravagant con-
" ditions which we had offered, we determined
" to exhauſt your majeſty's powers, and to pro-
" poſe the ceſſion of Straſburg to be reſtored
" upon the footing of an Imperial city. We
" agreed with Vanderduſſen, that monſieur
" Rouillé and I ſhould wait upon the penſionary
" the next morning, in order to acquaint him
" with your majeſty's laſt intentions.

" The offer of Straſburg did not altogether
" ſatisfy the penſionary, not ſo much in regard
" to himſelf, for I am perſuaded he is deſirous of
" peace, and that he is convinced of the ſolidity
" of our reaſons, tho' the generality in this place
" are blinded by paſſion; but in all probability
" he judged that this laſt offer would not yet ſa-
" tisfy the allies of the Republic, and we ſee that
" theſe ſame allies are become in ſome meaſure
" the maſters of Holland. The penſionary ſaid
" therefore, that Straſburg muſt be ceded in its
" preſent condition, with its fortifications; we
" objected againſt this, and reaſons were not
" wanting on our ſide. I was more in pain, Sir,

" about

" about your majeſty's powers; for I was obliged
" to give a very large extent to thoſe with
" which you had been pleaſed to honour me;
" and I had reaſon to doubt, whether they au-
" thorized me to conſent that Straſburg and fort
" Kehl ſhould be ſurrendered at the ſame time,
" with their preſent fortifications. Yet we were
" ſtreightened in time, and I own to your ma-
" jeſty, that taking upon me to exceed the
" bounds you had preſcribed to me, I was not
" without ſome apprehenſion leſt this new pro-
" poſal ſhould complete, as it ought naturally to
" have completed, the whole affair.

" THE penſionary convinced me nevertheleſs,
" that we were ſtill at a great diſtance, by in-
" ſiſting ſtronger than ever on the engagement
" of his maſters to the duke of Savoy, and on
" the neceſſity they are under, in virtue of their
" treaty, of procuring for that prince the ceſſion
" of Exilles, Feneſtrelles, Chaumont, and the
" valley of Pragelas, ſo that Mount Geneve ſhall
" henceforward be the barrier betwixt France
" and his territories.

" THE penſionary informed me, and Marlbo-
" rough afterwards demonſtrated to me more
" particularly, that the duke of Savoy pretends,
" in virtue of his treaty, that the allies ſhall add
" Briançon, mount Dauphin, fort Barrau, and
" Monaco, to what he already poſſeſſes.

" AT length the penſionary concluded that
" he would immediately wait upon lord Marl-
' borough,

" borough, and acquaint him with the offer of
" Straſburg, and that we ſhould meet that very
" evening, as we had done the preceding.

" As I was going out, they came and told
" me that lord Marlborough had ſent word,
" that he intended to pay me a viſit; I ſent
" back to him to beg he would give me leave
" to wait on him at twelve o'clock. The con-
" verſation began on his ſide with the ſame pro-
" teſtations, as he had made me the firſt time
" I ſaw him by himſelf. He repeated what he
" had ſaid, in regard to his deſire of meriting
" your majeſty's protection after the peace. I
" was very little inclined to flatter him with
" any hopes, not having received the leaſt aſſiſt-
" ance on his part. Yet I ſpoke to him in
" ſuch terms, as I thought proper for encourag-
" ing the notions he had formed, without en-
" tering into a poſitive engagement. True it
" is, that when I mentioned his private intereſts,
" he bluſhed and ſeemed deſirous of changing
" the topic of converſation. He told me that
" prince Eugene was very much puzzled, be-
" ing obliged to ſatisfy the princes of the em-
" pire in regard to the reſtitution of Alſace. I
" did not want reaſons to let them ſee that the
" empire was an empty name, employed for the
" authorizing an unjuſt pretenſion; and that
" moſt of thoſe princes would be one day ſorry
" to ſee Alſace wreſted from the crown of France,
" eſpecially if it was to revert to the houſe of
" Auſtria.

" The

"THE conference which was held in the even-
"ing at the penſionary's greatly reſembled that
"of the day before. The ſame queſtion about Al-
"ſace, and the arguments nearly the ſame. Prince
"Eugene growing warm, advanced that the em-
"peror had a juſt title to pretend at preſent to a
"province which he had been obliged to cede
"by the treaty of Munſter; and that preſent
"power and the proſperous ſituation of affairs,
"were reaſons ſufficient for redreſſing the grie-
"vance of onerous treaties. I aſked the pen-
"ſionary and the other members of the aſſembly,
"whether they agreed to this maxim, and whether
"we were to eſtabliſh it as the baſis of the peace
"in queſtion. Prince Eugene wanted to explain
"himſelf; and though he ſpoke eloquently upon
"the ſubject, his reaſons were extremely weak.
"He did not agree, no more than the day be-
"fore, as to the form of government which he
"intended to ſettle in Alſace. He ſaid only, with-
"out giving up the emperor's pretenſion, that it
"might ſerve for the indemnification which the
"duke of Lorrain had demanded, and the emperor
"had promiſed, for the duchy of Montferrat. He
"complained of the delays your majeſty had hi-
"therto uſed, in giving an equivalent for the
"provoſtſhip of Longwi. In ſhort, Sir, they
"eſpouſe the quarrels of all thoſe who form any
"pretenſions againſt your majeſty; allies or not,
"they are friends, provided they have a ſubject
"of complaint. Now I think I may tell your
majeſty,

" majeſty, that in conſequence of what I have
" heard ſaid by the penſionary, by prince Eu-
" gene, and by the duke of Marlborough, ſince
" I have been here, it will be highly neceſſary
" to watch the motions of the duke of Lorrain;
" whoſe intentions are certainly very bad.

" THE conference ended without any good ef-
" fect; at which the penſionary ſeemed to be
" concerned. Monſ. Rouillé and I ſtayed ſome
" time with him. He begged of us both to
" ſtudy ſome expedient for conciliating matters.
" We ſhewed him it was no longer in our power
" to contribute to this end, when they inſiſted
" upon Alſace. He returned to the ſcheme of
" reducing your majeſty's rights to the footing
" of the treaty of Munſter; but at the ſame time
" he wanted to leave Landau, Briſac, and Fort
" Louis to the emperor. We cannot make them
" underſtand, that your frontiers ought not to
" be naked, ſince this would be affording means
" to the neighbouring princes to penetrate in-
" to your kingdom; that ſo jealous as they are
" of having barriers for themſelves, and of pro-
" curing others for their allies, they ought in rea-
" ſon to leave your majeſty in poſſeſſion of thoſe
" you have at preſent.

" THEIR only anſwer, which they have inceſ-
" ſantly repeated ſince the beginning of this me-
" lancholy negotiation, is that your majeſty's
" power is ſuch, that you have nothing to fear
" from your neighbours; that Alſace is not a
" province

" province of France, but a conquered country; " from whence they draw this falſe conſequence, " that your majeſty may eaſily part with it, or " at leaſt may keep it on the footing of the trea- " ty of Munſter rectified, a term invented by " Buys.

" THEIR obſtinacy, Sir, is equally inſup- " portable, in regard to the article of the duke " of Savoy. The province of Holland eſpouſes " his cauſe with ſuch warmth, that your maje- " ſty's armies muſt obtain ſurprizing advanta- " ges, to oblige them to deſiſt. The penſionary, " deſiring to reconcile the minds of his country- " men to peace, acquainted the ſtates of this " province yeſterday, with the defeat of the Por- " tugueſe, before he made a report of our laſt " propoſals. Notwithſtanding this preparatory " ſtep, there were ſome who voted for a further " augmentation of the troops, if it ſhould be ne- " ceſſary for carrying on the war.

" As we ſee, Sir, that God has reſerved the ter- " minating of this war to himſelf, and that this de- " ſired period is not yet come, we reckon to ſet out " from hence, M. Rouillé and I, to-morrow, or " after to-morrow; for our tarrying here any " longer would be of no ſervice. Prince Eugene " returns to-morrow to Bruſſels, and my lord " Marlborough ſets out next Saturday. When " they are gone from hence, all negotiation will " ceaſe. We ſhall ſee the penſionary again this " evening, to take our leave of him.

" IF

" If the peace had depended only on the article " of the duke of Savoy, and there had been a poſ- " ſibility of agreeing to a ſuſpenſion of arms, upon " your majeſty's conſenting to that prince's de- " mands, I preſume to acknowledge, Sir, that I " ſhould have taken upon me to leave the preſi- " dent Rouillé here, and to deſire him to wait for " further orders, depending on the repreſentation " of affairs, which I ſhould have the honour of " making to your majeſty: but ſeeing that no- " thing is ever brought to a concluſion, and that " in proportion as we grant, they make freſh de- " mands, all appearance of negotiation appears " to me as uſeleſs, as it is contrary to your " majeſty's dignity. I am extremely ſorry I have " not been able to anſwer the ſatisfaction your " majeſty has been pleaſed to expreſs in regard " to my conduct, by the commiſſion with which " you have honoured me. Tho' the diſpoſitions " we have found in this place, the demands they " have made upon us, and the anſwers we have " received, ſeemed to juſtify my proceeding; " yet I cannot think but there has been ſome " fault, to occaſion want of ſucceſs, after ſuch " ample powers as thoſe with which I have been " graciouſly honoured by your majeſty. There- " fore I preſume to beſeech you will with your " uſual goodneſs forgive my incapacity, and " only conſider my zeal and impatient deſire to " obey your orders. However, I hope that the " manner in which I have executed them, will

" not

" not be entirely uſeleſs to your majeſty: that " both your ſubjects and your enemies will be " alike convinced, it is not your fault, if peace " is deferred; that your offers will be productive " of favourable alterations in the minds of the " public; and that the ſacrifice which your ma- " jeſty was ready to make, will bring down the " Divine Bleſſing on your arms, at a time when " it is ſo greatly wanting for the real welfare of " Chriſtendom. I have made no myſtery of the " propoſals which M. Rouillé and I agreed to. " I thought it was conducive to your majeſty's " ſervice, that they ſhould become public: by " this means thoſe who contribute the moſt to " carrying on the war, will be convinced, that " all this great expence is incurred, only to ſa- " tisfy the immoderate ambition of their allies; " and that this ſame ambition may deprive their " Republic of the conſiderable advantages ſhe " was on the point of obtaining; for we have ſe- " veral times declared, and this evening we ſhall " again declare, that all our offers are void, the " moment they are not accepted of, and in caſe " we are permitted to go away without conclud- " ing. I am, with the moſt profound reſpect, " *&c. &c.*

Hague, May the 22d, 1709.

our,

" I RECKONED this morning, when I wrote " the letter, which I have now the honour of " ſending to your majeſty, that M. Rouillé and

" I ſhould ſet out to-morrow; but when we
" waited this evening on the penſionary, to take
" our leave of him, he told us that affairs were
" now too far gone, for us to part without conclud-
" ing: and yet he has not facilitated the means.
" The ſame diſpute ſubſiſts concerning the arti-
" cle of the duke of Savoy, and that of Alſace.
" He pretends, nevertheleſs, to perform the of-
" fice of mediator in regard to the ſecond arti-
" cle; but the only expedient he propoſes, is to
" leave to your majeſty the rights ſpecified by
" the treaty of Munſter; namely, thoſe which
" the princes of the houſe of Auſtria enjoyed as
" landgraves of Alſace, and prefects of the ten
" cities; and to demoliſh, in execution of the
" ſame treaty, the fortreſſes built on the banks
" of the Rhine, from Baſil to Philipſburg. In
" vain was it for us to oppoſe this preten-
" ſion, by alledging, that the Dutch had no
" intereſt, either in the demolition of thoſe
" fortreſſes, or in the reſtitution of the pre-
" tended privileges of the ten cities; that they
" had never promiſed their allies to frame and
" ſupport ſuch a propoſal; that it is not even
" inſiſted upon by the parties concerned; and
" that the guarantees of the peace of Weſtphalia
" make no complaint on this head. In vain was
" it for us to repeat, that your majeſty ought to
" have fortreſſes in Alſace, to defend the pro-
" vince againſt any invaſion; that they could
" not demand the re-eſtabliſhment of the treaty

" of Weſtphalia only as to one part, and leave " out the other which gave to your majeſty the " town of Briſac, and the right of garriſoning " Philipſburg. The uſual anſwer is, that no " power will ever preſume to attack your ma- " jeſty; that your own forces will always be " able to protect your kingdom; and that to " obtain a peace, the empire muſt be contented. " The reply on our ſide was eaſy, our powers not " permitting us to grant the conditions which the " penſionary demanded. We told him ſo; and, " yet, Sir, we have not refuſed the conference " which he propoſed to hold at his houſe to- " morrow morning, along with prince Eugene, " the duke of Marlborough, and the two depu- " ties of State.

" THE plan is this. We are to read a memo- " rial, drawn up by the preſident Rouillé, and " containing all the articles upon which we are " agreed. Each will make his remarks upon it; " ſo that we may agree ſucceſſively upon the " whole. We ſhall examine afterwards into the " means of regulating the ſuſpenſion of arms, in " order to prevent the operations of the cam- " paign: and as there will be two articles re- " maining which we cannot conſent to, namely, " that of the duke of Savoy, and that of Alſace, " we promiſe to ſend a courier to your majeſty, " in order forthwith to know your intentions as " to both: thus either the ſuſpenſion of arms " will take place, or the campaign will be open-

" ed, as ſoon as your majeſty ſhall have declared " your ultimate reſolution.

" If this plan is followed, I ſhall ſet out im- " mediately, as ſoon as we have ſent away the " new courier, and M. Rouillé is to wait for his " return, in order to receive your majeſty's fur- " ther inſtructions.

" I have exceeded thoſe you have given me, " by deferring to break off all negotiation upon " two articles, which you was very far from " granting; wherefore I muſt give your majeſty " the reaſons which determined me to this con- " deſcenſion.

" Mons. Rouillé and I conſidered, that the " condition of your majeſty's armies, and of the " grain throughout the kingdom, was either " better than reported, or unfortunately as bad " as all the letters from France to this country " repreſent it. In the firſt caſe, as your ma- " jeſty is not bound by the precipitancy we have " ſhewn in going beyond your orders, you will " get rid of the affair, by diſowning the act of " imprudent miniſters, who were carried too far " by a groundleſs apprehenſion; and tho' the " misfortune of meeting with your diſapproba- " tion would be very great to us, yet it is not to " be compared with what the kingdom would " be threatened with, if its ſituation being ſuch " as the enemies of your majeſty repreſent, the " peace was hindered merely by our refuſing to " aſk your orders.

" This

"THIS will take up ſome time, but cannot "prejudice your majeſty's affairs. Your orders "concerning the campaign will not be the leſs "executed; and the delay, if any, will be rather "prejudicial to your enemies than to yourſelf; "for this remnant of negotiation ſtill detains "their generals. Comparing therefore on one "ſide, Sir, the utility, and on the other the in-"conveniencies that might ariſe from abſolutely "refuſing the penſionary's propoſals, I thought "the advantage lay intirely on your majeſty's ſide, "without involving you in the leaſt difficulty, or "in the leaſt engagement; and that if there was "any harm done, the blame muſt fall upon none "but me. I hope to give your majeſty an account "before the end of the week, of the ſituation in "which I ſhall leave affairs at this place; and I ſhall "immediately follow the ſecond courier, whom I "propoſe ſending to your majeſty. Prince Eugene "has put off his departure, becauſe of the two con-"ferences which we are to have to-morrow, one in "the morning, and the other in the evening."

THE letter written to the king the 22d of May contained an exact detail of every thing eſſential that was ſaid, either in the viſits which Torcy had made to the duke of Marlborough, and in thoſe which the duke returned; or in the conferences held at the penſionary's, ſince this general arrived at the Hague. His converſation was extremely polite. He omitted no opportunity of mentioning his reſpect for the king, and

even his attachment to his majeſty's perſon. It was in France, and under marſhal Turenne, that he had learnt the military art. He would fain have perſuaded us, that he ſhould for ever retain a grateful ſenſe of the favour. His expreſſions contained proteſtations of ſincerity contradicted by facts; of probity, corroborated by oaths upon his honour, his conſcience, and often mentioning the name of God. He called him to witneſs the truth of his intentions. I was tempted to ſay to him; why does thy unhallowed mouth preſume to name my law? and indeed his mentioning the wonders of Providence, to which he attributed all his ſucceſſes, was only to infer from thence, that France ought to loſe no time, but to clap up a peace directly; that her preſervation depended on a ſpeedy iſſue of the war, let the price be what it would.

HAVING laid down this principle, the conſequence he drew was, that it muſt be a dangerous delay to the kingdom, to engage in idle diſputes for obtaining a kind of equivalent in favour of king Philip; that on this point the Engliſh were unanimous, for the nation would never conſent to leave Naples and Sicily, nor even one of thoſe kingdoms, in the hands of a prince of the houſe of France; that no Engliſh miniſter would dare to give ear to, and much leſs to defend ſuch a propoſal. And yet he acknowledged that his country had need of repoſe; but he was ſilent in regard to its inteſtine troubles.

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He muſt have foreſeen, that theſe troubles were likely to terminate in his diſgrace, an event not very remote, notwithſtanding his ſucceſsful campaigns.

It was to maintain his ground, and to ſupport the intereſt of his friends, that he went over to England. He told Torcy, that he had made this voyage for his own private affairs; that he would not have undertaken it, but have ſtaid in Holland, had he known of this miniſter's coming. He complained in an obliging manner, that he had given him no notice of it, as he might eaſily have done, if the duke of Berwick had been deſired to write to him.

Besides his affecting to mention the duke of Berwick, he expreſſed a great tenderneſs for a nephew worthy of the eſteem and friendſhip of all his acquaintance.

In the courſe of converſation, they fell upon ſeveral ſubjects that were foreign to the negotiation. On occaſion of the preceding campaign, Marlborough ſaid, that he could never conceive, how the French generals could think of guarding the banks of the Scheld the length of thirty leagues, and of flattering themſelves to be able to hinder fourſcore thouſand men from paſſing it in ſome part of its courſe.

The conference having been appointed at the penſionary's the 23^{d} of May, Torcy and Rouillé went there together at nine o'clock in the morning.

PRINCE Eugene, Marlborough, and Townſhend were there ſoon after, as were alſo Buys and Vanderduſſen. The penſionary ſtated the expedient he had propoſed in regard to Alſace. Prince Eugene made anſwer, that as it was a point that intereſted the empire, he was not empowered to treat about it; that he was only the emperor's miniſter, and not the empire's; that he would not enter into any engagements, without having an authority to contract them; nor expoſe himſelf to the complaints of the princes of the empire, whoſe miniſters at the Hague had begun already to be clamorous. He mentioned the arrival of Stadian, envoy from the elector of Mentz and from the four circles of the Upper and Lower Rhine, Franconia, and Suabia.

ON this occaſion they read a long letter, in the name of thoſe Circles to the princeſs of Denmark, full of invectives againſt France, and concluding that the limits of this kingdom ought to be reduced to the Maeſe. After this letter was read, they reſumed the ſame ſubject. Torcy repeated what he had already ſaid, that his powers were exhauſted; that all he had to do further was to liſten to their demands, and make a report of them to the king; but only in order to acquaint his majeſty therewith, being firmly perſuaded he would not accept them in their preſent form.

THE allied miniſters had ſeveral petty conferences; the reſult of which, at length, was to propoſe

propoſe that the king ſhould keep Alſace on the footing of the treaty of Munſter, except Briſac, which ſhould be reſtored to the emperor; and that all the fortreſſes erected by France contrary to the literal ſenſe of this treaty ſhould be demoliſhed.

TORCY wrote the article as they deſired, ſtill aſſuring them that he exceeded his powers; that he could only ſend it to his majeſty, but reminding them at the ſame time, that if they were deſirous of peace, they ſhould uſe more endeavours to promote it.

MENTION was made of the two electors of Cologne and Bavaria. Prince Eugene ſaid, he could not, after the publication of the ban, ſign an act wherein they were treated as electors; that the diſcuſſion of their intereſts muſt be deferred till the conferences of peace. The article was committed to writing, in order to be ſent to the king.

AFTER a great many ſpeeches, the French left with the allies a plan of the articles agreed upon, for them to examine it, and to make their obſervations.

THEY agreed to meet again in the evening, and to reaſon about it, in order to put the finiſhing hand to the work.

IN fine they ſaid, that as ſoon as all matters were agreed to, they would treat of the meaſures to be taken for a ceſſation of arms; that they would afterwards ſend a courier to the king, with

with the articles which Torcy and Rouillé had refuſed to ſign. That if his majeſty agreed to them, the ſuſpenſion would take place; but if it was rejected, the armies were to enter upon their reſpective operations.

During the intervals of the conferences, Marlborough and prince Eugene entered into a chat with Torcy, and informed him of the different circumſtances of their campaigns, as well as of the miſtakes of the French generals, the whole without any air of rodomantade. Prince Eugene aſked, who the king would pitch upon for the general conferences of peace, and to regulate the ſuſpenſion of arms. He muſt, ſaid he, be a perſon of great prudence, who will not ſpoil affairs by unſeaſonable punctilio's. He ſpoke of marſhal Villars, as not at all proper for ſuch a commiſſion. Marſhal Boufflers was mentioned as a grave and proper character, as alſo marſhal d'Huxelles.

At length after a deal of uſeleſs converſation, they adjourned till ſix in the evening, when they all met again at the penſionary's. They had examined the plan drawn by M. Rouillé, and the penſionary had made his obſervations in writing.

The firſt was on the ſecurity of the renunciation of Spain, and this article met with very warm debates. They pretended that the king, merely by declaring his reſolution of abandoning the king of Spain, and of withdrawing the French troops, entered into no poſitive engagement; while on the

the other hand he reaped the benefit of the peace, and even before the peace was eſtabliſhed, the benefit of the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities: that it was not fair that France ſhould ſee an end to the war, as far as concerned herſelf, while the emperor and his allies muſt ſtill be in arms, to put the archduke in poſſeſſion of his dominions; that the tranquillity ought to be general, and equally extended to all nations. In the midſt of theſe diſputes, they did not forget to mention the example of the ſuccours ſent to Portugal after the Pyrenean treaty; and they concluded that it would be impoſſible to come to any ſolid agreement without a clear, poſitive, and real aſſurance, that king Philip V. ſhould immediately remove out of Spain, as ſoon as they had agreed to the ſeveral points of the treaty.

Torcy and Rouillé made anſwer, that the ſureſt way to oblige him to remove, was to recall the French troops; that when he came to draw no ſuccours but from the finances and armies of Spain, he could not hold it out long; that the Spaniards would become his greateſt enemies, and in crowds would go over to the archduke. Torcy added, that lord Marlborough told him, he reckoned that war as nothing. The duke replied, it was true, and yet it would be neceſſary to finiſh it at the ſame time as the reſt, and that ſome expedient muſt be thought on. Torcy demonſtrated the impoſſibility of obliging the king to wage war againſt his grandſon

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in order to dethrone him. Marlborough allowed it, and even ſuggeſted ſome hints for wording the article in ſuch a manner, as without engaging his majeſty to wage war againſt Spain, it ſhould plainly appear that he was really willing the ceſſion ſhould take place. The king's miniſter applauded the whole, and even began to write in the ſenſe propoſed by Marlborough; but ſcarce was the article drawn, when Marlborough diſavowed it.

PRINCE Eugene aſked whether his majeſty would let an army paſs thro' his kingdom, to make war againſt Spain? This propoſal was backed by no body. In a word, the whole time was ſpent in cavils and diſputes, and in private conferences among the allies.

MARLBOROUGH compared thoſe conferences to the committees during the ſeſſions of the Engliſh parliament. At nine o'clock prince Eugene and the Engliſh negotiators went away: Torcy and Rouillé ſtaid with the penſionary, Vanderduſſen, and Buys. Then they conferred with more order, tho' Buys's harangues occaſioned the loſs of a great deal of time. They ran over the other articles of the plan. The penſionary had written his obſervations; which he read: but the chief difficulty ſtill turned upon the article of Spain, and on the means of ſecuring the execution of the treaties. Their principal aim, they ſaid, in beginning the war was to hinder a prince of the line of France from reigning over Spain; that

that the peace would be concluded, while this prince continued to ſit on the throne; ſo that they ſhould be ſtill obliged to carry on the war againſt him, whilſt France enjoyed her repoſe; therefore they muſt have ſome ſecurities.

It was in vain for thoſe who negotiated on the behalf of the king, to repeat that there was no greater ſecurity, and that no other ſecurity the king could give, than the recalling his troops; that this difficulty would not be in their way, if they left a partition to his catholic majeſty, becauſe then the king would anſwer for the ceſſion of Spain. Still they continued to demand this ſecurity. At length the penſionary, after ſome talk with the two deputies, propoſed that a certain number of ſtrong towns in Spain ſhould be delivered up to the troops of the archduke, and others in the Netherlands to the Dutch, as pledges of the execution of the treaty on the part of king Philip. He inſiſted upon three towns in Spain, and three in the Netherlands.

The anſwer was, that even if his majeſty could conſent to ſuch a propoſal, which he was very far from doing, yet it would not be in his power to put it in execution; that his troops were only auxiliaries in the towns belonging to Spain; and beſides that they were now in the field, and not in garriſon; and that upon recalling them, as his majeſty was ready to promiſe he would, thoſe towns would naturally fall into the hands of the archduke.

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THE penſionary and the other two deputies inſiſted, that the execution of the treaty would be very precarious; that the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities would deprive them of the advantages which they had reaſon to expect from the opening of the campaign; and that in virtue of this ſuſpenſion, the king ought at leaſt to put them in poſſeſſion of the towns they were to have for their barrier.

OUR anſwer to this pretenſion was, that a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities alone never produced the intire effect of a definitive treaty; that it is neceſſary it ſhould be ratified on both ſides, before it can have its full force. The penſionary replied, that as to their part, they could turn the articles agreed upon into a definitive treaty; and that a reſolution of the ſtate upon the articles ſigned, had in their republic the entire force of a ratification. That the duke of Marlborough would receive the ratification immediately from England, as ſoon as lord Townſhend and he had ſigned.

THAT prince Eugene would alſo ſign for the emperor, but that the ratification would be ſome time a coming. That in regard to the empire, he confeſſed he could not promiſe the ſame expedition, but that the empire alone would not carry on the war, when the allies were willing to put an end to it. He ſpoke of the duke of Savoy, as one that he was ſure of.

By means of this expedient, the penſionary ſaid, that a peace, inſtead of a ſuſpenſion of arms, might be concluded; that it would be proper the king ſhould deliver up at the ſame time ſome cautionary towns to the Dutch, as a ſecurity that the war in Spain ſhould ceaſe; and that they ſhould be reſtored to his majeſty, as ſoon as king Philip returned to France. Theſe towns were Valenciennes, Cambray, St. Omers, which indeed he did not demand in expreſs terms, but mentioned for example; and Peronne, added Torcy: ſo that the penſionary perceiving the abſurdity of his propoſal, could not help ſmiling himſelf.

In the midſt of theſe mortifying pretenſions, M. Rouillé thought he had hit on a plan, which muſt undoubtedly be productive of a peace, becauſe if Holland, England, and the emperor were once agreed, there would be no other powers able to continue the war. Rouillé underſtood the matter better than Torcy, who acknowledged that after debating and diſputing five hours, he was no longer capable of attending to what they ſaid.

It was eleven o'clock at night, when this remnant of the aſſembly broke up, and left the penſionary. The French negotiators went away, with melancholy reflexions on the unreaſonableneſs of the demands which the allies were forming every day; and on the news induſtriouſly

duſtrioufly publiſhed, of the deplorable condition of France.

THE day following, which was the 24th, they returned to the penſionary at nine o'clock in the morning. Torcy had drawn up a project, by which they might agree to the articles relating to the king of Spain. He ſhewed it to Heinſius. Tho' he had uſed the ſtrongeſt expreſſions poſſible, to remove all ſuſpicion of his majeſty's aſſiſting the king his grandſon; ſtill he was obliged to bear a multitude of contradictions, and moreover to have the complaiſance of making an infinite number of additions, according to the different propoſals mentioned by the penſionary and by Buys, either together or alternately; for they changed opinion as ſoon as their obſervations were committed to writing.

STILL the principal difficulty on their part turned on the article of Spain. They had for ever in their mouths, that they had undertaken this war only to hinder the union of that monarchy and of France; an union which had been effectually formed ſince a prince of the houſe of France ſat upon the throne of Spain; therefore it was neceſſary in treating, that they ſhould have a ſecurity for the execution of whatever was agreed to. That neither the recalling of the troops, nor the terms of the treaty were ſufficient, ſo long as the king would not undertake to ſee it executed; that they muſt be involved

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in war, while France was enjoying peace, and that it would be very imprudent on their part not to put an end to all ſubjects of quarrel at the ſame time.

In vain was it to anſwer that it would be impoſſible for the king of Spain to maintain the war, after his grandfather recalled his troops; for my lord Marlborough himſelf had owned that it would occaſion no great trouble to the allies. The penſionary and the other two did not think ſo, but differed from the opinion of Marlborough and prince Eugene in regard to this article. On the contrary they inſiſted on cautionary towns, to ſecure, as they ſaid, the execution of the conditions promiſed them. This was their method of reaſoning: "Either the king of Spain will be directed by "the counſels of the king his grandfather, which "we believe he will; or he will reſolve to main"tain himſelf in poſſeſſion of the throne."

"In the former caſe, it will be no prejudice to "the king to let us have thoſe cautionary towns, "becauſe they ſhall be immediately reſtored to "him after the conſummation of the treaty.

"In the latter, it muſt appear evident to "all the world, and even to the Spaniards "themſelves, that the king acts bona fide, and "that he really intends not to ſuccour his "grandſon either directly or indirectly, ſince "he parts with towns as a ſecurity for perform"ing his promiſe.

They remained inflexible in regard to this article, notwithstanding all that could be said to convince them of the injustice of such a pretension, which the king would never agree to, and which moreover would be offensive to his majesty, because it was doubting of his word, at the very time that they wanted him to place an excessive confidence in their sincerity, even beyond the ordinary bounds of treaties.

For they demanded that as soon as the suspension of arms was agreed to, the king should immediately put them in possession of one of the towns, which were to form the barrier in Flanders; that the rest of those towns should be successively surrendered; Dunkirk be dismantled, and the harbour filled up, before the definitive treaty was signed. The only engagement they proposed on their side and on the behalf of England, was to continue the armistice, after these conditions were accomplished.

The reason they gave for so strange a proposition, was that it would be a long time before they could have an answer from the empire, or the emperor's ratification. They could not be persuaded, that it was impossible to treat with them upon such harsh and unprecedented terms. Still the president Rouillé would fain try to reconcile the full rigour of their propositions, with some expedient or other for promoting not only an armistice but a peace. He drew up a project, which they opposed. At length they parted,

parted, after having agreed, that they would communicate the ſtate of the affair and the articles projected to the two generals, and that if there was time enough at night, they ſhould have another conference.

At eight o'clock that night Torcy and Rouillé received a meſſage from the penſionary, that he ſhould be glad to ſee them at his houſe. It was Torcy's opinion, that ſince the negotiation made ſo little progreſs, and the enemy ſhewed ſuch injuſtice, as well as ſuch obſtinacy, in availing themſelves of the diſtreſſed ſituation of the kingdom, and ſuch greedineſs in making an advantage of the neceſſity by which France was reduced to ſue for peace, or at leaſt for a ſuſpenſion of arms; it would be highly expedient both for his majeſty's ſervice, and for the particular ſatisfaction of the negotiators, to make the penſionary give them a project in writing, of the articles inſiſted upon by the allies. Rouillé was of the ſame opinion. Heinſius told them that he had conferred with the two generals; that they were very well ſatisfied with the form of the articles relative to Spain, but that it was neceſſary to have a ſecurity of their being executed, and there ſhould be a ſtipulation for depoſiting a certain number of towns as a pledge, till his catholic majeſty departed that kingdom. He ſaid afterwards, that Marlborough had oppoſed the expreſſion of reſtoring the trade to the Indies, upon the footing it had been under the reign of

the late king Charles II. and according to the laws of Spain; that he demanded this article ſhould be excluſive only in regard to the French, purſuant to the treaty of the grand alliance.

TORCY and Rouillé did not neglect to anſwer, that if this unjuſt alteration took place, it would affect Holland as much as France; and that the bare propoſition diſcloſed the ſecret views of the Engliſh. The penſionary, far from expreſſing the leaſt inquietude, with indifference replied, that the Dutch were very little intereſted in the American commerce. Why then, ſaid Torcy, do you ſo obſtinately inſiſt on giving to the houſe of Auſtria the ſovereignty of this new world, in which your commerce is ſo little concerned?

THE general reply was the pretended neceſſity of reducing the exorbitant power of France within proper bounds, for the good of Europe.

THIS maxim being once adopted by the enemies of this kingdom, ſerved as a foundation to all their iniquitous pretenſions.

BUYS however was ſo ſcandalized at the obſervation made by Marlborough, and at the alteration propoſed by the Engliſh, that he expreſſed himſelf with great warmth to the other two deputies in Flemiſh, and let drop theſe two French words, *Pot aux roſes* *. Torcy, who obſerved them, thought there was room to judge, that the Dutch deputy was juſtly diſſatisfied with the ſecret intentions of the Engliſh. The deputy

* A ſecret or myſtery.

puty did not deny it, but maintained that it concerned the Republic to ſettle this condition of the treaty with England. As the queſtion then was in regard to ſeveral new demands, which exceeded the powers of thoſe whom the king had appointed to negotiate a peace; Torcy repreſented that the accumulating ſuch a multitude of pretenſions, would only occaſion uſeleſs diſputes, which it would be impoſſible for them to determine; that even if there was any way of determining, it would be neceſſary to examine them more at leiſure, and more coolly, than the brevity of time, and perhaps the warmth of conferences would permit. This was the critical moment for propoſing to the miniſters of the allies, to include all their demands in a project of treaty, which the penſionary ſhould take the trouble to draw up. Torcy therefore propoſed it, and ſaid that as ſoon as the plan was communicated to him and to M. Rouillé, they would make their obſervations on it, in the ſame manner as the penſionary had made his on the ſchemes which they had put into his hands.

Torcy with pleaſure ſaw that the propoſal was accepted; the penſionary gave his word to ſet about the work immediately, and to let them have it as ſoon as it was finiſhed. On both ſides they promiſed a great deal of ſincerity and plain-dealing, as well in ſtating the demands, as in the obſervations that ſhould be made upon them.

FROM ſeveral hints that dropped in the preceding conferences, there was room to judge that the alliance between Holland and England had not extinguiſhed the old jealouſy between the two nations; but in this laſt conference it appeared in a ſtronger light; inſomuch that the penſionary and the other two deputies endeavoured in ſome meaſure to perſuade Torcy, that the Republic had a ſincere deſire of entering into a cloſe union with his majeſty, after the peace was eſtabliſhed. Torcy anſwered that with intentions ſo agreeable to their own intereſts, they ought to ſhew a greater regard to thoſe of his majeſty; and ſo much the more, as his miniſter had acquainted them at the beginning of the conferences, that the king on his part was alſo willing to give proofs of his affection to the United Provinces.

AFTER ſome diſcuſſions on various ſubjects, among the reſt on the deſigns of the duke of Savoy, thoſe of the greateſt moment were referred to the penſionary's intended plan, and to the obſervations that were to be made on each article.

THE 15th of May, Marlborough and Townſhend came to Torcy's lodgings together in the morning. The preſident Rouillé was there. They ſaid that, as they were both deſirous of pleaſing king James, and as they were perfectly acquainted with the temper and diſpoſition of their

their countrymen, Townſhend was of opinion that the propoſed alternative in regard to the removal of this prince, tho' juſt, would be refuſed; that England would go no further, than purely and ſimply to inſiſt upon his quitting France. They were of opinion that it would be more to his advantage, to agree only to his removal by one of the preliminaries, and to ſpecify in the ſame article, that the manner of removing ſhould be regulated at the general conferences of peace. After ſome objections, the article was by mutual agreement drawn up in the following terms.

"THE king of England having deſired to "withdraw from the kingdom of France, and "prevented the demand which his ſiſter, prin-"ceſs Anne of Denmark, and the Engliſh na-"tion have made, ſhall retire to ſuch a country "and in ſuch a manner as ſhall be agreed upon "at the next treaty of general peace, as well in "regard to his retreat, as to what concerns his "perſon."

THIS viſit being over, Marlborough as he was going out of the room whiſpered Torcy, that he ſhould be glad to ſpeak to him the next morning; that Zinzendorff, with whom he had been three hours in cloſe converſation, was very hard to be pleaſed.

PRINCE Eugene, Zinzendorff, and Marlborough met at the penſionary's at five in the

evening. Buys and Vanderduſſen were there. The conference laſted a long time; it was not ended at paſt ten. Pettekum came to let Torcy know of his having been informed in the town, that Zinzendorff's inſtructions were entirely different from thoſe of prince Eugene; that the emperor at preſent demanded Franche Comté and Burgundy. Pettekum undertook to wait upon the penſionary the next morning, in order to acquaint him that Torcy could not defer his departure any longer, and to know whether he had any thing further to communicate to him.

The earl of Portland was then at the Hague. His appearance at that time no way reſembled the ſplendid figure he had made in France, when, upon the concluſion of the treaty of Ryſwic, king William ſent him ambaſſador-extraordinary to his moſt chriſtian majeſty, and when the firſt propoſitions of the treaty of partition were concerted with him.

His health had been greatly impaired, ſince the loſs of favour which he had ſo long enjoyed during the life of that prince. By ſeveral fits of apoplexy, he was not only grown heavy and dull, but he had even loſt all facility of expreſſion: and had he been ſtill capable of managing affairs of importance, thoſe who were at the helm would have taken care not to employ him; for it is often the caſe, that when the maſter is no more, the having had a ſhare in his confidence

and

and in the adminiſtration, is with his ſucceſſor a ſufficient cauſe of excluſion.

Lord Portland had been already to ſee Torcy; he paid him the ſecond viſit, the 26th of May; and under the pretence of intereſting himſelf in the welfare of France, he preſſed him to come to a clear explanation, to give proper ſecurities for the execution of the treaty; in a word, to conclude without loſs of time. He ſpoke like one who was an emiſſary, though not an intimate of Marlborough's.

Petkum brought the penſionary's anſwer. He excuſed himſelf for not ſending his memorial, which he had not had time to draw up, becauſe of the long conference the evening before between him and Zinzendorff, which laſted till eleven at night. The penſionary pretended that prince Eugene, Marlborough and himſelf, had found it very difficult to make Zinzendorff conceive a right notion of affairs. He was to return to Heinſius, with his obſervations. The promiſed memorial ſhould be ſent, and followed by a conference. And prince Eugene ſtill deferred his departure.

What paſſed from the 26th of May to the 28th of the ſame month, is related in the following letter to the king, of the ſame date, and ſent from Rotterdam by a courier.

Letter

Letter to the King.

Rotterdam, May the 28th, 1709.

Sir,

"WHEN I had the honour of acquainting your majeſty the 13th inſtant, with the "ſtate of the negotiation, in which you have "been pleaſed to employ me, I reckoned that I "ſhould diſpatch another courier to apprize "you of a determinate reſolution, either as to "peace, or to continuing the war. But af-"fairs proceed very ſlowly, when they are to be "diſcuſſed in conferences compoſed of a variety "of miniſters, who think they ſerve their ma-"ſters, by advancing daily ſome new pretenſion.

"THE demolition of the fortreſſes in Alſace, and "the pretenſions of the duke of Savoy, or the "affair of Exilles, Feneſtrelles, Chaumont and "the valley of Pragelas, formed the principal "difficulty, when I had the honour of writing "to your majeſty; and I had declared, that I "would not ſign thoſe articles, being abſolutely "contrary to your majeſty's orders. The con-"ference of the 23d in the morning was pro-"ductive of nothing new towards facilitating a "concluſion; tho' we had occaſion to obſerve, "on the part of thoſe with whom we are nego-"tiating, a greater ſolicitude to bring matters to "an iſſue, than they had hitherto demonſtrated. "Prince Eugene, for his part, ſeemed to remove

all

" all the little difficulties that might ſtand in the " way; but he ſtood firm to the eſſential arti- " cles. Yet the whole time was ſpent in diſputes: " the way to put an end to them, and to fix the " ſtate of the queſtion, was to write down the ar- " ticles comprized under the title of prelimina- " ries, and to leave each perſon at liberty to exa- " mine them, and to make his remarks.

" Mons. Rouillé drew up this memorial, " and gave it to the penſionary; they all agreed " that they would examine it together. In " the evening, we met at the penſionary's; the " debates grew warmer than ever, and we were " further than ever from concluding. The " difficulty that had been ſtarted, in regard to " the execution of the treaty, was renewed. " They objected that the moſt eſſential article " was that of the renunciation of Spain and the " Indies; that it was to procure thoſe dominions " for the archduke, that the Republic and her " allies were now waging war; and yet a peace " was propoſed, when they had reaſon to pro- " miſe themſelves every thing they could deſire " from the approaching campaign, without our " giving them any ſecurity that they ſhould ob- " tain the point they aimed at; that France alone " would enjoy the benefit of the peace, while the " allies would have a war ſtill to maintain in " Spain.

" We anſwered, that this war would nei- " ther be long nor difficult, when your majeſty

" with-

" withdrew your troops; the forces of Spain
" alone being insufficient to support his catholic
" majesty, even if we were to suppose the whole
" nation steadily attached to him. It was upon
" these two opposite principles, that we disputed
" a long time, without persuading either side.
" In the midst of the debate, Prince Eugene
" asked whether your majesty would grant a free
" passage to their troops, to march into Spain
" through France; others pretended, that your
" majesty ought to join your forces to those of
" the allies, in order to finish the Spanish war.
" In short, Sir, nothing more was heard but ex-
" orbitant demands and proposals, not one of
" which could we admit.

" NEITHER had we more reason to be satis-
" fied, in canvassing the subject with the pen-
" sionary, and with Buys and Vanderdussen, af-
" ter prince Eugene and the English negotiators
" were gone. We found a stronger apprehen-
" sion in them, of seeing a continuance of the
" war in Spain, after France had concluded a
" peace. They did not neglect to cite the ex-
" ample of the succours given to Portugal, after
" the Pyrenean treaty; while they rejected every
" thing we could say, in regard to the security
" of your majesty's word, when once you had
" promised not to assist Spain any longer, either
" directly or indirectly: they would have real
" sureties; and for this end the pensionary de-
" manded that your majesty should deliver up

" six

" ſix fortified towns into the hands of the States-
" General, as a pledge of the execution of the
" peace in Spain. He propoſed three in that
" kingdom, and three in the Netherlands; the
" latter were Cambray, Valenciennes and St.
" Omers, mentioning that they ſhould be faith-
" fully reſtored to your majeſty, as ſoon as the
" treaty was intirely executed.

" WE went away perſuaded, that it was in
" vain to think of coming to a concluſion. Upon
" this, Sir, it came into my head, that the only
" advantage I ought now to propoſe from my
" journey, was at leaſt to know for certain and
" exactly the conditions, upon which your ma-
" jeſty's enemies would conſent to a peace. I
" thought the only way of coming at this know-
" ledge, was to deſire the penſionary to give us
" a plan of treaty, ſince on our part we had given
" him a general ſcheme of preliminaries. Ac-
" cordingly I made the propoſal; and he ac-
" cepted of it, as a perſon ſincerely deſirous of
" finding out ſome means to come to a conclu-
" ſion. Friday afternoon, Saturday, and Sunday
" paſſed, without our receiving any anſwer. He
" was buſy about the plan which we had aſked
" of him, and was drawing it up in concert with
" Marlborough, prince Eugene, and count Zin-
" zendorff, who is lately arrived at the Hague,
" in order to aſſiſt at the conferences of peace on
" the part of the emperor.

" THIS

" THIS long silence prevented my sending a " courier to your majesty, as I had proposed, " not being able to write any thing of conse- " quence, or with any certainty, till the next " conference. At length, Sir, we had this con- " ference yesterday morning at the pensionary's. " There was no-body with him but Mess. Buys " and Vanderdussen. He communicated his " memorial to us. We easily perceived, at the " first reading of it, the absolute unreasonable- " ness of this project, and how contrary it was to " the orders we had received from your majesty, as " well as how difficult to execute, difficult to such " a degree, that even if your majesty consented to " the conditions required of you, it was uncer- " tain whether you could perform them. Yet I " asked the pensionary to give us time to make " our observations, as he had made his; and in " order not to lose a moment in this critical " juncture, by the opening of the campaign, we " agreed to wait upon him again at six o'clock " in the evening. We had therefore, Sir, only " a very short interval to make remarks, which " would have required several days; and of this " your majesty will be but too well convinced, " when you come to hear those observations read, " which I have the honour of sending you; but " even if they had been more judicious, they would " not have been of more service, as we have to do " with people fully persuaded that they are able " to prescribe laws to us, and that the news they

" re-

" receive from France is true. Your majeſty " will ſee the effect of this opinion, by the plan " they have delivered to us, and by the anſwers " they have made to our obſervations. Yet they " reckon that theſe are to be the articles of peace; " that your majeſty will conſent to every thing " they contain; and on this preſumption, the " meaſures are already concerted for immediately " obtaining the ratifications of England and Hol- " land, to the end that nothing may retard the " execution of theſe articles. .....

" HAD I the power to ſign them, I would " have broke off the negotiation, rather than " bind your majeſty to ſuch conditions, which, " in my apprehenſion, give you no ſufficient ſe- " curity of a peace, though they require a ſecu- " rity of your evacuating your fortreſſes: but " finding, Sir, that they required no engage- " ment on your part, till I was returned to your " royal preſence, I thought it would be condu- " cive to your ſervice, to ſet before you the full " pretenſions of your enemies, and to leave you " at liberty to determine in what manner you " will chuſe to anſwer them. I have therefore " taken the reſolution of leaving M. Rouillé at " the Hague, where he is to ſtay till he receives " further orders from your majeſty. I have pro- " miſed that he ſhould receive thoſe orders the " 4th, or at the lateſt the 5th of the next month. " Prince Eugene has given me his word, that he " will enter upon no operation till the 4th; but

" he has not desired the like engagement on the " behalf of marshal Villars, neither could I give " him any.

" YOUR majesty is therefore at full liberty, " either absolutely to reject these conditions, as " I hope the situation of your affairs will permit " you; or to accept of them, if unfortunately " you are of opinion a peace is to be concluded " at any rate whatsoever, as your enemies flatter " themselves, and give out.

" IN the former case, the inconveniency of " leaving M. Rouillé at the Hague a few days " after me, will be no prejudice to your majesty; " and in the latter it will be very necessary to " have upon the spot a person authorized to " sign the articles, which properly constitute the " treaty of peace. These are the reasons that " have determined M. Rouillé and myself. I " hope to have the honour of giving a more " particular account to your majesty the latter " end of this week, as I set out this evening " from the Hague, upon my return to France. " I presume beforehand to mention, that if your " majesty rejects, as I hope you will, the articles " I have the honour of sending you, it will be " of service to you to break off upon the de- " mands relating to Alsace, and in favour of the " duke of Savoy, rather than upon any article " indirectly relative to Spain; for here they " have made the public believe, that your ma- " jesty never had any design to abandon that

" crown

"crown and the Indies; and that you only wanted "to procure a peace for your people, while the "enemy were ſtill to have the expence and trouble "of a Spaniſh war, which your majeſty might "eaſily ſupport by private ſuccours.

"I SHOULD avoid Mons on my return, were it "poſſible to be done, without giving the elector of "Bavaria juſt reaſon to believe, and to complain "that he was abandoned. As there has been no-"thing ſigned, I think it will be proper to inform "him of the ſtrong oppoſition which he is likely "to find from your majeſty's enemies, and the "little aſſiſtance he muſt expect from the Dutch, "whom he imagined to be inclined to favour him.

"THEY are not to be perſuaded by any ſound "reaſons whatever; and ſhould the ſucceſs of the "campaign unfortunately anſwer their expecta-"tion, as well as that of their allies, there will be "no bounds to their unjuſt pretenſions. I am, "with the moſt profound reſpect,

"*SIR,*

"*Your majeſty's moſt humble,*

"*moſt obedient, and*

"*moſt faithful ſubject and ſervant.*"

PRELIMINARY ARTICLES

TO THE

Treaties of GENERAL PEACE.

Obſervations on the ſaid articles.

Plan of the ſaid articles delivered by the penſionary.

The ſaid articles ſettled in the manner they are to be ſigned.

ARTICLE I.

The treaty comprehends the emperor and every one of the allies; while his majeſty's allies are excluded, which is contrary to the uſual form of treaties, for the incluſion of the allies ought to be reciprocal.

TO proceed immediately to a good, firm, and laſting peace, confederacy, and perpetual alliance and friendſhip, between his Imperial majeſty, as alſo between all and each of the allies of his Imperial majeſty, and eſpecially the kingdom of Great Britain, and the lords the States General of the United Provinces, on one part.

To proceed immediately to a good, firm, and laſting peace, confederacy and perpetual alliance and friendſhip between his Imperial majeſty, as alſo between all and each of his Imperial majeſty's allies, and eſpecially the kingdom of Great Britain, and the lords the States General of the United Provinces, on one part.

The emperor will only endeavour to obtain the conſent of the empire as ſoon as poſſible. So weak an engagement is inſufficient. His Imperial majeſty

And on the other between his moſt chriſtian majeſty. And as the preſent conjunctures have not permitted his Imperial majeſty previouſly to receive the agreement and conſent

And on the other between his moſt chriſtian majeſty and his allies. And as the preſent conjunctures have not permitted his Imperial majeſty

ought to promiſe, and to anſwer for this conſent, as a neceſſary condition previous to the execution of the articles relating to the empire, to which the king is willing to bind himſelf.

of the empire, which concerns them in ſeveral articles contained in theſe preliminaries, he will endeavour to obtain the ſaid conſent as ſoon as poſſible, purſuant to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the empire,

previouſly to receive the agreement and conſent of the empire, which concerns them in ſeveral articles contained in theſe preliminaries, he will endeavour to obtain, purſuant to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the empire, the conſent and ratification of the ſaid empire, before the execution of the articles which particularly relate to the empire.

II.

It is ſaid that ſome preliminary articles have been agreed to: the expreſſion is inſufficient, becauſe the articles in this plan contain all the preliminaries. It would be therefore neceſſary to uſe theſe terms: That the preliminary articles have been agreed to, which are to ſerve as a baſis to the treaties of general peace.

They ſhould have added, and to be put in execution after the exchange of the ratifications of the ſaid articles.

And in order to attain as ſoon as poſſible this ſalutary end, and to enjoy it as much as poſſible from this preſent time, ſome preliminary articles have been agreed to, as well to ſerve for the treaties of general peace, as to be put in execution, at the time of concluding the ſaid articles.

And in order to attain this ſalutary end as ſoon as poſſible, and to enjoy it as much as poſſible from this preſent time, preliminary articles have been agreed to, which are to ſerve as a baſis to the treaties of general peace.

III.

In the firſt place, in conſideration and in conſequence of the ſaid good peace, and ſincere re-union on all ſides, the moſt chriſtian king will from this preſent time, publicly and authenticly acknowledge, and will hereafter in the concluſion of the peace, king Charles III. as king of Spain, the Indies, Naples, Sicily, and in general of all the territories dependent on and comprized under the name of the Spaniſh monarchy, in whatſoever part of the world they be ſituated, except what is to be given to the crown of Portugal and to the duke of Savoy, purſuant to the treaties concluded between the high allies, and except alſo the barrier which king Charles III. is to give to the ſaid lords the States General, in the Netherlands, according to the tenour of the grand alliance concluded in the year 1701, as alſo what ſhall be hereafter ſaid of the upper quarter

Idem.

of Gueldérland, and the conventions to be made with the ſaid Charles III. without any exception, but with all the rights the late king Charles II. was poſſeſſed of, or could be poſſeſſed by his heirs and ſucceſſors, according to the teſtamentary diſpoſition of Philip IV. and the pacts eſtabliſhed and received with the moſt ſerene houſe of Auſtria.

IV.

And foraſmuch as the duke of Anjou is at preſent in poſſeſſion of a great part of the kingdoms of Spain, of the coaſt of Tuſcany, the Indies, and part of the Netherlands, it has been mutually agreed to, that for ſecuring the execution of the ſaid articles, and the treaties of peace to be made, the ſaid treaties ſhall be brought to a concluſion within the term of two months, beginning from the firſt of next June, if poſſible, during which term his moſt chriſtian majeſty will cauſe the kingdom of Sicily to be delivered up to his majeſty Charles III. and the ſaid duke ſhall retire with all ſafety and liberty out of the kingdoms of Spain, with his ſpouſe, the princes his children, their effects, and generally all thoſe perſons who ſhall be willing to follow him; ſo that if the duke of Anjou does not conſent to execute the preſent convention, before the expiration of the term aforeſaid, his moſt chriſtian majeſty, and the contracting princes and ſtates, ſhall in concert take convenient meaſures, to ſecure the full execution thereof, that all Europe, by the execution of the ſaid treaties of peace, may immediately enjoy a perfect tranquillity.

V.

In order to forward the agreement aforeſaid, his moſt chriſtian majeſty will withdraw, within the ſaid term of two months, the troops and officers which he has at preſent in Spain, as alſo thoſe that are in the kingdom of Sicily, and in other places, countries, and ſtates, dependant on the ſaid monarchy in Europe, and in the Indies as ſoon as poſſible; promiſing faithfully and on the word of a king, not to aſſiſt henceforward the duke of Anjou if he refuſes to acquieſce to it, or his adherents, either with troops, artillery, ammunition, or money, directly or indirectly.

VI.

Exceſſive pretenſions oftentimes weaken what we intend to render moſt ſolid. The excluſion of all the princes of the houſe of France, is too general to ſubſiſt for ever, eſpecially when the princes of the houſe of Auſtria are left at full liberty to re-unite in one and the ſame perſon, all the kingdoms, ſtates, and dignities, which they are capable of acquiring, by every way and means whatſoever.

It would not be a leſs inconveniency for Europe, to ſee a prince of the houſe of Auſtria, raiſed to too high a degree of power, as to ſee a prince of the houſe of France in the ſame degree of elevation.

The apprehenſion of the union of the crowns of France and Spain, in the perſon of the ſame prince, was the motive of the preceding renunciations; it

The Spaniſh monarchy ſhall remain entirely in the poſſeſſion of the houſe of Auſtria, in the manner as abovementioned, and that of Bourbon for ever excluded, ſo that no part of it ſhall be ever diſmembered, nor ſhall the ſaid crown, either in the whole or in part, be united to that of France, nor one and the ſame king, nor a prince of the houſe of France become ſovereign thereof in any manner whatſoever, by teſtament, call, ſucceſſion, matrimonial conventions, gifts, ſales, contracts, or other ways whatever; nor ſhall the prince who reigns in France, nor a prince of the houſe of France, ever become capable of reigning likewiſe in Spain, or acquire within the limits of the ſaid monarchy, any town, fort, place or country, in any part thereof, eſpecially in the Netherlands, by virtue of any gifts, ſales, exchanges, matrimonial conventions,

The Spaniſh monarchy ſhall remain entire to the houſe of Auſtria, in the manner as above mentioned, ſo that no part of it ſhall be ever diſmembered, nor the ſaid monarchy either in the whole or in part, be united to that of France, nor one and the ſame king, nor a prince of the houſe of France, become ſovereign thereof, in any manner whatſoever, by teſtament, call, ſucceſſions, matrimonial conventions, gifts, ſales, contracts, or other ways whatever; nor ſhall the prince who reigns in France, nor a prince of the houſe of France, ever become capable of reigning likewiſe in Spain, or acquire in the ſaid monarchy, any town, fort, place, or country, in any part thereof, eſpecially in the Netherlands, by virtue of any gifts, ſales, exchanges, matri-

would be therefore ſufficient to take the neceſſary precautions for preventing it, and with that view to extend the excluſion at fartheſt to the princes and brothers of the reigning prince in France, as had been propoſed: but it would be neceſſary to ſuppreſs the unjuſt clauſe, which they want now to inſert, of excluding his heirs, the deſcendants and princes of his family that are not kings.

heritage, will, ſucceſſion by will, or *ab inteſtate*, in any manner whatſoever, either for himſelf, or for the princes his children, or brothers, their heirs and deſcendants, or for any princes of the houſe of France.

monial conventions, inheritance, call, ſucceſſion, by will, or *ab inteſtate*, in any manner whatſoever, either for himſelf, or for the princes his children, or brothers, their heirs and deſcendants.

In a word, it would be neceſſary to prevent the ſame ſubject of alarm in regard to the houſe of Auſtria, and to ſtipulate that whoever is king of Spain, ſhall not become emperor, king of Bohemia and Hungary, or archduke of Auſtria, nor poſſeſs any of the hereditary dominions in Germany.

VII.

The prohibition of the indirect commerce of France, is contrary to what has been practiſed ſince the Spaniards have been maſters of the country; nay they cannot do without French goods. After mentioning that the French ſhall not trade thither directly, this addition ought to have been made: but in this reſpect things ſhall be put on the ſame footing as they were under the late king Charles II.

Eſpecially that France ſhall never become miſtreſs of the Spaniſh Weſt Indies, nor ſend any ſhips to trade thither either directly or indirectly, under any pretence whatſoever.

Eſpecially that France ſhall never become miſtreſs of the Indies, nor ſend any ſhips to trade thither under any pretence whatſoever.

VIII.

In all probability there are conſiderable magazines at Straſburg; it would not therefore be juſt to oblige the king to give them up; hence this article requires an exception. It is ſufficient to reſtore the artillery and ammunition which belonged to the town, when his majeſty took poſſeſſion of it, or their value. The evacuation of ſo important a town, and of the forts depending thereon, cannot be done the very moment that a perſon appears at the gates, with the emperor's ſimple power; therefore a fixed day ſhould be agreed to, and this cannot be regulated, but from the day that the emperor and the empire ſhall have ratified the treaty.

The Catholic, Apoſtolic, and Roman religion, ought to be preſerved in Straſburg, as exerciſed there at preſent;

His moſt chriſtian majeſty, being willing to give undoubted marks of his intention to maintain a firm and laſting peace, and to remove all ſuſpicion of his deſigns, agrees to reſtore to his Imperial majeſty and to the empire, the town and citadel of Straſburg, in the condition they are now in, with fort Kehl, and its dependances and appurtenances ſituated on both ſides of the Rhine, without any demand of charges or expences, under any pretence whatſoever, with the artillery and ammunition that are there, without any reſerve, in order to be reſtored to the rank, prerogatives, and privileges of an Imperial city, which it enjoyed before it became ſubject to his moſt chriſtian majeſty, which city and fortification of Straſburg, ſhall be reſtored and evacuated, as ſoon as a commiſſioner ſhall appear before the gates of the ſaid city and fort, with the full powers of his

His moſt chriſtian majeſty, being willing to give undoubted marks of his intention to maintain a firm and laſting peace, and to remove all ſuſpicion of his deſigns, agrees to yield to his Imperial majeſty and to the empire, the town and citadel of Straſburg, in the condition they are now in, with fort Kehl and its dependances and appurtenances ſituated on both ſides of the Rhine, without any demand of charges or expences, under any pretence whatſoever, with a hundred pieces of braſs cannon of different ſizes, namely fifty pieces of 24 and 12, and fifty of 8 and 4 pounders, and ammunition in proportion, to be reſtored to the rank, prerogatives, and privileges of an Imperial city, which it enjoyed before it became ſubject to his moſt chriſtian majeſty, which city of

the biſhop and chapter maintained in all their ſpiritual and temporal rights, prerogatives, pre-eminences and privileges, which the predeceſſors of the ſaid biſhop and the ſaid chapter enjoyed in the empire, as well on this as on the other ſide of the Rhine.

Imperial majeſty and of the empire, according to uſual form, to take poſſeſſion thereof.

Straſburg with its fortifications ſhall be reſtored and evacuated immediately after the ratifications of the emperor and the empire, which ſhall be exchanged at the Hague, and as ſoon as a commiſſioner appears before the gates, with the full powers of his Imperial majeſty and of the empire, according to uſual form, to take poſſeſſion thereof.

IX.

This article is one of thoſe which we cannot agree to, the king's orders being poſitive, that we ſhould obtain the town of Landau, for conſenting to the reſtitution of Briſac.

In the articles ſigned by the allied miniſters, there is this addition, *with the artillery, and ammunition that ſhall be found there.*

The town of Briſac with its territory ſhall be evacuated by his moſt chriſtian majeſty, and by him reſtored to his Imperial majeſty and to the houſe of Auſtria, with all the artillery, and ammunition that ſhall be found therein, by the end of June the very lateſt, to be enjoyed henceforward in full property, by his Imperial majeſty, according to the true intent and meaning of the peace of Ryſwic.

Idem.

X.

We have declared that we have no powers in regard to this article, nor to the next.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall henceforth poſſeſs Alſace, in the literal ſenſe of the treaty of Weſtphalia, ſo that

Idem.

he ſhall be ſatisfied with the right of prefecture over the ten Imperial cities in the ſaid Alſace, yet without extending the ſaid rights in prejudice to the prerogatives, rights and privileges belonging to them, as to other free cities of the empire; which country and towns his moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall enjoy with the prerogatives, revenues, and domains, as he did at the concluſion of the treaties aforeſaid; and the fortifications of the ſaid towns are to be reſtored to the condition they were in at that time, excepting however the town of Landau, the poſſeſſion and property whereof ſhall for ever belong to his Imperial majeſty and to the empire, with the power of demoliſhing the ſaid fortreſs, if the emperor and the empire ſhall judge proper.

XI.

According to the tenor of the ſaid treaty of Weſtphalia, his moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall demoliſh at a time agreed upon, at his own expence, the fortreſſes he has at preſent upon the Rhine, from Baſil down to Philipſburg, namely Hunningen, new Briſac, and fort Louis, with all the works depending on the ſaid fort, as well on this as on the other ſide of the Rhine, never to be rebuilt.

XII.

The diſpute betwixt the two landgraves of Heſſe-Caſſel and Rheinsfeld, is a domeſtic concern of the empire, therefore it is needleſs to mention it in the preliminary articles.

The town and fortreſs of Rheinsfeld, with their appurtenances, ſhall continue in the poſſeſſion of the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, till he is ſatisfied for his pretenſions to the ſaid town and fortreſs.

The town and fortreſs of Rheinsfeld with their appurtenances, ſhall continue in the poſſeſſion of the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, till it be otherwiſe agreed upon.

XIII.

The queen of Great Britain and the lords the States General, maintaining that the clauſe inſerted in the fourth article of the treaty of Ryſwic, concerning religion, is contrary to the tenor of the peace of Weſtphalia, and therefore ought to be revoked, it has been judged proper, that this affair ſhall be referred to the negotiations of the general peace.

XIV.

We are agreed upon the three next articles. Only it is neceſſary to add to that, which relates to the reſtitution of Newfoundland, that it ſhall be made on the conditions to be ſettled, at the time of concluding the general treaty of peace.

With regard to Great Britain, his moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall at preſent acknowledge in the negotiation of the treaties to be made, the queen of Great Britain in that quality.

XV.

His majeſty ſhall alſo acknowledge the ſucceſſion to the crown of Great Britain, in the proteſtant line, as eſtabliſhed by the acts of parliament of Great Britain.

XVI.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall cede to the crown of Great Britain whatever France poſſeſſeth in the iſle of Newfoundland, and there ſhall be a reſtitution on the part of the queen of Great Britain, as well as on that of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, of all the countries, iſlands, fortreſſes and coloñies, which both ſides have occupied by their arms ſince the preſent war, in whatever part of the Indies.

XVII.

The term mentioned in this article would not be ſufficient to demoliſh ſuch conſiderable works as thoſe of Dunkirk. It would be proper to enquire ingenuouſly, in concert with commiſſaries appoint-

His ſaid majeſty promiſes to cauſe all the fortifications of the town of Dunkirk, the harbour and riſbans and others thereto belonging, to be demoliſhed at his own expence, and to cauſe the harbour to be filled

His ſaid majeſty promiſes to demoliſh all the fortifications of the town of Dunkirk, the harbour and riſbans and others thereto belonging, at his own expence, without exception; ſo that one

ed by England and by the States-General into the term neceſſary for demoliſhing the works, and filling up the harbour, on proviſo that the workmen ſet about it, without loſing a ſingle moment, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty.

up, and intirely deſtroyed, within the term of two months, the whole to the ſatisfaction of the queen of Great-Britain, and of the lords the States-General of the United-Provinces; nor ſhall it be ever allowed to re-eſtabliſh the ſaid fortifications, or render the harbour navigable, directly or indirectly.

moiety of the ſaid fortifications be demoliſhed, and one moiety of the harbour be filled, within the term of two months, and the other moiety of the fortifications be demoliſhed, as well as the other moiety of the harbour filled up, within the term of two months longer; the whole to the ſatisfaction of the queen of Great-Britain and the lords the States-General of the United-Provinces, &c.

XVIII.

The perſon who pretends to be king of Gr-Britain, having deſired to remove out of the kingdom of France, and prevented the demand made by the queen of Great-Britain and the Britiſh nation, &c.

In regard to the perſon who pretends to be king of Great-Britain, the propoſed alternative ſhall be obſerved, purſuant to which he ſhall leave France, to retire to whatever country in Europe he ſhall think fit, and there to enjoy a full ſecurity and liberty, receiving from Great-Britain ſuch a ſum as ſhall be agreed upon, for his ſubſiſtence; or in caſe Great-Britain ſhould refuſe to pay the ſaid ſum, he ſhall continue to reſide in France, as he has done hitherto.

The perſon who pretends to be king of England, having deſired to remove out of the kingdom of France, and prevented the demand made by the queen of Great-Britain and the Britiſh nation, ſhall retire to ſuch a country, and in ſuch a manner as by the approaching treaty of general peace ſhall be agreed upon, concerning the means of the ſaid retreat.

XIX.

We agree to this, as well as to the two following articles.

In the general negotiation of the treaties to be made, endeavours ſhall be uſed to agree upon a treaty of commerce with Great-Britain.

XX.

In regard to the king of Portugal, his moſt chriſtian majeſty conſents that he ſhall enjoy all the advantages ſtipulated in his favour, by the treaties made between him and his allies.

XXI.

His majeſty ſhall acknowledge the king of Pruſſia in that quality, and promiſe not to diſturb him in the poſſeſſion of the principality of Neufchatel and the county of Valengin.

XXII.

First of all, we ought to know for certain, whether fort Knocke is included in the further Ambacht.

Ypres ought to be expreſſed with its chatellany, not with its chatellanies. In fine, they ſhould have diſtinguiſhed the chatellany of Liſle from Doway and its government, as alſo from Orchies and its dependance, to the end that there be no diſpute a-

And in regard to the lords the States-General, his majeſty ſhall cede to them, in the moſt expreſs terms that ſhall be judged proper, the town of Furnes, with the further Ambacht or diſtrict belonging to the ſame, (the fort of Knocke being therein included) Menin with its verge, Ypres with its chatellanies, Liſle with its chatellany, Tournay, Condé and Maubeuge, with all their depen-

And in regard to the lords the States General his majeſty ſhall cede to them, in the moſt expreſs terms that ſhall be judged proper, the towns of Furnes, with the further Ambacht (including fort Knocke,) Menin with its verge, Ypres with its chatellany and dependances, which henceforth ſhall be Bailleul, Warneton, Comines, Werwick,

bout this article hereafter.

dances, the whole in the condition the ſaid towns are at preſent; and eſpecially with the cannon, artillery, and ammunitions of war therein, to ſerve with the reſt of the Spaniſh Netherlands, as a barrier to the lords the States-General; upon which they may agree with the ſaid king Charles, according to the tenour of the ſaid grand alliance, as well in regard to the garriſons, which the ſaid lords the States-General ſhall maintain therein, as to all other things in the Spaniſh Netherlands, and particularly as to their having in full property and ſovereignty, the upper quarter of Guelderland, according to the 52d article of the treaty of Munſter in the year 1646, as from time to time they ſhall judge proper.

Poperingue, and whatever depends on the places above-mentioned; the town and chatellany of Caſſel, continuing to be poſſeſſed by his moſt chriſtian majeſty; Liſle with its chatellany, excepting Doway and its government, Tournay, Condé, and Maubeuge with their dependances, the whole in the ſtate the ſaid towns are in at preſent; and eſpecially with the cannon, artillery and ammunitions of war therein, to ſerve with the reſt of the Spaniſh Netherlands as a barrier to the ſaid lords the States-General; upon which they may agree with the ſaid king Charles, according to the tenour of the grand alliance, as well in regard to the garriſons which the ſaid States-General ſhall maintain therein, as to all other things in the Spaniſh Netherlands, and particularly as to their having in full property and ſovereignty, the upper quarter of Guelderland, according to the 52d article of the treaty of Munſter, in the year 1646, as from time to time they ſhall judge proper; provided however that, if there be a general magazine at Tournay, there ſhall be an agreement for the quantity and quality of artillery and ammunition that are to be left in the ſaid town.

XXIII.

In theſe towns, there are governors and troops appointed by the king of Spain; the elector of Bavaria has the general command, and the king having no authority there, can engage no further than to withdraw the garriſons compoſed of his own troops, with their officers.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall alſo reſtore all the towns, forts, and ſtrong places, which he has ſeized upon in the Spaniſh Netherlands, in the ſtate they are in at preſent, with the cannon, artillery, and ammunition, and ſhall evacuate them within a term to be agreed upon; the whole upon expreſs condition that the catholic religion ſhall be preſerved in all the ſaid towns that are to be delivered up, and in their dependances, in the ſame manner as it is now eſtabliſhed there, except that the garriſons of the States ſhall have liberty to exerciſe their own religion, as well in the towns that ſhall be ceded to enlarge the barrier, as in thoſe that ſhall be reſtored in the Spaniſh Netherlands.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty ſhall alſo reſtore the towns, forts and ſtrong places, which he has ſeized upon in the Spaniſh - Netherlands, in the ſtate they are at preſent, with their cannon, artillery, and ammunition: provided, however that if, ſince the troops of his moſt chriſtian majeſty have entered Namur, they have erected any magazines, or laid up any ſtores of artillery and ammunition in the town or caſtle, otherwiſe than for their own defence, they ſhall be removed by the officers of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, in concert with thoſe of the States-General, at the time of evacuation, which ſhall not be retarded on this account, but ſhall be done at a time to be agreed upon; the whole upon expreſs condition that the catholic religion ſhall be preſerved in all the ſaid towns that are to be delivered up, and in their dependances, in the ſame manner as it is now eſtabliſhed there, except that the garriſons of the States ſhall have liberty to exerciſe their own religion, as well in the towns that ſhall be ceded to inlarge the barrier, as in the towns that ſhall be reſtored.

XXIV.

His majeſty has put into the towns belonging to Spain, and into his own, more artillery and ammunition, for their defence, than uſual; now it would not be fair that his majeſty ſhould be obliged at preſent, to leave the ſame quantity there, to be delivered up together with the towns.

And to the end that this convention may have its full effect, his moſt chriſtian majeſty promiſes not to remove from this time any cannon, artillery, or ammunition, out of thoſe towns and fortreſſes, which are to be reſtored and ceded in virtue of theſe articles. Idem.

XXV.

Proper expedients ſhall be propoſed, to remove with joint conſent the difficulties, which might embarraſs the trade betwixt the French and the Dutch, and it ſhall be ſettled in a friendly manner at the concluding of the peace.

His majeſty ſhall grant to the States-General, in regard to their commerce, whatever has been ſtipulated by the treaty of Ryſwic, the tariff of 1664, the ſuppreſſion of the tariffs made ſince, the revocation of all the edicts, declarations, and arrets poſterior to them, contrary to the ſaid tariff of 1664, and alſo the abolition of the tariff made between France and the ſaid lords the States-General the 29th of May, 1699; ſo that none ſhall be of force in reſpect to them, but the tariff of 1664; and all Dutch ſhips trading to the ports of France, ſhall be exempted from paying the tonnage duty of 50 ſols *per* ton. Idem.

XXVI.

The king conſents to this as well as to the following article.

His majeſty ſhall acknowledge, at the time of ſigning the treaties of peace, the ninth electorate, erected in favour of the elector of Hanover. Idem.

XXVII.

The duke of Savoy ſhall be reſtored to the poſſeſſion of the duchy of Savoy, of the county of Nice, and of all the places and countries which belong to him by inheritance, and of which his majeſty ſhall have poſſeſſed himſelf by his arms, during the courſe of the preſent war, without any exception; his majeſty conſenting moreover, that his royal highneſs ſhall enjoy all the countries, territories, and ſtrong towns, that have been ceded to him by the emperor and his allies. Idem.

XXVIII.

This condition is abſolutely contrary to the expreſs orders given us by the king.

That the king ſhall make over to the duke of Savoy, the property and ſovereignty of the

towns of Exilles and Feneſtrelles, and Chaumont, at preſent occupied by the arms of his royal Highneſs, as alſo of the valley of Pragelas, together with whatever lies on this ſide mount Genevre and other mountains; ſo that from henceforward, the ſaid mountains ſhall ſerve for a barrier and limits between the kingdom of France and the principality of Piedmont.

XXIX.

It would be ſubjecting the electors of Cologn and Bavaria to the ſentence of their adverſaries to accept of this article for them. According to the tenour of it, no mention would be made of their intereſts, till the king was no longer in a condition to ſupport them, his majeſty being ſuppoſed to have evacuated or demoliſhed all the ſtrong towns that are demanded of him, in execution of the treaty.

It is therefore neceſſary that aſſurance be given of the reſtoration of the two electors, ſince we can include in the preliminary articles, the confirmation of what has been done in favour of the elector Palatine, and of the

In regard to the perſons who were heretofore electors of Cologne and Bavaria, their demands and pretenſions ſhall be referred to his imperial majeſty and to the empire, to the end that they may be diſcuſſed at the treaties of peace; and the orders and decrees of his imperial majeſty and the empire, made and publiſhed during this war, ſhall be maintained, in regard to his highneſs the elector Palatine, who ſhall continue in poſſeſſion of the Upper Palatinate, of the county of Cham, and of the rank and dignity, with which he has been inveſted by his imperial majeſty; as alſo in regard to what has been done in favour of the imperial town of Donawerth, and ſeveral other diſpoſitions of that nature; and as to what concerns the garriſons

In regard to the perſons who were heretofore electors of Cologn and Bavaria, their demands and pretenſions ſhall be referred to the negotiation of the treaties of peace; and the orders and decrees of his imperial majeſty and the empire, &c.

Idem.

town of Donawerth; and ſince they want to ſtipulate that the States-General ſhall have the right of garriſoning the ſtrong towns of the biſhopric of Liege and the electorate of Cologne.

which are at preſent or hereafter may be, on the behalf of the lords the States-General, in the town of Huy, the citadel of Liege, and the town of Bonne; they ſhall remain there, till it be otherwiſe agreed with his imperial majeſty and the empire.

XXX.

And in order to remove all doubts concerning the execution of the ſaid articles, and to forward this execution, on which depends the re-eſtabliſhment of the general peace, and of mutual confidence and friendſhip.

XXXI.

For the ſecurity of the preſent articles, it is neceſſary to ſtipulate that the princes here mentioned ſhall be contented with the countries, towns, and territories, which ſhall be reſpectively granted them by the ſaid articles; that in the negotiation of the general peace, they ſhall not pretend to other conditions, than ſuch as they ſhall ſet down in a ſeparate catalogue or liſt.

It is agreed that the Emperor, the queen of Great-Britain, and the ſaid lords the States-General, ſhall be contented with what has been reſpectively above granted them, and that in the negotiation of the general peace they ſhall not pretend to any other conditions, than ſuch as they ſhall ſet down in a ſeparate catalogue or liſt.

It is agreed, that the ulterior demands, which the Emperor, the Q. of Great-Britain, and the ſaid lords the States-General may make in the negotiation of the general peace, as well as the moſt chriſtian king, ſhall not interrupt the ceſſation of arms hereafter mentioned.

ditions in this reſpect; that they ſhall diſcuſs no other points than thoſe of which a ſeparate catalogue and liſt ſhall be made, and be ſatisfied with ſupporting them in ſuch a manner, that the diſcuſſion of the ſaid points ſhall in no caſe be able to interrupt the ceſſation of arms.

XXXII.

It is neceſſary alſo to expreſs in this article, that the princes, here mentioned, ſhall not pretend for their allies, to any other ſtrong towns, nor to a larger extent of territory, than has been agreed by the preſent articles, and that in no caſe they ſhall take up arms, on account of the demands, which their allies may form, when the general peace is in tranſaction. The duke of Lorrain not being at war, ought not ſo much as to be named; it will be ſufficient that he be comprized in the general enumeration, which each party intereſted in the war ſhall make, at the time of concluding the peace, of the princes whom they ſhall deſire to comprize in the general treaty.

As to the empire, the four aſſociated circles, the king of Pruſſia, the duke of Savoy and other allies, as alſo the duke of Lorrain, they ſhall be at liberty, beſides what has been above granted them, to make in the ſaid general congreſs, ſuch demands as they ſhall think meet.

As to the empire, the aſſociated circles, the king of Portugal, the king of Pruſſia, the duke of Lorrain, and the other allies, they ſhall be at liberty, &c.
Idem.

XXXIII.

We agree that the general negotiation cannot be determined too ſoon.

The general negotiation ſhall terminate, if poſſible, in the ſpace of two months, as above.

Idem.

XXXIV.

And to the end that the ſaid negotiation may be the better terminated in the ſpace of two months; and that upon the execution of the ſaid articles, the peace may immediately be made, it is agreed, that there ſhall be a ceſſation of arms between the armies of all the parties who are at war, to commence every where, as ſoon as the concluſion of the ſaid articles ſhall come to the knowledge of the ſaid parties now at war.

According to the diſpoſition of theſe articles, the king would be expoſed to the danger of ſeeing the war kindled anew, after his majeſty had ceded or diſmantled a great number of conſiderable fortreſſes; for it is mentioned that if the Spaniſh monarchy is ſurrendered or ceded to the archduke, according as has been ſtipulated by theſe articles, the ceſſation of arms ſhall continue till the concluſion and ratification of the treaties of peace that are to be made. It is therefore certain, that if the king of Spain does not ſign the treaties, and if, contrary to all appearance, he is able to maintain the war, the king of France ſhall have ſurrendered and diſmantled his towns, without having either a peace, or a ſuſpenſion of arms, and the war would be renewed intirely to the diſadvantage of his majeſty, the frontiers of his kingdom being left altogether naked. We muſt therefore conclude, that the bare ſigning of theſe articles, is not ſufficient to ſecure the execution of them, that the ratifications of all the parties will be neceſſary; and that the towns are not to be evacuated or diſmantled, till the ratifications ſhall be exchanged at the times agreed upon.

XXXV.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty, in order to give proofs of his deſire and inclination to terminate forthwith this bloody war, promiſes, immediately upon the concluſion and ratification of the ſaid articles, to evacuate, as above, in the Netherlands, the towns of Namur, Mons and Charleroy, before the 15th of next June; Luxemburg, Condé, Tournay and Maubeuge 15 days after; and before the 15th of July, the towns of Neuport, Furnes, fort Knocke and Ypres, as alſo the town and citadel of Straſburg, with fort Kehl; and before the expiration of thoſe two months, to demoliſh and fill up, as hath been above agreed to, the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty, in order to give proofs of his deſire and inclination to terminate forthwith this bloody war, promiſes, immediately upon the concluſion and ratification of the ſaid articles, to evacuate, as above, in the Netherlands, the towns of Namur, Mons, and Charleroy, before the 15th of next June; Luxemburg, Condé, Tournay, and Maubeuge fifteen days after; and before the 15th of July, the towns of Neuport, Furnes, fort Knocke, and Ypres; and before the expiration of theſe two months, to demoliſh and fill up, as hath been above agreed to, the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk, referring, in regard to Straſburg and fort Kehl, to what has been mentioned in the eighth article.

XXXVI.

His moſt chriſtian majeſty promiſes likewiſe, at the time of the ſaid concluſion, and before the expiration of the two months after it, to execute all that has been ſtipulated in the foregoing articles, in regard to the other allies.

XXXVII.

And in caſe his moſt chriſtian majeſty executes all that is above mentioned, and that the whole monarchy of Spain be delivered up and yielded to king Charles III. as is ſtipulated by theſe articles, within the limited term, it is agreed, that the ceſſation of arms between the parties at war, ſhall continue till the concluſion and ratification of the treaties of peace which are to be made.

XXXVIII.

All this ſhall ſerve for the baſis and foundation of the treaties of peace to be made; which ſhall be drawn up in the moſt ample forms that have uſually been obſerved in treaties of peace, with reſpect to ceſſions, ſucceſſions, renunciations, dependancies and appendages, evacuation of cannon, artillery and ſtores of war, galleys, ſlaves or crews ſerving in galleys, without coſt and charges, and the like things.

XXXIX.

The ratification of the preliminary articles above ſpecified, ſhall be finiſhed and exchanged, on the part of the moſt chriſtian king, the queen of Great-Britain, and the lords the States-General, before the 15th of June next; on the part of the emperor, by the 1ſt of July following; and of the empire as ſoon as poſſible: and upon the delivery of the ſaid ratifications of the queen of Great-Britain, and the lords the States-General, the

execution of what is ſtipulated concerning the evacuation of the places which his moſt chriſtian majeſty is to reſtore and yield up in the Netherlands, as alſo concerning the demolition of the town of Dunkirk, and the filling up of its harbour; and every thing granted to the ſaid potentates ſhall immediately be put in execution: the like execution ſhall take place, in regard to what is ſtipulated in favour of the emperor and king Charles III. after his imperial majeſty's ratification; and all that relates to the empire ſhall be executed, after the ratification of the ſaid empire ſhall be exchanged: as to the other allies, the articles that concern them ſhall be executed, after they have acquieſced in, ſigned, and ratified the ſaid articles.

XL.

And to accelerate the concluſion of the treaties of a general peace, it is agreed, that on the 15th of June next, the congreſs ſhall begin in this place of the Hague: and all kings, princes, and ſtates in the alliance, and others, ſhall be invited to ſend hither their miniſters plenipotentiaries: and to prevent all difficulties and diſputes about the ceremonial; and to forward as much as poſſible, the concluſion of the general peace, thoſe of the ſaid miniſters who ſhall have the character of ambaſſadors, ſhall not declare it till the day of ſigning the treaties of the ſaid peace.

Done, concluded and ſigned by the plenipotentiaries of his ſaid imperial majeſty, of her majeſty the queen of Great-Britain, and of the lords the States General of the United-Provinces, with the miniſters plenipotentiaries of his moſt chriſtian majeſty.

The

THE king knew perfectly well, that under the name of articles of peace, his enemies were only propoſing inadmiſſible conditions of a captious truce of two months, by means of which they ſhould take poſſeſſion of the principal towns of the frontiers of Flanders, with a moral certainty of continuing maſters thereof, ſince it would be impoſſible to execute the definitive treaty of peace, within the term limited. His majeſty therefore did not heſitate about the only party he had to take, not only for his own glory, but for the good of his ſubjects. Yet he concealed his intentions, and deferred ſending his laſt orders to the preſident Rouillé, till Torcy's return, expecting an account of ſeveral circumſtances, which that miniſter might have omitted in his letters.

AT Mons Torcy ſaw the elector of Bavaria, who was extremely uneaſy about the iſſue of the conferences of the Hague. The marquiſs undeceived this prince in regard to the hopes, with which he had flattered himſelf, of being ſupported by the Dutch, and quieted his apprehenſions of being abandoned at length by the king. He let him know at the ſame time that his enemies in the empire were both potent and numerous.

HE continued his journey by Doway, where marſhal Villars was aſſembling the army. The public ſervice required that this general ſhould be informed of the ſtate of a negotiation which had

had hitherto ſuſpended the opening of the campaign. It was then the beginning of June. The marſhal, ſurprized at the enemy's demands, and perſuaded that the king would not liſten to their propoſals, begged the marquiſs to aſſure his majeſty of the valour and good diſpoſition of the troops, of which he had a thorough confidence. In regard to the army's ſubſiſtance, "I "have corn, ſaid he, to laſt the next month, "when that is gone, it is to be hoped that pro-"vidence will enable us to find means of ſub-"ſiſting."

THE king being perfectly acquainted with the intentions of his enemies, recalled the preſident Rouillé. His majeſty was alſo willing that Torcy ſhould fulfil his promiſe to prince Eugene, and that in purſuance thereof he ſhould write to him to Bruſſels, to acquaint him before the fourth of June with the reſolution which his majeſty had taken, of rejecting the penſionary's project.

THE king's letter to the preſident Rouillé, contains the juſt motives of his deciſion.

The king's letter to the preſident Rouillé.

June 2, 1709.

"MR. preſident Rouillé, I was willing to hear "Torcy's account of his journey to the "Hague, before I took my final reſolution in "regard to the conditions called preliminaries,

"and

" and contained in the project drawn up by the " penſionary of Holland, in concert with the " miniſters of the allies of that republic.

" THEIR ſteadineſs in maintaining ſuch pre- " tenſions, ſeems to contradict the aſſurances " they gave you of their real inclination of con- " tributing to the re-eſtabliſhment of the public " tranquillity. I had reaſon to believe that, " ſincerely deſirous of promoting this great end, " they would at length deſiſt from the preſſing " inſtances they have made, to obtain the demo- " lition of all the fortreſſes, which I have cauſed " to be erected in Alſace; and that they would " agree to treat of the intereſts of the electors " of Cologne and Bavaria, ſince thoſe very pre- " liminaries mention theſe two princes, to con- " firm the diſpoſitions made or to be made to " their prejudice: but I perceive that inſtead of " treating upon a fair footing, a condition eſ- " ſentially requiſite in all reciprocal engage- " ments, the Republic and her allies act quite " contrary thereto, in the principal article of the " treaty which they propoſe; for they only pro- " miſe a ceſſation of arms the ſpace of two " months, in conſideration of the fortified towns, " which they require me to yield to them im- " mediately after the exchange of thoſe prelimi- " nary articles, intending to renew the war, if " I cannot by that time prevail on the king of " Spain to renounce the throne, a condition

" which

" which they look upon as abſolutely neceſſary
" for ſecuring the entire execution of the peace.
" COULD I comply with their demands in re-
" gard to the two firſt articles, I ſhould do it only
" in conſideration of my people, and with the ſole
" view of procuring them that repoſe which they
" have ſo much reaſon to wiſh for, after ſo long
" and ſo burthenſome a war, as that which I
" now maintain: but by accepting the plan
" drawn up at the Hague, I ſhould be very far
" from the point I aim at; for by giving up
" and by diſmantling my fortreſſes before my
" enemies had entered into any real engage-
" ment with me, I ſhould enable them to carry
" on the war againſt me with more conveniency,
" while I voluntarily deprived myſelf of the
" means of withſtanding their attacks. Thus
" my ſubjects would be only expoſed to more
" enterprizes, and conſequently more wretched;
" ſince it is impoſſible for me to anſwer for the
" conſent of the king my grandſon, when the
" point is the renunciation of a crown; it is as
" impoſſible I ſhould promiſe to join my ene-
" mies, to act againſt a nation that had no other
" demerit in regard to me, than being faithful
" to their lawful king. And yet it appears that
" if I abandon him, his friends and adherents
" will comply with the times, and upon my
" withdrawing my troops, the Spaniſh war will
" ſoon be ended; but this is the only engage-
" ment

" ment they can aſk of me, and I think I have " done every thing, when I promiſe that I ſhall " faithfully perform it. This I will ſtill do, if " you think you can conclude the treaty on that " condition: but if my enemies perſiſt to demand " terms, which it is not in my power to fulfil, " could I even reſolve to promiſe them, the pub- " lic will eaſily judge that they are not deſirous " of peace, becauſe they confide in the ſtrength of " their arms, and their only aim is to perpetuate " the war. God may diſappoint their deſigns, " as much as hitherto he has favoured them.

" It would not however be prudent to con- " ſent to a certain loſs, ſuch as that of the ſtrong " towns I was to deliver up, or to diſmantle; " for the ſake of purchaſing only an apparent " tranquillity for two months, and with that " ſole view, of avoiding for ſo ſhort an interval " the uncertain calamities which my enemies " ſet in proſpect before me. I am ſenſible that " the repetition of thoſe arguments you have " uſed, will not convince them at the eve of a " campaign, from which they expect ſuch ſignal " ſucceſſes; it is my intention nevertheleſs, that " as ſoon as you have received my letter, you " ſhall acquaint the penſionary of Holland, with " the contents. You may even ſhew it him, " if you think it neceſſary; but if you expect no " abatement of their demands, you are to ſet " out from the Hague, after declaring to him " again,

" again, as you have already done, that I revoke " and conſider as void, all the offers made on my " part, either to the States General of the United " Provinces, or to their allies, ſince they have " not been able, purſuant to my deſign, to re- " eſtabliſh a good and ſolid peace, ſo neceſſary " for the general welfare of Chriſtendom.

" You are to ſpeak in the ſame manner to the " duke of Marlborough, if he is ſtill at the " Hague. I beg God, &c."

THE preſident Rouillé punctually executed the king's orders, and ſet out from the Hague, after having declared to the Dutch miniſtry, that the offers which his majeſty had made for facilitating the concluſion of the peace, were thenceforward null and void.

BUT peace was ſo ardently deſired in France, that ſome perſons of ſuperior merit, diſtinguiſhed by their great actions and their high employments, diſapproved of the king's refuſing to ſign the preliminaries, tho' they never had ſeen them. Their judgment was founded on the extreme neceſſity of the kingdom.

THE ſame conſideration had made ſuch an impreſſion on the preſident Rouillé, that when the penſionary delivered the plan of the preliminaries, Rouillé was inclined to ſign them. " You know, ſaid he to Torcy, the ſituation " affairs were in, when you came to Holland. " Your journey is a proof thereof. If you go

" away

"away without concluding a peace, tho' never "so onerous, depend upon it you will be cen- "sured and condemned by the whole nation."

GOD permitted Torcy to have better hopes; but at his return he took the liberty to propose to his majesty, to raise the courage of his loyal subjects, and to give them a mark of his goodness, in acquainting them with the surprizing but ineffectual concessions, which he had made to forward a peace, and with the obstinate opposition of his enemies.

THE letter he wrote for this purpose to the governors of the provinces, convinced the public that he had omitted nothing to procure a peace for his people, looking upon himself as their father, and loving them with the same bowels of affection as his own children.

THE projectors of the preliminaries thought likewise, that it was their common interest not only to publish, but also to sign them, as an engagement which the allied powers mutually renewed among themselves. Thus they bound themselves to continue the war, till France should be forced to sign the conditions, which they pretended to prescribe to her.

PRINCE Eugene saw plainly that France continued to be at liberty while her enemies were tying their hands by a closer engagement, and of course were renouncing every way that might ease them of the weight of a burthensome war

by

by an equitable peace. This he ſaid to the duke of Marlborough.

THE penſionary of Holland met with reproaches of the like nature from ſome of his countrymen.

THE Engliſh complained of their miniſters, as much as the Dutch, for loſing an opportunity ſo little expected, of concluding peace upon conditions, with which thoſe two powers were ſatisfied; and Marlborough's perſonal enemies improved to his diſadvantage, the complaiſance he had ſhewn in preferring the emperor's intereſts to the good of his country.

NEITHER was this prince more ſatisfied with the conduct of his allies. He ſaid, they had not been attentive enough to ſecure the barrier of the empire: that the intereſts of the duke of Lorrain had been too much neglected: in ſhort, the Imperial miniſters at the Hague had been forced as it were to ſign thoſe preliminaries "which the French miniſters refuſed to ac-"cept; from whence they concluded at Vienna, "that the contract was not binding of either "ſide."

THE thoughts of the ſages of this world, and the vanity of their deſigns, are all open to the Deity; his power alone had placed Philip on the throne of Spain, and that alone was able to ſupport him. This great event was not conducted by human policy. Neither was the peace

to

to be the work of man. But before the divine majeſty would grant this peace to a kingdom, which his goodneſs has always protected, he was pleaſed it ſhould be preceded by the humiliation of a great king. The reſignation of this prince ſatisfied his juſtice, and the God of mercy looked down with an eye of pity on the monarch and his people. He infuſed new ardour into the French, ever zealous for the glory of their maſter. The patience of this nation, in the adverſities which they were ſtill to ſuffer, proved equal to their well-known valour.

ENGLAND underwent a change of miniſtry; the duke of Marlborough and his adherents who had directed every thing in that kingdom, were diſcarded, and the adminiſtration was entruſted to able miniſters, more zealous for the real welfare of the nation than their predeceſſors: ſenſible of the abſurdity of perpetuating a fruitleſs war, they made private overtures of an equitable peace, and ſnatched the negotiation out of the hands of the Dutch, who thought themſelves in poſſeſſion of it.

ENGLAND at length ſeparating from her allies, who were afterwards defeated at Denain, had the glory of contributing to reſtore peace to Europe, a peace that might be ſaid to be happy and ſolid; a peace advantageous to France by the reſtitution of the principal towns which ſhe had loſt in the courſe of the war, and by the preſervation of thoſe which the king had offered

to deliver up three years before; a peace deemed glorious by maintaining a prince of the royal family on the throne of Spain; a peace in ſhort, become neceſſary by the fatal loſs, which the kingdom ſuſtained, four years after this melancholy negotiation, and two years after the peace, of the greateſt prince that ever ſat on the Gallic throne.

The ſequel of theſe memoirs will explain the principal circumſtances of this work of Providence, preceded by a train of afflictions which his majeſty was obliged to undergo, before he experienced the wonderful effect of the divine omnipotency and goodneſs.

The king's diſpatches to the marquiſs of Torcy.

Marly, May 14, 1709.

"I HAVE received your letter, begun the "7th inſtant, and continued the 8th and 9th. "By the account you give me of the confer- "ences you have had in particular with the "penſionary Heinſius, and afterwards with him "and Meſſ. Buys and Vanderduſſen, I find that "the States General, elated with their ſucceſſes, "ſtretch their pretenſions beyond what you have "added by my orders to the offers I had al- "ready made; and that in anſwer to your ſolid "arguments againſt their demands, whether for "themſelves or for their allies, they have no- "thing to alledge but idle pretexts of fear, or

"the

" the neceſſity of fulfilling the engagements which " they pretend to have contracted. However as " there are no hopes of concluding a ſpeedy peace, " which is abſolutely neceſſary for my king- " dom, except the Dutch can be determined " by views of private intereſt, I cannot but ap- " prove of the wiſe conduct you have hitherto " obſerved in your conferences. You have for- " got nothing that could ſurmount the mighty " difficulties that have been thrown in your " way; and I obſerve the like marks of your " prudence, when, after having made a mo- " derate uſe of your powers ſo long as you " had any hopes that the ſolidity of your ar- " guments would convince thoſe with whom " you were negotiating, you have at length " taken the reſolution in your third conference, " to increaſe thoſe motives by degrees, which " ſhould incline the Dutch to put an end to the " war. But upon promiſing ſtill to ſtrengthen " their barrier with the towns of Tournay and " Liſle, with its chatellany, and without receiving " any equivalent, you ſhould take notice that " the chatellanies of Orchies and Doway, which " are dependances of Liſle, ought not to be " comprehended in this ceſſion. I have reaſon " to believe that the States General will be ſtruck " with theſe offers; and it was proper to make " them before the time of their meeting, in or- " der to deprive thoſe who ſtill delight in war,

" of every ſort of pretence for rejecting your
" propoſals, as not ſo advantageous to their
" republic. And in order to furniſh you with
" the means of removing the other difficulties,
" which ſtill remain concerning the articles
" diſcuſſed between you, I will further explain,
" and even enlarge the orders I have already
" given you.

" The extract here annexed from the letter,
" which Monſieur Amelot wrote me the 30th
" of April, will inform you of the ſteps, which
" the king my grandſon has thought fit to
" make, in order to be ſure of the ſentiments
" of his privy council, and of the principal
" nobility of Spain. It is eaſy to foreſee the
" conſequences of the reſolution he has tak-
" en, to reſign the adminiſtration of the
" principal affairs of his kingdom into their
" hands; and were they even capable of ſhew-
" ing as much ſteadineſs and courage, as they
" have given teſtimonies of zeal on this occa-
" ſion, ſtill the nation, exhauſted of men and
" every reſource, will not be long able to fur-
" niſh him with the neceſſary ſupplies for carry-
" ing on the war, when my troops ſhall ceaſe to
" act in his defence. This diſpoſition makes
" no change in the orders with which I have
" entruſted you, and whether you are able
" to obtain the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily
" for him, or that of Naples only, I ſhall agree
" that

" that a fixed time be ſtipulated, as for inſtance " of three months, in which the king of Spain " ſhall be bound to accept of the partition aſ- " ſigned him, which he ſhall forfeit, if he " exceeds that term. I am willing that you " promiſe alſo, that in caſe he refuſes to ac- " cept of ſuch partition, he ſhall forfeit all right " to it, after the expiration of this term, and " that I will not only withdraw my troops " which ſerve in Spain, but moreover that I- " will ceaſe to lend him any aſſiſtance either " by ſea or land, or even any ſum of money " for his defence; but that I cannot by any " means, engage to employ my forces in de- " throning the king my grandſon; or to grant " a paſſage thro' my territories to thoſe troops, " which the Dutch or their allies might be will- " ing to march into Spain.

" THO' nothing ſeems to be wanting to the " ſacrifice I am making, in order to procure a " peace for my people, which they ſtand ſo " greatly in need of, yet I am willing to add " one more. If it be abſolutely impoſſible to " determine the Engliſh to conſent, that the " king my grandſon ſhall have the kingdoms of " Naples and Sicily, or even the former only; " and if the ultimate reſolutions of the Dutch in " regard to peace depend on that nation, I am " further willing in caſe of the utmoſt extre- " mity, not to reſerve any territory at all for the " king my grandſon, and to promiſe alſo not to

" lend him any aſſiſtance, after the manner in " which I juſt now explained myſelf, but with- " out engaging to employ my forces againſt " him, or to grant a paſſage to the enemy's " troops thro' my dominions; and I leave it to " your prudence not to declare yourſelf, either " in regard to the promiſe of not aſſiſting the " king of Spain, or to the refuſal of concurring " to ſtrip him of his territories, till you judge " proper. I am perſuaded that ſhould you be " obliged even to give up the article of Naples " to the importunity of the Engliſh, ſtill you " would not forget to make advantage of this " ceſſion, as well as of that of Sicily, and to " avail yourſelf of this means, either for pre- " ſerving Dunkirk and Straſburg, or one of " thoſe towns, or for ſilencing the unjuſt preten- " ſion of the Dutch, who at the ſame time that " they want the treaty of Weſtphalia to be re- " eſtabliſhed, are willing to execute only ſuch " articles of that treaty, as are contrary to the " intereſts of my crown. But I do not look " upon the objects here explained, as an equiva- " lent abſolutely neceſſary for the freſh ſacrifice " I am making; nay, I permit you to exhauſt " the whole extent of my powers, and to add " this further extenſion, if it be neceſſary, in " order to prevent the opening of the cam- " paign.

" THE demand they have made of fort Louis, " is one of thoſe pretenſions ſucceſſively added, in

" proportion as the report of the exhauſted con-
" dition of my people has gained ground. I
" reckon you will omit nothing to preſerve that
" fortreſs in my poſſeſſion, by deſtroying the
" works of *the head of the bridge* towards the
" empire. Yet if they were to inſiſt on this ar-
" ticle, and by conſenting to demoliſh this place,
" you could preſerve Straſburg, and the town of
" Landau with its fortifications, only giving up
" Briſac, you have my leave to promiſe this
" alſo.

" I MAKE no doubt but the elector Palatine
" will uſe all ſorts of means, to hinder Lan-
" dau from being yielded to me with its forti-
" fications: but if the Dutch ſhould want to
" maintain all the pretenſions of their allies,
" founded like this, on the ſole reaſon of conve-
" niency, we ſhould prepare ourſelves for mak-
" ing a long war of it indeed.

" I DON'T in the leaſt queſtion but you avail
" yourſelf of the opportunities you have of ſee-
" ing the duke of Marlborough, to let him
" know that I have been informed of the ſteps
" he has taken, to hinder the progreſs of the
" conferences of peace, and even to break them
" off entirely; that I have been ſo much the
" more ſurprized thereat, as I had reaſon to be-
" lieve, from the aſſurances he had already given,
" that he was willing to contribute to this end;
" that I ſhould be glad his conduct was ſuch
" as to deſerve the reward I have promiſed him;

" and in order that you may be able to come to
" a clearer explication, I am willing you ſhould
" give him a poſitive aſſurance, that I will re-
" mit two millions of livres to him, if by his
" good offices he can obtain one of the follow-
" ing conditions for me.

" To preſerve Naples and Sicily for the king
" my grandſon, or at the utmoſt extremity to
" preſerve Naples only. I ſhould make him
" the ſame gratification were he to preſerve
" Dunkirk under my obedience, with its har-
" bour and fortifications, without even Naples
" or Sicily; the ſame for preſerving Straſburg
" only, excepting fort Kehl, which I ſhall
" give up to the empire in the ſtate it was in
" when firſt I conquered it, or in ſhort in the
" ſtate it was in when reſtored to my obedience;
" and alſo without preſerving Naples or Sicily:
" but of all theſe different expedients, the ob-
" taining of Naples for my grandſon, is that
" which I ſhould like the beſt.

" I SHOULD conſent to extend this recom-
" pence to three millions, if he obtained Naples
" for my grandſon, and at the ſame time I
" was permitted to keep Dunkirk with its fortifi-
" cations and harbour. If I were obliged to re-
" linquiſh the article of Dunkirk, I ſhould give
" him the ſame ſum, could he contrive ſo as to
" preſerve Naples and Straſburg, in the manner
" as above explained, and Landau with its for-
" tifications, by giving up Briſac; or even could

" I be

"I be allowed to keep Straſburg and Dun-
"kirk, both in their preſent condition. In
"ſhort, I am willing you ſhould offer the
"duke of Marlborough four millions, ſhould
"he enable me to keep Naples and Sicily for
"the king my grandſon, and to preſerve Dun-
"kirk with its fortifications and harbour, and
"Straſburg and Landau in the manner above
"explained, or even the ſame ſum, were Sicily
"to be excepted out of this laſt article.

"I MUST alſo explain to you, that if the
"treaty was once ſigned, with the reſervations
"in favour of the king of Spain, and this prince
"had forfeited them, for non-acceptance within
"the limited time, this ſhould make no change
"in what you promiſed the duke of Marlborough.

"THERE remains nothing further but to
"give you my orders in regard to the duke
"of Lorrain. This prince has delivered a
"clear explanation of his pretenſions to M.
"de Saint Conteſt, and by the annexed copy of
"a letter, which the latter has wrote to you
"ſince your departure, you will ſee in what
"manner he has done it. You ſhould avoid as
"much as poſſible, to inſert the articles relating
"to the duke of Lorrain into the preſent pre-
"liminaries: but ſhould you be obliged to do
"it, you muſt abſolutely refuſe to agree to the
"permiſſion he wants of fortifying Nancy, or
"any other town; as this article would be as
"contrary to the treaties that have determined

"this

" this point otherwiſe, as it might become pre-
" judicial to my intereſts.

" I SHOULD conſent even now to grant an
" equivalent for the town and provoſtſhip of
" Longwi; but I can by no means admit of
" the propoſal of giving the town and diſtrict
" of Toul for this equivalent. The indemni-
" fication which this prince may demand for the
" Monferrat, cannot concern me at all; there-
" fore it ſhould not be mentioned, no more
" than the pretended ſovereignty of Charleville.
" I have left all the claimants at full liberty to
" maintain their rights by law to this eſtate;
" but ſhould the Dutch inſiſt upon this laſt ar-
" ticle, you may judge, that this ſovereignty is
" not a matter of ſuch a conſequence, as to hin-
" der you from concluding, after all I have done
" to procure a peace.

" IN ſhort, if the means I have given you,
" for advancing this important buſineſs, ſhould
" enable you to ſettle the preliminaries, it is my
" intention that you inſiſt upon a ſuſpenſion of
" arms. What remains towards completing this
" great work, will be eaſier to regulate, when
" the tumult of arms is over; and when the
" Dutch have been ſatisfied in regard to their
" own intereſts, they themſelves ought to deſire
" it. It cannot be proper for them to abandon
" ſuch evident advantages to the fate of arms;
" and I perceive that the penſionary himſelf has
" given you a hint of it.

" THE

" THE princeſs of Epinoy has earneſtly begged " of me to recommend her intereſts to your " care, and tho' the diſcuſſion of all private af- " fairs ought to be baniſhed from the preſent " negotiation, yet I have been willing, out of " the great regard I have for that princeſs, to " let you know, that if you ſhould find any op- " portunity of doing her ſervice, I ſhall ap- " prove of the ſteps you may take in her favour. " And I pray God to keep you under his holy " protection. Written at Marly the 14th of " May 1709. *Signed* LEWIS: *and lower down,* " CHAMILLARD.

May 17, 1709.

" MONSIEUR the marquiſs de Torcy, I " have juſt now received of the duke of " Alva, the news of a very conſiderable advan- " tage, obtained by the marquiſs de Bay over " the Portugueſe army. I was willing to in- " form you thereof, and at the ſame time to " confirm the orders I have ſent you by the re- " turn of your courier whom you diſpatched " the 14th inſtant. And I pray God to keep " you under his holy protection. *Signed* LEWIS: " *and lower down,* CHAMILLARD.

May 22, 1709.

" MONSIEUR the marquiſs de Torcy, " you know that I have lately received ſe- " veral accounts of the meaſures which the elec- " tor of Bavaria was concerting with my ene- " mies,

" mies, in order to make his ſeparate peace, by
" entering into engagements with them, equally
" repugnant to thoſe which he had already
" ſigned with me, and to my intereſts. Theſe
" ſame accounts have been confirmed to me
" from ſo ſure a quarter, as not to leave the
" leaſt room to doubt of his deſigns; and you
" may judge of what importance it is to me
" in the preſent juncture, to hinder him from
" taking this ſtep, or at leaſt to retard it.
" For this reaſon I diſpatch the expreſs who
" is charged with this letter, to acquaint you
" with the advice I have received, and to ob-
" ſerve to you, that as the elector of Bavaria
" could not ſet this negotiation on foot, but
" with the view of being reſtored to his domi-
" nions, and of acquiring new advantages by
" the ſacrifice of every thing in his power to my
" enemies; we cannot expect to prevent his
" putting his deſign in execution, but by giv-
" ing him room to believe that I am deter-
" mined to contribute to his full and entire re-
" ſtoration, as alſo to the views he may have
" of further aggrandizement. It is therefore my
" intention that as ſoon as you receive this letter,
" you are to call upon the Bavarian miniſter at
" the Hague; and without giving him any rea-
" ſon to ſuſpect your being acquainted with his
" maſter's deſigns, you are to tell him, that I have
" renewed the orders given you before, to for-
" get nothing that can be conducive to the in-

" tereſt of the elector his maſter, but to try " whether by any means whatever you can pro- " cure for him an entire reſtitution of his domi- " nions, as alſo other advantages, either by pre- " ſerving the general government of the Ne- " therlands, or by the acquiſition of the duchy " of Mantua, or of the kingdom of Sardinia; " in a word, you are to add to what hath been " here obſerved, every thing that you can think " proper to diſſuade the elector from breaking " his engagements, or at leaſt every thing that " may prevent him from concluding the ne- " gotiation, which he has begun with my ene- " mies, and which I have reaſon to believe is " very far advanced.

" By your letter of the 16th, which I received " yeſterday, I find how much you have inſiſted " in purſuance of my orders, on the reſtitution " of Exilles and Feneſtrelles, and what an op- " poſition that article meets with. You know " how diſagreeable it would be to me, to con- " ſent, that the duke of Savoy ſhould be au- " thorized by treaty, to keep thoſe two for- " treſſes belonging to the ancient demeſne of " my kingdom. I am therefore perſuaded that " you will forget nothing, in order to obtain " this reſtitution: but if the Engliſh and the " Dutch ſhould ſtill have recourſe to their old " plea, the neceſſity of fulfilling their engage- " ments to their allies; and this reaſon only

" ſhould

" ſhould hinder them from agreeing to the " preliminaries, or the concluding of the trea- " ty depended abſolutely on this article, I have " already made ſo great a ſacrifice for the re- " poſe of my people, that I ſhould not chuſe " the affair broke off merely upon this ac- " count; therefore I permit you to give up " the fortreſſes of Exilles and Feneſtrelles, if " it ſhould be impoſſible to ſettle the preli- " minaries without this new condeſcenſion, or " this conſideration only ſhould hinder the con- " cluſion of the treaty.

" I HAVE already given you my orders, " in regard to the pretended ſovereignty of " Charleville; I ſhall only add, that ſhould " you be obliged by the preliminary articles, " to cede this principality to the duke of Lor- " rain, you are to uſe your utmoſt endea- " vours that ſuch of my ſubjects as have any " demands upon that eſtate, ſhall preſerve their " mortgages, and the duke of Lorrain ſhall en- " gage to pay them off. This condition how- " ever, muſt neither hinder nor retard the " concluſion of the important affair commit- " ted to your management. And I pray, &c. " &c. *Signed* LEWIS, *and counter-ſigned*, CHA- " MILLARD.

May

May the 30th.

"MONSIEUR the marquiſs de Torcy, "your letter of the 22d and 23d of this "month was delivered to me by your courier. "The exact account you give me of the confe- "rences you have had with prince Eugene and "the duke of Marlborough, as alſo with the pen- "ſionary Heinſius and the deputies of the States- "General, either jointly or ſeparately, has con- "vinced me of the extreme difficulties you have "met with, in regard to points which ought not "to have been inſiſted upon by my enemies: "and, at the ſame time I perceive, that though "you have forgot nothing, to make them ſenſi- "ble of the injuſtice of their pretenſions, conſi- "dering the ſacrifices I am ready to make for "re-eſtabliſhing the repoſe, which Europe ſtands "ſo greatly in need of; ſtill thoſe ſolid reaſons, "tho' enforced with your uſual ability and ſkill, "have not been able to ſurmount the obſtacles, "whereby ſo ineſtimable a bleſſing, through paſ- "ſion or private intereſts, hath been hitherto ob- "ſtructed. In ſhort, the addition to your letter "informs me, that the penſionary and thoſe who "have the lead in Holland, conſcious of the full "extent of the conſiderable advantages which I "offered them, have been hindered from ac- "cepting thoſe offers, merely out of regard to "their allies, who have aſſumed the right of ſub- "jecting the reſolutions of the Republic to their "will;

" will; and that the prime miniſter of Hol-
" land had again prevailed upon you, to de-
" fer your departure, in order to finiſh this im-
" portant work, at a conference wherein all
" the preliminary articles, that formed the ſub-
" ject matter thereof, were to be ſettled; that
" it was to be held the 23d; that you reck-
" oned to ſend me an expreſs, in order to ap-
" prize me of its ſucceſs; and that upon re-
" ceiving no further account from you, I might
" have reaſon to ſuſpect that your courier had
" been ſtopped upon the road, unleſs I judged
" alſo, that you had been obliged to diſcuſs even
" the terms of the different articles; and that as
" you had to do with miniſters extremely ſcru-
" pulous, this diſcuſſion might be long. I have
" thought proper, notwithſtanding, to inform
" you by this expreſs, if you are ſtill in Holland,
" that I have had no letters from you, ſince that
" whoſe receipt I now acknowledge; to the end,
" that if you have ſent me a courier, and he has
" been intercepted, you may ſend me the du-
" plicates of his diſpatches.

" You muſt have learnt by a letter, which
" was ſent you on the 23d by the common mail,
" that I had diſpatched an expreſs to you the
" 22d; and I make no doubt of your uneaſineſs
" at his not being yet arrived. I had never a
" paſſport for his ſecurity, which made me con-
" ſign my letter for you to count de Bergheik,
" imagining he would be able to forward it to

" you

"you without danger. But as he had no paſſ-
"ports, and did not think proper to run the
"riſk of its being intercepted, he ſent it back;
"ſo that you will find it in this packet. One of
"the articles will ſhew you, that I had foreſeen
"what you obſerved, namely the invincible dif-
"ficulty, in regard to the fortreſſes of Exilles
"and Feneſtrelles; and that yielding to the ex-
"treme neceſſities of my people, I had removed
"even this obſtacle, which is one of the two that
"remained to be ſettled, by permitting you to
"give up this point, if you found it impoſſible
"otherwiſe to finiſh the affair you have taken in
"hand; and this new condeſcenſion ſhould enable
"you to finiſh it. Should you be ſtill at the Hague
"upon this courier's arrival, I leave it to your
"prudence to examine, whether you ought to
"make uſe of this extenſion of my orders, but
"you are to make no manner of difficulty about
"it, if in giving up this article, you can ter-
"minate that of Alſace, ſo as to leave me in full
"poſſeſſion of that province, only reſtoring, pur-
"ſuant to your offers, Straſburg and fort Kehl
"with their fortifications.

"In ſhort, if the ceſſion of the two fortreſſes
"of Exilles and Feneſtrelles ſhould not enable
"you to remove the difficulties concerning Al-
"ſace, the conſequence of which you thoroughly
"know, I believe it will be more proper to de-
"fer this conceſſion, till you have made me ac-

" quainted with the ſituation of affairs at your
" departure; and then I ſhall be able to give my
" orders to the preſident Rouillé, in regard to any
" further regulations that may be neceſſary, in
" caſe you have followed your reſolution of ſet-
" ting out immediately, after diſpatching the
" courier with the reſult of your laſt conferences.
" I make no ſort of doubt, but you have exert-
" ed all your abilities, to ſhew the injuſtice of
" the enemy, in demanding the demolition of
" my fortreſſes in Alſace, under the notion of
" the pretended ratification of a treaty, which the
" empire hath always conſidered as the baſis of
" its ſecurity and liberty. You are not ignorant
" that this treaty explains itſelf in the cleareſt
" terms, ſaying that there ſhall be no fortreſs
" erected on the banks of the Rhine, betwixt Ba-
" ſil and Philipſburg on the German ſide only.
" In this point, there is no ſort of ambiguity,
" nor was it ſo much as mentioned, upon the
" diſpute concerning the extent of my rights to
" Alſace; wherefore this pretenſion is as ill
" founded, as it is obſtinately maintained; and
" if it took place, I could not be ſure of the poſ-
" ſeſſion of Alſace, which has been ceded to me
" with the conſent of all the powers of the em-
" pire. This province, being almoſt detached
" from the other parts of my dominions, might
" be ſoon invaded by the emperor, if he was to
" keep ſuch conſiderable fortreſſes on this fron-

" tier,

"tier, as are to remain in his hands, and I was "not to have one ſtrong-hold left, but to be de- "barred of the means of providing ſure quarters "in this province, for a body of troops to de- "fend it, in caſe of an attack. I reckon that "you have had recourſe to all theſe reaſons; but "as I find by experience, that the pretenſions of "my enemies, are not directed by the rule of "equity, I ſhall, purſuant to what I have al- "ready obſerved, defer explaining my intentions "more particularly, till I receive your diſpatches "which I hourly expect. In ſhort, the expreſs "whom I have ſent away to-day, hath orders to "deliver you my letter upon the road, if he "meets you in your return; to the end, that "after it is deciphered, you may write to the "preſident Rouillé by this ſame courier, what- "ever you think he ought to know, concerning "my intentions, according to the ſituation of af- "fairs at the time of your departure, till he re- "ceives my further orders, which will be as "ſoon as I receive your diſpatches, which I ex- "pect every moment. And I pray, *&c. &c.*" *Signed* LEWIS, *and counterſigned* CHAMIL-LARD.

The king's letter to the governors of the provinces of his kingdom.

"SIR, the expectation of a ſpeedy peace was "ſo generally diffuſed throughout my king-"dom, that I think it my duty, in return for "the fidelity which my people have ſhewn me, "during the courſe of my reign, to give them "the ſatisfaction of being acquainted with the "reaſons, which ſtill hinder them from enjoy-"ing that repoſe, which I intended to procure "them.

"IN order to re-eſtabliſh a general peace, I "ſhould have accepted of terms very much op-"poſite to the ſecurity of my frontier provinces; "but the more I have ſhewn myſelf ready and "diſpoſed to remove all ſuſpicions, which the "enemy affect to entertain of my power and de-"ſigns, the more they have multiplied their pre-"tenſions, inſomuch, that by gradually adding "new demands to the former, and making uſe of the "duke of Savoy's name, or pretending the intereſt "of the princes of the empire, they have equally "ſhewed, that their intention was only to enlarge, "at the expence of my crown, the ſtates which "border upon France, and to open an eaſy way "for themſelves, to penetrate into the heart of "my kingdom, whenever it ſhould be agree-"able to their intereſts to commence a new war. "Even that which I now maintain, and was de-

"ſirous

" ſirous to finiſh, would not be at an end, were
" I to conſent to the propoſals they have made
" me: for they limited to two months, the time,
" wherein I was on my part to execute the trea-
" ty; and during that interval, they pretended
" to oblige me to deliver up the ſtrong towns
" which they demanded of me in the Netherlands
" and in Alſace, and to demoliſh the fortifica-
" tions of others. They refuſed on their ſide,
" to enter into any other engagement, than to
" ſuſpend all acts of hoſtility till the firſt of Au-
" guſt, reſerving to themſelves the liberty of re-
" newing then the operations of war, if my
" grandſon the king of Spain perſiſted in the re-
" ſolution to defend the crown which God hath
" given him, and to periſh rather than forſake
" a faithful people, who theſe nine years have
" acknowledged him for their lawful ſovereign.
" Such a ſuſpenſion of arms, more dangerous
" than the war itſelf, retarded peace rather than
" forwarded the concluſion of it; for I was not
" only obliged to continue the ſame expence for
" maintaining my armies, but my enemies, after
" the expiration of the term of ſuſpenſion, would
" have attacked me with new advantages, by rea-
" ſon of the ſtrong holds, which I was to deliver
" into their hands, at the ſame time that I de-
" moliſhed thoſe, which ſerve as a barrier to ſome
" of my frontier provinces. I ſhall take no no-
" tice of the inſinuations they have made to me,
" to join my forces to thoſe of the confederacy,

" and

" and to compel the king my grandſon to deſcend
" the throne, unleſs he voluntarily conſented to
" live henceforward without any dominions, and
" to reduce himſelf to a private condition. It
" is ſhocking to humanity, to believe that they
" could entertain any thoughts of engaging me
" to enter into any ſuch alliance with them. But
" though my affection for my people is as ſenſi-
" ble as that which I have for my own children;
" though I ſhare with them all the calamities
" which war draws on ſuch faithful ſubjects;
" and though I have manifeſted to all Europe,
" that I was ſincerely deſirous of procuring a
" peace for them, yet I am perſuaded that they
" themſelves would be againſt receiving it, upon
" conditions equally oppoſite to juſtice and the
" honour of the French name.

" IT is therefore my intention, that all thoſe
" who for ſuch a ſeries of years have given me
" proofs of their zeal, in contributing by their
" labour, their property, and their blood, to
" ſupport ſo burdenſome a war, ſhould be in-
" formed, that the only return the enemy pre-
" tended to make to my offers, was a ſuſpenſion
" of arms; which being limited to the ſpace of
" two months, would have procured them much
" greater advantages, than they can expect from
" the confidence they put in their troops. As I
" put mine in the protection of the Almighty,
" and as I hope that the purity of my intentions
" will draw down the Divine Bleſſing upon my

" arms, I am willing that my people within " your juriſdiction ſhould know from you, " that they ſhould already enjoy peace, had it " depended merely on my will to procure them " a bleſſing which they wiſh for with reaſon; but " which muſt be obtained by new efforts, ſince " the immenſe conceſſions I was ready to make, " are of no effect for reſtoring the public tran- " quillity." *Signed* LEWIS, *and counterſigned* COLBERT.

End of the FIRST VOLUME.

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